Omar Sobh
4c32799906
YAML choked on the leading backtick in the description value (line 2 column 14 — the `cargo-audit` inline-code span). Quoting the whole string makes it a scalar, not a tag/anchor. Surfaced by prod server logs after today's compose refresh.
59 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
59 lines
2.9 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: cargo-audit-workflow
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description: "`cargo-audit` (rustsec) — how to run it, triage findings, and integrate into the security template's mission flow."
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when_to_use: You're on a security mission or investigating a RUSTSEC advisory in a Rust project.
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tags: [security, rust, versioned]
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---
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# cargo-audit workflow
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Anchored to **cargo-audit 0.21+** (2026 line) reading the [RustSec Advisory DB](https://rustsec.org/advisories/).
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## Basic usage
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```
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cargo install cargo-audit --locked
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cargo audit # scans Cargo.lock, reports vulnerabilities
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cargo audit fetch # update advisory DB
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cargo audit --deny warnings # non-zero on any warning too (yanked crates, unmaintained)
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```
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CI runs: `cargo audit --deny warnings --json` — JSON output goes to the mission's `mission_artifacts` as a `security_report`.
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## Triage each finding
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For every advisory the report surfaces:
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1. **Is the vulnerable path reachable from OUR code?**
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- `cargo tree -i <cratename>` shows who depends on it.
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- Sometimes a vulnerable transitive dep is only exercised by a feature you don't enable — check the report's `affected_functions`.
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2. **What versions fix it?**
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- The advisory lists `patched_versions`. Try `cargo update -p <crate> --precise <version>` to hop to a patched minor without a semver-major bump.
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- If patched only in a newer major, plan the migration (may be a multi-INT effort).
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3. **Is there a `RUSTSEC` allowlist for a known-false-positive?**
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- `[advisories.ignore]` in `audit.toml` — with a comment explaining WHY and a ticket link + expiry date.
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- Never ignore without expiry; reviewers should re-evaluate quarterly.
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## Common findings + fixes
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- **`RUSTSEC-YYYY-NNNN` on a dev-dep**: less urgent, but fix anyway — dev tools run in CI with elevated permissions.
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- **Yanked crate** — the version was pulled from crates.io. Update immediately; `cargo update -p <crate>` picks the next non-yanked.
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- **Unmaintained crate warning** — no CVE yet, but the maintainer walked away. Long-term: replace. Short-term: pin and document.
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## Integration with the security mission template
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The security-hardening mission runs `cargo audit --json` in the security_scan phase. Each finding becomes a `mission_task` with:
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- `external_id = "RUSTSEC-YYYY-NNNN"`
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- `title = advisory.title`
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- `status = "created"`
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The coding phase picks up each finding as an INT-XX item and applies the fix (bump, replace, or add ignore-with-justification). Emit `COMPLETED: RUSTSEC-YYYY-NNNN` when the follow-up commit lands.
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## Anti-patterns
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- **Silencing an advisory in CI without a fix commit.** Advisories aren't a code style violation — they're a claim your code is exposed. Fix or explicitly accept.
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- **Bumping to a beta version to "fix" it.** Betas can regress. Prefer a patched stable; if none exists, wait or fork.
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- **Running `cargo audit` only in CI, never locally.** Every commit that changes Cargo.lock should trigger a local run.
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