BENCHMARKS.md

@@ -243,6 +243,30 @@ index asked for ~16 000 candidates, where scanning the few hundred or thousand
 allowed records is exact and cheap. Re-ranking a 3k candidate pool and
 confidence rejection add about 3%.
 
+### Signed checkpoints
+
+Measured 2026-09-25 on tank (AMD Ryzen 7 7800X3D). A default store (float16,
+int8 index), 384-dim; each checkpoint rewrites the whole file, as every
+checkpoint does. Medians of five checkpoints and three verifies; three runs
+agreed to within the ranges shown.
+
+```bash
+cargo run --release -p clawhdf5-bench --bin search_harness -- --signing-study --full
+```
+
+| N | checkpoint, unsigned | checkpoint, signed | signing adds | `verify` | file size added |
+|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|
+| 1 000 | 5.4 ms | 6.4 ms | 0.7–1.0 ms | 2.1 ms | 0.03 MiB |
+| 10 000 | 46 ms | 55 ms | 8.1–9.4 ms | 18.6 ms | 0.31 MiB |
+| 100 000 | 495 ms | 598 ms | 89–112 ms | 247 ms | 3.05 MiB |
+
+Signing costs about 20% of a checkpoint: every record is rehashed (SHA-256)
+and the Merkle root recomputed each time; the Ed25519 signature itself is
+microseconds. Caching per-record hashes between checkpoints would cut this to
+the records that changed. The per-record hashes stored for locating edits are
+32 bytes each (4% of a 100K float16 store). `verify` reads and rehashes the
+whole checkpoint.
+
 ### float16 embedding storage (`MemoryConfig::float16`)
 
 Measured 2026-09-23 on tank (AMD Ryzen 7 7800X3D). The same clustered

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@
 ## Unreleased
 
 ### Upgrade Notes
+- **Breaking:** `MemoryError` is now `#[non_exhaustive]` and gained
+  `SigningKeyRequired`; a `match` on it needs a wildcard arm. Future variants
+  will no longer be breaking.
+- **Breaking:** `clawhdf5-agent`'s `agent` feature is removed. It enabled
+  nothing — the agent layer is always built — but the README and guides told
+  people to pass it; drop `agent` from `features = [...]`.
 - **`clawhdf5-migrate` now writes a real agent store.** Its output used to be
   a layout of its own (`/chunks`, `/sessions`, `/entities`, `/relations`, no
   `/meta`) that `HDF5Memory::open` rejected, so a migrated file could not be
@@ -57,6 +63,29 @@
   `quantized_index = false`, or pass `create --f32-index` to the CLI, to opt
   out. The CLI's `--quantized-index` is still accepted but is now a no-op.
 
+### Signing
+- `clawhdf5-agent`: **Ed25519-signed checkpoints** — the README's
+  "cryptographically verifiable memory", now true. With
+  `HDF5Memory::set_signing_key(key)`, every checkpoint stores a signed
+  manifest: a SHA-256 per record (text, embedding as stored, channel,
+  timestamp, session, tags, deleted flag, activation) in a Merkle tree, plus
+  hashes of the settings (and WAL mark), sessions and knowledge graph, with
+  the per-record hashes in `/integrity/record_hashes`.
+  `HDF5Memory::verify(path, &public_key)` recomputes everything from the file
+  and reports which part changed and which records (`changed_records`); a
+  forged manifest fails the signature. The key is never persisted; a signed
+  store refuses to checkpoint without it (`MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired`),
+  and `remove_signature()` is the deliberate way back to unsigned. Saves still
+  in the WAL are not covered (`wal_entries_unsigned`). Tests include every
+  kind of edit, and an edit made with h5py in place, which verify pinpoints.
+  Cost: ~20% of a checkpoint, 32 bytes per record (`BENCHMARKS.md`, "Signed
+  checkpoints"). New dependencies `ed25519-dalek`, `sha2`, `rand_core` — pure
+  Rust; the no-C check still passes.
+- `clawhdf5-cli`: `keygen --out <file>` (owner-only key file),
+  `--signing-key <file>` / `CLAWHDF5_SIGNING_KEY` on writing commands
+  (`create` signs immediately), `verify --public-key <hex|file>` (JSON report;
+  exit status 2 if not valid), and `signed` in `create`/`stats` output.
+
 ### Migration
 - `clawhdf5-migrate`: writes through the agent's own API (`HDF5Memory::create`
   / `open`, `save_batch`, the session cache and knowledge graph), so there is

CLAUDE.md

@@ -109,6 +109,17 @@ Cargo workspace with 16 crates under `crates/` (plus `libaec-sys`, an internal F
   `search_harness --options-study`.
 - `MemoryConfig::compression` is off by default; when on, embeddings are
   deflate-compressed, or Zstd with the agent's `zstd` feature (links libzstd).
+- Signed checkpoints (`clawhdf5-agent` `signing` module): with
+  `HDF5Memory::set_signing_key` every checkpoint stores an Ed25519-signed
+  manifest (SHA-256 per record in a Merkle tree + settings/sessions/graph
+  hashes; per-record hashes in `/integrity/record_hashes`);
+  `HDF5Memory::verify(path, &pk)` locates edits. The hashes must cover exactly
+  what the file persists in the form the loader returns it (strings lose
+  trailing NULs; an empty WAL mark is not written) or untouched stores stop
+  verifying — `tests/signed_store.rs` round-trips awkward strings. The key is
+  never persisted; a signed store refuses to checkpoint without it
+  (`MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired`, and `MemoryError` is `#[non_exhaustive]`).
+  WAL entries after the checkpoint are not covered.
 - `Dataset::verify_provenance()` (clawhdf5 facade, `provenance` feature, on by
   default) recomputes a dataset's SHA-256 and compares it against the
   `_provenance_sha256` attribute written automatically on save when

README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 [![LongMemEval](https://img.shields.io/badge/LongMemEval__s-Turn--Level%20Hit@5%2081.4%25%20hybrid-blue.svg)](BENCHMARKS.md#longmemeval-results)
 [![Footprint](https://img.shields.io/badge/on--disk-~820%20B%2Frecord%20float16%2C%20synthetic%20text-lightgrey.svg)](BENCHMARKS.md#memory-footprint-1)
 
-ClawHDF5 is a pure-Rust HDF5 implementation combined with a research-grade agent memory engine. It gives AI agents persistent, searchable, integrity-checked memory — all stored in a single portable file.
+ClawHDF5 is a pure-Rust HDF5 implementation combined with a research-grade agent memory engine. It gives AI agents persistent, searchable, cryptographically verifiable memory (Ed25519-signed checkpoints) — all stored in a single portable file.
 
 > **Two things live here:**
 > - **A general-purpose, pure-Rust HDF5 library** — zero C dependencies, NetCDF-4 support, SIMD/GPU acceleration. See the **[Crate Map](#crate-map)** and **[BENCHMARKS.md](BENCHMARKS.md)** for the libhdf5 head-to-head numbers.
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ Every AI agent needs memory. Today that means scattered Markdown files, SQLite d
 | Memory consolidation | Manual pruning | Hippocampal-inspired automatic tiers |
 | Temporal queries | Custom code | Native temporal index (622 ns range query over 10K) |
 | Multi-modal | Multiple stores | Unified cross-modal search (exact scan: 842 µs over 1K records) |
-| Integrity | Hope for the best | Chained-CRC WAL, checksummed chunk indexes, write-anomaly alerts, opt-in SHA-256 dataset provenance |
+| Integrity | Hope for the best | Ed25519-signed checkpoints that pinpoint any edited record, chained-CRC WAL, checksummed chunk indexes, write-anomaly alerts |
 | Portability | Config + DB + files | **One `.h5` file. Copy it anywhere.** |
 
 ---
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ directly; the store persists the records, sessions and graph they work over.
 | **`confidence`** | Low-confidence rejection — suppresses spurious recalls when nothing matches. Opt-in via `SearchOptions::with_confidence`; on in the OpenClaw backend |
 | **`temporal`** | Sorted timestamp index, session DAG, entity timeline, temporal query hints |
 | **`multimodal`** | Cross-modal search across text/image/audio/video embeddings |
+| **`signing`** | Ed25519-signed checkpoints: SHA-256 per record in a Merkle tree, plus hashes of settings, sessions and the knowledge graph; `HDF5Memory::verify` names any edited record |
 | **`provenance`** | Source attribution and an unkeyed FNV-1a content hash per record, held in memory for the session, for detecting accidental corruption (not tamper-proof) |
 | **`anomaly`** | Write rate limiting, 15 injection-pattern detectors, source-distribution analysis. Alerts never block a save; drain them with `take_anomaly_alerts` |
 | **`openclaw`** | OpenClaw integration: MemoryBackend trait, Markdown ↔ HDF5 conversion |
@@ -457,6 +458,35 @@ let careful = memory.search(
 );
 ```
 
+### Signed Checkpoints
+
+```rust
+use clawhdf5_agent::signing;
+
+// Once, somewhere safe: keep the secret key, publish the public key.
+let key = signing::generate_key();
+let public = key.verifying_key();
+
+// Every checkpoint is signed from now on. The key is never written to disk;
+// a signed store refuses to checkpoint without it.
+memory.set_signing_key(key);
+memory.flush_wal()?;
+
+// Anyone holding the public key can check the file, e.g. after copying it.
+let report = HDF5Memory::verify(std::path::Path::new("agent.h5"), &public)?;
+assert!(report.is_valid());
+// On a tampered file: report.changed_records lists the records that differ.
+```
+
+The signature covers every record (text, embedding as stored, channel,
+timestamp, session, tags, deleted flag, activation), the store's settings,
+its sessions and its knowledge graph — a change made with any tool is caught.
+It covers checkpoints, not saves still in the WAL
+(`report.wal_entries_unsigned` counts those). CLI: `clawhdf5-cli keygen`,
+`--signing-key <file>` on writing commands, and `verify --public-key`.
+Signing adds about 20% to a checkpoint and 32 bytes per record to the file
+([BENCHMARKS.md § Signed checkpoints](BENCHMARKS.md#signed-checkpoints)).
+
 ### Knowledge Graph
 
 ```rust
@@ -615,7 +645,6 @@ ClawhDF5's agent memory design draws from 15+ recent papers:
 | `openblas` | no | OpenBLAS (Linux) |
 | `gpu` | no | GPU search via wgpu |
 | `async` | no | Tokio async with background flush |
-| `agent` | no | Reserved; currently enables nothing (the agent layer is always built) |
 
 To opt out of the parallel build: `--no-default-features --features float16,hnsw`.
 For an exact linear cosine scan instead of HNSW: `--no-default-features --features float16`.

crates/clawhdf5-agent/Cargo.toml

@@ -19,6 +19,10 @@ clawhdf5-ann = { path = "../clawhdf5-ann", version = "2.7.0", optional = true }
 clawhdf5-gpu = { path = "../clawhdf5-gpu", version = "2.7.0", optional = true, default-features = false }
 serde = { workspace = true }
 byteorder = "1"
+# Signed checkpoints (MemoryConfig-independent; see `signing`). Pure Rust.
+ed25519-dalek = { version = "2", features = ["rand_core"] }
+sha2 = "0.10"
+rand_core = { version = "0.6", features = ["getrandom"] }
 half = { workspace = true, optional = true }
 rayon = { version = "1", optional = true }
 matrixmultiply = { version = "0.3", optional = true }
@@ -64,7 +68,6 @@ zstd = ["clawhdf5/zstd"]
 # `--no-default-features` (plus re-enabling other defaults) to force the exact
 # linear cosine scan.
 hnsw = ["clawhdf5-ann"]
-agent = []
 gpu = ["clawhdf5-gpu/gpu-wgpu"]
 fast-math = ["matrixmultiply"]
 accelerate = ["accelerate-src", "cblas-sys"]

crates/clawhdf5-agent/src/lib.rs

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ pub mod reranker;
 pub mod schema;
 pub mod search;
 pub mod session;
+pub mod signing;
 pub mod storage;
 mod store_lock;
 pub mod temporal;
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ pub use session::{SessionCache, SessionEntry};
 // --- Error type ---
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
+#[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum MemoryError {
     Io(std::io::Error),
     Hdf5(String),
@@ -88,6 +90,11 @@ pub enum MemoryError {
     /// A record the store cannot hold as given, e.g. an embedding value
     /// outside the half-precision range of a `float16` store.
     InvalidEntry(String),
+    /// The store's checkpoints are signed and no signing key is set, so a
+    /// checkpoint would leave it unsigned. Set the key with
+    /// [`HDF5Memory::set_signing_key`], or drop the signature on purpose with
+    /// [`HDF5Memory::remove_signature`].
+    SigningKeyRequired(String),
 }
 
 impl std::fmt::Display for MemoryError {
@@ -99,6 +106,7 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for MemoryError {
             MemoryError::NotFound(e) => write!(f, "not found: {e}"),
             MemoryError::Locked(e) => write!(f, "store is locked: {e}"),
             MemoryError::InvalidEntry(e) => write!(f, "invalid entry: {e}"),
+            MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired(e) => write!(f, "signing key required: {e}"),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -317,6 +325,12 @@ pub struct HDF5Memory {
     activations_dirty: bool,
     /// Opened with [`HDF5Memory::open_read_only`]: nothing may reach the disk.
     read_only: bool,
+    /// Key that signs every checkpoint; never persisted. See
+    /// [`HDF5Memory::set_signing_key`].
+    signing_key: Option<signing::SigningKey>,
+    /// Checkpoints of this store are signed: the file on disk is, or a key
+    /// has been set. A checkpoint without a key is then refused.
+    signed: bool,
     /// A WAL that `open()` could not read and moved aside; see
     /// [`HDF5Memory::quarantined_wal`].
     quarantined_wal: Option<PathBuf>,
@@ -372,6 +386,8 @@ impl HDF5Memory {
             bm25_filter: bm25::TokenFilter::default(),
             activations_dirty: false,
             read_only: false,
+            signing_key: None,
+            signed: false,
             quarantined_wal: None,
             _lock: Some(lock),
         })
@@ -550,6 +566,8 @@ impl HDF5Memory {
             bm25_filter: bm25::TokenFilter::default(),
             activations_dirty: false,
             read_only,
+            signing_key: None,
+            signed: checkpoint.signed,
             quarantined_wal,
             _lock: lock,
         })
@@ -710,6 +728,39 @@ impl HDF5Memory {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Sign every checkpoint from now on with `key` (Ed25519). The key is
+    /// never written anywhere; set it again after every `open`. Once a store
+    /// is signed, a checkpoint without the key is refused
+    /// ([`MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired`]) rather than silently leaving it
+    /// unsigned. Setting a different key re-signs the store under that key
+    /// from the next checkpoint; a verifier trusting the old key will then
+    /// reject it, which is the point. Call [`AgentMemory::flush_wal`] to sign
+    /// right away.
+    pub fn set_signing_key(&mut self, key: signing::SigningKey) {
+        self.signing_key = Some(key);
+        self.signed = true;
+    }
+
+    /// Stop signing: the next checkpoint writes the store unsigned. The
+    /// deliberate way out of [`MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired`].
+    pub fn remove_signature(&mut self) {
+        self.signing_key = None;
+        self.signed = false;
+    }
+
+    /// Checkpoints of this store are signed (on disk, or from the next
+    /// checkpoint because a key has been set).
+    pub fn is_signed(&self) -> bool {
+        self.signed
+    }
+
+    /// Check the checkpoint at `path` against the public key the caller
+    /// trusts; see [`signing::verify_store`]. Reads the file only: it works
+    /// on a store another process has open.
+    pub fn verify(path: &Path, trusted: &signing::VerifyingKey) -> Result<signing::VerifyReport> {
+        signing::verify_store(path, trusted)
+    }
+
     /// Flush current state to disk and truncate the WAL.
     ///
     /// Every code path that persists the full cache to the .h5 file must
@@ -725,10 +776,28 @@ impl HDF5Memory {
         // Record which WAL prefix this checkpoint contains, so a crash before
         // the truncate below can't replay those entries a second time.
         let wal_applied = self.wal.as_ref().map(|w| w.mark());
+        let signature = match &self.signing_key {
+            Some(key) => Some(signing::sign(
+                key,
+                &self.config,
+                &self.cache,
+                &self.sessions,
+                &self.knowledge,
+                wal_applied,
+            )),
+            None if self.signed => {
+                return Err(MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired(format!(
+                    "{} is signed; set its signing key before a checkpoint \
+                     (saves so far are held in the WAL or in memory)",
+                    self.config.path.display()
+                )));
+            }
+            None => None,
+        };
         // Written before the .h5 so a crash in between leaves a sidecar whose
         // generation matches no checkpoint (ignored), never the reverse.
         let ann_generation = self.persist_vector_index();
-        storage::write_to_disk_with_meta(
+        storage::write_to_disk_signed(
             &self.config.path,
             &self.config,
             &self.cache,
@@ -737,7 +806,9 @@ impl HDF5Memory {
             &schema::CheckpointMeta {
                 wal_applied,
                 ann_generation,
+                signed: signature.is_some(),
             },
+            signature.as_ref(),
         )?;
         if let Some(ref mut w) = self.wal {
             w.truncate()?;

crates/clawhdf5-agent/src/schema.rs

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ pub const ZEROCLAW_VERSION: &str = "0.8.0";
 const WAL_APPLIED_LEN_ATTR: &str = "wal_applied_len";
 const WAL_APPLIED_CRC_ATTR: &str = "wal_applied_crc";
 const ANN_GENERATION_ATTR: &str = "ann_generation";
+const SIG_VERSION_ATTR: &str = "sig_version";
 
 /// Build a complete HDF5 file from the in-memory state.
 pub fn build_hdf5_file(
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ pub fn build_hdf5_file_with_mark(
 ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, MemoryError> {
     let meta = CheckpointMeta {
         wal_applied,
-        ann_generation: None,
+        ..CheckpointMeta::default()
     };
     build_hdf5_file_with_meta(config, cache, sessions, knowledge, &meta)
 }
@@ -61,6 +62,10 @@ pub struct CheckpointMeta {
     /// one left over from another checkpoint can never be attached to records
     /// it wasn't built from.
     pub ann_generation: Option<u64>,
+    /// The checkpoint carries an Ed25519 signature (see [`crate::signing`]).
+    /// Read-only: whether a checkpoint is *written* signed is decided by the
+    /// signature passed to [`build_hdf5_file_signed`].
+    pub signed: bool,
 }
 
 /// [`build_hdf5_file`] with checkpoint bookkeeping.
@@ -70,6 +75,19 @@ pub fn build_hdf5_file_with_meta(
     sessions: &SessionCache,
     knowledge: &KnowledgeCache,
     checkpoint: &CheckpointMeta,
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>, MemoryError> {
+    build_hdf5_file_signed(config, cache, sessions, knowledge, checkpoint, None)
+}
+
+/// [`build_hdf5_file_with_meta`], plus a signed manifest of the contents
+/// (see [`crate::signing`]).
+pub fn build_hdf5_file_signed(
+    config: &MemoryConfig,
+    cache: &MemoryCache,
+    sessions: &SessionCache,
+    knowledge: &KnowledgeCache,
+    checkpoint: &CheckpointMeta,
+    signature: Option<&crate::signing::StoredSignature>,
 ) -> Result<Vec<u8>, MemoryError> {
     let wal_applied = checkpoint.wal_applied;
     let mut builder = clawhdf5::FileBuilder::new();
@@ -130,11 +148,42 @@ pub fn build_hdf5_file_with_meta(
         // round trip through every reader.
         meta.set_attr(ANN_GENERATION_ATTR, AttrValue::I64(generation as i64));
     }
+    if let Some(sig) = signature {
+        use crate::signing::to_hex;
+        let m = &sig.manifest;
+        meta.set_attr(
+            SIG_VERSION_ATTR,
+            AttrValue::I64(crate::signing::MANIFEST_VERSION),
+        );
+        meta.set_attr("sig_algorithm", AttrValue::String("ed25519".into()));
+        meta.set_attr("sig_public_key", AttrValue::String(to_hex(&sig.public_key)));
+        meta.set_attr("sig_signature", AttrValue::String(to_hex(&sig.signature)));
+        meta.set_attr("sig_record_count", AttrValue::I64(m.record_count as i64));
+        meta.set_attr(
+            "sig_records_root",
+            AttrValue::String(to_hex(&m.records_root)),
+        );
+        meta.set_attr("sig_settings", AttrValue::String(to_hex(&m.settings)));
+        meta.set_attr("sig_sessions", AttrValue::String(to_hex(&m.sessions)));
+        meta.set_attr("sig_graph", AttrValue::String(to_hex(&m.graph)));
+    }
     // Need at least one dataset in the group for it to be a proper group
     meta.create_dataset("_marker").with_u8_data(&[1]).compact();
     let finished_meta = meta.finish();
     builder.add_group(finished_meta);
 
+    // /integrity: the signed per-record hashes, so verification can say
+    // which records changed.
+    if let Some(sig) = signature {
+        let mut group = builder.create_group("integrity");
+        let flat: Vec<u8> = sig.record_hashes.iter().flatten().copied().collect();
+        group
+            .create_dataset("record_hashes")
+            .with_u8_data(&flat)
+            .with_shape(&[sig.record_hashes.len() as u64, 32]);
+        builder.add_group(group.finish());
+    }
+
     // /memory group
     build_memory_group(&mut builder, config, cache)?;
 
@@ -440,6 +489,64 @@ pub fn read_wal_mark(file: &clawhdf5::File) -> Option<WalMark> {
     Some(WalMark { len, crc })
 }
 
+/// Read a checkpoint's signature, if it has one. A signature whose
+/// attributes are present but malformed is an error, not "unsigned".
+pub fn read_signature(
+    file: &clawhdf5::File,
+) -> Result<Option<crate::signing::StoredSignature>, MemoryError> {
+    use crate::signing::{Manifest, StoredSignature, from_hex};
+    let attrs = file
+        .group("meta")
+        .and_then(|g| g.attrs())
+        .map_err(|e| MemoryError::Schema(format!("cannot read /meta attrs: {e}")))?;
+    let version = match attrs.get(SIG_VERSION_ATTR) {
+        None => return Ok(None),
+        Some(AttrValue::I64(v)) => *v,
+        Some(_) => return Err(MemoryError::Schema("malformed sig_version".into())),
+    };
+    if version != crate::signing::MANIFEST_VERSION {
+        return Err(MemoryError::Schema(format!(
+            "unsupported signature version {version}"
+        )));
+    }
+    fn hex<const N: usize>(
+        attrs: &std::collections::HashMap<String, AttrValue>,
+        name: &str,
+    ) -> Result<[u8; N], MemoryError> {
+        match attrs.get(name) {
+            Some(AttrValue::String(s)) => from_hex::<N>(s),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+        .ok_or_else(|| MemoryError::Schema(format!("malformed or missing {name}")))
+    }
+    let record_count = match attrs.get("sig_record_count") {
+        Some(AttrValue::I64(v)) if *v >= 0 => *v as u64,
+        _ => return Err(MemoryError::Schema("malformed sig_record_count".into())),
+    };
+    let group = file
+        .group("integrity")
+        .map_err(|e| MemoryError::Schema(format!("signed checkpoint without /integrity: {e}")))?;
+    let flat = read_u8_dataset(&group, "record_hashes")?;
+    if flat.len() % 32 != 0 {
+        return Err(MemoryError::Schema(
+            "/integrity/record_hashes is not a whole number of hashes".into(),
+        ));
+    }
+    let record_hashes = flat.as_chunks::<32>().0.to_vec();
+    Ok(Some(StoredSignature {
+        manifest: Manifest {
+            record_count,
+            records_root: hex::<32>(&attrs, "sig_records_root")?,
+            settings: hex::<32>(&attrs, "sig_settings")?,
+            sessions: hex::<32>(&attrs, "sig_sessions")?,
+            graph: hex::<32>(&attrs, "sig_graph")?,
+        },
+        record_hashes,
+        public_key: hex::<32>(&attrs, "sig_public_key")?,
+        signature: hex::<64>(&attrs, "sig_signature")?,
+    }))
+}
+
 /// Read the checkpoint bookkeeping from `/meta`.
 pub fn read_checkpoint_meta(file: &clawhdf5::File) -> CheckpointMeta {
     let ann_generation = file
@@ -450,9 +557,14 @@ pub fn read_checkpoint_meta(file: &clawhdf5::File) -> CheckpointMeta {
             Some(AttrValue::I64(v)) => Some(*v as u64),
             _ => None,
         });
+    let signed = file
+        .group("meta")
+        .and_then(|g| g.attrs())
+        .is_ok_and(|attrs| attrs.contains_key(SIG_VERSION_ATTR));
     CheckpointMeta {
         wal_applied: read_wal_mark(file),
         ann_generation,
+        signed,
     }
 }
 

crates/clawhdf5-agent/src/signing.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+//! Ed25519-signed checkpoints.
+//!
+//! When a signing key is set ([`crate::HDF5Memory::set_signing_key`]), every
+//! checkpoint writes a signed manifest of the store: a SHA-256 per memory
+//! record rolled into a Merkle root, plus hashes of the store's settings, its
+//! sessions and its knowledge graph. [`verify_store`] recomputes all of it from
+//! the file and checks the signature against a public key the caller trusts,
+//! so any change to the checkpointed file — a record's text or embedding, a
+//! setting, a session, a graph edge, made through this crate or any other HDF5
+//! tool — is detected, and the per-record hashes say which records changed.
+//!
+//! What it does not cover: saves still only in the WAL (made since the last
+//! checkpoint). [`VerifyReport::wal_entries_unsigned`] counts them.
+//!
+//! The hashes cover exactly what the file persists, in the form the loader
+//! returns it, so a store verifies after any number of reopen/checkpoint
+//! cycles. Derived data (L2 norms, the vector index) is not covered; it is
+//! recomputed from covered data.
+
+use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, Verifier};
+pub use ed25519_dalek::{SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+
+use crate::MemoryConfig;
+use crate::cache::MemoryCache;
+use crate::knowledge::KnowledgeCache;
+use crate::session::SessionCache;
+use crate::wal::WalMark;
+
+/// Version of the manifest encoding; part of what is signed.
+pub const MANIFEST_VERSION: i64 = 1;
+
+type Hash = [u8; 32];
+
+/// The hashes a signature covers.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Manifest {
+    pub record_count: u64,
+    /// Merkle root over the per-record hashes.
+    pub records_root: Hash,
+    /// Settings persisted in `/meta`, plus the checkpoint's WAL mark.
+    pub settings: Hash,
+    pub sessions: Hash,
+    pub graph: Hash,
+}
+
+impl Manifest {
+    /// The exact bytes that are signed.
+    pub fn signed_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let mut m = Vec::with_capacity(160);
+        m.extend_from_slice(b"clawhdf5-agent signed checkpoint\0");
+        m.extend_from_slice(&MANIFEST_VERSION.to_le_bytes());
+        m.extend_from_slice(&self.record_count.to_le_bytes());
+        m.extend_from_slice(&self.records_root);
+        m.extend_from_slice(&self.settings);
+        m.extend_from_slice(&self.sessions);
+        m.extend_from_slice(&self.graph);
+        m
+    }
+}
+
+/// A signature as stored in a checkpoint.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct StoredSignature {
+    pub manifest: Manifest,
+    pub record_hashes: Vec<Hash>,
+    pub public_key: [u8; 32],
+    pub signature: [u8; 64],
+}
+
+/// Build the manifest (and per-record hashes) for the state about to be
+/// checkpointed, and sign it.
+pub fn sign(
+    key: &SigningKey,
+    config: &MemoryConfig,
+    cache: &MemoryCache,
+    sessions: &SessionCache,
+    knowledge: &KnowledgeCache,
+    wal_applied: Option<WalMark>,
+) -> StoredSignature {
+    let (manifest, record_hashes) = manifest(config, cache, sessions, knowledge, wal_applied);
+    let signature = key.sign(&manifest.signed_bytes()).to_bytes();
+    StoredSignature {
+        manifest,
+        record_hashes,
+        public_key: key.verifying_key().to_bytes(),
+        signature,
+    }
+}
+
+/// Compute the manifest of a store's state.
+pub fn manifest(
+    config: &MemoryConfig,
+    cache: &MemoryCache,
+    sessions: &SessionCache,
+    knowledge: &KnowledgeCache,
+    wal_applied: Option<WalMark>,
+) -> (Manifest, Vec<Hash>) {
+    let record_hashes: Vec<Hash> = (0..cache.len()).map(|i| record_hash(cache, i)).collect();
+    let manifest = Manifest {
+        record_count: cache.len() as u64,
+        records_root: merkle_root(&record_hashes),
+        settings: settings_hash(config, wal_applied),
+        sessions: sessions_hash(sessions),
+        graph: graph_hash(knowledge),
+    };
+    (manifest, record_hashes)
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Canonical encoding
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// A SHA-256 over length-prefixed fields, so no two different field lists
+/// hash the same bytes.
+struct Fields(Sha256);
+
+impl Fields {
+    fn new(domain: &str) -> Self {
+        let mut h = Sha256::new();
+        h.update((domain.len() as u64).to_le_bytes());
+        h.update(domain.as_bytes());
+        Self(h)
+    }
+    fn bytes(&mut self, b: &[u8]) -> &mut Self {
+        self.0.update((b.len() as u64).to_le_bytes());
+        self.0.update(b);
+        self
+    }
+    /// Strings as the loader returns them: stored null-padded, so a trailing
+    /// NUL cannot survive a round trip and must not be part of the hash.
+    fn str(&mut self, s: &str) -> &mut Self {
+        self.bytes(s.trim_end_matches('\0').as_bytes())
+    }
+    fn u64(&mut self, v: u64) -> &mut Self {
+        self.0.update(v.to_le_bytes());
+        self
+    }
+    fn f64(&mut self, v: f64) -> &mut Self {
+        self.0.update(v.to_bits().to_le_bytes());
+        self
+    }
+    fn f32(&mut self, v: f32) -> &mut Self {
+        self.0.update(v.to_bits().to_le_bytes());
+        self
+    }
+    fn finish(self) -> Hash {
+        self.0.finalize().into()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Everything persisted about record `i`, including its position. The
+/// embedding is hashed as the cache holds it — for a `float16` store that is
+/// the half-rounded value the file holds.
+fn record_hash(cache: &MemoryCache, i: usize) -> Hash {
+    let mut f = Fields::new("clawhdf5-agent/record");
+    f.u64(i as u64).str(&cache.chunks[i]);
+    let emb: Vec<u8> = cache.embeddings[i]
+        .iter()
+        .flat_map(|v| v.to_bits().to_le_bytes())
+        .collect();
+    f.bytes(&emb)
+        .str(&cache.source_channels[i])
+        .f64(cache.timestamps[i])
+        .str(&cache.session_ids[i])
+        .str(&cache.tags[i])
+        .u64(u64::from(cache.tombstones[i]))
+        .f32(cache.activation_weights[i]);
+    f.finish()
+}
+
+/// Binary Merkle tree: leaves are the record hashes; a parent hashes its two
+/// children with a node prefix; an odd node is carried up unchanged.
+fn merkle_root(leaves: &[Hash]) -> Hash {
+    if leaves.is_empty() {
+        return Fields::new("clawhdf5-agent/merkle-empty").finish();
+    }
+    let mut level: Vec<Hash> = leaves.to_vec();
+    while level.len() > 1 {
+        level = level
+            .chunks(2)
+            .map(|pair| match pair {
+                [l, r] => {
+                    let mut h = Sha256::new();
+                    h.update([1u8]);
+                    h.update(l);
+                    h.update(r);
+                    h.finalize().into()
+                }
+                [only] => *only,
+                _ => unreachable!(),
+            })
+            .collect();
+    }
+    level[0]
+}
+
+fn settings_hash(c: &MemoryConfig, wal_applied: Option<WalMark>) -> Hash {
+    let mut f = Fields::new("clawhdf5-agent/settings");
+    f.str(crate::schema::SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        .str(&c.created_at)
+        .str(&c.agent_id)
+        .str(&c.embedder)
+        .u64(c.embedding_dim as u64)
+        .u64(c.chunk_size as u64)
+        .u64(c.overlap as u64)
+        .u64(u64::from(c.float16))
+        .u64(u64::from(c.compression))
+        .u64(u64::from(c.compression_level))
+        .f32(c.compact_threshold)
+        .f32(c.hebbian_boost)
+        .f32(c.decay_factor)
+        .u64(u64::from(c.wal_enabled))
+        .u64(c.wal_max_entries as u64)
+        .u64(u64::from(c.quantized_index))
+        .u64(c.hnsw_m as u64)
+        .u64(c.hnsw_ef_construction as u64)
+        .u64(c.hnsw_ef_search as u64);
+    // An empty mark is not written to the file, so it must hash as none.
+    match wal_applied.filter(|m| m.len > 0) {
+        Some(m) => f.u64(1).u64(m.len).u64(u64::from(m.crc)),
+        None => f.u64(0),
+    };
+    f.finish()
+}
+
+fn sessions_hash(s: &SessionCache) -> Hash {
+    let mut f = Fields::new("clawhdf5-agent/sessions");
+    f.u64(s.entries.len() as u64);
+    for (i, e) in s.entries.iter().enumerate() {
+        f.str(&e.id)
+            .u64(e.start_idx)
+            .u64(e.end_idx)
+            .str(&e.channel)
+            .f64(e.ts)
+            .str(s.summaries.get(i).map(String::as_str).unwrap_or(""));
+    }
+    f.finish()
+}
+
+fn graph_hash(k: &KnowledgeCache) -> Hash {
+    let mut f = Fields::new("clawhdf5-agent/graph");
+    f.u64(k.entities.len() as u64);
+    for e in &k.entities {
+        f.u64(e.id)
+            .str(&e.name)
+            .str(&e.entity_type)
+            .u64(e.embedding_idx as u64);
+    }
+    f.u64(k.relations.len() as u64);
+    for r in &k.relations {
+        f.u64(r.src)
+            .u64(r.tgt)
+            .str(&r.relation)
+            .f32(r.weight)
+            .f64(r.ts);
+    }
+    f.u64(k.alias_strings.len() as u64);
+    for (s, id) in k.alias_strings.iter().zip(&k.alias_entity_ids) {
+        f.str(s).u64(*id as u64);
+    }
+    f.finish()
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Verification
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// The outcome of [`verify_store`].
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct VerifyReport {
+    /// The checkpoint carries a signature.
+    pub signed: bool,
+    /// The signature was made by the key the caller trusts.
+    pub key_matches: bool,
+    /// The signature over the stored manifest is valid.
+    pub signature_valid: bool,
+    /// The file's current contents match the signed manifest.
+    pub records_match: bool,
+    pub settings_match: bool,
+    pub sessions_match: bool,
+    pub graph_match: bool,
+    /// Records whose contents differ from what was signed (by position),
+    /// when the stored per-record hashes are themselves authentic.
+    pub changed_records: Vec<usize>,
+    /// Records in the file versus in the signed manifest.
+    pub record_count: u64,
+    pub signed_record_count: u64,
+    /// The public key the checkpoint claims to be signed by.
+    pub public_key: Option<[u8; 32]>,
+    /// Saves in the WAL after the checkpoint: not covered by the signature.
+    pub wal_entries_unsigned: usize,
+}
+
+impl VerifyReport {
+    /// Signed by the trusted key, signature valid, and every part of the
+    /// file unchanged since it was signed.
+    pub fn is_valid(&self) -> bool {
+        self.signed
+            && self.key_matches
+            && self.signature_valid
+            && self.records_match
+            && self.settings_match
+            && self.sessions_match
+            && self.graph_match
+    }
+}
+
+/// Check a store file against the public key the caller trusts.
+///
+/// Reads the checkpoint (not the WAL), recomputes every hash from its
+/// contents and checks the signature. Never writes.
+pub fn verify_store(
+    path: &std::path::Path,
+    trusted: &VerifyingKey,
+) -> Result<VerifyReport, crate::MemoryError> {
+    let file = clawhdf5::File::open(path)
+        .map_err(|e| crate::MemoryError::Hdf5(format!("cannot open {}: {e}", path.display())))?;
+    let (config, cache, sessions, knowledge) = crate::schema::validate_and_load(&file)?;
+    let checkpoint = crate::schema::read_checkpoint_meta(&file);
+    let stored = crate::schema::read_signature(&file)?;
+    let wal_entries_unsigned = count_wal_entries_after(path, checkpoint.wal_applied);
+
+    let (current, current_hashes) = manifest(
+        &config,
+        &cache,
+        &sessions,
+        &knowledge,
+        checkpoint.wal_applied,
+    );
+
+    let Some(stored) = stored else {
+        return Ok(VerifyReport {
+            signed: false,
+            key_matches: false,
+            signature_valid: false,
+            records_match: false,
+            settings_match: false,
+            sessions_match: false,
+            graph_match: false,
+            changed_records: Vec::new(),
+            record_count: current.record_count,
+            signed_record_count: 0,
+            public_key: None,
+            wal_entries_unsigned,
+        });
+    };
+
+    let key_matches = stored.public_key == trusted.to_bytes();
+    let signature_valid = trusted
+        .verify(
+            &stored.manifest.signed_bytes(),
+            &Signature::from_bytes(&stored.signature),
+        )
+        .is_ok();
+    // The stored per-record hashes can localise a change only if they are
+    // the ones that were signed.
+    let hashes_authentic = signature_valid
+        && stored.record_hashes.len() as u64 == stored.manifest.record_count
+        && merkle_root(&stored.record_hashes) == stored.manifest.records_root;
+    let changed_records = if hashes_authentic {
+        let n = current_hashes.len().max(stored.record_hashes.len());
+        (0..n)
+            .filter(|&i| current_hashes.get(i) != stored.record_hashes.get(i))
+            .collect()
+    } else {
+        Vec::new()
+    };
+
+    Ok(VerifyReport {
+        signed: true,
+        key_matches,
+        signature_valid,
+        records_match: signature_valid
+            && current.record_count == stored.manifest.record_count
+            && current.records_root == stored.manifest.records_root,
+        settings_match: signature_valid && current.settings == stored.manifest.settings,
+        sessions_match: signature_valid && current.sessions == stored.manifest.sessions,
+        graph_match: signature_valid && current.graph == stored.manifest.graph,
+        changed_records,
+        record_count: current.record_count,
+        signed_record_count: stored.manifest.record_count,
+        public_key: Some(stored.public_key),
+        wal_entries_unsigned,
+    })
+}
+
+fn count_wal_entries_after(store: &std::path::Path, mark: Option<WalMark>) -> usize {
+    let wal = store.with_extension("h5.wal");
+    if !wal.exists() {
+        return 0;
+    }
+    crate::wal::WalFile::read_entries_for_migration(&wal, mark)
+        .map(|e| e.len())
+        .unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
+/// A new random signing key from the operating system's RNG.
+pub fn generate_key() -> SigningKey {
+    SigningKey::generate(&mut rand_core::OsRng)
+}
+
+/// Hex encoding for keys and signatures in attributes and the CLI.
+pub fn to_hex(bytes: &[u8]) -> String {
+    bytes.iter().map(|b| format!("{b:02x}")).collect()
+}
+
+/// Parse hex into exactly `N` bytes.
+pub fn from_hex<const N: usize>(s: &str) -> Option<[u8; N]> {
+    let s = s.trim();
+    if s.len() != 2 * N {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut out = [0u8; N];
+    for (i, byte) in out.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+        *byte = u8::from_str_radix(&s[2 * i..2 * i + 2], 16).ok()?;
+    }
+    Some(out)
+}

crates/clawhdf5-agent/src/storage.rs

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ pub fn write_to_disk_with_mark(
 ) -> Result<(), MemoryError> {
     let meta = schema::CheckpointMeta {
         wal_applied,
-        ann_generation: None,
+        ..schema::CheckpointMeta::default()
     };
     write_to_disk_with_meta(path, config, cache, sessions, knowledge, &meta)
 }
@@ -50,7 +50,21 @@ pub fn write_to_disk_with_meta(
     knowledge: &KnowledgeCache,
     checkpoint: &schema::CheckpointMeta,
 ) -> Result<(), MemoryError> {
-    let bytes = schema::build_hdf5_file_with_meta(config, cache, sessions, knowledge, checkpoint)?;
+    write_to_disk_signed(path, config, cache, sessions, knowledge, checkpoint, None)
+}
+
+/// [`write_to_disk_with_meta`] with a signed manifest of the contents.
+pub fn write_to_disk_signed(
+    path: &Path,
+    config: &MemoryConfig,
+    cache: &MemoryCache,
+    sessions: &SessionCache,
+    knowledge: &KnowledgeCache,
+    checkpoint: &schema::CheckpointMeta,
+    signature: Option<&crate::signing::StoredSignature>,
+) -> Result<(), MemoryError> {
+    let bytes =
+        schema::build_hdf5_file_signed(config, cache, sessions, knowledge, checkpoint, signature)?;
 
     if bytes.is_empty() {
         return Err(MemoryError::Hdf5("build_hdf5_file produced 0 bytes".into()));

crates/clawhdf5-agent/tests/h5py_interop.rs

@@ -92,3 +92,64 @@ print(len(names))
         assert!(n >= 10, "only {n} datasets");
     }
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn an_edit_made_with_h5py_breaks_the_signature_and_names_the_record() {
+    if !h5py_available() {
+        assert!(
+            std::env::var("CLAWHDF5_REQUIRE_INTEROP").as_deref() != Ok("1"),
+            "CLAWHDF5_REQUIRE_INTEROP=1 but python3 with h5py is not available"
+        );
+        eprintln!("SKIP: python3 with h5py not available");
+        return;
+    }
+    use clawhdf5_agent::signing::SigningKey;
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let path = dir.path().join("signed.h5");
+    let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[42; 32]);
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::create(MemoryConfig::new(path.clone(), "agent", 8)).unwrap();
+    m.set_signing_key(key.clone());
+    m.save_batch(
+        (0..10)
+            .map(|i| MemoryEntry {
+                chunk: format!("memory {i}"),
+                embedding: (0..8).map(|j| ((i * 8 + j) as f32).cos()).collect(),
+                source_channel: "test".into(),
+                timestamp: i as f64,
+                session_id: "s".into(),
+                tags: String::new(),
+            })
+            .collect(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(m);
+    assert!(
+        HDF5Memory::verify(&path, &key.verifying_key())
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_valid()
+    );
+
+    // Someone edits one timestamp in place with h5py.
+    let script = format!(
+        r#"
+import h5py
+with h5py.File("{}", "r+") as f:
+    ts = f["memory/timestamps"]
+    ts[3] = 12345.0
+"#,
+        path.display()
+    );
+    let out = Command::new(python())
+        .args(["-c", &script])
+        .output()
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        out.status.success(),
+        "{}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+    );
+
+    let r = HDF5Memory::verify(&path, &key.verifying_key()).unwrap();
+    assert!(r.signature_valid && !r.is_valid(), "{r:?}");
+    assert_eq!(r.changed_records, vec![3]);
+}

crates/clawhdf5-agent/tests/signed_store.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,330 @@
+//! Ed25519-signed checkpoints: `HDF5Memory::set_signing_key` and
+//! `HDF5Memory::verify`.
+
+use std::path::Path;
+
+use clawhdf5_agent::signing::{SigningKey, VerifyReport, VerifyingKey};
+use clawhdf5_agent::storage;
+use clawhdf5_agent::{AgentMemory, HDF5Memory, MemoryConfig, MemoryEntry, MemoryError, schema};
+use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+const DIM: usize = 16;
+
+fn key(seed: u8) -> SigningKey {
+    SigningKey::from_bytes(&[seed; 32])
+}
+
+fn entry(i: usize, chunk: &str) -> MemoryEntry {
+    MemoryEntry {
+        chunk: chunk.to_string(),
+        embedding: (0..DIM)
+            .map(|j| ((i * DIM + j) as f32 * 0.37).sin())
+            .collect(),
+        source_channel: "chat".into(),
+        timestamp: 1_700_000_000.0 + i as f64,
+        session_id: format!("s{}", i % 3),
+        tags: format!("t{i}"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Awkward strings on purpose: they must hash the same after a round trip.
+const TEXTS: [&str; 6] = [
+    "plain text",
+    "ünïcödé — 日本語 🙂",
+    "",
+    "trailing spaces   ",
+    "tab\tand\nnewline",
+    "x",
+];
+
+fn signed_store(dir: &TempDir, float16: bool, k: &SigningKey) -> std::path::PathBuf {
+    let mut cfg = MemoryConfig::new(dir.path().join("s.h5"), "agent", DIM);
+    cfg.float16 = float16;
+    let path = cfg.path.clone();
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::create(cfg).unwrap();
+    m.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+    let entries = (0..30).map(|i| entry(i, TEXTS[i % TEXTS.len()])).collect();
+    m.save_batch(entries).unwrap();
+    // Some graph and a deleted record, so every part of the manifest is used.
+    let a = m.knowledge_mut().add_entity("Alice", "person", 0);
+    let b = m.knowledge_mut().add_entity("Acme", "org", -1);
+    m.knowledge_mut().add_relation(a, b, "works_at", 0.75);
+    m.sessions_mut()
+        .add_at("s0", 0, 9, "chat", "first session", 1_700_000_000.0);
+    m.delete(4).unwrap();
+    m.flush_wal().unwrap();
+    path
+}
+
+fn verify(path: &Path, k: &SigningKey) -> VerifyReport {
+    HDF5Memory::verify(path, &k.verifying_key()).unwrap()
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn a_signed_store_verifies_through_reopen_and_checkpoint_cycles() {
+    for float16 in [true, false] {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let k = key(7);
+        let path = signed_store(&dir, float16, &k);
+        let r = verify(&path, &k);
+        assert!(r.is_valid(), "float16={float16}: {r:?}");
+        assert_eq!(r.public_key, Some(k.verifying_key().to_bytes()));
+        assert_eq!(r.record_count, 30);
+        assert!(r.changed_records.is_empty());
+
+        // Reopen, change nothing, checkpoint again (with the key): still valid.
+        for _ in 0..3 {
+            let mut m = HDF5Memory::open(&path).unwrap();
+            assert!(m.is_signed());
+            m.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+            m.flush_wal().unwrap();
+            drop(m);
+            assert!(verify(&path, &k).is_valid());
+        }
+        // And after real changes, re-signed.
+        let mut m = HDF5Memory::open(&path).unwrap();
+        m.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+        m.save(entry(99, "added later")).unwrap();
+        m.hybrid_search(&entry(1, "").embedding, "text", 0.4, 0.6, 5);
+        m.flush_wal().unwrap();
+        drop(m);
+        let r = verify(&path, &k);
+        assert!(r.is_valid(), "{r:?}");
+        assert_eq!(r.record_count, 31);
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn a_signed_store_refuses_to_checkpoint_without_its_key() {
+    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let k = key(1);
+    let path = signed_store(&dir, true, &k);
+
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::open(&path).unwrap();
+    m.save(entry(50, "pending")).unwrap();
+    match m.flush_wal() {
+        Err(MemoryError::SigningKeyRequired(msg)) => assert!(msg.contains("signed"), "{msg}"),
+        other => panic!("expected SigningKeyRequired, got {other:?}"),
+    }
+    // The file is untouched and still valid; the save is still in the WAL.
+    let r = verify(&path, &k);
+    assert!(r.is_valid());
+    assert_eq!(r.wal_entries_unsigned, 1);
+
+    // Supplying the key lets the checkpoint through, signed.
+    m.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+    m.flush_wal().unwrap();
+    drop(m);
+    let r = verify(&path, &k);
+    assert!(r.is_valid());
+    assert_eq!((r.record_count, r.wal_entries_unsigned), (31, 0));
+
+    // Removing the signature on purpose writes it unsigned.
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::open(&path).unwrap();
+    m.remove_signature();
+    m.flush_wal().unwrap();
+    drop(m);
+    let r = verify(&path, &k);
+    assert!(!r.signed && !r.is_valid());
+    assert!(!HDF5Memory::open(&path).unwrap().is_signed());
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn the_wrong_key_does_not_verify_and_a_new_key_re_signs() {
+    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let (a, b) = (key(1), key(2));
+    let path = signed_store(&dir, true, &a);
+    let r = verify(&path, &b);
+    assert!(r.signed && !r.key_matches && !r.signature_valid && !r.is_valid());
+
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::open(&path).unwrap();
+    m.set_signing_key(b.clone());
+    m.flush_wal().unwrap();
+    drop(m);
+    assert!(verify(&path, &b).is_valid());
+    assert!(!verify(&path, &a).is_valid());
+}
+
+/// Rewrite the store with changed contents but the *old* signature — what
+/// someone with write access to the file, but not the key, can do.
+fn tamper(path: &Path, change: impl FnOnce(&mut Tampered)) {
+    let file = clawhdf5::File::open(path).unwrap();
+    let (config, cache, sessions, knowledge) = schema::validate_and_load(&file).unwrap();
+    let checkpoint = schema::read_checkpoint_meta(&file);
+    let signature = schema::read_signature(&file).unwrap().unwrap();
+    drop(file);
+    let mut t = Tampered {
+        config,
+        cache,
+        sessions,
+        knowledge,
+    };
+    change(&mut t);
+    storage::write_to_disk_signed(
+        path,
+        &t.config,
+        &t.cache,
+        &t.sessions,
+        &t.knowledge,
+        &checkpoint,
+        Some(&signature),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+}
+
+struct Tampered {
+    config: MemoryConfig,
+    cache: clawhdf5_agent::cache::MemoryCache,
+    sessions: clawhdf5_agent::SessionCache,
+    knowledge: clawhdf5_agent::knowledge::KnowledgeCache,
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn every_kind_of_edit_is_detected_and_located() {
+    let k = key(3);
+    type Edit = Box<dyn FnOnce(&mut Tampered)>;
+    type Case = (&'static str, Edit, fn(&VerifyReport) -> bool);
+    let cases: Vec<Case> = vec![
+        (
+            "record text",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| t.cache.chunks[7] = "rewritten".into()),
+            |r| !r.records_match && r.changed_records == vec![7],
+        ),
+        (
+            "one embedding value",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| {
+                let mut e = t.cache.embeddings[12].to_vec();
+                e[3] = 0.5;
+                t.cache.embeddings.set(12, &e);
+            }),
+            |r| r.changed_records == vec![12],
+        ),
+        (
+            "undelete",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| t.cache.tombstones[4] = 0),
+            |r| r.changed_records == vec![4],
+        ),
+        (
+            "timestamp",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| t.cache.timestamps[20] += 1.0),
+            |r| r.changed_records == vec![20],
+        ),
+        (
+            "record appended",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| {
+                t.cache.push(
+                    "new".into(),
+                    vec![0.1; DIM],
+                    "x".into(),
+                    1.0,
+                    "s".into(),
+                    "".into(),
+                );
+            }),
+            |r| !r.records_match && r.changed_records == vec![30] && r.record_count == 31,
+        ),
+        (
+            "setting",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| t.config.agent_id = "someone-else".into()),
+            |r| !r.settings_match && r.records_match,
+        ),
+        (
+            "session summary",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| t.sessions.summaries[0] = "edited".into()),
+            |r| !r.sessions_match && r.records_match,
+        ),
+        (
+            "graph edge",
+            Box::new(|t: &mut Tampered| t.knowledge.relations[0].weight = 1.0),
+            |r| !r.graph_match && r.records_match,
+        ),
+    ];
+    for (name, edit, check) in cases {
+        let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let path = signed_store(&dir, true, &k);
+        tamper(&path, edit);
+        let r = verify(&path, &k);
+        assert!(
+            r.signed && r.key_matches && r.signature_valid,
+            "{name}: {r:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(!r.is_valid(), "{name}: edit not detected: {r:?}");
+        assert!(check(&r), "{name}: {r:?}");
+    }
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn a_forged_manifest_fails_the_signature() {
+    // Recomputing the hashes for tampered contents does not help without the
+    // key: the signature no longer matches the manifest.
+    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let k = key(5);
+    let path = signed_store(&dir, true, &k);
+    let file = clawhdf5::File::open(&path).unwrap();
+    let (config, mut cache, sessions, knowledge) = schema::validate_and_load(&file).unwrap();
+    let checkpoint = schema::read_checkpoint_meta(&file);
+    let mut sig = schema::read_signature(&file).unwrap().unwrap();
+    drop(file);
+    cache.chunks[0] = "forged".into();
+    // Re-sign with an attacker key, then splice the victim's public key back.
+    let forged = clawhdf5_agent::signing::sign(
+        &key(66),
+        &config,
+        &cache,
+        &sessions,
+        &knowledge,
+        checkpoint.wal_applied,
+    );
+    sig.manifest = forged.manifest;
+    sig.record_hashes = forged.record_hashes;
+    storage::write_to_disk_signed(
+        &path,
+        &config,
+        &cache,
+        &sessions,
+        &knowledge,
+        &checkpoint,
+        Some(&sig),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let r = verify(&path, &k);
+    assert!(
+        r.key_matches && !r.signature_valid && !r.is_valid(),
+        "{r:?}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn an_unsigned_store_reports_unsigned() {
+    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::create(MemoryConfig::new(dir.path().join("u.h5"), "a", DIM)).unwrap();
+    m.save_batch(vec![entry(0, "hello")]).unwrap();
+    drop(m);
+    let r = HDF5Memory::verify(&dir.path().join("u.h5"), &VerifyingKey::from(&key(1))).unwrap();
+    assert!(!r.signed && !r.is_valid());
+    assert_eq!(r.record_count, 1);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn nul_bytes_in_text_still_verify() {
+    // Strings are stored null-padded; the hash must follow what a reopened
+    // store actually holds, or an untouched store would fail to verify.
+    let dir = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+    let k = key(9);
+    let mut m = HDF5Memory::create(MemoryConfig::new(dir.path().join("n.h5"), "a", DIM)).unwrap();
+    m.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+    m.save_batch(vec![
+        entry(0, "inner\0nul"),
+        entry(1, "trailing nul\0"),
+        entry(2, "\0leading"),
+    ])
+    .unwrap();
+    drop(m);
+    let r = verify(&dir.path().join("n.h5"), &k);
+    assert!(r.is_valid(), "{r:?}");
+    let m = HDF5Memory::open(&dir.path().join("n.h5")).unwrap();
+    eprintln!(
+        "reloaded: {:?}",
+        (0..3).map(|i| m.get_chunk(i)).collect::<Vec<_>>()
+    );
+}

crates/clawhdf5-bench/src/bin/search_harness.rs

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 //! cargo run --release -p clawhdf5-bench --bin search_harness -- --ann-only --uniform
 //! cargo run --release -p clawhdf5-bench --bin search_harness -- --float16-study --full
 //! cargo run --release -p clawhdf5-bench --bin search_harness -- --options-study --full
+//! cargo run --release -p clawhdf5-bench --bin search_harness -- --signing-study --full
 //! ```
 
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
@@ -488,6 +489,81 @@ fn bench_end_to_end(n: usize, json: &mut Vec<serde_json::Value>) {
     }));
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Signing study: what does an Ed25519-signed checkpoint cost?
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// `--signing-study`: checkpoint time unsigned vs signed, `verify` time, and
+/// the file-size cost of the stored per-record hashes. Default store
+/// settings (float16, int8 index). Medians of five checkpoints / three
+/// verifies.
+fn signing_study(n: usize) {
+    use clawhdf5_agent::signing::SigningKey;
+    let data = make_dataset(n, 0x516 ^ n as u64);
+    let mut rng = Rng(9);
+    let entries: Vec<MemoryEntry> = data
+        .vectors
+        .iter()
+        .enumerate()
+        .map(|(i, v)| MemoryEntry {
+            chunk: text_for(data.cluster_of[i], i, &mut rng),
+            embedding: v.clone(),
+            source_channel: "bench".into(),
+            timestamp: i as f64,
+            session_id: format!("s{}", i % 50),
+            tags: format!("t{i}"),
+        })
+        .collect();
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let path = dir.path().join("sign.h5");
+    let mut mem = HDF5Memory::create(MemoryConfig::new(path.clone(), "bench", DIM)).unwrap();
+    mem.save_batch(entries).unwrap();
+    std::hint::black_box(mem.hybrid_search(&data.queries[0], "", 1.0, 0.0, K));
+
+    let median = |mut v: Vec<Duration>| {
+        v.sort();
+        v[v.len() / 2]
+    };
+    let checkpoint = |mem: &mut HDF5Memory| {
+        median(
+            (0..5)
+                .map(|_| {
+                    let t = Instant::now();
+                    mem.flush_wal().unwrap();
+                    t.elapsed()
+                })
+                .collect(),
+        )
+    };
+    let unsigned = checkpoint(&mut mem);
+    let unsigned_bytes = std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().len();
+    let key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[7; 32]);
+    mem.set_signing_key(key.clone());
+    let signed = checkpoint(&mut mem);
+    let signed_bytes = std::fs::metadata(&path).unwrap().len();
+    drop(mem);
+    let vk = key.verifying_key();
+    let verify = median(
+        (0..3)
+            .map(|_| {
+                let t = Instant::now();
+                let r = HDF5Memory::verify(&path, &vk).unwrap();
+                let d = t.elapsed();
+                assert!(r.is_valid());
+                d
+            })
+            .collect(),
+    );
+    println!(
+        "| {n} | {:.1} | {:.1} | {:+.1} | {:.1} | {:+.2} |",
+        millis(unsigned),
+        millis(signed),
+        millis(signed) - millis(unsigned),
+        millis(verify),
+        (signed_bytes as f64 - unsigned_bytes as f64) / (1024.0 * 1024.0),
+    );
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Search options study: source filters, re-ranking, confidence rejection
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -960,6 +1036,21 @@ fn main() {
         }
         return;
     }
+    if args.iter().any(|a| a == "--signing-study") {
+        println!("## Signed checkpoints ({DIM}-dim, float16, int8 index)\n");
+        println!(
+            "| N | checkpoint ms, unsigned | checkpoint ms, signed | signing adds ms | verify ms | file MiB added |"
+        );
+        println!("|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|");
+        for &n in if full {
+            &[1_000, 10_000, 100_000][..]
+        } else {
+            &[1_000, 10_000][..]
+        } {
+            signing_study(n);
+        }
+        return;
+    }
     if args.iter().any(|a| a == "--options-study") {
         println!("## Search options ({DIM}-dim, k = {K}, Hebbian boost off)\n");
         println!("| N | options | filtered recall@10 | p50 ms | p99 ms |");

crates/clawhdf5-cli/src/main.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,22 @@
-use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 
 use clap::{Parser, Subcommand};
+use clawhdf5_agent::signing::{self, SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
 use clawhdf5_agent::{AgentMemory, HDF5Memory, MemoryConfig, MemoryEntry};
 
 /// ClawhDF5 — HDF5-backed cognitive memory for AI agents
 #[derive(Parser)]
 #[command(name = "clawhdf5", version, about)]
 struct Cli {
-    /// Path to the .h5 memory file
+    /// Path to the .h5 memory file (not needed for `keygen`)
     #[arg(short, long, env = "CLAWHDF5_PATH")]
-    path: PathBuf,
+    path: Option<PathBuf>,
+
+    /// File holding an Ed25519 signing key (64 hex characters, from
+    /// `keygen`). Every checkpoint this command makes is then signed; a
+    /// signed store refuses to checkpoint without it.
+    #[arg(long, env = "CLAWHDF5_SIGNING_KEY", global = true)]
+    signing_key: Option<PathBuf>,
 
     #[command(subcommand)]
     command: Commands,
@@ -91,6 +98,38 @@ enum Commands {
         /// Destination path
         dest: PathBuf,
     },
+    /// Generate an Ed25519 signing key for signed checkpoints
+    Keygen {
+        /// Where to write the secret key (created new, owner-only on Unix)
+        #[arg(long)]
+        out: PathBuf,
+    },
+    /// Verify a signed store against a public key; exit status 2 if not valid
+    Verify {
+        /// The trusted public key: 64 hex characters, or a file holding them
+        #[arg(long)]
+        public_key: String,
+    },
+}
+
+fn read_signing_key(path: &Path) -> Result<SigningKey, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let text = std::fs::read_to_string(path)
+        .map_err(|e| format!("cannot read signing key {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
+    let bytes = signing::from_hex::<32>(&text)
+        .ok_or_else(|| format!("{} is not a 64-hex-character key", path.display()))?;
+    Ok(SigningKey::from_bytes(&bytes))
+}
+
+/// Open for writing, with the signing key applied if one was given.
+fn open_writable(
+    path: &Path,
+    key: &Option<SigningKey>,
+) -> Result<HDF5Memory, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    let mut mem = HDF5Memory::open(path)?;
+    if let Some(k) = key {
+        mem.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+    }
+    Ok(mem)
 }
 
 fn main() {
@@ -103,6 +142,37 @@ fn main() {
 }
 
 fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
+    if let Commands::Keygen { out } = &cli.command {
+        let key = signing::generate_key();
+        let mut opts = std::fs::OpenOptions::new();
+        opts.write(true).create_new(true);
+        #[cfg(unix)]
+        {
+            use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
+            opts.mode(0o600);
+        }
+        use std::io::Write;
+        let mut f = opts
+            .open(out)
+            .map_err(|e| format!("cannot create {}: {e}", out.display()))?;
+        writeln!(f, "{}", signing::to_hex(&key.to_bytes()))?;
+        let j = serde_json::json!({
+            "status": "generated",
+            "secret_key_file": out.display().to_string(),
+            "public_key": signing::to_hex(&key.verifying_key().to_bytes()),
+        });
+        println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&j)?);
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let path = cli
+        .path
+        .clone()
+        .ok_or("--path (or CLAWHDF5_PATH) is required")?;
+    let key = cli
+        .signing_key
+        .as_deref()
+        .map(read_signing_key)
+        .transpose()?;
     match cli.command {
         Commands::Create {
             agent_id,
@@ -113,7 +183,7 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
             f32,
             float16: _,
         } => {
-            let mut config = MemoryConfig::new(cli.path.clone(), &agent_id, dim);
+            let mut config = MemoryConfig::new(path.clone(), &agent_id, dim);
             config.wal_enabled = wal;
             // As with --f32-index: only ever switch the library default off.
             if f32 {
@@ -127,15 +197,21 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
                 config.quantized_index = false;
             }
             let config_quantized = config.quantized_index;
-            let mem = HDF5Memory::create(config)?;
+            let mut mem = HDF5Memory::create(config)?;
+            // Sign straight away, so the store is never on disk unsigned.
+            if let Some(k) = &key {
+                mem.set_signing_key(k.clone());
+                mem.flush_wal()?;
+            }
             let j = serde_json::json!({
                 "status": "created",
-                "path": cli.path.display().to_string(),
+                "path": path.display().to_string(),
                 "agent_id": agent_id,
                 "embedding_dim": dim,
                 "wal_enabled": wal,
                 "quantized_index": config_quantized,
                 "float16": config_float16,
+                "signed": mem.is_signed(),
                 "count": mem.count(),
             });
             println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&j)?);
@@ -152,7 +228,7 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
                 }
             };
             let entry: MemoryEntry = serde_json::from_str(&input)?;
-            let mut mem = HDF5Memory::open(&cli.path)?;
+            let mut mem = open_writable(&path, &key)?;
             let idx = mem.save(entry)?;
             let j = serde_json::json!({ "status": "saved", "index": idx, "count": mem.count() });
             println!("{}", serde_json::to_string(&j)?);
@@ -166,7 +242,7 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
             keyword_weight,
         } => {
             let emb: Vec<f32> = serde_json::from_str(&embedding)?;
-            let mut mem = HDF5Memory::open(&cli.path)?;
+            let mut mem = open_writable(&path, &key)?;
             let results = mem.hybrid_search(&emb, &query, vector_weight, keyword_weight, top_k);
             let j: Vec<serde_json::Value> = results
                 .iter()
@@ -184,7 +260,7 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
         }
 
         Commands::Recall { index } => {
-            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&cli.path)?;
+            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&path)?;
             match mem.get_chunk(index) {
                 Some(content) => {
                     let j = serde_json::json!({ "index": index, "chunk": content });
@@ -198,22 +274,23 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
         }
 
         Commands::Stats => {
-            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&cli.path)?;
+            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&path)?;
             let cfg = mem.config();
             let j = serde_json::json!({
-                "path": cli.path.display().to_string(),
+                "path": path.display().to_string(),
                 "agent_id": cfg.agent_id,
                 "embedding_dim": cfg.embedding_dim,
                 "count": mem.count(),
                 "active": mem.count_active(),
                 "wal_enabled": cfg.wal_enabled,
                 "wal_pending": mem.wal_pending_count(),
+                "signed": mem.is_signed(),
             });
             println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&j)?);
         }
 
         Commands::FlushWal => {
-            let mut mem = HDF5Memory::open(&cli.path)?;
+            let mut mem = open_writable(&path, &key)?;
             let before = mem.wal_pending_count();
             mem.flush_wal()?;
             let j = serde_json::json!({
@@ -225,7 +302,7 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
         }
 
         Commands::AgentsMd { output } => {
-            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&cli.path)?;
+            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&path)?;
             let md = mem.generate_agents_md();
             match output {
                 Some(p) => {
@@ -237,7 +314,7 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
         }
 
         Commands::Export => {
-            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&cli.path)?;
+            let mem = HDF5Memory::open_read_only(&path)?;
             for i in 0..mem.count() {
                 if let Some(chunk) = mem.get_chunk(i) {
                     let j = serde_json::json!({ "index": i, "chunk": chunk });
@@ -246,11 +323,44 @@ fn run(cli: Cli) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
             }
         }
 
+        Commands::Keygen { .. } => unreachable!("handled before opening a store"),
+
+        Commands::Verify { public_key } => {
+            let text = if Path::new(&public_key).is_file() {
+                std::fs::read_to_string(&public_key)?
+            } else {
+                public_key
+            };
+            let bytes = signing::from_hex::<32>(&text)
+                .ok_or("--public-key must be 64 hex characters or a file holding them")?;
+            let trusted = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&bytes)?;
+            let r = HDF5Memory::verify(&path, &trusted)?;
+            let j = serde_json::json!({
+                "valid": r.is_valid(),
+                "signed": r.signed,
+                "key_matches": r.key_matches,
+                "signature_valid": r.signature_valid,
+                "records_match": r.records_match,
+                "settings_match": r.settings_match,
+                "sessions_match": r.sessions_match,
+                "graph_match": r.graph_match,
+                "changed_records": r.changed_records,
+                "record_count": r.record_count,
+                "signed_record_count": r.signed_record_count,
+                "signed_by": r.public_key.map(|k| signing::to_hex(&k)),
+                "wal_entries_unsigned": r.wal_entries_unsigned,
+            });
+            println!("{}", serde_json::to_string_pretty(&j)?);
+            if !r.is_valid() {
+                std::process::exit(2);
+            }
+        }
+
         Commands::Snapshot { dest } => {
-            let _result = clawhdf5_agent::storage::snapshot_file(&cli.path, &dest)?;
+            let _result = clawhdf5_agent::storage::snapshot_file(&path, &dest)?;
             let j = serde_json::json!({
                 "status": "snapshot_created",
-                "source": cli.path.display().to_string(),
+                "source": path.display().to_string(),
                 "dest": dest.display().to_string(),
             });
             println!("{}", serde_json::to_string(&j)?);

docs/QUICKSTART.md

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ The core use case. Give your AI agent persistent, searchable memory in a single
 ```toml
 # Cargo.toml
 [dependencies]
-clawhdf5-agent = { version = "2.0", features = ["agent"] }
+clawhdf5-agent = { git = "https://git.redclaw.dev/quantumclaw/clawhdf5" }  # not on crates.io yet
 ```
 
 ### Create a Memory Store

docs/USE_CASES.md

@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ This is the container image for intelligence.
 | Your Situation | Features to Enable | Why |
 |----------------|-------------------|-----|
 | **Quick prototype** | Default | Vector search works out of the box |
-| **Production agent** | `agent`, `float16`, `parallel` | Half-precision saves 50% storage, parallel search for scale |
+| **Production agent** | defaults (`float16`, `hnsw`, `parallel`) | HNSW search and a parallel index build; half-precision *storage* is `MemoryConfig::float16`, on by default for new stores |
 | **macOS** | + `accelerate` | Apple AMX coprocessor for matrix ops |
 | **Linux server** | + `openblas` or `fast-math` | BLAS acceleration |
 | **GPU available** | + `gpu` | wgpu-based search, wins at 100K+ scale |
@@ -220,14 +220,15 @@ This is the container image for intelligence.
 | **Edge device** | Default only | Minimal dependencies, smallest binary |
 
 ```toml
+# Not on crates.io yet: depend on the repository.
 # Production agent on Linux
-clawhdf5-agent = { version = "2.0", features = ["agent", "float16", "parallel", "fast-math"] }
+clawhdf5-agent = { git = "https://git.redclaw.dev/quantumclaw/clawhdf5", features = ["fast-math"] }
 
 # Edge device
-clawhdf5-agent = { version = "2.0", features = ["agent"] }
+clawhdf5-agent = { git = "https://git.redclaw.dev/quantumclaw/clawhdf5" }
 
 # macOS with GPU
-clawhdf5-agent = { version = "2.0", features = ["agent", "float16", "accelerate", "gpu", "async"] }
+clawhdf5-agent = { git = "https://git.redclaw.dev/quantumclaw/clawhdf5", features = ["accelerate", "gpu", "async"] }
 ```
 
 ---