P2 complete: Docker sandbox with kernel assertions + secret broker
tc-sandbox:
- SandboxSpec/SandboxDriver + DockerDriver (bollard): uid 10001, cap-drop
ALL, no-new-privileges, embedded seccomp deny profile (unshare/ptrace/
bpf/keyctl/mount/...), read-only rootfs with tmpfs /tmp + /home/agent,
network=none, mem/cpu/pids limits
- agent-base image: non-root, all setuid binaries stripped
- 6 kernel-level assertion tests probing from INSIDE real containers:
uid + CapEff==0, rootfs read-only, seccomp EPERM on unshare, zero
traffic-carrying interfaces + failed egress connect, no setuid +
NoNewPrivs=1, lifecycle
tc-secrets:
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 envelope encryption under a FileKey (generated 0600,
AEAD tamper detection tested); secrets table ciphertext-at-rest
- teamclaw-broker daemon: length-prefixed JSON over a unix socket; no
protocol operation ever returns plaintext; InvokeHttp independently
consumes the single-use execution grant against Postgres BEFORE touching
any credential, then performs the call itself with the secret injected
- Tests over the real socket + real Postgres + a real local HTTP receiver:
encrypted at rest, pending approval refused, approved call carries the
bearer token exactly once, grant replay refused, non-http URLs rejected
116 Rust + 61 frontend tests + 14 E2E journeys green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
