check_rate_anomaly's 60s window is shared across all sessions/sources —
when it trips, the alert reported only the anonymous aggregate count,
unlike the separate cumulative max_writes_per_session check, which does
name the offending session. A session's write count can never exceed the
window's aggregate count, so whenever the window trips, name the
top-contributing session and source within it in the same alert instead
of adding a second, redundant per-session threshold check.
INT-07
check_pattern_anomaly did a plain case-folded literal-substring test, so
inserting whitespace, punctuation between letters, or a zero-width/
invisible-formatting character anywhere in a flagged phrase defeated every
one of the 15 injection patterns while the text still displays normally.
Add normalize_for_pattern_match: lowercases, drops control and
invisible-format characters (ZWSP, ZWJ, ZWNJ, bidi marks, BOM, soft
hyphen, word joiner, invisible math operators), drops punctuation
entirely (so split words rejoin instead of just being separated), and
collapses whitespace runs. Apply it to both the chunk and each configured
pattern before matching.
Scope, stated plainly: this does not add Unicode NFKC normalization or
confusable/homoglyph folding (e.g. Cyrillic а standing in for Latin a) —
that needs a per-codepoint confusable table (Unicode's confusables.txt)
beyond what's reasonable to hand-roll correctly, and no such crate is a
dependency of this crate today. A determined attacker using homoglyphs
can still evade these patterns; only the whitespace/punctuation/
zero-width bypasses are closed here.
INT-06
ClawHDF5 Coding Agent