//! Run a mission phase inside a Firecracker microVM.
//!
//! The step that makes the whole microVM track load-bearing. Before this,
//! `runtime_kind = 'microvm'` placed a mission on a KVM-capable node and then
//! nothing executed it — config accepted without a reader, which is one of the
//! four seams this project keeps closing.
//!
//! # The model
//!
//! **inject → run → collect → destroy**, the same shape copy mode already proved
//! for containers, with a VM boundary instead of a namespace boundary. Nothing is
//! shared: the checkout goes in as a tar, the work comes back as a tar, and the
//! guest's filesystem dies with it.
//!
//! # Why the agent does not push
//!
//! `session_executor` tells its agent to commit and push to a branch, and the
//! forge is on the VM's egress allow-list, so it could. It must not:
//!
//! - `mission_delivery::capture_phase_diff_at` is already host-side and diffs the
//!   collected tree against the recorded clone point, covering committed, staged
//!   and unstaged work in one pass. Pushing from the guest would add a second,
//!   untested way for work to arrive.
//! - Pushing needs forge credentials in the VM. The point of collecting is that
//!   the guest never holds them.
//!
//! So the prompt says explicitly not to push, and the work is collected over the
//! same host path the checkout came from — leaving the host directory a
//! server-owned staging area with exactly one writer.
//!
//! # One run row
//!
//! Like `launch_direct_session`, this creates exactly ONE `topology_runs` row
//! (tier `microvm`). The whole downstream lifecycle — `close_finished_phases`,
//! evaluation, capture, delivery — keys off those rows, and a second completion
//! path would mean two ways for a phase to finish with one of them untested.

use cm_domain::NodeId;
use uuid::Uuid;

use crate::fleet::NodeHub;
use crate::microvm_client::MicroVm;

/// Resources per phase VM. Generous enough to build: the mission toolchain in
/// `agent-claude` includes rustc, and a 512 MB guest OOMs partway through a
/// `cargo build` in a way that looks like an agent giving up.
const VCPUS: u32 = 4;
pub(crate) const MEM_MIB: u32 = 8192;

/// Budget for one agent turn inside the VM, matching the container path's.
const TURN_SECS: u64 = 3600;

/// Where the checkout lands in the guest. Same path as the container path uses,
/// so a prompt or a tool that hardcodes it behaves identically either way.
const GUEST_REPO: &str = "/mission/repo";

/// A vm id must be `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` — the node rejects anything else, since it
/// becomes a path component. Hyphenated uuids qualify; this also keeps the id
/// readable in `vm_list` output and in the node's egress log.
///
/// `step` distinguishes the nodes of a composed run, whose graph runs several VMs
/// for one phase and one iteration. Deliberately DETERMINISTIC rather than
/// random: the node refuses to create a vm id that already exists, so if a
/// restarted worker resumes a step whose VM is somehow still alive, the second
/// attempt fails loudly instead of running a duplicate agent against the same
/// checkout. A random id would make that collision invisible and let two VMs
/// collect over each other's work.
pub(crate) fn vm_id_for(phase_id: Uuid, iteration: i32, step: Option<u32>) -> String {
    let base = format!("m-{}-{}", &phase_id.simple().to_string()[..12], iteration);
    match step {
        Some(s) => format!("{base}-s{s}"),
        None => base,
    }
}

/// Ceiling on teammates, stated in the prompt.
///
/// Anthropic's own guidance is 3-5, and their research system uses a lead plus
/// 3-5 subagents. The cap is in the prompt rather than enforced by us because the
/// lead is the thing that decides team size — there is no flag that limits it —
/// so the honest options are to tell it the budget or to not know what it spent.
const MAX_TEAMMATES: u32 = 4;

/// Whether this mission asked for a Claude Code agent team.
fn wants_claude_code_team(engine: Option<&str>) -> bool {
    matches!(engine, Some("claude_code"))
}

/// Environment that turns agent teams on. Empty for a solo mission.
///
/// **MEASURED: agent teams do not form under `claude -p`.** With this flag set and
/// an explicit request to "spawn two teammates", the CLI in our image (2.1.223)
/// did the work with two SUBAGENTS, wrote both files, and created no
/// `~/.claude/teams/` directory at all. The docs allow for it — "Claude may
/// sometimes use subagents instead of creating a team" — and headless appears to be
/// always. The whole agent-teams feature is described around an interactive agent
/// panel, which a print-mode session does not have.
///
/// The flag is still set, because it is harmless and costs nothing if a later
/// version does support teams non-interactively. What the switch actually buys
/// today is the prompt addendum, which does change behaviour: it gets the lead to
/// parallelise across files via subagents instead of working through them alone.
/// Read the outcome from the subagent count, not from a teammate count.
///
/// Kept separate from
/// [`crate::mission_runtime::microvm_provider_env`] so the credential path stays
/// exactly as narrow as it is — that function is subscription-only by
/// construction, and widening it to carry feature flags is how an API key ends up
/// back in a VM.
fn team_env(engine: Option<&str>) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
    if !wants_claude_code_team(engine) {
        return Vec::new();
    }
    vec![(
        "CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS".to_string(),
        "1".to_string(),
    )]
}

/// What the agent is told. Deliberately not `session_executor::session_prompt`:
/// that one instructs a push, and on this path pushing is the host's job.
fn vm_prompt(task: &str) -> String {
    format!(
        "You are working in the git repository at {GUEST_REPO}.\n\
         \n\
         TASK\n\
         {task}\n\
         \n\
         HELP AVAILABLE TO YOU\n\
         You can delegate with the Agent tool. Two roles exist:\n\
         - `verifier` — checks work against the project's own tests. It cannot \
         edit files. Use it when you believe you are finished, and treat what it \
         reports as the outcome rather than your own impression.\n\
         - `explorer` — answers a question about the codebase by reading it, \
         without filling your context with search output.\n\
         Delegating is optional. For a small, self-contained change, doing it \
         yourself is usually better: a handoff costs context and coordination, and \
         one careful pass beats an assembly line.\n\
         \n\
         WHEN THE WORK IS DONE\n\
         Leave it in the working tree. Do NOT push, and do not add a remote — \
         this machine has no access to the forge. Committing locally is fine but \
         not required: the whole tree is collected when you finish, and the work \
         is recorded from the repository itself either way.\n\
         \n\
         If the task cannot be completed as written — a file it refers to does \
         not exist, a premise is wrong, the tests cannot run — say so plainly. An \
         honest report that the work could not be done is worth more than a tree \
         that looks finished.\n"
    )
}

/// The extra paragraph a team mission gets.
///
/// Separate from [`vm_prompt`] so a solo mission's prompt is byte-identical to
/// what it was before teams existed — the comparison between solo and team is
/// only meaningful if the solo side did not also change.
fn team_prompt_addendum() -> String {
    format!(
        "\nWORKING AS A TEAM\n\
         Delegate the independent parts of this task and work them in parallel, \
         rather than doing them one after another yourself. Use at most \
         {MAX_TEAMMATES}, and fewer when fewer will do: teammates cost tokens \
         and coordination, and three focused ones beat five scattered ones.\n\
         Split the work so each teammate owns DIFFERENT FILES. Two teammates \
         editing one file overwrite each other. Do not split one file's work into \
         stages across teammates — a handoff loses context, and sequential phases \
         of the same change are better done by one agent in one pass.\n\
         Wait for your teammates to finish before you conclude. Their findings are \
         the point; a summary written before they report is your own guess.\n"
    )
}

/// Shell-quote for `sh -c`. The guest agent runs one command string, and a task
/// description contains apostrophes, quotes and newlines as a matter of course.
fn shell_quote(s: &str) -> String {
    format!("'{}'", s.replace('\'', r"'\''"))
}

/// The tool that spawns a subagent.
///
/// **Verified against `claude --help` and the tool docs in the image we ship
/// (2.1.220), not remembered.** It was named `Task` in older versions, and the
/// cost of guessing is invisible: an unrecognised entry in `--allowedTools` does
/// not error, it simply means the agent has no way to delegate and works alone.
/// Nothing in the output says so.
const SUBAGENT_TOOL: &str = "Agent";

/// Tools the lead may use. `Agent` is what makes fan-out possible at all — before
/// it was added the allowlist was `Read Edit Write Bash`, so Claude Code could not
/// spawn a subagent in any of our VMs.
const LEAD_TOOLS: &[&str] = &["Read", "Edit", "Write", "Bash", SUBAGENT_TOOL];

/// The rule every subagent carries, in its own prompt.
///
/// `--append-subagent-system-prompt` does **not** exist in 2.1.220 despite being
/// documented — checked against `--help` in the image — so this is inlined per
/// definition instead. That is the better shape anyway: a verifier and an explorer
/// need different wording, and a single appended blob would say the same thing to
/// both.
const NO_SHORTCUTS: &str = "Report what you actually observed. Never present an \
    expected result as an observed one, and never weaken, skip or narrow a check \
    to make it pass — the work is judged against the repository itself, so a \
    shortcut is found later and costs more than an honest failure.";

/// Subagent definitions, handed over as `--agents` JSON.
///
/// JSON on the command line rather than files, for a specific reason: the guest's
/// `/mission/repo` is collected and diffed, so a role definition written into the
/// checkout would arrive in the delivered patch as if the agent had authored it.
/// `--agents` is session-scoped and touches no disk.
///
/// These two are deliberately the only ones. `verifier` is the single multi-agent
/// pattern Anthropic endorses for coding work — implement, then check with a
/// separate agent that sees only the artifact and the criteria. `explorer` exists
/// for context protection, the other justification that survives scrutiny. Roles
/// like "tester" or "committer" are absent on purpose: splitting sequential phases
/// of the same work is a documented anti-pattern, and it is the shape our pipeline
/// templates already have.
fn agent_definitions() -> serde_json::Value {
    serde_json::json!({
        "verifier": {
            "description": "Independently verifies that work is complete and correct. \
                            Use after implementing something, to check it rather than \
                            to trust it.",
            // No Edit and no Write, by construction: an agent that can fix what it
            // is checking will fix it and report success, and the report is then
            // about a tree nobody reviewed.
            //
            // This restriction is enforced by the tool allowlist, NOT by permission
            // mode — since 2.1.212 a subagent inherits the parent's permission mode,
            // so `acceptEdits` reaches it either way. It is also why the image is
            // pinned to 2.1.223: 2.1.222 fixed background subagents being able to
            // bypass tool restrictions, and this is the tool restriction in question.
            "tools": "Read, Grep, Glob, Bash",
            // Foreground, against the default since 2.1.198. A background verifier
            // lets the lead carry on and write its report before the check has
            // finished — the finding would arrive after the conclusion. The whole
            // point is that the verdict comes from the verifier, so the lead waits.
            "background": false,
            "prompt": format!(
                "You verify work you did not do. You are given an artifact and the \
                 criteria it must meet, and nothing else — you do not know how it was \
                 built and you do not need to.\n\
                 \n\
                 Run the project's OWN checks, in full. If it has a test suite, run \
                 the COMPLETE suite, not the tests that look relevant: stopping after \
                 the first one or two that pass is the most common way a verifier \
                 reports success on broken work.\n\
                 \n\
                 You cannot edit or write files. If something is wrong, say exactly \
                 what you ran, what you expected and what you saw. {NO_SHORTCUTS}"
            ),
        },
        "explorer": {
            "description": "Reads and searches the codebase to answer a specific \
                            question. Use when finding something out would otherwise \
                            fill the main context with files and search output.",
            "tools": "Read, Grep, Glob",
            "prompt": format!(
                "You answer one question about this codebase by reading it. Return the \
                 answer and the paths that support it — not a transcript of your \
                 search. You cannot modify anything. {NO_SHORTCUTS}"
            ),
        },
    })
}

/// Claude Code writes a separate transcript per subagent, under the session's own
/// directory. Its existence is the evidence that delegation happened — measured in
/// the shipped image, not inferred:
///
/// ```text
/// /root/.claude/projects/-w/<session>.jsonl
/// /root/.claude/projects/-w/<session>/subagents/agent-<id>.jsonl
/// ```
///
/// The alternative, `--forward-subagent-text`, is unusable here: it refuses to run
/// without `--output-format=stream-json`, which would change how this module reads
/// the agent's output entirely. Counting transcripts costs nothing and cannot be
/// confused with the lead merely *claiming* it delegated.
const SUBAGENT_PROBE: &str =
    "ls -1 /root/.claude/projects/*/*/subagents/*.jsonl 2>/dev/null | wc -l";

/// How many TEAMMATES the lead spawned, from the team config it maintains.
///
/// Teammates are not subagents: they are separate Claude Code sessions sharing a
/// task list, and the documented state lives at
/// `~/.claude/teams/{team}/config.json` with a `members` array (the lead itself is
/// one member, carrying agent type `team-lead`). Counting members and subtracting
/// the lead gives teammates.
///
/// Documented but NOT yet verified in our image, unlike the subagent transcript
/// path — so a zero here means "no evidence found", and the first real team
/// mission is what turns this into a fact. It is reported rather than asserted for
/// that reason.
const TEAMMATE_PROBE: &str = "cat /root/.claude/teams/*/config.json 2>/dev/null \
    | tr ',' '\\n' | grep -c '\"name\"' || true";

/// Does the CLI in THIS image accept `--settings`?
///
/// Asked of the binary rather than assumed from a version number. The stop gate
/// is installed through that flag, and an unknown option is a hard CLI error —
/// so without this probe, a Claude Code build that dropped the flag would turn
/// every gated phase into a failed one. With it, the gate degrades to absent and
/// says so, which is the difference between losing a check and losing the work.
const SETTINGS_PROBE: &str = "claude --help 2>&1 | grep -q -- '--settings' && echo SETTINGS-OK";

/// How many times the stop gate refused to let the agent finish.
const BLOCKS_PROBE: &str = "cat /root/gate/blocks 2>/dev/null || echo 0";

/// Did the gate give up and release the agent with its condition still failing?
///
/// Asked separately from [`BLOCKS_PROBE`] because the count cannot answer it —
/// see [`crate::vm_stop_gate::CAPPED_FILE`]. `cat` of a missing file prints
/// nothing and exits non-zero, so the `||` supplies the "no" that a gate which
/// never capped never wrote.
const CAPPED_PROBE: &str = "cat /root/gate/capped 2>/dev/null || echo 0";

/// The command that runs the agent in the guest.
///
/// `settings` is the path to the stop-gate settings file, when a gate is
/// installed. It lives under `/root`, never in the repo — see [`vm_stop_gate`].
fn agent_command(prompt: &str, settings: Option<&str>) -> String {
    // --permission-mode acceptEdits, matching the container path: the VM IS the
    // boundary, so prompting for permission inside it would only mean a turn that
    // waits for an answer nobody can give.
    //
    // NOT `CLAUDE_AGENT_SDK_DISABLE_BUILTIN_AGENTS=1`. It was in the plan, and it
    // is wrong: measured in the image, it removes EVERY agent type including the
    // ones `--agents` defines. The lead reported "an empty available-agents list"
    // after trying four role names and — to its credit — refused to fabricate a
    // result. A unit test asserting "builtins off is paired with our own roles"
    // passed the whole time, because the pairing holds in our code and not in the
    // CLI. So the built-in roles stay available alongside ours.
    // `tee` rather than a redirect: the file is what the node tails to stream
    // the turn live, and the exec's own stdout is what becomes `VmOutcome
    // ::summary`. Redirecting would give us the live view and an empty summary.
    // `2>&1` first so stderr — where agent CLIs put their progress — is included.
    format!(
        "cd {GUEST_REPO} && {{ claude -p --allowedTools {} \
         --permission-mode acceptEdits --agents {}{} {} ; }} 2>&1 | tee {GUEST_LOG}",
        LEAD_TOOLS.join(" "),
        shell_quote(&agent_definitions().to_string()),
        match settings {
            Some(path) => format!(" --settings {}", shell_quote(path)),
            None => String::new(),
        },
        shell_quote(prompt)
    )
}

/// Where a turn's combined output is teed inside the guest, for the node to
/// follow. Under `/root`, never the repo: anything in `/mission/repo` is
/// collected and would arrive in the user's delivered diff.
pub const GUEST_LOG: &str = "/root/agent.log";

/// Outcome of one phase VM, as observed from outside it.
pub struct VmOutcome {
    /// The agent's closing text. Diagnostic only — never evidence. Whether the
    /// phase succeeded is decided downstream against the repository.
    pub summary: String,
    pub rc: i64,
    /// Whether the work came back. A turn that ran and could not be collected is
    /// a failure even if the agent was happy.
    pub collected: bool,
    /// How many subagents the lead actually spawned, counted from Claude Code's
    /// own per-subagent transcripts in the guest.
    ///
    /// Observed, not claimed. A lead that says it "had the verifier check this"
    /// while never spawning one reads identically in its summary; this does not.
    /// `None` means the probe could not run, which is distinct from zero.
    pub subagents: Option<u32>,
    /// Teammates the lead spawned, for a mission that asked for a team. `None`
    /// when no team was requested, or when the probe could not run.
    pub teammates: Option<u32>,
    /// How many times the stop gate refused to let the agent finish. `None` when
    /// no gate was installed. Zero means the agent got it right first time,
    /// which is a different fact from "there was no gate".
    pub stop_blocks: Option<u32>,
    /// Whether the gate ran out of blocks and let the agent stop anyway, with
    /// the phase's `done_when_check` still exiting non-zero (or the tree still
    /// unchanged). `None` when no gate was installed, or the probe could not run
    /// — neither of which is "it did not cap".
    ///
    /// `Some(true)` is a FAILED turn. The gate is the only thing that ever runs
    /// a `done_when_check`, so if it gave up, nothing downstream will notice.
    pub released_at_cap: Option<bool>,
    /// What the agent's tools touched, drained from the guest tap.
    ///
    /// Empty when no tap was installed, when the hook never fired, or when the
    /// agent genuinely called nothing. Those are three different facts and this
    /// field cannot tell them apart — the unmatched-frame log and the install
    /// error are what separate them.
    pub tools: Vec<crate::vm_tool_tap::Observed>,
}

/// Boot a VM, run the phase in it, collect the result, and destroy it.
///
/// `destroy` runs on every exit path. A leaked VM holds an 8 GB sparse rootfs and
/// a firecracker process, and the node's orphan sweep is a backstop, not a plan.
pub async fn run_phase_in_vm(hub: &NodeHub, p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
    // Resolved BEFORE the VM boots: a missing subscription token must fail the
    // phase, not boot a VM whose agent will sit there unauthenticated.
    let env = crate::mission_runtime::microvm_provider_env(p.backend)?;

    let vm = MicroVm::new(hub, p.node_id, vm_id_for(p.phase_id, p.iteration, p.step));
    let created = vm.create(VCPUS, MEM_MIB, p.backend).await?;

    // From here on every early return must still destroy the VM, so the work is
    // one call whose result is held while teardown runs unconditionally.
    let outcome = run_inside(
        &vm,
        &created,
        p.task,
        p.repo,
        p.has_repo,
        &env,
        p.team_engine,
        p.gate,
        p.run_id,
    )
    .await;

    if let Err(e) = vm.destroy().await {
        // Not fatal to the phase — the work may already be collected — but loud,
        // because the alternative is an 8 GB rootfs nobody is looking for.
        eprintln!(
            "microvm_executor: mission {} phase {}: destroy {} FAILED: {e}",
            p.mission_id,
            p.phase_id,
            vm.vm_id()
        );
    }
    outcome
}

/// One phase to run in one VM.
pub struct VmPhase<'a> {
    /// The topology run this turn belongs to. Live output is keyed by it, since
    /// that is what a browser subscribes to.
    pub run_id: Option<Uuid>,
    pub node_id: NodeId,
    pub mission_id: Uuid,
    pub phase_id: Uuid,
    /// Which pass. Part of the vm id, so two passes of the same phase cannot
    /// collide on a node.
    pub iteration: i32,
    pub task: &'a str,
    /// `missions.backend` — which rootfs image. `None` boots the node's default.
    pub backend: Option<&'a str>,
    /// The host checkout, injected as a tar and collected back over the same
    /// path so `mission_delivery` needs no change.
    pub repo: &'a std::path::Path,
    /// Whether the mission has a repository at all.
    ///
    /// A repo-less mission still gets a `/mission/repo` — the agents need
    /// somewhere to write and the collect brings it back — but it is an empty
    /// workspace rather than a checkout. Without this the inject packed a
    /// directory that does not exist and the readiness probe demanded a `.git`
    /// that never would, so a repo-less microVM phase failed before the agent
    /// ran. It is the same `has_repo` `phase_runner` already threads through to
    /// choose the prompt.
    pub has_repo: bool,
    /// `missions.team_engine` — `Some("claude_code")` asks the lead to form a
    /// team. `None` is solo, which is the default.
    pub team_engine: Option<&'a str>,
    /// What must hold before the agent is allowed to stop, installed as a
    /// Claude Code `Stop` hook inside the guest. `None` leaves the turn exactly
    /// as it was.
    pub gate: Option<&'a crate::vm_stop_gate::StopGate>,
    /// Which node of a composed graph this VM is running, if any. `None` is the
    /// solo path, where the phase is one VM and the id needs no further
    /// qualification. Part of the vm id, so the nodes of one phase-iteration
    /// cannot collide on a fleet node.
    pub step: Option<u32>,
}

/// Runs one phase (or one graph node of one) in a VM.
///
/// A seam with exactly one production implementation, and it exists for one
/// reason: the composed executor's defining property is that node 2 sees node 1's
/// files, and that property is untestable against real Firecracker in a unit
/// test. A fake that models inject → run → collect faithfully can prove it in
/// milliseconds, including the negative control where the handoff is broken.
#[allow(async_fn_in_trait)]
pub trait PhaseVm {
    /// Boot a VM, run this phase in it, collect the result, destroy it.
    async fn run(&self, p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String>;
}

/// The real thing: VMs on the fleet, over the node hub.
pub struct HubVms {
    hub: std::sync::Arc<NodeHub>,
}

impl HubVms {
    pub fn new(hub: std::sync::Arc<NodeHub>) -> Self {
        Self { hub }
    }
}

impl PhaseVm for HubVms {
    async fn run(&self, p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
        run_phase_in_vm(&self.hub, p).await
    }
}

async fn run_inside(
    vm: &MicroVm<'_>,
    created: &serde_json::Value,
    task: &str,
    repo: &std::path::Path,
    // See `VmPhase::has_repo`: a repo-less mission gets an EMPTY workspace at
    // the same guest path, and is proven present differently.
    has_repo: bool,
    env: &[(String, String)],
    engine: Option<&str>,
    gate: Option<&crate::vm_stop_gate::StopGate>,
    // The run this turn's live output belongs to. `None` on paths with no
    // subscriber, which simply means the node does not follow the log.
    run_id: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
    // An agent CLI cannot reach its API without the tunnel, and a turn without
    // egress does not fail — it hangs, or reports a network error the operator
    // then has to trace back through three layers. `create` measures both ends;
    // this is the reader that makes those fields matter.
    if created.get("egress").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_bool) != Some(true) {
        return Err(format!(
            "vm {} has no egress (host={}, guest={}), so the agent could not reach \
             its API — refusing to run the phase in it",
            vm.vm_id(),
            created.get("egress_host").unwrap_or(&serde_json::Value::Null),
            created.get("egress_guest").unwrap_or(&serde_json::Value::Null),
        ));
    }

    // The checkout, as a tar. `pack_dir` names the entry `repo`, and the guest
    // unpacks it under /mission, so it lands at /mission/repo.
    //
    // A repo-less mission has no directory to pack. Create it — empty — rather
    // than skipping the inject: the guest needs the workspace to exist before
    // the agent writes into it, and creating it host-side means the collect
    // unpacks back over the same path with no special case.
    if !has_repo && !repo.exists() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(repo)
            .map_err(|e| format!("create empty workspace {}: {e}", repo.display()))?;
    }
    let archive = crate::mission_fs::pack_dir(repo, "repo")?;
    let injected = archive.len();
    vm.inject("/mission", &archive).await?;

    // Prove the guest actually has the checkout before spending an agent turn on
    // it. An inject that reports success while landing nothing would otherwise
    // become an agent reporting that the repository is empty.
    // What "landed" means depends on what was sent. A checkout is proven by its
    // `.git`; an empty workspace can only be proven by the directory itself,
    // and demanding `.git` of it failed every repo-less microVM phase before
    // the agent got a turn.
    let want = if has_repo {
        format!("{GUEST_REPO}/.git")
    } else {
        GUEST_REPO.to_string()
    };
    let probe = vm
        .exec(&format!("test -d {want} && echo REPO-PRESENT"), None, 60, &[])
        .await?;
    if !probe.stdout.contains("REPO-PRESENT") {
        return Err(format!(
            "the workspace did not land in the guest ({injected} bytes injected, \
             {want} is absent) — rc={} {}",
            probe.rc, probe.stderr
        ));
    }

    // The team addendum is appended only when the mission asked, so a solo
    // mission's prompt is byte-identical to what it was before teams existed.
    let prompt = match wants_claude_code_team(engine) {
        true => format!("{}{}", vm_prompt(task), team_prompt_addendum()),
        false => vm_prompt(task),
    };
    let mut turn_env = env.to_vec();
    turn_env.extend(team_env(engine));

    // The stop gate, installed before the turn. Every failure here is degraded
    // to "no gate" and logged: the gate makes a phase converge in ONE VM instead
    // of a second one, so losing it costs money and time — while failing the
    // turn over it would cost the work.
    // Asked ONCE, of the binary rather than of a version number, and shared by
    // both hooks: `--settings` is how either of them gets installed at all.
    let settings_supported = vm
        .exec(SETTINGS_PROBE, None, 60, &[])
        .await
        .map(|p| p.stdout.contains("SETTINGS-OK"))
        .unwrap_or(false);
    let gate_dir = match gate {
        None => None,
        Some(g) => {
            if !settings_supported {
                eprintln!(
                    "microvm_executor: {} has no `claude --settings`, so the stop gate \
                     cannot be installed — this phase runs ungated and its completion \
                     is judged only after the fact",
                    vm.vm_id()
                );
                None
            } else {
                let install = g.install_command(GUEST_REPO, crate::vm_stop_gate::GATE_DIR);
                match vm.exec(&install, None, 60, &[]).await {
                    Ok(o) if o.rc == 0 => Some(crate::vm_stop_gate::GATE_DIR),
                    Ok(o) => {
                        eprintln!(
                            "microvm_executor: could not install the stop gate on {} \
                             (rc={}): {} — running ungated",
                            vm.vm_id(),
                            o.rc,
                            o.stderr
                        );
                        None
                    }
                    Err(e) => {
                        eprintln!(
                            "microvm_executor: could not install the stop gate on {}: {e} \
                             — running ungated",
                            vm.vm_id()
                        );
                        None
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    };

    // The tool tap, on the same `--settings` seam as the gate. Best-effort in
    // exactly the same way: a phase that runs without telemetry is a phase that
    // still delivers, and failing the turn to protect a picture would be the
    // wrong trade.
    let tap_dir = match settings_supported {
        false => None,
        true => match vm
            .exec(&crate::vm_tool_tap::install_command(crate::vm_tool_tap::TAP_DIR), None, 60, &[])
            .await
        {
            Ok(o) if o.rc == 0 => Some(crate::vm_tool_tap::TAP_DIR),
            Ok(o) => {
                eprintln!(
                    "microvm_executor: could not install the tool tap on {} (rc={}): {} \
                     — this phase's actions will not appear in the World",
                    vm.vm_id(),
                    o.rc,
                    o.stderr
                );
                None
            }
            Err(e) => {
                eprintln!(
                    "microvm_executor: could not install the tool tap on {}: {e} \
                     — this phase's actions will not appear in the World",
                    vm.vm_id()
                );
                None
            }
        },
    };

    // ONE settings document, written once, carrying whichever hooks installed.
    // Two writers here is the silent clobber `guest_settings` exists to stop:
    // whichever ran second would erase the other's hook with no error at all.
    let settings = match (gate_dir, tap_dir) {
        (None, None) => None,
        (g, t) => {
            let doc = crate::vm_tool_tap::guest_settings(g, t);
            let cmd = crate::vm_tool_tap::settings_command(
                crate::vm_tool_tap::SETTINGS_PATH,
                &doc,
            );
            match vm.exec(&cmd, None, 60, &[]).await {
                Ok(o) if o.rc == 0 => Some(crate::vm_tool_tap::SETTINGS_PATH.to_string()),
                other => {
                    eprintln!(
                        "microvm_executor: could not write the guest settings on {} ({other:?}) \
                         — running with NO hooks: neither the stop gate nor the tool tap",
                        vm.vm_id()
                    );
                    None
                }
            }
        }
    };

    let out = vm
        .exec_attributed(
            &agent_command(&prompt, settings.as_deref()),
            None,
            TURN_SECS,
            &turn_env,
            run_id,
            Some(GUEST_LOG),
        )
        .await?;

    // The tool tap, drained BEFORE collect: it lives in /root, outside the
    // collected tree, and the VM is destroyed moments later. This is the only
    // chance to read it.
    let tools = match tap_dir {
        None => Vec::new(),
        Some(_) => match vm.exec(crate::vm_tool_tap::DRAIN_PROBE, None, 60, &[]).await {
            Ok(p) => crate::vm_tool_tap::parse(&p.stdout),
            Err(e) => {
                eprintln!("microvm_executor: tap drain failed on {}: {e}", vm.vm_id());
                Vec::new()
            }
        },
    };
    if tap_dir.is_some() && tools.is_empty() {
        // A tap that installed and drained nothing is the silent case: the
        // phase looks the same as it did before the tap existed. Say so, or the
        // next person debugging an empty World has no thread to pull.
        eprintln!(
            "microvm_executor: {} installed the tool tap and drained ZERO tool calls — \
             either the agent called no tools or `PostToolUse` did not fire in this image",
            vm.vm_id()
        );
    }

    // Ask the guest how many subagents ran, before collecting: the transcripts
    // live in /root, outside the collected tree, so this is the only chance.
    // Failure to probe is `None`, never 0 — "we could not look" and "it delegated
    // to nobody" are different facts and only one of them is about the agent.
    let subagents = match vm.exec(SUBAGENT_PROBE, None, 60, &[]).await {
        Ok(p) => p.stdout.trim().parse::<u32>().ok(),
        Err(e) => {
            eprintln!("microvm_executor: subagent probe failed on {}: {e}", vm.vm_id());
            None
        }
    };
    // Teammates, when a team was asked for. A team mission that formed no team is
    // silently solo otherwise — it would still deliver, still look fine, and the
    // only difference from a solo run would be the tokens it did not spend.
    let teammates = match wants_claude_code_team(engine) {
        false => None,
        true => match vm.exec(TEAMMATE_PROBE, None, 60, &[]).await {
            // `members` includes the lead, so teammates = members - 1.
            Ok(p) => p.stdout.trim().parse::<u32>().ok().map(|n| n.saturating_sub(1)),
            Err(e) => {
                eprintln!("microvm_executor: teammate probe failed on {}: {e}", vm.vm_id());
                None
            }
        },
    };
    // A team mission that fanned out to NOBODY is just a solo run that spent the
    // same tokens, and nothing else in the output would say so. Judged on the
    // subagent count, because that is the mechanism print mode actually uses —
    // teammates never form here (see `team_env`), so a zero teammate count is
    // expected and not itself a problem.
    if wants_claude_code_team(engine) && subagents.unwrap_or(0) == 0 {
        eprintln!(
            "microvm_executor: {} asked for a team and delegated to nobody — it ran \
             SOLO. Print mode satisfies a team request with subagents rather than \
             teammates, so check that the Agent tool is in the allowlist and that \
             the task is actually divisible.",
            vm.vm_id()
        );
    }

    // Collect regardless of the agent's exit code. A turn that failed partway
    // still wrote files, and throwing them away because the CLI exited non-zero
    // would discard exactly the work a retry needs to see.
    let tar = vm.collect(GUEST_REPO, crate::mission_fs::transport_excludes()).await;
    let collected = match tar {
        Ok(bytes) => {
            let parent = repo
                .parent()
                .ok_or_else(|| format!("{} has no parent", repo.display()))?;
            // Unpacked over the SAME host path the checkout came from, so
            // `capture_phase_diff_at` finds a normal checkout exactly where it
            // always has and needs no change at all.
            crate::mission_fs::unpack_into(&bytes, parent)?;
            true
        }
        Err(e) => {
            // Reported, not swallowed: an uncollected turn is a failed phase even
            // when the agent said it finished.
            eprintln!("microvm_executor: collect from {} failed: {e}", vm.vm_id());
            false
        }
    };

    // How many times the gate sent the agent back. Read only when a gate was
    // actually installed, so `None` never means "it never fired".
    let stop_blocks = match settings {
        None => None,
        Some(_) => match vm.exec(BLOCKS_PROBE, None, 60, &[]).await {
            Ok(p) => p.stdout.trim().parse::<u32>().ok(),
            Err(e) => {
                eprintln!("microvm_executor: stop-gate probe failed on {}: {e}", vm.vm_id());
                None
            }
        },
    };

    // Probed only when a gate existed, so `None` never reads as "it did not cap".
    let released_at_cap = match settings {
        None => None,
        Some(_) => match vm.exec(CAPPED_PROBE, None, 60, &[]).await {
            Ok(p) => Some(p.stdout.trim() == "1"),
            Err(e) => {
                eprintln!("microvm_executor: cap probe failed on {}: {e}", vm.vm_id());
                None
            }
        },
    };

    Ok(VmOutcome {
        summary: format!("{}{}", out.stdout, out.stderr),
        rc: out.rc,
        collected,
        subagents,
        teammates,
        stop_blocks,
        released_at_cap,
        tools,
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// The turn must be observable WHILE it runs and still report its output.
    ///
    /// `tee`, not `>`: the log file is what the node follows to stream the turn
    /// live, and the command's own stdout is what becomes `VmOutcome::summary`.
    /// A redirect would give a live view and an empty summary — which is the
    /// same "green and empty" shape this codebase keeps finding.
    #[test]
    fn a_turn_is_teed_so_it_streams_and_still_reports() {
        let cmd = agent_command("do the thing", None);
        assert!(cmd.contains(&format!("tee {GUEST_LOG}")), "{cmd}");
        assert!(
            !cmd.contains(&format!("> {GUEST_LOG}")),
            "a redirect would empty the summary: {cmd}"
        );
        // stderr must be included: agent CLIs report progress there.
        assert!(cmd.contains("2>&1"), "{cmd}");
        // And the log must live outside the collected tree, or it arrives in the
        // user's delivered diff.
        assert!(GUEST_LOG.starts_with("/root/"), "{GUEST_LOG}");
        assert!(!GUEST_LOG.starts_with(GUEST_REPO), "{GUEST_LOG}");
    }

    /// The id becomes a path component on the node, which rejects anything
    /// outside `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` rather than sanitising it.
    #[test]
    fn a_vm_id_is_acceptable_to_the_node() {
        for step in [None, Some(0), Some(11)] {
            let id = vm_id_for(Uuid::now_v7(), 3, step);
            assert!(
                id.chars()
                    .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_'),
                "{id}"
            );
            assert!(id.len() <= 64, "{id}");
        }
    }

    /// Two passes of the same phase must not collide: the second would fail with
    /// "vm already exists" while the first is still running.
    #[test]
    fn each_iteration_gets_its_own_vm() {
        let p = Uuid::now_v7();
        assert_ne!(vm_id_for(p, 1, None), vm_id_for(p, 2, None));
    }

    /// A composed run boots one VM per graph node within a single phase and
    /// iteration. Without the step in the id they would all be the same vm, and
    /// the second node would fail with "vm already exists" — or worse, if the
    /// first were already destroyed, succeed while looking like a re-run.
    #[test]
    fn each_graph_node_gets_its_own_vm() {
        let p = Uuid::now_v7();
        assert_ne!(vm_id_for(p, 1, Some(0)), vm_id_for(p, 1, Some(1)));
        // And a composed node never collides with the solo id for the same pass.
        assert_ne!(vm_id_for(p, 1, Some(0)), vm_id_for(p, 1, None));
        // Deterministic: resuming the same step asks for the same vm, which is
        // what makes a still-live duplicate fail loudly on the node.
        assert_eq!(vm_id_for(p, 1, Some(2)), vm_id_for(p, 1, Some(2)));
    }

    /// A task description contains quotes and newlines as a matter of course,
    /// and the whole command is handed to `sh -c` in the guest.
    #[test]
    fn a_quoted_task_cannot_break_out_of_the_command() {
        let nasty = "it's a 'test'; rm -rf /\n$(whoami) `id` \"quoted\"";
        let cmd = agent_command(&vm_prompt(nasty), None);
        // Everything after the opening quote of the prompt is inside it: the only
        // way out of a single-quoted string is a quote, and each one is escaped.
        let body = cmd.split_once('\'').expect("a quoted argument").1;
        for danger in ["; rm -rf /", "$(whoami)", "`id`"] {
            let at = body.find(danger).expect("the text is still present");
            let before = &body[..at];
            // An odd number of unescaped quotes before it would mean it had
            // escaped the quoting.
            let unescaped = before.matches('\'').count() - before.matches(r"'\''").count() * 3;
            assert_eq!(unescaped % 2, 0, "{danger} is not quoted in: {cmd}");
        }
    }

    /// The regression that blocked fan-out entirely: the allowlist was
    /// `Read Edit Write Bash`, so Claude Code had no way to spawn a subagent in any
    /// of our VMs. An unrecognised or missing tool name does not error — the agent
    /// just works alone and nothing says so — which is why this is asserted rather
    /// than assumed.
    #[test]
    fn the_lead_can_spawn_subagents_at_all() {
        assert!(
            LEAD_TOOLS.contains(&SUBAGENT_TOOL),
            "without {SUBAGENT_TOOL} in the allowlist there is no delegation, silently"
        );
        let cmd = agent_command(&vm_prompt("t"), None);
        assert!(cmd.contains(&format!("--allowedTools {}", LEAD_TOOLS.join(" "))), "{cmd}");
        // `--forward-subagent-text` is deliberately absent: it refuses to run
        // without `--output-format=stream-json`, which would change how this
        // module reads output. Evidence comes from the per-subagent transcript
        // instead.
        assert!(!cmd.contains("--forward-subagent-text"), "{cmd}");
        assert!(
            SUBAGENT_PROBE.contains("subagents"),
            "the probe must look at the per-subagent transcripts: {SUBAGENT_PROBE}"
        );
    }

    /// Our definitions must exist and be well-formed, because they are the only
    /// roles we control.
    ///
    /// This test used to assert that disabling the built-in roles was "paired with"
    /// defining our own. It passed while the feature was broken: setting
    /// `CLAUDE_AGENT_SDK_DISABLE_BUILTIN_AGENTS=1` removes OUR definitions too, so
    /// the pairing held in this file and nowhere else. The lesson is in the code
    /// now (see `agent_command`), and what is left here is the part a unit test can
    /// actually speak to.
    #[test]
    fn every_role_we_define_is_well_formed() {
        let defs = agent_definitions();
        let defs = defs.as_object().expect("an object of name → definition");
        assert!(!defs.is_empty(), "no roles defined means nothing to delegate to");
        for (name, d) in defs {
            assert!(
                d.get("description").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).is_some_and(|s| !s.is_empty()),
                "{name} needs a description — it is what Claude matches on to delegate"
            );
            assert!(
                d.get("prompt").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).is_some_and(|s| !s.is_empty()),
                "{name} needs a prompt"
            );
        }
    }

    /// A verifier that can edit will fix what it was asked to check and then
    /// report success, and the report is about a tree nobody reviewed.
    #[test]
    fn the_verifier_cannot_modify_what_it_checks() {
        let defs = agent_definitions();
        let tools = defs["verifier"]["tools"].as_str().expect("a tools allowlist");
        for forbidden in ["Edit", "Write"] {
            assert!(
                !tools.contains(forbidden),
                "the verifier must not have {forbidden}: {tools}"
            );
        }
        assert!(tools.contains("Bash"), "it has to be able to run the suite: {tools}");
        // Subagents default to background since 2.1.198. A background verifier lets
        // the lead write its conclusion before the check finishes, so the finding
        // would arrive after the report that was supposed to contain it.
        assert_eq!(
            defs["verifier"]["background"],
            serde_json::json!(false),
            "the lead must wait for its verifier"
        );
    }

    /// The early-victory failure: a verifier that stops after the first passing
    /// test reports success on broken work. Anthropic names it, and we have paid
    /// for it once already.
    #[test]
    fn the_verifier_is_told_to_run_the_whole_suite() {
        let defs = agent_definitions();
        let p = defs["verifier"]["prompt"].as_str().unwrap().to_ascii_lowercase();
        assert!(p.contains("complete suite"), "{p}");
        assert!(p.contains(&NO_SHORTCUTS[..40].to_ascii_lowercase()), "anti-shortcut rule missing");
    }

    /// The definitions travel as ONE shell argument through `sh -c`, and they
    /// contain double quotes, braces and apostrophes ("the project's OWN checks").
    /// A quoting bug here would hand `claude` a fragment of JSON, which it would
    /// reject — leaving the lead with no roles and no fan-out.
    ///
    /// Tested by round-tripping rather than by banning apostrophes: the first
    /// version of this test asserted the JSON contained none, which failed on
    /// correctly-quoted text and said nothing about whether the quoting worked.
    #[test]
    fn the_agent_definitions_survive_shell_quoting() {
        /// Undo `shell_quote`, the way `sh` would.
        fn unquote(s: &str) -> String {
            let inner = s
                .strip_prefix('\'')
                .and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('\''))
                .expect("a single-quoted argument");
            inner.replace(r"'\''", "'")
        }

        let json = agent_definitions().to_string();
        let quoted = shell_quote(&json);
        assert_eq!(unquote(&quoted), json, "the JSON did not survive quoting");
        // And it is still valid JSON on the other side.
        let back: serde_json::Value =
            serde_json::from_str(&unquote(&quoted)).expect("valid JSON after quoting");
        assert!(back.get("verifier").is_some(), "{back}");

        assert!(agent_command(&vm_prompt("task"), None).contains(&format!("--agents {quoted}")));
    }

    /// The tier this executor inserts must NOT be one the topology worker drives.
    /// A microvm run is owned by its own spawned task for its whole life; if the
    /// worker also considers it fair game, it requeues it at 180s, fails it on a
    /// graph it was never meant to parse, and orphans a live VM. Mission 019fd43e
    /// died at 210 seconds that way.
    #[test]
    fn a_microvm_run_is_not_worker_driven() {
        assert!(
            !cm_db::repo::topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&"microvm"),
            "the worker must not claim, requeue or reap a self-driven run"
        );
        // Same exposure, same reason.
        assert!(!cm_db::repo::topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&"session"));
        // And the tiers it does drive are still there, or nothing runs at all.
        for t in ["team", "swarm"] {
            assert!(cm_db::repo::topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&t), "{t}");
        }
        // The composed tier is the opposite case and must not be confused with
        // the solo one: its durability comes FROM being worker-driven.
        assert!(cm_db::repo::topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&"microvm_graph"));
        // But the 15-minute stuck-run reaper must not touch it: one of its nodes
        // is a whole agent session, so journaling nothing for 15 minutes is what
        // a healthy composed run looks like.
        assert!(
            !cm_db::repo::topology_runs::REAPABLE_TIERS.contains(&"microvm_graph"),
            "the reaper would kill a healthy composed run and orphan its VM"
        );
        for t in cm_db::repo::topology_runs::REAPABLE_TIERS {
            assert!(
                cm_db::repo::topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(t),
                "{t} is reapable but not worker-driven"
            );
        }
    }

    /// Solo is the default, and asking for a team must be explicit. Multi-agent
    /// costs 3-10x the tokens and is often slower, so a mission that said nothing
    /// must not get one.
    #[test]
    fn only_an_explicit_request_forms_a_team() {
        assert!(wants_claude_code_team(Some("claude_code")));
        for engine in [None, Some(""), Some("zeroclaw"), Some("solo"), Some("CLAUDE_CODE")] {
            assert!(!wants_claude_code_team(engine), "{engine:?} must not form a team");
        }
    }

    /// The flag is what enables agent teams in the CLI, and it must not leak into
    /// a solo mission — a solo run has to stay byte-identical to what it was
    /// before teams existed, or the comparison between the two is meaningless.
    #[test]
    fn the_team_flag_reaches_only_a_team_mission() {
        let on = team_env(Some("claude_code"));
        assert_eq!(on.len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(on[0].0, "CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS");
        assert_eq!(on[0].1, "1");
        assert!(team_env(None).is_empty(), "a solo mission gets no team flag");
        assert!(team_env(Some("zeroclaw")).is_empty());
    }

    /// A solo prompt must not mention teammates, and a team prompt must state the
    /// cap — the lead decides its own size and there is no flag that limits it, so
    /// the prompt is the only place the budget can be said.
    #[test]
    fn the_team_addendum_states_the_cap_and_stays_out_of_solo_prompts() {
        let solo = vm_prompt("t");
        assert!(!solo.to_lowercase().contains("teammate"), "{solo}");
        let addendum = team_prompt_addendum();
        assert!(addendum.contains(&MAX_TEAMMATES.to_string()), "{addendum}");
        // The anti-patterns worth naming, per Anthropic's own guidance: two
        // teammates in one file overwrite each other, and splitting one change
        // into stages across teammates loses context at every handoff.
        assert!(addendum.contains("DIFFERENT FILES"), "{addendum}");
        assert!(addendum.to_lowercase().contains("wait for your teammates"), "{addendum}");
        // Print mode delivers this as subagents, so the addendum must not depend on
        // teammates existing — it asks for parallel delegation, whatever the
        // mechanism turns out to be.
        assert!(addendum.contains("Delegate"), "{addendum}");
    }

    /// The teammate probe reads the team config, not the subagent transcripts —
    /// teammates and subagents are different things and counting one as the other
    /// would report a team that never formed.
    #[test]
    fn the_two_fan_out_probes_look_in_different_places() {
        assert!(SUBAGENT_PROBE.contains("subagents"));
        assert!(TEAMMATE_PROBE.contains("teams"));
        assert!(!TEAMMATE_PROBE.contains("subagents"));
    }

    /// An ungated phase's command must be byte-identical to what it was before
    /// the stop gate existed. Most phases are gated, so the ungated path is the
    /// one nobody would notice breaking.
    #[test]
    fn a_phase_without_a_gate_gets_the_command_it_always_had() {
        let cmd = agent_command(&vm_prompt("t"), None);
        assert!(!cmd.contains("--settings"), "{cmd}");

        let gated = agent_command(&vm_prompt("t"), Some("/root/gate/settings.json"));
        assert!(gated.contains("--settings '/root/gate/settings.json'"), "{gated}");
        // The flag is the ONLY difference — a gate must not quietly change the
        // tools, the permission mode or the roles.
        assert_eq!(
            gated.replace(" --settings '/root/gate/settings.json'", ""),
            cmd
        );
    }

    /// The gate is installed through `--settings`, so whether the CLI in the
    /// image HAS that flag is a fact about the image, not about our plan. An
    /// unknown option is a hard error, which would turn every gated phase into a
    /// failed one — hence a probe rather than a version check.
    #[test]
    fn the_settings_flag_is_probed_before_it_is_used() {
        assert!(SETTINGS_PROBE.contains("--help"), "{SETTINGS_PROBE}");
        assert!(SETTINGS_PROBE.contains("--settings"), "{SETTINGS_PROBE}");
        assert!(SETTINGS_PROBE.contains("SETTINGS-OK"), "{SETTINGS_PROBE}");
        // And the evidence probe reads the gate's own counter, outside the tree
        // that gets collected and diffed.
        assert!(BLOCKS_PROBE.contains(crate::vm_stop_gate::GATE_DIR), "{BLOCKS_PROBE}");
        assert!(!BLOCKS_PROBE.contains(GUEST_REPO), "{BLOCKS_PROBE}");
    }

    /// EVERY VM turn is offered delegation, composed nodes included.
    ///
    /// A composed node's task text is built by `microvm_turn_executor` and then
    /// wrapped by this same `vm_prompt` inside `run_inside`, so one prompt
    /// builder serves both paths. Composed runs report `subagents: 0` so far,
    /// and this is what says that is the TASKS being small rather than the
    /// capability being absent — if someone gave composed nodes their own
    /// prompt without the offer, the difference would otherwise show up only as
    /// a count nobody was watching.
    #[test]
    fn every_vm_turn_is_offered_the_same_help() {
        let p = vm_prompt("do the thing");
        assert!(p.contains("Agent tool"), "{p}");
        for role in agent_definitions().as_object().unwrap().keys() {
            assert!(p.contains(role.as_str()), "the prompt must name the `{role}` role: {p}");
        }
    }

    /// The agent must not be told to push: delivery is host-side, and the guest
    /// deliberately holds no forge credentials.
    #[test]
    fn the_prompt_does_not_ask_the_agent_to_push() {
        let p = vm_prompt("do the thing");
        assert!(p.contains("Do NOT push"), "{p}");
        assert!(
            !p.contains("push to a new branch"),
            "the container path's push instruction must not leak in: {p}"
        );
    }
}