Canary first, production second — the point of pinning is that the upgrade is a decision, and the point of `canary-claude` is that the decision has evidence. Taken for 2.1.225's fix to a transient 401 that replaced a long-lived CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN with a short-lived one and broke HEADLESS sessions until restart. Our sessions are headless and our VMs are per-mission, so "until restart" reads as a failed phase. The 2.1.225 workspace-trust prompt does NOT apply: `--help` states the dialog is skipped in non-interactive mode (`-p`, or stdout not a TTY) and we satisfy both. Read from the CLI in a booted 2.1.226 VM rather than inferred from the changelog. Verified on the production path after the rebuild: guest kernel 6.1.128, delegation to a subagent, `--settings` stop gate installed, judge independent (glm-4.7), single writer. 6/6. `rootfs-canary-claude.ext4` is left on tank as the mechanism for the next candidate, not as a leftover.
49 lines
2.5 KiB
Docker
49 lines
2.5 KiB
Docker
# Plan A6, first of three: one image per agent CLI, independently versioned.
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#
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# Everything shared lives in agent-toolchain (git, node, rust, scanners, tea).
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# This layer is only the CLI and its env contract, so bumping Claude Code does
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# not rebuild 3 GB of toolchain and cannot disturb agent-kimi / agent-glm.
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#
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# Build (on the node that will run it — see agent-toolchain for why this is not
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# in AGENT_IMAGES):
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#
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# ssh osobh@tank "cd ~/clawmates && \
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# docker build -f images/agent-toolchain/Dockerfile -t clawmates/agent-toolchain:dev images/agent-toolchain/ && \
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# docker build -f images/agent-claude/Dockerfile -t clawmates/agent-claude:dev images/agent-claude/"
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#
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# Then turn it into a microVM rootfs and prove a VM boots from it:
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#
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# scripts/fc-build-rootfs.sh osobh@tank clawmates/agent-claude:dev claude 8G
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FROM clawmates/agent-toolchain:dev
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# Pinned: an unpinned `npm i -g` makes the image's behaviour depend on the day
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# it was built, and a mission that regresses would have no version to compare.
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#
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# 2.1.223, up from 2.1.220, for one reason that matters to how we use subagents:
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# 2.1.222 "Fixed PreToolUse auto-allow hooks bypassing tool restrictions in
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# background agent tasks". Subagents run in the background by default since
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# 2.1.198, and our `verifier` role's whole guarantee is a TOOL RESTRICTION — no
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# Edit, no Write — so on 2.1.220 the one property we rely on was the one the bug
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# could undo. 2.1.221 also fixes `--mcp-config` servers not connecting before the
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# first turn in print mode, which is exactly the mode we run and will matter when
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# the MCP door reaches a VM.
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ARG CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION=2.1.226
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RUN npm install -g "@anthropic-ai/claude-code@${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}" \
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&& npm cache clean --force \
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&& rm -rf /root/.npm \
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&& claude --version
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# The CLI reads its credentials from $HOME/.claude. On the container path HOME is
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# /zeroclaw-data because the daemon owns it; here there is no daemon, so HOME is
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# just root's home. Credential injection (B4.4) writes into this directory over
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# vsock at VM start so the credentials live and die with the VM and are never
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# baked into the image.
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ENV HOME=/root \
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CLAWMATES_AGENT_CLI=claude
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RUN mkdir -p /root/.claude
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# No ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, and none is accepted: this backend authenticates by
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# subscription via CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN. An API key present in the
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# environment silently overrides the subscription OAuth (fixed once already,
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# task #16) and would bill per-token against a plan we already pay for.
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