Author SHA1 Message Date
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 fd5e71ccfe fix(missions): re-assert a mission's crew when its container is recreated
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m10s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m15s
Claws are provisioned exactly once, at on_launch. `ensure_container`
RECREATES a container that is not running, and recreation reseeds
.zeroclaw from the seed directory — which does not hold this mission's
claws. The agents still exist in Postgres and the crew query looks
perfect, so nothing reads as broken; the alias is simply gone from the
daemon and /ws/chat answers 400 Bad Request. A retried mission could
therefore never connect again.

Re-assert the crew after ensure_container. provision_claw is idempotent,
so this costs one call per claw on the happy path and is the difference
between a resumable mission and a dead one.

Two things this has to get right, both of which fail silently:
  - Aim at the per-mission daemon via for_gateway(ec.endpoint), never
    from_env() — that targets the shared global gateway and leaves this
    container with no claws at all, exactly as for_gateway's own doc
    comment warns.
  - Provisioning creates the agent but cannot set workspace.path (the
    config prop-schema has no way to express it), so follow with
    pin_agent_workspaces or every claw runs in its own sandbox and
    delivers nothing.

Verified on mission 01a00538: research and coding phases both completed
after four straight failures, with all five graph aliases present and
ten claws pinned to /mission/repo.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-16 07:25:58 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 85a6038c08 fix(missions): create /mission before copying the checkout in
`copy_in` cannot create its own destination, so a mission whose container
had no /mission directory failed its checkout sync outright. In copy mode
that is how the agent gets the code at all, so the phase launched against
an empty tree.

Exec `mkdir -p /mission` as root first. Idempotent, and it costs one exec
on a path that already shells out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-16 07:25:58 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 6e8785f159 fix(missions): a server restart no longer kills a running mission
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m25s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m34s
Mission 01a00538 ("ClawHDF5 REsearch and Refactor") failed 19 minutes and 93,762
tokens into its research phase with `pair failed: 403 Forbidden`, and its coding
phase was then correctly skipped as unreachable. The cause was not the coding
phase and not the model — it was pairing.

A per-mission runtime is authenticated with a SINGLE-USE pairing code, and the
bearer token it returns was cached in memory only. Any restart of the server
discarded that token; the next turn re-paired with a code the gateway had
already spent and got 403 — permanently, for that mission. A deploy, a crash or
an OOM would each do it. The durable-run machinery exists precisely so work
survives a restart; pairing was the one thread that did not, and it failed
closed.

`missions.runtime_token` persists the token at the moment pairing succeeds, and
the worker seeds the executor's cache from it, so a new process reuses the
credential instead of re-pairing. Persisting is best-effort: failing to save
must not fail a turn that just paired successfully.

Verified by reproducing the original failure: launched a mission, confirmed the
token was written, restarted the server MID-PHASE, and watched the mission run
to completion with no pairing failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 21:43:05 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 43436d7181 feat(telemetry): push bus for live agent frames
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m25s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m20s
/api/world/live is a 2s database poll, which is right for queryable state and
wrong for a token stream: reasoning only became visible after a step finished
and its row was written. This adds a process-wide broadcast bus that
topology_exec publishes to as the runtime's WebSocket delivers frames, and the
SSE handler forwards without waiting for the next tick.

Measured: the pushed frame arrived ~2.2s before the polled copy of the same
text.

Design notes worth keeping:
- A global (OnceLock), not an AppState field. The publisher is reached through
  phase_runner -> topology_worker -> MissionTap, none of which hold AppState;
  threading a handle through all of them would put a UI concern into four
  layers that have no other reason to know about one.
- Lossy by design. A slow subscriber lags and skips rather than applying
  backpressure to the agent producing. mission_events remains the durable
  record; this bus is the fast path, never the source of truth.
- Only `claw_<uuid>` aliases are attributed. The governor, door and evaluator
  drive real turns under other names, and attributing their output to an agent
  would put words in someone's mouth. Asserted in a test.
- The poll no longer emits `reasoning`: with both paths live, every turn
  arrived TWICE — once pushed, once polled ~2s later. The row is still written;
  this feed just is not its second mouth.

CEILING, measured rather than assumed: turns are not token-level because the
runtime is not streaming. zeroclaw's claude_cli provider runs
`claude -p --output-format json`, which returns ONE result object when the turn
completes — there are no incremental tokens to forward. Making this genuinely
token-by-token needs `--output-format stream-json` and incremental parsing in
the zeroclaw fork, not here. The bus is in place and will carry them the day it
does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 16:29:12 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 ba9d7aa185 feat(telemetry): WORKING ON NOW shows the mission an agent is on
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m10s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m13s
The last of the three declared-but-never-emitted event types.
`agent.task.update` had no producer anywhere in the backend, so the card read
"idle — no active task" for an agent that was mid-turn.

Derived rather than newly instrumented: an agent is working on its crew's
RUNNING mission, and that mission's phases are the steps (completed/skipped →
done, running/evaluating → active, else pending). Nothing is emitted for an
agent with no running mission, so "idle" stays truthful rather than freezing on
a stale last-known task.

Verified on a live mission: 116 agent.task.update events observed on
/api/world/live, carrying the mission title and phase steps, with the state
advancing pending → active as the phase started.

That closes the set. Of the seven cards in the command centre, five were dark:
three had no emitter at all and two read a table the mission path never wrote.
DOORS and LOOPS were correctly wired the whole time and were reporting an honest
zero.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 16:03:42 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 bf40d10064 feat(telemetry): the reasoning stream actually streams
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m18s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m17s
`agent.reasoning.delta` and `agent.tool.call` have been declared in the taxonomy
and listened for by the command centre since it shipped — and NOTHING ever
emitted them. The world feed emitted five types; neither was among them, so
REASONING STREAM could not populate no matter what an agent did.

The feed is a database poll, not a push bus, so a live card can only show what
was persisted. The worker already holds each step's output text and the claw
that produced it, so it records a `reasoning` mission_event (truncated — the
card renders a tail, not a transcript, and mission_events is capped per phase),
and the feed emits it forward from a cursor that starts at the current max so a
page load streams rather than replaying history.

`tool.call` is emitted from the same place. On the container tier it will stay
empty, and that is correct rather than broken: those agents are tool-free behind
the §15 door. Tool lines appear where agents actually hold tools.

Verified on a live mission: agent.reasoning.delta observed on /api/world/live
carrying the agent's own text, keyed by agentId.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 15:58:56 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 8be7b3c9b2 feat(telemetry): record per-agent usage for mission turns
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m31s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m23s
The command centre's SPEND, ACTIVITY and THROUGHPUT cards read `usage_events`,
and nothing on the mission path ever wrote a row: `cm_billing::charge` was
called only from the agent-run path. Measured mid-mission with 14 agents live,
`usage_events` was 0 while a crew had just burned 15k tokens — so an agent that
had done real work reported zero cost and zero activity.

The worker already knew everything needed: it logs node, role and token count
per step, and the node's `attrs.agent` carries the `claw_<uuid>` binding the
runtime dispatches on. This routes that to the ledger.

`charge`'s run_id is now Option. `usage_events.run_id` references `agent_runs`,
and a topology turn has no row there — passing its `topology_runs` id was a
foreign-key violation, which is exactly what the first attempt hit. NULL is the
honest value; the agent-run caller still passes its real id.

The executor reports one total rather than an in/out split, so the cost is right
(credits price the sum) and the columns record it as output rather than
inventing a split.

Verified end to end on a real mission: 4 agents, 1046-8670 tokens each, credits
attributed per agent, and the SPEND/ACTIVITY queries now return real numbers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 05:09:56 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 8ef7067467 fix(repos): a scoped connection can name a user, not just an org
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m19s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m42s
Scoping a Gitea connection to `osobh` — the personal namespace clawmates itself
lives in — failed with "org 'osobh' not found or PAT lacks access". The sync
only ever called /orgs/{owner}/repos, and Gitea serves user namespaces from
/users/{owner}/repos. The error pointed at permissions for what was really a
wrong endpoint, which is the kind of message that sends you to rotate a token
that was fine.

Retry as a user on 404 before giving up, and say what was actually checked.

Verified: owner=osobh now syncs 7 repos, owner=redclaw 22 — 29 instead of the
182 an unscoped connection pulls.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-14 21:00:17 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 b290025fc4 feat(agents): make delete permanent, and expose the census
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m25s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m10s
A soft delete marked the row and left it. The agent stayed in the table forever,
kept appearing on any surface that forgot `deleted_at IS NULL`, and deleting it
again did nothing — the decision was recorded and never honoured. Two agents on
this deployment had been in that state since June.

`deleted` is now a fifth lifecycle state, collected with NO grace window: a
human already decided, months ago. It takes usage_events with it, which is the
explicit trade — the alternative is rows that outlive the decision to delete
them.

Two endpoints, because this was previously only answerable by reading the
database by hand:

  GET  /api/claws/lifecycle        the census: who is active, completed,
                                   orphaned, deleted — and what is reapable
  POST /api/claws/lifecycle/sweep  run the reap now, rather than waiting out
                                   the hourly timer for a decision already made

Verified end to end: census reported both as `deleted`/`reapable`, the sweep
returned {"reaped":2,"failed":0}, and agents and usage_events both went to 0.

The safety property is unchanged and re-asserted by a new test: adding `deleted`
did not make `owned` or `active` reapable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-14 18:04:43 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 ccbc387f4b fix(agents): stop listing soft-deleted agents
deploy / test (push) Successful in 3m54s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m20s
Deleting an agent looked like a no-op: it disappeared from the workforce but
stayed on the Team board, and deleting it again did nothing because the row was
already marked. Two queries selected from `agents` without `deleted_at IS NULL`:

  routes/team.rs   the leaderboard — the surface still showing them
  routes/world.rs  the "working" set — a deleted agent holding a stale
                   agent_containers row rendered as live

Observed on this deployment: /api/workforce correctly returned nothing while
/api/team/leaderboard returned two agents soft-deleted back in June.

NOT changed: those rows still exist. Making delete permanent means hard_purge,
which also deletes usage_events — billing history, 6 credits on one of these
two. Discarding that as a side effect of tidying a roster is an explicit
decision, not something a display fix should smuggle in.

.sqlx regenerated: team.rs uses the compile-time-checked query! macro, so the
cached entry no longer matched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-14 12:20:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 a494634f81 feat(agents): classify agents by lifecycle and reap the finished and orphaned
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m42s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m7s
A mission mints a crew, and the only thing that reaped one was DELETING the
mission. A mission that merely completed left its agents in the roster forever,
and a crew whose reap was skipped or failed left agents bound to nothing —
indistinguishable in the UI from the operator's own staff.

Four states, from one query:

  owned      no agent_template_link row   → hand-created. NEVER reaped.
  active     on a running/draft mission   → working right now. Kept.
  completed  every mission terminal       → reaped after a 24h grace.
  orphaned   minted, bound to nothing     → reaped.

The discriminator is `agent_template_link`, which mission_orchestrator writes
per minted claw. This matters more than it looks: verified on live data, a
hand-created agent and an orphaned crew member both have ZERO team links and are
structurally identical by binding alone. Judging orphanhood by "no team" would
delete the user's workforce. Provenance is the only honest signal.

The grace window exists because the results view, the World's 24h replay and
"who did this work?" all read the crew AFTER the run ends; reaping on the
terminal transition deletes the answer exactly when the question gets asked. A
completed crew with no usable timestamp is KEPT — a missing date must never read
as "old enough to delete".

Also fixes the delete summary, which reported how many claws were FOUND rather
than purged: "reaped 4 claw(s)" was printed by a delete that purged none, which
is precisely the log you would read while wondering why the agents are still
there. It now reports purged / kept / FAILED, and failed > 0 is the orphan case.

Verified against live data — all four states observed, including the two that
look alike.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-14 10:55:56 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 eb120a10dd perf(image): drop chromium from the server image — 875 MB to 212 MB
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m0s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 1m41s
Chromium and fonts-liberation were 758 MB of an 875 MB image: 87% of the server
image was a browser it never launched.

It was installed for the Slice 6 mission PDF renderer, which no longer exists —
every call site passes `render_pdf: false` because markdown is the deliverable —
and NOTHING in the workspace reads the CHROMIUM_BIN this image set. The only
Chromium the platform actually uses is `browser.goto`, which runs it inside the
agent's dedicated egress-enabled BROWSER container
(cm-runtime/src/tools/browser.rs), never in the server.

Measured on gw-04: 875 MB -> 212 MB. The remainder is debian-slim (75 MB), git
and its dependencies (~95 MB) and the server binary (42 MB). git stays: research
topic clones shell out to it, which is why this image left distroless in the
first place.

Verified in the slimmed image: git 2.39.5 present, CA bundle present, chromium
absent, binary executable, templates and all 8 skills shipped.

That 663 MB was paid on every deploy, every registry push, and every air-gapped
bundle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 21:24:01 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4d07868410 ci: stop leaking a 2.8 GB postgres volume every run
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m43s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 4m0s
`docker rm -f` without -v orphans the anonymous volume the postgres image
declares. cm-testkit creates a database per test, so each CI run left ~2.8 GB
behind: 38 GB of dangling volumes had accumulated on gw-04, most of the 99 GB
-> 23 GB drop in free space over one day.

Note for anyone reaching for `docker volume prune` to clean this up: don't. On
gw-04 the dangling set also contained traefik-acme (Let's Encrypt certificates)
and all three CI cargo caches. Only the anonymous 64-hex volumes were safe to
remove.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 21:16:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 25a3d6902a ci: only publish a release for an actual tag
deploy / test (push) Successful in 3m55s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 57s
On workflow_dispatch GITHUB_REF_NAME is the BRANCH, so the upload step created a
Gitea release AND a git tag both named "main" — a tag sharing the branch name,
from a run that was only meant to be a smoke test. Both have been deleted.

Gated on github.ref_type == 'tag'. A dispatch now exercises build, SBOM, sign
and offline verify, and stops there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 21:06:44 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 837a3d3ff0 ci: don't run the install rehearsal on the production gateway
deploy / test (push) Successful in 3m56s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 56s
Every other step in the release job is inert with respect to prod — build,
SBOM, sign, offline verify. The rehearsal is the only one whose purpose is to
stand a full stack up and tear it down with `down -v`, and it was doing that on
the machine serving production. On 2026-08-13 it adopted the live compose
project and destroyed clawmates_pgdata.

The script itself is now safe (unique -p, a guard against the production project
name, and a health probe pointing at the port the bundle actually publishes) and
is kept for use on a build box or throwaway VM. What changes here is only WHERE
it runs, which was the real problem: a destructive verification step does not
belong on the host it can destroy.

Releases still build, sign, verify offline in a --network none container, and
upload to Gitea.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 20:56:30 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 875ff948f8 fix(rehearsal): probe the port the bundle actually publishes
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m0s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 55s
The health check polled 127.0.0.1:18080, but deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml
publishes "8080:8080" and deploy/airgapped/install.sh does not rewrite ports.
Nothing was ever listening on 18080, so the rehearsal always ended in
"platform never became healthy" — regardless of whether the install worked.

Visible now only because the earlier failures (no cargo, compose v1, project
collision) all stopped the script before it got this far.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 20:44:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e7d2fc9696 fix(rehearsal): never adopt the production compose project
deploy / test (push) Successful in 3m56s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 54s
INCIDENT: the release rehearsal destroyed production data on gw-04.

deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml declares `name: clawmates` at the top level,
and that beats --project-directory. So `compose up` from a temp directory did
not create an isolated stack — it ADOPTED the running production stack of the
same name, recreated its containers, and then the cleanup trap's `down -v`
deleted its volumes, including clawmates_pgdata. Prod came back with an empty
database: 177 repos, all missions and all agents gone. There were no backups.

The fix is `-p rehearse-$$` on every invocation, plus an assertion that refuses
to run under the production project name. Isolation here was implicit and
therefore not isolation at all.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 15:36:51 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 41854c70e1 ci: the install rehearsal needs compose v2, and says so
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m23s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 57s
The v1 fallback I added a commit ago cannot work: deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml
uses v2-only syntax — a top-level `name:` and long-form
`env_file: {path, required}` — so docker-compose 1.29 rejects the file outright
("'name' does not match any of the regexes"). A fallback that always fails is
worse than no fallback, so the script now requires v2 and fails immediately with
what to do about it.

$COMPOSE overrides the detection. gw-04 is deliberately left WITHOUT a
`docker compose` plugin: installing one system-wide would flip the production
rolling deploy (clawmates-deploy.sh prefers v2 when present) off docker-compose
v1 as an invisible side effect of a release change. The runner gets a standalone
v2 binary at /opt/act-runner/bin/docker-compose and the workflow passes it in,
so prod keeps rolling exactly as it did.

Verified on gw-04: standalone v2.32.4 runs, and `docker compose` still resolves
to nothing, so clawmates-deploy.sh takes its v1 branch unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 15:22:29 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 9441cf401c ci: make the install rehearsal work with compose v1
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m13s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 58s
The rehearsal reached "First boot" — bundle assembled, signed, verified offline,
images loaded, install staged — and then died with
`unknown flag: --project-directory`. That message is misleading: gw-04 has no
docker compose v2 plugin at all, only docker-compose 1.29.2, so `docker compose`
is parsed as `docker` with a bogus flag rather than reported as a missing plugin.

Use the same v2-then-v1 fallback deploy/gw-04/clawmates-deploy.sh already needs.
v1.29.2 supports --project-directory, so the invocations are otherwise unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 15:11:09 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 bd1c970577 ci: let the install rehearsal use a pre-built bundler
deploy / test (push) Failing after 2m56s
deploy / build (push) Skipped
The rehearsal hardcoded `cargo build -p clawmates-bundler`, so it died with
"cargo: command not found" on the release runner — gw-04 builds Rust inside a
container and has no toolchain of its own. The release job had already built the
bundler two steps earlier, so it was also redundant work.

CLAWMATES_BUNDLER now short-circuits that build when it points at an executable,
falling back to cargo otherwise, so running the script by hand is unchanged.

Everything before this step already passed on the runner: images built, SBOMs
generated, bundle assembled and signed, and "bundle OK: 94 artifacts verified
offline" inside a --network none container.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 15:02:05 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c1642a7004 ci: copy the bundler out of the target volume
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m24s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 58s
First dispatch failed at exit 127, "target/release/clawmates-bundler: No such
file or directory". The bundler builds inside a container where /w/target is a
NAMED VOLUME, so the binary was written somewhere no later host step can see —
the workspace's target/ stays empty. Copy it to .tools/ (bind-mounted) and
assert it landed, so the next occurrence fails at the build step with a clear
message instead of two steps later as a missing file.

deploy.yml does not hit this because it copies clawmates-node into
frontend/public/dl/ from inside the same container.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 14:51:50 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 de8736c16b ci: move release.yml to Gitea and make it actually runnable
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m37s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 56s
It could never have run as written: `runs-on: ubuntu-latest` matches no runner
on this forge, and `softprops/action-gh-release` talks to GitHub's API. There
are zero tags and zero releases, which is consistent with it never having fired.

Rewritten for this runner:
- runs-on: gw04 (the only reachable x86_64 host; prod artifacts must be amd64)
- the bundler builds in a rust container with the shared cargo cache volumes —
  gw-04 has no cargo, and installing a toolchain onto the production gateway to
  build a release is the wrong trade
- release creation + asset upload go to Gitea's own API, create-or-reuse so a
  re-run of a tag updates rather than 409s
- syft installs into the workspace, not /usr/local/bin: the host executor runs
  as root on the gateway and a release should leave nothing behind
- a disk-reclaim step, because the artifacts are GBs of image tarballs on a box
  that is also serving production. It removes only the versioned images it
  created — never a blanket prune, since clawmates/agent-*:dev exist in no
  registry and are the source of the microVM rootfs files
- workflow_dispatch added so the pipeline can be exercised without minting a tag

BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY now exists as a repo secret (fresh ed25519 keypair; nothing
depended on a previous one). The signing and offline-verify steps are unchanged:
verification still runs inside a --network none container, which is the whole
air-gapped contract.

.github/ is now empty and removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 14:43:33 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 26e571fe01 ci: drop .github/workflows/ci.yml
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m31s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 6m11s
It targets `runs-on: ubuntu-latest`, which no runner on this Gitea provides, so
every push left a failed job in the Actions tab. .gitea/workflows/deploy.yml now
covers the gates that actually hold: the full `cargo test --workspace` (including
the DB- and docker-backed integration suites, which this workflow never ran) plus
frontend typecheck and tests.

What is deliberately NOT carried over, because none of it passes today and
silently keeping a red gate is worse than removing it:
  cargo fmt --all --check      63 files drift
  clippy -D warnings           pre-existing warnings across the workspace
  ci/check-loc.sh              MissionWizard.tsx 1153 lines vs a 1100 soft limit
  ci/check-no-placeholders.sh  false positive on `vec!["rg", "TODO", "src"]`,
                               which is test DATA, not a placeholder
  playwright e2e               needs a browser toolchain on the runner

Re-adopting any of these is a cleanup project, not a workflow edit. The scripts
under ci/ are kept so that work has somewhere to start.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 12:19:43 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 548f977212 style: rustfmt the four files the repo-less mission fix touched
Found while removing .github/workflows/ci.yml: three of the four files in that
change were unformatted, and four of the diffs were newly introduced (the new
prompt tests and the tool_preamble format! call). Formatting only the files that
change already touched — a repo-wide `cargo fmt` would be 63 files of unrelated
churn and belongs in its own commit.

Mechanical; `cargo test -p cm-api --lib` stays at 322 passed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 12:19:43 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 022ef98e44 feat(auth): opt-in local auto-login for single-user deployments
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m51s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 6m33s
Skips the login form and lands on the dashboard. It performs a REAL backend
login — the API still issues and can revoke the session — so this does not
weaken auth; it only removes a form for a deployment with exactly one operator.

Gated on BOTH LOCAL_AUTOLOGIN_EMAIL and LOCAL_AUTOLOGIN_PASSWORD, and refuses
outright in clerk mode. Prod sets neither, so the route 404s there. Two
conditions rather than one flag: a single misread value should not be able to
hand a session to an anonymous visitor.

The route emits a RELATIVE Location — inside the container request.url is the
0.0.0.0:3000 bind, so NextResponse.redirect would send the browser to a host
that only exists in Docker — and the cookie's secure flag keys on
x-forwarded-proto rather than NODE_ENV.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:47:14 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 7cf77a9248 feat(ui): level up moves to the agents sidebar; repos open collapsed
Level up now sits at the bottom of the Agents sidebar, labelled with the
selected agent's name, and renders only once an agent is selected — it is hidden
during select mode so the reap bar stays the single footer action there. It is
gone from the ClawCommandCenter header.

Repos open with every org folded. Rather than seeding a "collapsed" set with all
keys on load, the state tracks EXPANDED: a smaller change that also stays correct
for orgs that arrive later from a sync, which a seeded set would render open.
With 182 repos across 8 orgs, an all-expanded default buried the org names the
list is meant to be navigated by.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:47:14 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 5db695460f fix(missions-ui): the results area could not scroll at all
The canvas host is a position:relative BLOCK, so flex:1 on MissionCanvas's root
was inert and its height collapsed to its content. That starved the scroller
beneath it — scrollHeight === clientHeight — so it never scrolled, and the
overflow spilled past the page and was clipped by the host's overflow:hidden.
Long results were rendered and then thrown away. Every sibling canvas already
used position:absolute; inset:0; missions was the only one that did not.

Measured after, on a brief 5x the viewport: one scroller, clientH 736 vs
scrollH 3244, scrolling 0 -> 2508 (exactly scrollH - clientH, i.e. the true
bottom), zero page overflow, tab strip pinned throughout.

Also removed five nested scrollers (70vh on live events; maxHeight caps on run
streams, phase summaries, artifact bodies and error traces). Those existed only
to work around the missing height and would have become portholes onto the very
content the operator is trying to read. The xterm pane keeps its bounded box —
FitAddon needs one, and a terminal owning its scrollback is correct.

Deleting the header's description peek reclaims 104px for results (header
256 -> 152px); the same text renders in full in Setup -> Overview, as the code's
own comment noted.

Streaming now follows only when already at the bottom, via a shared
useStickToBottom hook replacing two byte-identical copies, plus a "jump to
latest" pill neither had. Defaults collapse by mission state, and a remount key
fixes scrollTop leaking between tabs — a bug that only appears once scrolling
works.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:47:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4dec77ae6d fix(missions): give repo-less container missions the workspace they are promised
Every agent on a research_only mission refused to work, each reporting it was
"in Claude Code", had no /mission/repo, and only had Read/Edit/Bash. All three
statements were true. The run still recorded completed — 5 turns, 7.4k tokens,
0 artifacts, no error.

The machinery is correct when a repo IS bound (verified on a live prod
per-mission container: /mission/repo present, all 5 agents pinned). Only the
repo-less path was broken, in three layers that disagreed by construction:

- sync_in no-oped without a host checkout and copy mode does not bind /mission,
  so NOTHING created /mission/repo. The microVM tier already creates it, for the
  stated reason that "the guest needs the workspace to exist before the agent
  writes into it". Creating it host-side also un-breaks sync_out, equally a
  no-op before, so work survives across phases instead of being wiped.
- pin_agent_workspaces returned Ok after pinning ZERO agents, so the
  deliberately-fatal guard in mission_orchestrator could never fire. Its error
  text already described the exact outcome we got.
- The prompt advertised ZeroClaw tool names and explicitly denied `bash`, while
  every executor ends in `claude -p`: microVM passes Read/Edit/Write/Bash/Agent,
  session passes Read/Edit/Write/Bash, and claude_cli agents get Claude Code's
  native toolset — ZeroClaw's gating never reaches the subprocess. It was
  telling agents to use missing tools and avoid present ones.

And it went green because mission_outputs logged the failed collect and
continued — with the fail-empty rule and the NO-OUTPUT marker both BELOW that
continue, so the phase was retried forever and never failed. The retry is now
bounded by a grace window off completed_at.

Verified end to end: mission completed, agent wrote
/mission/repo/research/firecracker_vs_docker.md, collected and registered as a
document artifact (6.6 kB of real content).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:46:45 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 af89020dfd ci: put the docker CLI on PATH for the sandbox integration tests
deploy / test (push) Successful in 4m34s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 8m42s
cm-runtime/cm-sandbox tests shell out to `docker` via std::process, so the
mounted socket alone was not enough — browser_tool failed with
`docker available: NotFound`. Mount the host binary rather than apt-installing
docker.io: the container is fresh every run, so an install would re-download
~100 MB each time and cache nothing.

Verified on gw-04 that a mounted /usr/bin/docker talks to the host daemon
(client=29.1.3 server=29.1.3), and that the agent-*:dev images these tests need
are already present there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:18:01 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 ee1cea72d9 ci: mount the docker socket so the testcontainers suite can run
deploy / test (push) Failing after 2m54s
deploy / build (push) Skipped
cm-files' s3_store test starts a real MinIO via testcontainers. Without the
socket it does not skip — it fails with
`Client(Init(SocketNotFoundError("/var/run/docker.sock")))`, which looks like a
broken test rather than a missing capability. It passed locally only because the
Mac's docker socket was visible to the test process.

Sibling containers testcontainers starts are reachable because the test
container already shares the host network.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:13:26 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 8129f58845 ci: give cargo the credential for the private clawhdf5 git dep
deploy / test (push) Failing after 5m38s
deploy / build (push) Skipped
First run failed in `cargo test --workspace`: "failed to load source for
dependency clawhdf5", preceded by three "spurious network error: invalid packet
line" retries. Two separate causes, both needed:

- libgit2 cannot fetch from Gitea's smart-HTTP. images/server.Dockerfile already
  sets CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI for exactly this; the test step did not.
- quantumclaw/clawhdf5 is private (401 anonymous), so the CLI fetch needs a
  credential. Supplied via an insteadOf rewrite from a repo secret, so the token
  is masked in logs and never committed.

The server image build does not hit this — it builds only clawmates-server,
which does not pull cm-brain's clawhdf5 path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:06:34 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 b1bf50160a ci: build and deploy to production from a push to main
deploy / test (push) Failing after 42s
deploy / build (push) Skipped
Closes the one manual step left in the pipeline. gw-04 has run
clawmates-deploy.timer every minute since July, pulling :latest and rolling on
drift — the CD half already worked. What was missing was anything that moved
:latest, since the old build host (tank) is packed for the move.

The runner lives on gw-04 because it is the only reachable x86_64 host and prod
images must be linux/amd64: web-01 is aarch64 and the fleet build boxes are
offline. Host executor, capacity 1, so builds serialize rather than competing
with production traffic.

Three details that are not obvious:
- `docker push :latest` does NOT move the tag on this registry once the manifest
  exists under another tag. The PUT-the-manifest step is what actually moves it,
  and its absence is how a "successful" deploy could leave prod on a stale image.
- The final step verifies the image prod is RUNNING, not the one we pushed. A
  green edge on the old image is the failure this pipeline exists to prevent.
- broker is built here too. It had no :latest tag at all, so gw-04's deploy loop
  logged a pull failure every single cycle since 2026-08-11.

Also ignore the local env backups: `.env` was ignored but `.env.bak.*` was not,
and those copies hold real credentials.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-13 10:03:35 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 dc8f65fc64 fix(metrics): GPU, network and disk IO were arriving and being dropped
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
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`gpu_pct` read `info.g` as a scalar. Beszel 0.18 puts GPU in a different
collection entirely, as a MAP keyed by GPU index —
`{"0":{"n":"GeForce RTX 5060 Ti","u":0,"p":4.38}}` in `system_stats.stats`
— and `systems.info` carries no `g` at all. So every NVIDIA node reported
null while the data sat one request away. Null and "no GPU" are
indistinguishable downstream, so the fleet card showed nothing and a
`gpu_pct` drain rule could never fire, both without an error.

`net_sent_ps`, `net_recv_ps`, `disk_read_ps` and `disk_write_ps` were
columns nothing ever wrote. They come from the same sample.

The two array orders were MEASURED, not read off a schema, because
inverting one does not fail — it reports upload as download forever:

  b   = [sent, recv]. `stats.ni` gives per-interface [sent_ps, recv_ps,
        total_sent, total_recv]; indices 2 and 3 matched /proc/net/dev
        tx_bytes and rx_bytes on all four of tank's interfaces, and `b` is
        the sum of the per-second pair across them.
  dio = [read, write]. An 800 MB dd on tank moved index 1 from 7441 to
        23688 while index 0 stayed near zero.

`info.ct` is deliberately NOT mapped to container_count. It reads 1 on
tank, which runs 1 container, and also 1 on architect, which runs 4 —
right exactly often enough to pass a spot check.

One extra request per poll, not one per node: the newest 1m sample for
every system arrives in a single sorted page. A hub that cannot answer it
falls back to the info snapshot rather than losing the CPU and memory
readings that still work.

GPU is the busiest card, not the mean — placement asks whether there is a
free GPU, and averaging a saturated card with an idle one answers a
question nobody asked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 17:53:16 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 8470534e33 chore(fleet): drop morpheus from the deploy loop
ci / gates (push) Failing after 7s
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morpheus is packed for a move. It is drained in the `nodes` table —
heartbeats preserve `draining`, so it stays out of placement when it comes
back — and removed from the agent-image loop here.

An unreachable host in NODES does not merely skip it. The image loop
fails the whole script BEFORE its verify stage, so four deploys in a row
rolled the server and frontend correctly and then reported nothing at all;
every one had to be confirmed by hand. Keep this list to hosts that answer.

The name is left in a comment rather than deleted: putting it back is one
word, and the next person will want to know where it went.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 16:24:57 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c59cd9c424 feat(viz): the World draws missions, never the org chart
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
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The World seeded the Organization → Company → Team → Agent tree whenever
no mission was pinned — "My Workspace → General → Everyone". That tree
describes almost nothing: `agents` has no org, company or team column,
real membership is the `team_members` join, and four of its containers are
fabricated in the browser and exist in no table.

Worse, it did not replace the mission view, it SHARED the canvas with it.
The plan events are only filtered by id when a mission is pinned, so with
nothing pinned a live mission was drawn on top of the org chart: two
unrelated graphs, both parented at the invisible root, reading as one
scene in which they somehow connected. They never did — there is no edge
between them because there is no relationship in the data to draw.

The World now shows exactly one mission, or none. Three parts:

- the org tree is gone from the canvas seed, and `worldCanvasRoots`,
  `narrowRoots` and `stripSynthetics` with it. The sidebar keeps its
  synthetic containers so orphaned agents still have a visible home.
- the default focus prefers a RUNNING mission over the newest one.
  Newest-first picked whatever was created last, which on a workspace with
  history is a finished mission — so starting a run left the World looking
  at an old static map while the new work went unwatched.
- exactly one mission is focused whenever there is any, which is
  load-bearing rather than cosmetic: the plan channel keeps ONE `planRef`,
  so two missions on the wire overwrite each other's title and phases and
  the scene becomes a blend of two runs that never happened.

Seeding "all missions" was the tempting middle ground and is wrong twice:
/api/workforce returns every mission ever with no limit, which puts
hundreds of agents back on one canvas, and the plan channel cannot hold
more than one anyway.

An empty stage now says so. Blank canvas and broken page look identical,
and filling that silence with a hierarchy that meant nothing is how this
started.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 14:24:47 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 9f76f0915b fix(runtime): announce the runtime image once, not on every sweep tick
ci / gates (push) Failing after 12s
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`MissionRuntimeProvisioner::from_env` is called per use — on every mission
launch and from the terminal-mission reaper sweep — so the line added in
cdc45bd would have printed on every tick forever. A log that repeats
itself is a log nobody reads, which would have cost exactly the
visibility the line was added to provide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 14:08:10 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 cdc45bd082 chore(runtime): promote v0.8.4 from canary to the default image
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
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Every mission on gw-04 was already running v0.8.4 — pinned by
CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_IMAGE in .env. The canary is retired: the default tag
`clawmates-runtime:sync` now IS that image, the override is commented out,
and the built-in default is the single source of truth again.

Promoting it exposed why the pin was load-bearing in the first place. The
default tag resolved to zeroclaw 0.8.3 — two releases behind what was
actually running — and the REGISTRY copy of the same tag was a different
image again, 849MB against 2.31GB, without the Rust toolchain. A host that
pulled `sync` rather than retagging it would have lost the on-green test
gate with every probe still reporting success.

A moving tag pointing somewhere old resolves perfectly, starts perfectly,
and runs old code. Nothing anywhere said which image a mission got, so two
things now do:

- mission_runtime logs the image it resolved and whether that came from
  the env override or the built-in default, once at startup.
- runtime_preflight probes `zeroclaw --version` alongside the other tools
  and prints every tool's VERSION, not just that it is present. A presence
  check passes happily on an image two releases behind, which is exactly
  what happened here and was found by running the binary by hand.

Rollback is a retag: `clawmates-runtime:pre-v084-default` on gw-04 holds
the previous default, and .env.pre-v084-default holds the previous pin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 13:57:08 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d810fc0a86 fix(viz): read the gateway's real tool_call keys, and correct the record
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
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The frame is `{"type":"tool_call","id","name","args"}` — zeroclaw-gateway
/src/ws.rs. The tap read `tool` then `name`, and `arguments` then `input`.
`name` happened to be in the fallback chain; `args` was not in it at all,
so a container-tier tool call would have been recorded with its name and
NO path — a tool that reads as having touched nothing. `tool` and
`arguments` belong to `approval_request`, which is where they came from.

Also corrects what the histogram was read as saying. A mission turn on
gw-04 carried only chunk/done/session_start, and the first reading was
"there is no tool_call frame". Wrong: `grep -c tool_call` on the deployed
0.8.3 binary returns 46. Container-tier agents are provisioned tool-free
behind the MCP door (§15), so they call nothing — there is nothing to
observe on that tier, and nothing is broken.

That distinction is exactly what the histogram was shipped to make
possible: a tap matching no frame is otherwise indistinguishable from a
mission that used no tools.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 12:22:43 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 31158467f4 feat(viz): microVM tool motion is live, and needs no fleet-node change
The plan deferred this as "the only fleet-node binary change". It is not
one. `fcagent` is thread-per-connection — its own comment says so, and
the live log tail has relied on exactly that for the whole length of a
turn, on a second connection. So the host can drain the tap WHILE the
turn's exec is in flight, from the server alone.

The turn and a 20s drain loop now run concurrently. A coding phase shows
its files being touched as it works rather than an hour later, all at
once, and the drain is bounded by a cursor so a repeated poll returns
only what is new.

The cursor counts LINES, not parsed events, and that distinction is the
bug this commit would otherwise have shipped. The hook appends the event
and then a newline of its own, so a two-event tap is four lines; advancing
by event count leaves the cursor two lines short, `tail -n +N` hands back
events already recorded, and the live drain re-records everything it has
already written — worse the longer the turn runs, and silent throughout.
Caught while writing the test, not by it.

`tap_sink` and `VmOutcome::tools` are mutually exclusive by contract: with
a sink, the sink owns recording including the final batch and `tools`
comes back empty. Handing the same calls back on both would double every
file orb's weight with no way for the caller to tell which it was
looking at.

The sink is an unbounded channel to a recorder task, so the VM executor
stays free of the database: it observes, phase_runner records. The task
ends when the sender drops with the phase.

Verified before this change: the microVM tap is real. The `microvm`
scenario passed 6/6 and left ten `tool.call` rows and a `file.touch` on
MICROVM.md, repo-relative, from Claude Code's own PostToolUse hook.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 12:19:28 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f8438c32ea feat(viz): kind-specific choreography and a finished mission you can read
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
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Security: the pawns already orbited their destination, so homing them at
the security station gave circling for free. This adds the radial
press-and-retreat — an agent closing on the target and backing off reads
as probing it, where a fixed radius reads as waiting — and holds the
stochastic target release while probing, or the circling breaks up into
stray trips that look like distraction rather than a scan.

Findings are `mission_tasks` rows, one orb each, popped once. There is
deliberately no severity anywhere in the path: the scanner keeps
severity, file and line as substrings inside `title`, so a severity
parsed out of prose and rendered as an orb's RADIUS would be the picture
asserting a measurement the data never contained. Count only.

Benchmarks annotate the station, as text. `delta` has no schema —
compute_delta emits `{kind:"opaque"}` whenever the before/after metrics
were not structurally comparable, which is most drivers. The server
formats the shape it can parse and COUNTS the rest; an unparseable driver
reports "3 sample(s)" rather than an invented improvement, and an opaque
delta says nothing at all.

The finished map: the live label rule gates service/event nodes on
`heat > 0.12`, which is exactly backwards once everything has cooled — a
static map would be unlabelled dots. Frozen, the 25 most-touched nodes
label regardless of heat, phase stations carry a second line counting
what they produced, and the camera is released ONCE so it frames the
result even if the user panned during the run.

Every count in a caption is read off the drawn scene rather than a
parallel tally, so the words and the picture cannot disagree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 09:22:16 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 9e61e3ba35 feat(viz): what the agents actually did, as structured events
The World could draw a mission's shape but nothing about the work. The
detail existed only as prose in checkpoint.log and model output, where a
tool name is indistinguishable from an agent *talking about* a tool — so
it was never parsed, deliberately. `mission_events` is the structured
channel that replaces it.

Three taps, one table:

- Container tier: the `_ => {}` at the end of topology_exec's typed frame
  stream now matches `tool_call` and reads the tool's JSON ARGUMENTS for a
  path. Never the prose summary — a path scraped from a sentence would put
  files on the map that no agent opened, and the test proves a Grep whose
  summary says "src/main.rs" produces no file touch. The frame name itself
  is unverified, so the same commit ships an unmatched-frame-type
  histogram: a tap that matches nothing looks exactly like a mission that
  used no tools, and this is how one gw-04 run names the real frame.

- microVM tier: a `PostToolUse` hook, the seam vm_stop_gate already proved
  fires under `claude -p`. It copies stdin to /root/tap and exits 0
  unconditionally — a non-zero PostToolUse hook talks back to the model,
  which would turn the observer into a participant. Drained before collect,
  since the VM is destroyed moments later.

- Phase transitions: five identical copies of the pending→running UPDATE
  became one `mark_phase_running`, and `close_finished_phases` grew
  RETURNING. Its CASE decides each phase's status inside SQL from rows the
  statement does not change, so it cannot be re-derived afterwards without
  writing that CASE twice — without RETURNING it emits zero phase.completed
  and reports success.

The settings.json hazard the plan called out: the stop gate wrote the
WHOLE document, so a second hook writer would have silently erased it and
a coding phase would then complete having written nothing — the exact
failure the gate exists to catch. There is now one composer,
`vm_tool_tap::guest_settings`, one writer, and a source-walk test that
fails if anything else writes a settings document.

`mission_events.run_id` carries no FK on purpose: phase_runner DELETEs
topology_runs on retry, and a cascade would erase a phase's whole history
the moment it retried — silently, since a cascade is not an error.

world.rs streams it with a cursor that separates backfill from motion.
Everything already in the table when a subscriber arrives is drawn as
settled history; only what lands afterwards animates. Otherwise opening a
finished mission replays an hour of tool calls as a burst storm.

Bounded twice: 400 events per phase (enforced inside the INSERT, since
two concurrent taps would each read a count below the cap) and a 7-day
retention sweep in mission_gc.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 09:16:50 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c2fa8067e1 feat(viz): the coding station fractures into the files it worked on
The engine already turned `file:src/lib/a.ts` into a real dir chain, but
both copies of that loop rooted it at the origin — so a mission's files
floated beside the map instead of belonging to the work that produced
them. One `fileParent` helper now serves both call sites; splitting them
was how half the files could end up nesting correctly and half not,
decided by whichever code path saw the file first.

Files hang under the coding station when there is exactly one, else the
single running phase, else the origin. `world.touch` carries no phase id,
so with two coding phases any attribution is invented — the fallback is
the honest answer.

Two ordering hazards, both silent:
- the server emitted files BEFORE phases, so on the first pass a file
  arrived with no station to hang under and first-write-wins pinned its
  tree at the origin. Loops reordered, with a source-walk guard.
- `setFileHome` re-parents trees rooted before the plan landed, for the
  reconnect case the ordering alone cannot cover.

`mission.file` with `source: "tool"` is treated as motion (burst, pawn
beams); `"diff"` is end-of-phase truth and only marks the file present
and warm — bursting every file of a captured diff would set the whole
map alight at once on reconnect.

Directories taper in radius and opacity by path depth, so `src` and
`src/lib/live` no longer render as identical dots.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-11 08:29:55 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 cb8184e784 feat(delivery): record WHICH files a phase touched, not just how many
`capture_phase_diff_at` parsed `git diff --stat` down to three integers and
threw the filenames away. Nothing downstream could name a single file a coding
phase changed: the World can draw a coding station but nothing underneath it,
and an operator reading a mission sees "11 files" with no way to learn which.

A second `--name-status` call now records the paths into the code_diff metadata
and into `names.txt` beside `diffstat.txt`, so raw evidence survives
independently of the JSONB.

Three ways this could have been wrong, each guarded:

  - Different revision or excludes from the `--stat` call would make
    `files_changed` and the path list describe different diffs, with no way to
    tell which lied. A source-walk test pins both to the same `base_sha` and
    the same `excludes`.
  - Running after `git reset --quiet` would drop newly CREATED files, since
    `--intent-to-add` is what makes them visible to diff at all — and the stat
    would still count them, so the list would look merely incomplete rather
    than wrong. A test asserts the ordering.
  - A rename is `R100\told\tnew` — three fields. Taking field two records where
    the file USED to be, naming a path nobody can open, and the bug is
    invisible in any repo where nothing was renamed. `changed_paths` is now
    shared with auto_merge (which had the same parse) and takes the NEW path,
    with tests for renames and copies.

The list is capped at 500 paths with `files_truncated` beside it: a cap that
silently clips is worse than no cap, because "touched 12 files" and "touched at
least 500" would look identical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 22:34:39 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f37c6b92d8 feat(viz): a station shows whether it is pending, working, or done
Three independent questions get three independent channels, because encoding
them all as brightness makes "not started" and "finished" identical:

  stateAlpha  presence  — a pending station is faint; it has not happened yet
  heatFloor   life      — a running station stays lit between events
  settledColor settlement — a terminal station wears a ring (green/red/grey)

heatFloor is one line in the decay (`max(floor, heat - dt*0.5)`) and it lights
the whole existing treatment, since emissive, radius, glow and sparks are all
already heat-driven. The ring is the only new primitive and it earns its place.

The part that matters most is the staleness decay. A phase is drawn lit because
`mission_phases.status` says `running` — and that column keeps saying `running`
long after the agents behind it have died. Drawing that confidently lit is the
exact failure this codebase keeps hitting: something that looks alive because a
status field says so. After 90s with no real event landing on the station, its
floor sinks to a dim ember and the HUD counts it as "quiet", so a busy station
and an abandoned one cannot look the same.

That is also why `applyMissionPlan` only sets a running phase's floor ONCE, on
first sight. Re-applying it on every plan refresh would relight a dead station
every few seconds — the poll would silently undo the decay.

Rings are removed as well as added: status moves backwards when a phase
re-enters `running` on a retry, and they are swept with the mesh they orbit or
they leak one per phase and keep drawing at a stale position.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 22:31:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 006432c2dc feat(viz): the mission becomes a map — centre, stations, and agents at theirs
The clump was structural, not cosmetic. Four causes, each fixed here.

`homes` (an agent's resting node) was written only by `seed()`, so every agent
homed to the mission centre and orbited the same dot regardless of which phase
it was on. `setHome` points each agent at its CURRENT phase, and the existing
physics does the rest for free: the pawn rests at its station, the pawn→home
line tethers it there, and a touch becomes a visible departure and return. No
new motion code.

The mission node was seeded as `level: "team"` (my own bug from the focus
work). `seed()` casts that straight to a Tier and `ensureNode` is
first-write-wins, so it was created as a small teal team dot that the later
`node.activity` could never upgrade. That dot at the centre of the scene was
one line.

`mission`/`phase` replace the retired `repo`/`loop` tiers rather than adding a
parallel set. The backend stopped emitting repo:/loop: ids, which left their
whole landmark treatment — bigger radius, distinct colour, always-labelled, 60s
fade instead of 22s — orphaned on prefixes nothing sends. Missions and phases
need exactly that treatment. The two separately-written prefix→tier ternaries
in onTouch and onNodeActivity are now one `tierFor`: they agreed only by luck,
and whichever path saw a node first fixed its tier forever.

Phase stations spring out at 190 rather than the shared 64, or they pack into a
rosette around the centre and the point — agents moving BETWEEN stations — is
invisible. Idle roam is off under a mission scope: wandering to a random node
keeps an idle workspace alive, but inside one mission it sends agents to files
nobody opened, which reads as work and isn't.

Palette is injected at construction and keyed on template_kind, so a benchmark
run and a security sweep no longer render identically to a research mission.
It also collapses two uncoordinated kind→colour maps that had drifted:
LEVEL_COLOR by tier, and the fireColor if-chain by id prefix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 18:17:12 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 5f85dbb718 fix(world): missions were never really on the wire
Three bugs in one query, each hiding the next, plus one that made the whole
rich layer dead code.

`active_missions` joined `team_members` on `missions.team_id` — the LEGACY
pointer at the first minted team, superseded by the `mission_teams` junction in
0056. It was an INNER JOIN, and `mission_orchestrator::on_launch` deliberately
mints no team for a microVM mission, so the platform's primary execution tier
was dropped by a join and the World has been showing nothing at all for it. And
it selected only `status='running'`, while missions finish in minutes, so the
scene was empty almost always.

Now: join `mission_teams`, LEFT so teamless missions survive (their `agent_id`
is NULL and no pawn beams at them, which is the truth — nothing on this
platform ran that phase except a VM), and include missions finished in the last
24h carrying `status`/`template_kind` so the client can draw a finished map
instead of animating a corpse. `?mission=` scopes the feed server-side.

The whole phase plan now ships as `mission.phase`, including phases that have
not started: a phase list that appeared only as phases began made a five-phase
mission look like a one-phase mission until it was nearly over. Attribution
reuses `phase_runner::purposes_for` rather than copying it — two copies would
let the picture disagree with the machine about who is working on what, which
presents as a rendering bug and is really a lie.

Deleted the checkpoint tail. It read `topology_runs` keyed by an `agent_runs`
id; mission phases live in `topology_runs` under independently generated ids,
so it ran every poll and matched nothing, for every mission, forever. That is
why no mission has ever shown tool or file activity. Not repointed at
`topology_runs`: its only per-step content is the agent's own prose, and a tool
name in prose cannot be told from an agent talking about a tool. The a2a
`run_events` tail is kept — it genuinely works for the path that writes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 17:58:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 b210acf3c2 feat(viz): pin the World to one mission by default
Two leftovers from the sidebar swap.

The header still read "N ORGS · N AGENTS", describing the org->company->team
forest this tier stopped rendering; it now counts the missions and the distinct
people the sidebar actually lists.

And with nothing selected the World still fell back to every agent of every
mission in one space. That is not a picture of anything that happens — missions
do not share a stage, and past a few dozen agents the scene says less the more
it shows. It now pins to the most recent mission (the workforce feed is ordered
newest-first) and stays on whatever mission is pinned when an agent is selected
from the graph rather than from a mission group.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 16:57:02 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 44079eb8b4 feat(viz): the World shows one mission, not every mission at once
The visualization page carried the org -> company -> team -> agent forest in its
sidebar — the hierarchy the agents page stopped rendering — so the two pages
disagreed about the shape of the workspace, and there was no way to ask the
World to show a single mission. Everything ran together in one clump.

Same sidebar as the agents page now: My Workforce, missions under it, agents
under those. Selecting a mission scopes the scene to that mission's crew.

Scoping had to happen at the FEED, not the seed. `WorldEngine.ensurePawn`
materialises a pawn for any agentId an event mentions, so seeding the engine
with one crew would have left every other mission's agents streaming in
anyway — the view would have looked filtered for a frame and then re-clumped.
`focusAgents` gates every agent-bearing event, `focusMissionId` keeps other
missions' landmark orbs out, and comm beams require BOTH ends in focus or a
delegation would drag an outside agent onto the stage.

The engine also re-seeds when the focus changes. It was seeded once on mount,
which was right when the World only ever showed everything; now a stale engine
would keep the previous mission's pawns on stage, and the feed filter cannot
remove what is already there. Keyed on focusMissionId rather than on `roots`
identity — `roots` is rebuilt every Dashboard render, so depending on it would
throw the scene away continuously.

The HUD says which mission is being shown when scoped. A filtered world and an
idle world look identical otherwise, and that difference is the whole question
a viewer is asking.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 16:17:28 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d3a398716b fix(workforce): a crew should not read as an alphabetical run
Seeding the name pick with the role index (0..n) started every crew at the top
of the pool and took the next free names, so the first mission after the switch
to per-mission crews hired Aarav, Abebe, Adaora, Adrian, Agnieszka. Unique and
correct, and transparently generated.

Seed from the claw's own uuid instead. UUIDv7 puts its random bytes LAST — the
leading bytes are a timestamp, which would cluster the same way — so the tail
is what spreads five picks across the whole pool.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 15:57:54 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 98037f9b3e feat(workforce): every mission hires its own crew
Reverses the reuse added earlier, by operator decision. Reuse hired the
existing claw for a (template, slot) so the roster stayed at one team — but it
also meant every mission was staffed by the same five names, and the workforce
view showed one crew repeated down the page with nothing to tell the missions
apart. Distinct crews read better than a bounded roster.

The cost is the one reuse existed to avoid: claws are lifecycle='permanent'
and nothing reaps them until their MISSION is deleted, so the roster now grows
by the team size per mission. `agent_names::pick` keeps names unique
workspace-wide and degrades to a numeric suffix rather than colliding, and the
pool grew from 70 to 200+ given names so a workspace runs ~35 missions before
the first repeat. `reusable_claw` is kept in cm-db with its tests: this policy
has now flipped twice and the query is the hard part.

Also revives a test that had silently stopped running. An edit stranded
`runtime_data_is_scoped_to_one_mission`'s `#[test]` above its neighbour,
leaving two attributes there and none here — so the neighbour ran TWICE and
this one never ran at all. The total test count was unchanged by the fix
(291 before and after), which is exactly why a count is not evidence: rustc
had said "duplicated attribute" and "function is never used" all along, and
both read as ordinary warnings. The test guards per-mission `/zeroclaw-data`
isolation, i.e. one mission reading another's door token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 15:53:12 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c85027c83a fix(workforce): team_members.role, not role_slot
The roster query named tm.role_slot. That column is on agent_template_link;
team_members calls it plain `role`. These queries use untyped sqlx::query(),
so nothing caught it at compile time and the endpoint 500'd on its first real
request — the 401 an unauthed probe returns looks identical whether the SQL is
valid or not, which is why the payload had to be fetched with a real session
before believing the route worked.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 14:32:22 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0ad53da49c feat(workforce): missions group the roster, and agents get human names
Three things, all visible on the agents page.

**The roster looked like it was multiplying.** The sidebar flattened
orgs → companies → teams → agents, which renders a claw once per TEAM it
belongs to. Claws are reused across missions now, so a crew of five that had
run five missions appeared as twenty-five rows of the same five people. The
data was right and the view was lying. `GET /api/workforce` returns the roster
grouped by mission, and the tree renders each mission as a collapsible group,
so the repetition means something: the same colleague under each mission they
staffed. Claws on no mission come back under "Not on a mission" rather than
vanishing. The root now counts DISTINCT people, not rows.

**Agents were named after their jobs.** A team came back as planner, coder,
tester, reviewer, committer — the UI showed the same word twice (name on top,
role beneath) and the roster read as a stack of job tickets. New claws get a
given name from a deliberately wide pool (Amara, Vijay, Tomasz, Meredith…),
unique against the workspace roster AND within the team being minted. The role
is untouched in `job_title`, which is what the mission machinery binds on:
team_members.role_slot and the topology node carry the slot, so nothing
downstream keys off the display name. A reused claw keeps the name it had.

**Two latent reap bugs found while investigating a leak that was not one.**
Containers of completed missions are removed by `spawn_sweeper` after a
30-minute grace, and it works — an earlier report of leaking containers was me
reading that deliberate grace as a bug. But:

  - the sweeper cleared the runtime binding even when teardown FAILED, and it
    selects on `runtime_endpoint IS NOT NULL`. One transient docker error would
    therefore hide a surviving container from the only thing that would retry
    it, permanently. It now asks docker whether the container actually
    survived: gone means clear, still there means keep the binding and retry —
    which closes the orphan path without reintroducing the infinite retry the
    original comment was guarding against.
  - `set_runtime_binding` discarded rows_affected, so a mismatched workspace
    updated nothing and returned Ok. The binding is how the sweeper finds a
    container; a silent no-op there leaks one with no record of anything wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 14:26:42 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e2c312b728 docs(runtime): the judge no longer runs on a dead credential
`provider_alias_for` still documented the judge as deliberately sitting on
`anthropic.judge`/API key, so a subscription throttle would degrade missions
while verification kept working. That credential is an account with a zero
balance — driving the real path returns 400 "Your credit balance is too low" —
so the comment pointed the next reader at something that cannot answer.

`anthropic.default` and `anthropic.judge` are retired from the runtime config
and every agent that named them was repointed onto a live credential. The
independence argument that put the judge there still holds; it is now served by
a different FAMILY rather than a different key — CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL is
glm:glm-4.7 on gw-04, and cross_provider_judge already refuses a validator in
the implementer's own family.

Config-side (gw-04, not in this repo): 755 -> 246 lines, 128 -> 14 agent
blocks, after sweeping 19 [agents.claw_<uuid>] corpses — every one verified
against agents WHERE deleted_at IS NULL. Nothing reaped those, and the file is
byte-copied into every mission.

Verified: scout/judge/worker_kimi/worker_glm each answer on their new
provider, and multirole passes 4/4 against the reorganized config.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 13:18:16 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 104e3ef27c fix(runtime): the kimi fallback hop spawned a binary that 401s
A throttled subscription had nowhere to go. `claude_cli.default` carried no
`fallback`, and neither target alias was declared — they existed only as
commented-out examples. Forcing a 429 with a shimmed `claude` surfaced four
defects that all read as correct config and do nothing:

  - a `[providers.models.<f>.<a>.env]` SUB-TABLE is parsed then silently
    ignored ("fields must live directly under ..."). This block was already
    live for claude_cli.default, so the token injection has been inert. For
    the glm alias it would have dropped the z.ai routing AND the clearing of
    CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — credentials crossing between providers.
  - an empty `[providers.models.kimi_cli.default]` is skipped at runtime.
  - a claude_cli alias used as a fallback needs a non-empty `api_key` to pass
    FamilyProviderFactory's default readiness gate, even though the provider
    ignores the key and authenticates through `env`. Absent it the agent dies
    at STARTUP, which takes out every mission, not just throttled ones.
  - timeout_secs=600 capped every turn under the 3600s TURN_TIMEOUT from
    4c418f7, so that raise bought long turns nothing.

The kimi hop then 401'd: `kimi_cli` spawns the `kimi` binary, which rejects a
Kimi Code key. Kimi is reached the way the agent-kimi microVMs already reach
it — the `claude` binary against api.kimi.com/coding (no /v1; Claude Code
appends it). So the hop is `claude_cli.kimi`, and `kimi_cli.default` is left
declared but out of the chain so the finding stays visible.

kimi-home joins SEEDED_PATHS: each claude_cli fallback alias needs its own
HOME with a .claude.json, and separate homes stop two concurrent fallbacks
from sharing one Claude Code session directory.

Measured on gw-04 against the live config, zeroclaw 0.8.4:
  throttled primary -> OK (chain fires)   happy path -> OK (no regression)
Isolating each hop: kimi alone answers, glm alone answers, and with an empty
fallback the turn fails `rate_limited` at phase=http_response — the control
that makes the other two mean something. An earlier OK came from glm, not
kimi, so the reply alone was never evidence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 12:46:11 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4c418f7d9b fix(runtime): a turn gets the phase's budget, not 100s more than one call
A turn is an agent LOOP, not one model call. Each call inside it is bounded
separately by the daemon — `claude_cli`'s `timeout_secs`, 600s on gw-04,
verified in the live config — so TURN_TIMEOUT has to cover however many calls
the loop makes, not one of them. It was 700s.

MEASURED: a healthy research turn is ~157s. A throttled one blew the budget with
one slow call plus a second, and the executor killed it at 11m43s with no error
from the daemon, because nothing had failed yet. The operator got
"turn executor failed: turn timed out" and the container holding the reason was
torn down minutes later.

An hour matches the phase's own budget. A genuinely stuck CALL is still caught
at 600s by the daemon and surfaces as a real error; this only stops us killing
turns that are working, slowly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 10:51:08 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 b2e2735583 fix(diag): "turn timed out" now says what the agent was doing
A research_and_code mission failed with:

  turn executor failed: turn timed out
  turn executor failed: turn timed out

and that is the entire record. Investigating it found: the run produced zero
steps and zero output, it died at exactly 700s (TURN_TIMEOUT), the node→claw
aliases were bound correctly, and the same zeroclaw team path passes in the
`multirole` scenario. So the platform path is fine and the agent simply never
finished a turn — but the one place the reason lived, the per-mission runtime
container, is torn down after the phase and takes its log with it. By the time
anyone looks, all that survives is the string.

The timeout now reads the last 40 lines out of that container while it still
exists, and reports which agent alias and which gateway it was driving.
Best-effort by construction: it runs on a path that is ALREADY failing, so a
docker error there degrades to a note rather than replacing the real failure
with a second one.

`container_name` derives the container from the gateway URL and returns None
rather than guessing, because this feeds a diagnostic — a wrong name would put a
different container's log under a failure and send the reader somewhere else
entirely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 08:56:51 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e417247e7e fix(ui): clicking "My Workforce" offered to rebuild the hierarchy it replaced
Clicking the root opened the orphan-migration dialog:

  "You have some entities that never got parented into a real
   org → company → team chain. Naming the three below will materialize
   the chain and move everything under it in one transaction."

which is an offer to reconstruct exactly the structure that root exists to
replace.

`SYNTHETIC_TREE_IDS` was doing three jobs at once — "not a database row, so
cannot be renamed or selected for reap" AND "is a placeholder for unparented
entities, so clicking it offers the migration" — and adding `my-workforce` to it
inherited the second along with the first.

Split by what each set is FOR. `ORPHAN_CONTAINER_IDS` are the placeholders the
migration applies to and the nodes the world visualisation strips;
`SYNTHETIC_TREE_IDS` is that set plus the workforce root, and still guards
rename and reap. Clicking the root now just toggles the branch, which the row
handler in `StructureTree` was already doing before `onSelectNode` ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 07:43:41 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 fe2451fd60 feat(workforce): missions hire the agents you already have, and name them by role
Every zeroclaw mission minted a fresh team of claws. They are created
`lifecycle = 'permanent'` and nothing reaps them until the MISSION is deleted,
so the roster grew by a whole team per mission while each member worked exactly
once — "My Workforce" was a list of strangers, and upskilling had nothing
durable to act on.

A mission now hires the claw that already does the job, matched on
`agent_template_link (template_id, role_slot)`, minting only what is missing.
Oldest first, so reuse concentrates on the same few claws and their brains
actually accumulate rather than spreading thinly across a growing pool.

A claw on a RUNNING mission is not offered. Two missions driving the same
ZeroClaw agent and the same `.brain` at once is a data race with a model on the
other end of it, and minting a second claw is much cheaper than reasoning about
that.

A reused claw is NOT re-seeded from the template's brain_seed — that would
overwrite what it learned with its starting point, which is precisely the
accumulation this exists for.

Names are the role now (`planner`), not
`"{mission} · {purpose} · {template} · {slot}"`. That produced
"verify: a repo-less research mission keeps its output · mission · Rust SDLC ·
planner" — unreadable in the roster, the API and every log line at once. Which
mission a claw is on is context a caller can join to; it is not its name.

And the half that makes reuse safe rather than destructive: deleting a mission
now purges only claws no OTHER mission still employs. Without it, tidying up one
mission deletes staff another one holds — presenting as the roster quietly
shrinking rather than as an error. A test asserts the guard exists inside the
reaper AND runs before the purge, because a check after it is decoration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 07:18:12 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 895413509d feat(ui): My Workforce — one flat list of agents, and the "+" starts a mission
The sidebar showed Organization -> Company -> Team -> Agent. On this workspace
that read "My Workspace -> General -> Everyone": three levels of placeholder
wrapping five agents, with five orgs and three companies named "My Workspace",
"General" and "Workplace" between them.

None of it was load-bearing in the UI. `agents` has no org/company/team column
at all — membership is only the `team_members` join, which the mission executor
uses to map graph nodes to claws — and /orgs, /companies and /teams already
redirect to the dashboard. The tree survived in exactly one place.

So the tree is now a single "My Workforce" root with the agents directly under
it, expanded by default: a workforce collapsed behind a disclosure is one the
user has to discover they own. The World tier keeps the full forest, because
that visualisation is ABOUT structure and flattening it would remove its
subject. Nothing is deleted — the group pages and their APIs are untouched.

Both "+" affordances now open the MISSION wizard. They opened the deploy wizard,
while the copy beside them said "deploy wizard" and the tooltip said "Deploy a
new agent" — none of which is what someone arriving at an empty workspace wants
to do first. You get a workforce BY running missions. Hand-staffing one is a
real thing to want, just not the first thing, so it is demoted to "or create an
agent yourself" rather than removed.

"Add a new agent, team, company, or organization" becomes "Create your agent
workforce".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-10 07:13:04 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 dd80b69992 fix(microvm): the third place that assumed a VM phase has a repository
The research-vm scenario failed on its first run, and said exactly why:

  mission has no checkout at /var/lib/clawmates-missions/<id>/repo
    — a microvm phase needs a repository

`phase_runner` refuses upstream of both places the last commit fixed. Three
guards, written independently, all encoding "a microVM phase implies a git
checkout" — which is why the capture filter could cite it as settled fact.

A repo-BACKED mission with no checkout is still a real fault and still refused;
booting a VM to hand the agent an empty directory would turn a setup failure
into a confusing agent report. A repo-LESS one now gets the empty workspace
made here, so the executor's inject has something to pack.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 19:08:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 768e106614 fix(microvm): a mission with no repository can run in a VM, and its work comes back
Two halves, and the first was worse than the plan assumed. `run_phase_in_vm`
packed `<missions_root>/<mission>/repo` unconditionally — a directory a
repo-less mission does not have — and then required `/mission/repo/.git` inside
the guest before spending a turn. So a repo-less microVM phase did not merely
go uncaptured: it failed before the agent ran.

A repo-less mission now gets an EMPTY workspace at the same guest path, created
host-side so the collect unpacks back over it with no special case, and the
readiness probe asks for what was actually sent — the directory rather than a
`.git` that was never going to be there.

`mission_outputs` then drops its `runtime_kind <> 'microvm'` exclusion, whose
stated reason ("a microVM mission always has a checkout") is exactly what
stopped being true. Where the files come from now depends on the runtime, and
the difference is not cosmetic: a container mission's output is still inside a
running container, while a VM's has already been unpacked onto the host by the
end-of-turn collect. Asking docker for a VM mission's files would query a
container that never existed.

The recursive copy skips symlinks rather than following them — a link out of
the tree would publish whatever it points at.

`research-vm` is the proof, added to the suite as well as the dispatch: the same
assertions as `research-only` with `runtime_kind: microvm`. A scenario nobody
runs is a scenario that does not exist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 19:04:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e4bddeb1ba feat(ui): three-screen mission wizard that asks only what the type needs
Five fixed steps for every mission type, and getting a research document out of
it meant naming a team, choosing a runtime, and writing per-phase completion
conditions under a paragraph explaining what a model checker can and cannot
prove. Two of those steps asked for things the mission does not use, and one of
them blocked outright.

  1  What do you want to do?
  2  Title, a description with a Polish button, repo ONLY if the type needs one
  3  Review -> Launch, plus one collapsed Advanced section

Two hard defects fixed on the way:

- The microVM runtime could not be selected AT ALL. Step 4 gated Next on
  `targetNodeId`, which microVM deliberately never sets because placement picks
  the node per phase. Everything shipped today, the local-GPU backend included,
  was unreachable from the UI.
- Step 3 required a team while every workflow TOML already names one in
  `default_team_template` — which this file ignored. The answer was always
  available and the question was always asked. It is now resolved by key, with a
  category fallback, and shown under Advanced so an operator can see WHICH
  default rather than having to supply one.

A failed `/api/team-templates` request and a genuinely empty list rendered the
identical red banner, which sends the reader looking for missing template files
when the request had 401'd. They now say different things.

`phases[]` is no longer sent unless someone set a completion condition.
`recipeToPreset` strips each phase's `config`, so posting the stripped list
overrode the recipe's real settings — tools, commit policy, loop mode — with
nothing. Omitting it lets `phases_for_create` use the recipe, which is both
simpler and more correct.

Launch keeps its own gate, since Advanced can still produce an unlaunchable
combination — but it names what is missing instead of greying out in silence.

Artifacts get a Download link. Deliberately a plain link to the streaming route
rather than a Blob built from what "Read" already fetched: that content is
capped at 2 MiB and UTF-8-decoded, so reusing it would silently produce a
truncated or undownloadable file for exactly the artifacts worth downloading.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 18:50:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 25f075a8be feat(api): polish a description before the mission exists, and download an artifact
Two endpoints the wizard redesign needs.

`POST /api/missions/refine-draft` — the polish button fires while the user is
still typing, before anything is created, so it has no id to route on.
`refine` deliberately requires a saved draft because its Accept writes back;
this one has nothing to write back to and returns the text. Same system prompt,
same model chain. The phase list comes from the workflow recipe rather than the
caller, for the same reason `phases_for_create` prefers it: a client that
guessed would have the model write acceptance criteria for phases the mission
will not run.

`GET /api/missions/{id}/artifacts/{artifact_id}/download` — the file itself.
`artifact_content` caps at 2 MiB and reads as UTF-8, so a large or binary
artifact is unreachable by any means today; this streams the bytes with a
filename attached and no ceiling.

Both artifact routes now resolve through ONE containment check. Two copies of
"is this path under _outputs" is two chances for one of them to be the lenient
one, and the lenient one is an arbitrary read of the gateway's filesystem — so a
test asserts there is a single resolver and that both routes call it.

The download filename was chosen by an AGENT and lands in a header every browser
parses, so quotes, backslashes and control characters are stripped rather than
escaped; the test covers a header-injection attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 18:45:46 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f27d2605eb fix(agents): a soft-deleted agent could never be purged
Clearing the fleet's four leftover agents returned 404 on every one. They had
been soft-deleted back in June — correctly invisible in the UI ever since — and
`agents::get` filters `deleted_at IS NULL`, so `workspace_agent` could not find
them. Every route uses it, including `batch-delete`, the one that exists to
HARD-purge. So a soft-deleted agent was unreachable from the application
entirely and its row stayed forever.

`get_any` sees them, and only the purge path uses it: hiding soft-deleted rows
is right for every read, and wrong for the one operation whose whole job is
removing them. Written with `query_as` rather than the checked macro so it does
not force an offline-cache regeneration on every machine that builds this.

`fleet-reset.sh` now uses `batch-delete` for agents rather than
`DELETE /api/claws/{id}`. The latter is a SOFT delete, so pointing a reset
script at it would have quietly added to the pile it was meant to clear.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 18:15:56 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 16cfc29074 fix(ui): the backend picker showed two options meaning the same thing
`default` is the generic `rootfs.ext4` and `claude` is the named one, and
`microvm_credential_for` gives them the identical contract — so the list came
back with both under the same label, and whichever a user picked they got the
same thing. Collapsed to the named one where it exists; the generic keeps a
label of its own for a fleet that only has that.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 15:52:30 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 529497febb fix(placement): a composed graph needs every backend its nodes name
The full harness found it — 12 of 13 scenarios green, `roster` red:

  roster: the planner sized this mission at 2 member(s)              PASS
  roster: the approved roster is on the mission (2 nodes, composed)  PASS
  roster: this run added 1 line(s) for a 2-member roster             FAIL

  topology_runs.error: turn executor failed: node n1 in a microVM:
    vm_create failed: no rootfs for backend "canary-claude" on this node

The roster proposed `verifier@canary-claude`. Placement asked
`online_for_backend` about the MISSION's backend — `claude` — and architect
answered, holding `claude` and `local-ornith`. The graph's first node ran and
delivered, the second could not boot, and the mission finished half-done. The
question placement asked was true and insufficient.

A composed graph runs on ONE node, so that node needs every image its nodes ask
for. `required_backends` collects the mission's plus each
`config.roster.nodes[].attrs.backend`, and `online_for_backends` passes the
whole set to the same jsonb `@>` — containment already means "contains ALL of
these", so the query shape did not have to change, only what it was asked.

This is the failure mode the roster feature creates by existing: its entire
purpose is putting a verifier on a different provider, which is exactly what
makes one node insufficient. Nothing before the full suite had a reason to
exercise it — the composed scenario uses one backend for all five nodes.

`NoCapableNode` now names the set and says why one node must hold all of them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 15:36:40 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 171f901bcd feat(ops): fleet-reset — delete every mission and PROVE the disk came back
For a clean slate before a UI session, and for the thing that keeps being true
here: deleting a row has never deleted a directory. A full harness run leaves
~35 missions, each with a repo checkout and a runtime-data tree, on the smallest
disk in the fleet. There are 125 rows and 117 directories right now.

Deletes through the API, never with SQL. `missions::delete` tears down the
per-mission runtime container, hard-purges the FK graph in order, and removes
the workspace directory — falling back to a root purge for the files the
per-mission daemon leaves as root. A `DELETE FROM missions` skips all three and
orphans every one of them, which is how the orphans got there.

Then it checks, because rows gone is not bytes back and every incarnation of
this cleanup has managed the first while silently failing the second: it names
each directory left without a row, and counts root-owned residue separately
because that is the specific way it fails.

Refuses outright while any mission is RUNNING. Yanking a live mission's checkout
leaves a VM writing into a directory that no longer exists, and the symptom is a
phase that hangs rather than one that fails. Verified: it stopped exactly there
against the in-flight harness.

Dry by default; `--yes` to act; `KEEP=<substring>` to spare some.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 15:21:08 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e7b412d578 test(harness): local-ornith was missing from the all suite
Added to the case dispatch when it was written, and not to `all` — so the
newest backend, and the only one that runs on hardware we own, was excluded from
the one run that claims to check everything. A scenario nobody runs is a
scenario that does not exist.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 15:09:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c66c3c6377 feat(ui): the microVM path is reachable from the mission wizard
Everything built today — Firecracker missions, the four backends, the local GPU
one — was unreachable from the dashboard. The wizard offered `zeroclaw` and
`local_herdr` and nothing else, so a mission created in the UI could not be a
microVM mission at all, and `local-ornith`/`glm`/`kimi` were API-only. Testing
"our workflows in the UI" would have exercised none of it.

Adds the runtime option and a backend picker, fed by a new
`GET /api/fleet/backends` that returns `mission_roster::available_backends`
verbatim — the SAME list the roster planner is handed, not a second one. Its two
rules are both load-bearing and neither is visible from a node's capabilities
alone: the image must be built on an online node, and the backend must have a
credential contract. `agent-terminal` passes the first and fails the second —
bootable, with nothing for the agent inside to authenticate with — so offering
it would produce a mission that validates, launches, and dies at the agent turn.

Ids are deployment vocabulary, so the picker labels them: a user choosing
between `local-ornith` and `canary-claude` should not have to know which company
each one bills. An empty list says why (no rootfs built) instead of showing an
empty dropdown, and no node is chosen for a microVM mission because
`vm_placement` picks it per phase.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 15:09:07 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 1f6108f769 feat(gc): reclaim the mission tree on the gateway
`cleanup_sweeper` prunes ROWS. Deleting a row has never deleted a directory,
and `teardown_container` only runs while a mission still exists to tear down —
so a mission removed by any path that skipped teardown left its tree behind
permanently, on the smallest disk in the fleet (150 GB, shared with postgres and
every checkout). 106 mission directories are sitting there now.

Filesystem-first, deliberately: the DB is the PREDICATE, never the enumerator.
Enumerating from the database is exactly how these became invisible — a
directory whose row is gone is the one a row-driven sweep cannot see.

Three reapers, one deletion path. Orphan mission dirs (no row, past a 2h grace),
scratch trees (_bench/_gate/_verify/_merge past 6h — all four have leaked
before), and _outputs past 90d, whose artifact rows are marked only AFTER the
files are gone, because the other order claims artifacts are reaped while they
are still on disk.

The single removal path escalates: the server is uid 65532 and cannot delete
what the per-mission daemon leaves as root, so PermissionDenied falls back to
`root_copy::purge` and shouts if the tree survives even that. A GC that cannot
collect is the thing being fixed, so failures are counted and reported, never
swallowed.

Guards worth naming: `_cargo` is a SHARED cache every mission writes to and
lives under the same root, so an underscore-prefixed sibling treated as an
orphan mission would delete it out from under running work and look like a slow
cargo build. Only a well-formed mission id is ever a candidate — a directory
whose name is not an id can have no row by construction, so without that gate
every unrecognised directory looks orphaned.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 15:02:25 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 3c3d01c8d1 fix(llm): the chain preflight printed nothing at all
Deployed, and the report simply did not appear — from the tool built to stop
things failing silently. Two causes, both worth keeping:

There was no timeout anywhere in the probe, so one slow provider swallowed the
entire report. Each link is now bounded at 60s (generous: `complete_or` spends
up to 30s in its own backoff, so a tighter cap would report a merely throttled
link as hung) with `TimedOut` as its own state, and every line is emitted AS IT
RESOLVES rather than collected and printed at the end — a later link that hangs
must not be able to hide the ones already checked.

The first attempt at the timeout awaited the probe and then wrapped the result:

    let probe = complete_or(...).await;
    timeout(PROBE_TIMEOUT, async { probe }).await

That compiles, reads correctly, and bounds nothing. The timeout has to wrap the
future.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 14:51:51 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c7c3eeab46 fix(test): the colon-vs-spec test did not compile
Committed and deployed while its test compile was failing: the verify step was
`cargo test | grep -E "^error|test result" && git commit`, and grep exits 0 when
it MATCHES, so finding the error is what let the commit proceed. The library
built fine, so the deploy was sound, but the check that was supposed to gate it
did the opposite of gating.

The error itself was a borrow in a test closure; a plain fn fixes it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 14:47:37 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d9c5300859 fix(llm): the preflight found two broken links on its first live run, one its own
fallback chain (6 link(s), 4 usable):
    claude-opus-4-8            ok
    claude-sonnet-4-6          ok
    claude-haiku-4-5-20251001  ok
    kimi:kimi-k2.7-code        BROKEN: 400 ... role 'system' must not be empty
    glm:glm-4.7                ok
    local:ornith-fleet:9b      UNREGISTERED — resolves to the DEFAULT provider

Neither link was actually broken.

The probe sent an EMPTY system prompt, which Kimi rejects outright. A probe has
to look like the traffic it stands in for, or it measures itself.

The second is the one worth keeping. `resolve_provider` returns a spec unchanged
when it does not recognise the provider, and the part after the FIRST colon when
it does — so the obvious test, "does the model half still contain a colon",
reads correctly and is wrong the moment a model id has one. `ornith-fleet:9b`
has one. The probe reported a provider the server had just finished registering
as UNREGISTERED.

`evaluator::cross_provider_judge` had the identical check, and would therefore
have refused a local judge as "not independent" — silently falling back to a
same-family one, which is the exact claim that path exists to make honestly.
Both now compare against the whole spec.

That bug was written into the codebase before a model name with a colon existed,
was correct at the time, and became wrong when one arrived. Nothing would have
reported it; a boot-time probe of every link did, on its first run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 14:42:28 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c3ad5672fc feat(llm): six-link fallback chain, and a preflight that proves it
opus -> sonnet -> haiku -> kimi -> glm -> local. The order is capability first,
then independence: three Anthropic tiers on one account (a throttle usually hits
a tier, so stepping down often clears it), then two separately funded accounts
(now an outage, not just a throttle, is survivable), then our own GPU (nothing
left to be down). Every id was probed on this deployment and answered 200.

The preflight is the more important half. Configured is not working, and this
chain has a specific way of lying: `resolve_provider` falls back to the DEFAULT
provider when it does not recognise a provider name, so a typo in `kimi:` does
not error — it quietly runs on Anthropic, and a chain that reads as three
accounts is really one. A reachability-only probe calls that link green.

So `preflight` checks resolution and reachability separately, eight tokens per
link through the REAL call path, and reports four states. `Throttled` is
deliberately not a failure: a 429 means the spec resolved, the credential
authenticated, and there was no capacity this second — the exact condition the
chain exists to route around, and painting it red would train an operator to
ignore red. `Unregistered` and `Broken` are failures, and they get different
words because they need different fixes.

It runs at boot alongside validator_preflight and runtime_preflight, spawned so
it cannot delay startup. A chain is the one piece of infrastructure nobody looks
at until the day it has to work, so it is now checked on the days it does not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 14:38:55 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 5afcf63324 fix(harness): count what the roster run ADDED, not what the file holds
Forcing the planner onto the local link produced a green chain and a red
assertion:

  roster: the planner sized this mission at 1 member(s)          PASS
  roster: ROSTER.md has 3 line(s) for a 1-member roster          FAIL

The model was right and the check was wrong. ROSTER.md does not start empty —
the auto-merge work put an earlier run's two lines onto main — so a 1-member
roster that correctly appended one line delivered three, and the scenario
reported a model that had ignored its own proposal.

It now measures the DELTA against main. Any assertion against a scratch repo
that accumulates has to, or it decays into a test of how many times it has been
run before.

Proven on the local model end to end: opus 429 -> local:ornith-fleet:9b
answered -> `mission_roster: ... local:ornith-fleet:9b proposed 1 member(s)` ->
the composed graph ran -> the branch added exactly one line. 5/5.

CLAWMATES_MODEL_FALLBACK is removed from gw-04's .env again; it was set only to
force the last link for this test, and the deployed default is the full chain.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 14:24:46 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 b18e62041b feat(llm): the fallback chain's last link runs on our own hardware
`local:ornith-fleet:9b` joins opus -> haiku -> glm as the final link. Every
entry above it depends on somebody else's account staying funded and
unthrottled; this one depends on a GPU in the next room. It is last because it
is the weakest model, and present because a chain whose every link is external
is not a fallback chain, it is one outage in a trench coat.

Three small changes make it work:

- `build_provider_registry` accepts a provider with an empty `api_key_env`.
  A model on our own hardware has nothing to authenticate to, and the old
  behaviour SKIPPED a keyless provider — leaving the chain quietly one link
  shorter than it reads, which is the failure mode this whole area keeps
  producing.
- `provider_family` learns `ornith`/`ollama` for BARE names. A qualified
  `local:` spec was already answered by the split, but a bare one fell through
  to "unknown", and `cross_provider_judge` would then refuse a judge that is
  genuinely a different family from the Anthropic implementer.
- A test pins that the last link survives `resolve_provider`'s split-on-FIRST-
  colon: `local:ornith-fleet:9b` is provider `local`, model `ornith-fleet:9b`.
  Splitting on the last colon would ask for a provider named
  `local:ornith-fleet`, and the symptom would be a silent fall back to the
  default provider.

Infra: Ollama on tank and architect now binds 0.0.0.0 so the gateway (which has
no GPU) can reach it. `tailscale serve` cannot — Ollama rejects a non-local Host
header as a DNS-rebinding guard and OLLAMA_ORIGINS is CORS-only, so it 403s.
0.0.0.0 still includes loopback, so the microVM vsock pipe is unaffected;
verified on both nodes. This is an explicit trade: Ollama has no auth and its
API can pull and delete models, so it is now reachable from the LAN as well as
the tailnet. The drop-in carries the ufw one-liner to close the LAN side.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 14:13:05 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 774f17d194 test(fleet): a mission served entirely by the node's own GPU
`local-ornith` scenario, green on its first real run against tank:

  local-ornith: a locally-served model delivered a guest kernel (6.1.128)
  local-ornith: no Anthropic egress from a locally-served mission
  local-ornith: the node bound its local-model socket for this VM
  local-ornith: checkout has exactly one writer (uid=65532)

Three things had to be true at once and only a real run shows all three: the
agent reached a model at all (a pipe to a closed port produces a turn that HANGS
rather than errors, which is why this is a scenario and not a unit test), the
work came back and landed on a branch, and the VM still could not reach
api.anthropic.com.

That last one is not theoretical. The node log for this VM is a column of
`egress DENIED api.anthropic.com` — Claude Code's own telemetry, correctly
refused — while the model traffic went through the vsock pipe and Ollama logged
loading ornith-fleet:9b at 100% GPU with CONTEXT 131072. A local backend that
quietly kept Anthropic egress would be a credential path nobody asked for.

The egress check asks the NODE's proxy log rather than the agent, for the same
reason the GLM measurement did: a model's account of where its tokens came from
has no evidential value, and the proxy's record of what it dialled does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 13:21:57 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f56d41f5b7 feat(backend): local-ornith — a mission backend served by the node's own GPU
Claude Code pointed at the Ollama already installed on every GPU node. Ollama
has served a native Anthropic-compatible /v1/messages since v0.14, so this is
an env contract rather than a translation layer — the fourth variation on the
same idea as agent-glm and agent-kimi.

The route is NOT the egress proxy, and that is the design. `egress` speaks
CONNECT, takes a destination from the guest, resolves it and decides; every one
of those powers is a liability, which is why it refuses non-443 ports and IP
literals after a unit test caught them being bypassed. Routing a local model
through it would have meant relaxing both.

`local_model` is the opposite shape: there is no destination in the protocol.
fcagent listens on guest 127.0.0.1:11434 and pumps to vsock 9003; the node
splices that onto its own 127.0.0.1:11434 and copies bytes. A compromised guest
cannot redirect it because there is nothing to redirect — it is a pipe, not a
proxy, and strictly narrower than anything an allow-list could express. The
bytes never touch a network, so there is no wire for TLS to protect, and Ollama
stays bound to loopback rather than being exposed on the tailnet.

The socket is bound only for a backend declared to use a local model, so a
`local-ornith` VM reaches the forge through egress and nothing else, while every
other backend's guest port simply refuses. Both halves have negative controls.

`scripts/fleet-model-setup.sh` exists because of one measurement: stock
ornith:9b reported input_tokens=2050 for a 48000-word prompt and answered as
though nothing had been dropped. Ollama's default window is ~2K whatever the
model card says, and it truncates silently — the exact failure an agent turn
would hit and never report. The script pins num_ctx=131072 into a derived tag
and then PROVES both the window and tool calling before declaring success.
Verified on architect: ~65536 words -> 65604 input tokens, stop_reason=tool_use.

Placement needs no new capability key: building the rootfs only on GPU nodes
means `nodes::online_for_backend`'s existing `rootfs @> ["local-ornith"]`
predicate does the affinity, so morpheus never offers the backend.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 13:13:54 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e96c5143bc test(eval): a local judge, and the 2K context window that would have hidden it
Phase 1 of the local-model plan: prove the model before writing any plumbing.
`JUDGE=local` runs the existing done_when eval against Ollama on a GPU node.
Requests originate on that node rather than the gateway, because the model is
bound to 127.0.0.1 deliberately — it has no network exposure at all — and the
gateway has no GPU.

MEASURED on tank, 3 draws per case, against the incumbent on the same cases:

  local (ornith-fleet:9b)  14/15 — one UNPARSED, never a wrong verdict
  glm  (glm-4.7)           13/15 — two WRONG verdicts on kernel-ok

kernel-ok is the case production actually hit and the one this script's header
says is expected to fail on glm-4.7. A 5.6 GB model on hardware we already own
did not get it wrong once in three draws.

The tag is `ornith-fleet:9b`, not `ornith:9b`, and that is the finding worth
keeping. Ollama defaults to a ~2K window whatever the model claims: stock
ornith:9b reported input_tokens=2050 for a 48000-word prompt and answered as
though nothing had been dropped — silent truncation, confidently. The fleet tag
pins num_ctx=131072, which measures 9.3 GB resident of a 16 GB card (the full
262144 also fits, at 13.6 GB, 100% GPU). These eval cases are a few hundred
tokens, so this eval would have passed either way; that is exactly why the tag
under test has to be the one production would use.

Also measured: Anthropic /v1/messages returns well-formed tool_use with
stop_reason=tool_use on both nodes; the reported count_tokens?beta=true hang is
absent in 0.31.1 (clean 404, server unaffected); ~60 tok/s generate, ~2800
tok/s prefill, 120072-token prompts accepted end to end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 11:54:33 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f68fc019e4 fix(teardown): a mission dir with root-owned files is now actually removed
The server runs as uid 65532, so `remove_dir_all` on a mission directory
returns PermissionDenied the moment anything root-owned is left in it — and the
old code logged that at the same level as "file not found" and moved on. The
directory then lived forever.

After the seed-copy fix a mission holds 3281 files owned by 65532 and 26 owned
by root: `.claude.json` and the session jsonl the per-mission ZeroClaw daemon
writes itself, after the copy has been chowned. Twenty-six files is small
enough to keep every mission directory alive without anyone noticing why.

PermissionDenied now falls back to `root_copy::purge`, which deletes from
inside the container as root — the same escape hatch `container_exec` keeps for
exactly this, clearing debris a root process created. And if the directory
survives even that, it says so, because a cleanup that silently failed is the
thing being fixed.

Removing the last 26 properly means running the per-mission daemon as 65532,
which needs `/mission` pre-created in the image with that ownership — the
daemon creates it at boot today and cannot at a lower uid. That is an image
change, deliberately not bundled here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 11:17:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4967b9b8fd fix(runtime): the seed copy reads as root and hands the result to 65532
Running the seed copier as 65532 broke mission launch, and broke it quietly.
The seed dir is root-owned with parts at mode 0600 (`.claude.json`,
`clawmates-mcp.json`), so uid 65532 cannot READ them: `cp` failed on the first
unreadable entry, `set -e` abandoned the rest, and the mission came up with a
runtime-data holding `.zeroclaw` and nothing else — no Claude credentials, no
door config. The daemon then never created its agents' workspace, and the phase
failed 200 lines later on "Could not find the file /mission in container",
which points nowhere near the cause.

It was quiet because `seed_runtime_data` polled for the container to STOP and
returned Ok without ever reading its exit code. A copier that died on a
permission error and one that finished cleanly were indistinguishable. It now
reads the status and says what went wrong.

So: root for the read, `chown -R 65532:65532 /dst` for the result. Both halves
matter and they pull opposite ways — root is needed to read the seed, and
65532 is needed because everything else in the missions tree is 65532 and a GC
running as 65532 cannot delete what root left behind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 11:11:49 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 8ddea454d1 fix(runtime): the seed copy ran as root too, ~3200 files per mission
The uid fix landed and the CHECKOUT came back completely clean — 0 non-65532
files under `repo/` after a benchmark run that builds and tests Rust. But the
same mission still held 3247 root-owned files, all under `runtime-data/`.

`seed_runtime_data` spawns a throwaway container to `cp -a` the runtime seed
into the mission's directory and never set `user`, so it ran as root — the
identical absent-`user` omission `container_exec` had, in a container create
instead of an exec. The seed source is 65532-owned and the destination is
created by the server (which itself runs as 65532), so the copy never had a
reason to out-rank either.

This is the tree a gateway GC has to be able to delete, and a GC running as
65532 cannot remove root-owned files — the cleanup-that-cannot-clean-up shape,
found before writing the GC rather than after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 10:55:18 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 dcd9514622 fix(exec): mission work runs as uid 65532, so it stops creating debris it cannot delete
`CreateExecOptions` never set `user`. Not a wrong value — an ABSENT one: the
daemon defaults to root, and twelve callers inherited that without any of them
choosing it. That single omission is the origin of four separate patches —
root-owned `target/` directories inside a checkout owned by 65532, `root_copy`
existing at all, and a cleanup that had to re-enter the container as root to
undo its own mess.

The rule is positional and lives in ONE place: an exec whose workdir is inside
`missions_root()` runs as 65532; anything else (preflight probes, image checks)
keeps the daemon default so unrelated call sites cannot break. Twelve callers
each remembering to pass a uid is twelve chances to forget, and the one that
forgets leaves debris the other eleven cannot remove.

Non-root needs an environment the image does not provide. Measured in the
deployed image: uid 65532's HOME (/zeroclaw-data) and /usr/local/cargo are both
root-owned and unwritable, so this would otherwise break every cargo call — the
benchmark runner, the judge's sandbox, the delivery test gate — far more quietly
than the leak it fixes. The missions root IS bind-mounted and writable by 65532,
so HOME/CARGO_HOME move there and the cargo cache is shared across missions
rather than re-fetched per mission. Verified on gw-04: a clean `cargo build` as
65532 with those three variables produces output owned entirely by 65532.

Root remains reachable only through `exec_as_root`, whose name says so, and
which exists solely to clear debris earlier root execs left. `runtime_preflight`
now probes the whole policy at boot, so an image that moves or tightens that
mount fails loudly instead of failing every cargo call for a reason no error
message would connect to a uid. evaluator_tools' inlined fourth copy of the
purge is replaced by `root_copy::purge`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 10:47:59 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 42108c840d docs(placement): the drain half of that fix was never the broken half
drain-midmission passed 3/3 twice, but the "re-placing this phase" line the
last commit added never appeared in the log. It cannot: `online_for_backend`
filters on `status = 'online'`, so a draining node is not a candidate, never
reaches `unfit`, and the pin simply falls through to ranking — on the old code
as well as the new.

So the scenario passes either way and proves the affinity decision, not the
`TargetUnfit` bug. The path that genuinely used to fail a phase is "the
previous phase's node has since FILLED UP": that puts it in `unfit`, which
returned a non-transient error, which never reached the queue. That is what the
unit test now says, in place of a claim about draining the harness does not
support.

The accidental mission-to-node affinity was real and unconditional either way.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 10:18:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 13a35138e9 fix(placement): a drained previous node re-places the phase instead of failing it
`drain-midmission` found this. `choose` treated its `want` argument as a hard
requirement, and the only caller passes `missions.target_node_id` — which is
not an operator's choice, only where the PREVIOUS phase happened to run. Two
consequences, both wrong:

  - A node drained or filled between phases produced `TargetUnfit`, which
    `is_transient()` says false to, so `phase_runner` FAILED the phase rather
    than queueing or moving it. The queue silently did not apply to the second
    phase of any mission.
  - While the node stayed fit, every later phase went straight back to it
    regardless of ranking — accidental mission-to-node affinity, which this
    module's own header says must not exist.

Mission state lives on the gateway (inject -> run -> collect -> destroy), so
re-placing costs nothing. The pin is now advisory: preferred while it fits,
and when it does not, the reason is logged and ranking proceeds. `TargetUnfit`
is deleted rather than left unconstructed, so it cannot come back as a
non-transient failure by accident.

The scenario had its own race: it waited for phase 0 to COMPLETE before
draining, but warm phases finish in ~80s against a 10s placement sweep, so
phase 1 was often already placed — and the run then blamed the platform for
running on a node that was not yet drained. It now drains while phase 0 is
still running, which does not disturb a live VM and is the more faithful test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 06:34:48 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d4af58be85 fix(harness): the capacity burst got faster than the thing watching it
The first bursts took 25 minutes because every VM paid a cold 2.4 GB rootfs
copy. Warm, the same 16 missions finish in 70-140s each and the whole burst is
over in about two minutes — so a sampler that waited ~90s for its launch check
and then ticked every 15s caught three samples of the tail and reported
"architect peaked at 1 of 6" for a run that sat at 6/6/2.

Sampling now starts at the first tick, runs every 5s, and folds the launch
check into the same query so verifying the launches costs no observation
window. The 10-sample floor that produced the last NORUN is gone; it was
measuring how long the burst took, not how well it was watched.

And "nothing queued" no longer has one verdict for two causes. If the fleet
never actually filled — a slot can free before the sweep reaches the 15th
mission — the queue was not reached and this scenario did not test it: NORUN,
naming the high-water mark. Only a burst that DID saturate can call an absent
queue a failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 06:26:12 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 eacd3ee085 fix(harness): a blind sampler must not report an idle fleet
The burst re-run printed "architect peaked at 1 of 6" and "nothing ever
queued" for a run I could watch sitting at architect=6 tank=6 morpheus=2 with
2 phases queued. The fleet was right; the sampler was blind.

Three separate ssh+psql calls per 15s tick, each with stderr to /dev/null, and
under the load of 16 concurrent missions most came back empty. Empty was then
read as "nothing running" — absence encoded as a legitimate value, which is the
exact seam the header of this file was written about, reproduced in a scenario
added to catch it.

One query per tick now, returning done/blocked/per-node in a single row, and
unreadable samples are COUNTED rather than silently treated as zeroes. Fewer
than ten usable samples is NORUN: a sampler that barely looked must not be able
to describe itself as a fleet that was idle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 06:20:32 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 91fbd2dc88 refactor: the missions root has one definition, not five
`mission_workspace::missions_root()` is now the only place that answers "where
does mission state live". It had fragmented into five: this function, private
`env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT")` copies in security_scan, benchmark_runner
and mission_outputs, and a hardcoded `MISSIONS_HOST_ROOT` const in
mission_runtime that read no env at all.

They agree on the deployed value, so nothing has broken. The risk is entirely
in what comes next: anything that sweeps or reclaims this tree has to be
sweeping the same tree the writers use, and five definitions cannot promise
that — a reaper written against one would silently leave the others' directories
behind forever, which is how the orphans got there in the first place.

A source-walk test fails any module outside `mission_workspace` that reads the
env var itself.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 06:18:01 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e5f097c291 fix(harness): the capacity burst verifies its own launches
The re-run reported FAIL-NORUN "the burst did not finish in 1800s". The fleet
was fine — 3 of the 16 missions were still in `draft`. Each PATCH-to-running is
an ssh plus a `docker run curl`, and 16 at once does not reliably land; the
response was going to /dev/null, so a launch that never happened spent the full
timeout looking like a platform stall.

That is precisely the swallowed-error shape this file was written to catch,
committed inside the file itself. Launches are now verified against the mission
rows, retried once for the stragglers, and reported as "the burst never
happened" rather than as a timeout — a scenario that did not run must not be
able to describe itself as a slow one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 06:15:31 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4fedfcec30 fix(placement): a young VM's unconsumed memory was handed out twice
The capacity harness scenario, on its first full run, caught what it was
written to catch:

  capacity:   architect peaked at 6 of 6 slot(s)
  FAIL       capacity: 'morpheus' peaked at 3 concurrent VM(s) with only 2 slot(s)
  capacity:   tank peaked at 6 of 6 slot(s)
  PASS       capacity: the over-capacity missions QUEUED
  PASS       capacity: all 16 queued/placed missions completed

`capacity_of` inferred the host's own footprint by subtracting the VMs' FULL
8 GiB claim from observed usage — which assumes they have already consumed it.
A VM booted seconds ago holds about an eighth. On morpheus (31757 MiB total,
4314 MiB idle, 2 slots) with 2 young VMs at ~6314 MiB observed, the inference
6314 - 16384 goes negative, clamps to the 2048 floor, and invents 2266 MiB —
exactly enough for a third VM on a two-slot node.

The footprint is only honestly MEASURABLE when nothing is committed, so
remember it then: `nodes.mem_baseline_mib`, sampled by `survey` whenever it
observes an idle node with fresh health. When VMs are committed, take the
LARGER of the remembered reading and the old inference — a node that was once
idle at 4 GiB and is now running a 20 GiB build must not be scored as idle,
which would be the same over-commit arrived at from the other direction. Both
directions have a test; the second is the one that would otherwise rot.

Raising HOST_BASELINE_FLOOR_MIB would have made this one node's numbers pass
and drifted the moment the fleet changed shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 05:25:28 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 2056bb1d9e test(fleet): prove the queue and the spread under a real burst
Phase 1 shipped placement-at-phase-launch and a queue made of
`start_pending_phases` leaving a phase `pending`, both deployed unproven under
load — the exact condition this project keeps getting burned by: the code is
right, the system is wrong, and nothing errors.

`capacity` launches `slots + 2` microVM missions simultaneously and asserts two
things. That no node ever exceeds the slots `vm_placement` gave it — overcommit
does not fail loudly, it swaps, and every mission on that node gets slow rather
than dead. And that the excess QUEUES: a burst that drops the extras and one
that wedges them both look identical to any check that only reads the end
state. `capacity_blocked_since` is cleared the instant a phase is placed, so
the evidence only exists mid-flight; the scenario samples while it runs.

Capacity comes from `/api/fleet/capacity`, never recomputed here — a bash copy
of the slot arithmetic would drift from the scheduler and then agree with
itself. A burst that does not exceed capacity is reported NORUN, per rule 3.

`drain-midmission` drains the node phase 0 ran on, before phase 1 is placed,
and asserts phase 1 lands elsewhere AND still reads phase 0's file. That is the
test of the affinity decision: mission state lives on the gateway, so
re-placement is free — if it were not, this would either strand the mission or
silently lose the earlier work, and "silently lose" is what a status-only check
calls success. The node is restored before any assertion runs, so a failure
cannot leave the fleet permanently one node smaller.

Smoke-checked at CAPACITY_BURST=2: sampling, spread and completion all report,
and the queue check correctly returned NORUN rather than a green tick.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 05:17:54 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 dc0443de34 feat(fleet): GET /api/fleet/capacity returns the scheduler's own survey
Pulled forward from the observability phase because the capacity harness
scenario needs it. A test that recomputed the slot arithmetic in bash would
drift from `vm_placement` and then agree with itself while the scheduler did
something else — the same shape as every silent-success bug in this codebase.

Returns `survey()` + `rank()` unmodified, and keeps `unfit` as its own list:
"the fleet is full" and "we could not read the fleet" send an operator to
different places, so they must not be summed into one number.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-09 05:11:21 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d48bdbc9a7 fix(llm): two modules were posting to Anthropic behind the providers' back
The research scenario passed 4/4 and the log underneath it said:

  phase_summarizer: ... failed: anthropic 400 Bad Request: "Your credit
  balance is too low to access the Anthropic API"

`phase_summarizer` and `mission_refiner` each built their own reqwest POST to
the Messages API with `x-api-key: $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`. No audit of `.complete(`
call sites could have found them — they never touched a provider — so every
phase summary and every mission-brief refinement on this deployment had been
failing against an empty account while the phases themselves ran fine. The
summarizer even persisted an error row per phase, which is why nothing ever
retried loudly enough to notice.

Both now go through `subscription::complete_with_fallback`, so they inherit the
subscription-first credential choice, the 429 backoff, and the opus -> haiku ->
glm chain. The summarizer records the model that ANSWERED in
mission_phase_summaries.model rather than the one it asked for.

The guard is a source WALK, not a file list: any .rs under cm-api/src that
mentions the Messages API host or `x-api-key` fails the test. A hand-listed set
of files is exactly what let these two hide.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 23:11:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 52500a689c fix(door): say so when the security governor is failing open
`Runtime::judge` returns "governor unreachable (fail-open)" whenever the
provider never answers, and the door caller drops `reason` on every allow —
so a judge model that is rate limited or uncredited turns the governor into a
rubber stamp with nothing anywhere saying so. Fail-open stays (a governor
outage must not halt agents), but it is now loud.

Found while removing the metered key as a dependency: the governor reads
CLAWMATES_JUDGE_MODEL, which was `claude-opus-4-8` — a model that is 429 on
this deployment's subscription. gw-04's .env now points it at `glm:glm-4.7`,
matching CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL: funded separately, uncapped, and a
different family from the agent it judges.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 23:03:30 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 9c9439a271 feat(llm): the subscription is the default provider, with a recorded fallback chain
Two changes so an empty metered account stops being a platform outage.

1. `build_provider` prefers the subscription token over ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.
   A bare model name resolves to whatever this returns, so making it the
   subscription means no server-side call can reach the metered key by
   construction — rather than by a source-grep test that already missed four
   call sites once. The metered key remains a fallback and now warns loudly
   when it is the one in use; boot no longer requires it at all.

2. `complete_with_fallback` walks a declared chain when a model has no
   capacity: opus -> haiku -> glm:glm-4.7 by default, overridable via
   CLAWMATES_MODEL_FALLBACK, empty to disable. Measured on gw-04 today: opus
   and sonnet return 429 on the subscription while haiku, GLM and Kimi all
   return 200, so a capped window no longer means "the planner is gone".

The chain returns the model that ANSWERED, and every caller persists it —
mission_plan_proposals.author_model, mission_team_proposals.author_model, and
the swarm's step role. A plan drafted by the third link and filed as an opus
plan is a silent quality change, which is the failure shape this project keeps
paying for. Two negative controls hold the design: the chain never retries the
model that just failed as its own fallback, and it steps down ONLY for a
capacity failure — walking it on a malformed prompt would ask three models the
same bad question and report the third one's confusion.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 22:56:01 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 ee5a939ce6 fix(planner): the other four server-side calls were still on the metered key
The test that was supposed to prevent this grepped for the literal
`runtime.complete(` and passed while the phase planner (`mission_plan.rs`),
both swarm calls, and a second enhance path in `claws.rs` still billed the
pay-as-you-go account. They spell the receiver `state.runtime` or wrap the
call across lines, so the receiver name was never the thing to match. The
test now matches the METHOD, and covers all five files.

`complete_or` gains the rule that makes it safe to apply everywhere: a
`name:model` spec is an operator's explicit provider choice — the swarm
worker model is configured exactly that way — and is passed straight to
`Runtime::resolve_provider` untouched. Only a bare name is ambiguous, and a
bare name is precisely what resolves to the default provider. Hijacking a
chosen Kimi or GLM model onto Anthropic would be the same silent-substitution
bug pointed the other way.

`validator_preflight` and the evaluator judge keep calling the runtime
directly, on purpose: both exist to exercise the CONFIGURED spec.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 15:55:52 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 deed591da6 fix(roster): a rate-limited subscription is a 503 with a reason, not a 500
The retry landed and still failed: all four attempts returned 429. A bare
16-token probe with the same token, straight from gw-04, also returned 429
with `x-should-retry: true` — the Claude Code subscription itself is limited
right now, and no amount of backoff inside one HTTP request will outlast it.

So stop pretending it is a server bug. New `ApiError::Unavailable` → 503,
carrying the one sentence the operator can act on ("clears on its own; try
again shortly"), instead of an opaque `internal error` that sends them into
the logs. The harness now prints the response body rather than the generic
"the planner produced no usable proposal", which is what hid both walls —
first the credit balance, now this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 15:50:29 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c3c4447810 fix(planner): wait out a rate limit instead of failing the whole proposal
Moving the roster and planner onto the subscription removed the credit wall
and revealed the next one: the harness went from
`400 credit balance too low` to `429 rate_limit_error`. A one-shot proposal
call had no retry — there is no retry convention anywhere in cm-llm — so a
limit that clears in seconds killed the "propose a team" button outright.

Four attempts, 2/8/20s backoff, and only for errors that can actually clear:
429/5xx/transport. A 400, 401 or 404 returns immediately, because retrying
those is a 30s hang ending in the identical message, which reads to an
operator as a stall rather than a bad request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-08 15:44:12 -07:00
Omar Sobh 72046e7985 fix(planner): server-side model calls run on the subscription, not the metered key
The roster planner died with `400 — "Your credit balance is too low to access
the Anthropic API"` while every mission on the same machine kept running. Two
Anthropic credentials reach this server and they bill differently:
`ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` (sk-ant-api, metered, runs out) and the Claude Code
subscription token (sk-ant-oat) that every VM already uses.

`Runtime::complete` with a BARE model name — "claude-opus-4-8" — resolves to the
default provider, which is the metered key. Three server-side callers did that:
the roster planner, the Master Planner, and the claw enhancer. Missions were
never affected because `mission_runtime` deliberately sends only the
subscription token into a guest; the server had no equivalent rule.

`subscription::complete_or` is now that rule, and it is the ONE place a
subscription token becomes a provider — `evaluator::subscription_judge` had its
own copy, and two of them is how one ends up with a prefix check the other
lacks.

The `sk-ant-oat` prefix is checked rather than the variable name trusted: an
API key pasted into the OAuth slot would authenticate, work, and bill the
metered account — the same failure again, discovered weeks later.

`web_search` is carried explicitly rather than defaulted. The Master Planner and
the claw enhancer both pass `true`, and a helper that quietly dropped it would
have taken web search away from two features while every test still passed.

`validator_preflight` deliberately keeps `Runtime::complete`: it probes whatever
validator spec is configured (today `glm:glm-4.7`), and forcing it onto Anthropic
would make it prove the wrong thing. A test pins both halves — no other
server-side caller may regress to the metered key, and preflight must keep
probing the configured spec.

258 lib tests.
2026-08-08 09:34:19 -07:00
Omar Sobh d84d17207f feat(placement): place per phase, and let a full fleet queue
Phase 1b: wires the capacity model from 3a2d76a into the launch path, and turns
the existing pending-phase loop into the queue.

Placement moves from mission launch to PHASE launch. A node chosen at launch is
chosen once, minutes before the first VM boots and hours before the last — and
re-placing between phases is free, because mission state lives on the gateway
checkout and every VM is inject -> run -> collect -> destroy. Pinning early
bought nothing and cost the ability to react to a node filling or draining
mid-mission. One call site serves both the solo and composed paths so they cannot
disagree; the composed worker reads `missions.target_node_id`, which placement
writes before dispatch.

QUEUEING, with no new machinery: a phase with no admissible node keeps its
`pending` status and creates no `topology_runs` row. `start_pending_phases`
retries every 10s — that loop already was a queue; nothing downstream ever sees a
run that did not happen.

The risk that creates is the one this codebase keeps paying for: a phase waiting
for capacity looks exactly like a phase nothing is working on. So the wait is
RECORDED, not merely logged — migration 0073 adds `capacity_blocked_since` and
`capacity_note`, stamped once and preserved across retries so the wait is
measured from the first refusal. It is bounded at two full turns: a fleet that
frees will free within one, and a phase that waited two hours must say so rather
than sit pending forever looking like a bug.

Mission launch still fails when NO node could ever run the backend — that is not
transient, waiting will not fix it, and `microvm-negctl` asserts such a mission
stays `draft`. Capacity refusals are transient and queue; capability refusals are
not and fail. The two are separate variants precisely so they cannot be confused.

257 lib tests, 20 binaries.
2026-08-08 08:45:42 -07:00
Omar Sobh 3a2d76aa43 feat(placement): capacity model for the fleet — observed memory is not capacity
Phase 1a of the fleet-intelligence plan: the arithmetic and the inputs. Nothing
is wired to it yet; the launch path still picks `capable.first()`.

Placement has been `ORDER BY last_seen DESC` + `.first()` — the most recently
heartbeated node. Among healthy nodes all heartbeating every 5s that is
arbitrary, and it consults nothing about load, so two missions launched together
land on the same machine. It did not matter while tank held the only rootfs
image. All three nodes serve `claude` as of today.

THE correctness point, and the reason this is not a sort change: a VM that booted
30 seconds ago holds a fraction of its 8 GiB claim, so `mem_pct` reports a
sold-out node as nearly idle. `capacity_of` takes the WORSE of observed usage and
committed usage. The negative control pins it with the measured case — tank at
60 GiB total / 12 GiB observed / 5 VMs booted: utilisation alone says 5 more fit,
the node has room for 1. Booking those five is a node in swap, which slows every
VM on it together.

Commitments are unioned BY IDENTITY, never added: `vm_list` reports booted VMs,
`nodes::pinned_microvm_phases` reports phases chosen but not yet booted (a
window of seconds in which a real 8 GiB claim exists that no node can report).
The deterministic `vm_id_for` is what lets the same phase be recognised in both —
counting it twice would shrink the fleet by the number of phases starting.

`EvalRow::headroom()` finally gets a caller. It was written with the doc comment
"for placement ranking" and has had zero callers since. It is a TIEBREAK, not a
gate: ranking is slots first (spread, don't stack), then live headroom, then node
id so the same fleet state yields the same answer twice — which `last_seen DESC`
could never promise.

Fail-closed per house convention: draining, stale health (>30s, tuned just above
the 20s offline sweeper), and an unanswerable `vm_list` are all INELIGIBLE rather
than low-scoring. Stale Beszel metrics are the one exception — they demote a node
to zero headroom instead of excluding it, because they only ever break ties.

`FleetAtCapacity` and `FleetUnreadable` are separate variants with a test
asserting the second never says "at capacity": an operator sent hunting a load
problem that is really a dead daemon wastes the outage.

Also names the two nodes that were both called "New node" (tank, morpheus) — a
capacity report naming two machines identically is one nobody can act on.

257 lib tests.
2026-08-08 08:10:03 -07:00
Omar Sobh 5c5f1ced33 refactor: the judge's sandbox joins the other three copy sites on root_copy
Four places copy a mission checkout so a ROOT command can run against it without
touching the live tree: the judge, the benchmark runner, the on_green_tests gate,
and — until now — the judge again, with its own implementation predating the
shared one.

`evaluator_tools::Sandbox::for_checkout` now builds through `root_copy::RootCopy`.
Same packer, same exclusion list, same reasoning in one place.

It needs the copy to OUTLIVE the handle, because the judge has not run when
`for_checkout` returns and a firing `Drop` would delete the tree out from under
it. That is `into_workdir`, a method rather than a `mem::forget` at the call
site: the transfer of cleanup responsibility is then visible in the type instead
of implied by a leak. `Sandbox::purge` remains what actually clears it, since
only a container running as root can remove the root-owned `target/`.

What did NOT move: `pack_dir` in the microVM inject/collect path. That marshals a
tree to and from a guest over vsock — a transport, not a host-side copy — and
folding it in would merge two things that only look alike.

249 lib tests.
2026-08-08 06:12:34 -07:00
Omar Sobh 8b12245e79 chore(image): promote Claude Code 2.1.226 after the canary passed
Canary first, production second — the point of pinning is that the upgrade is a
decision, and the point of `canary-claude` is that the decision has evidence.

Taken for 2.1.225's fix to a transient 401 that replaced a long-lived
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN with a short-lived one and broke HEADLESS sessions until
restart. Our sessions are headless and our VMs are per-mission, so "until
restart" reads as a failed phase.

The 2.1.225 workspace-trust prompt does NOT apply: `--help` states the dialog is
skipped in non-interactive mode (`-p`, or stdout not a TTY) and we satisfy both.
Read from the CLI in a booted 2.1.226 VM rather than inferred from the changelog.

Verified on the production path after the rebuild: guest kernel 6.1.128,
delegation to a subagent, `--settings` stop gate installed, judge independent
(glm-4.7), single writer. 6/6.

`rootfs-canary-claude.ext4` is left on tank as the mechanism for the next
candidate, not as a leftover.
2026-08-08 05:47:25 -07:00
Omar Sobh 099a716bfd fix(egress): a backend is defined in two maps, and the canary only had one
First canary run failed: phase failed, nothing delivered, and the streamed log
said exactly why — "Failed to authenticate. API Error: 403 api.anthropic.com is
not on the egress allow-list".

Not a 2.1.226 regression. `canary-claude` was added to the server's credential
map and not to the node's `provider_hosts`, so the VM booted with a valid
subscription token and a door that only opened onto the forge. The fail-closed
branch was working correctly: a backend nobody taught that function about
reaches no model API, deliberately, so it cannot silently borrow another
provider's door.

Both maps now name it, each pointing at the other, with a test asserting the
canary reaches the same provider as `claude` AND that unknown backends still
resolve to nothing.

Worth noting what made this a five-second diagnosis instead of an afternoon: the
live log streaming built earlier today. The failure was a 403 inside a microVM
that no longer exists, and its reason was sitting in the run's checkpoint.
2026-08-07 23:42:58 -07:00
Omar Sobh 4193ae2cda feat(missions): a canary backend for testing a CLI version on the real path
Claude Code 2.1.223 -> 2.1.226 is worth taking (2.1.225 fixes a transient 401
that replaced a long-lived CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN with a short-lived one and
broke HEADLESS sessions until restart — which for us means a failed phase). But
the image every mission uses is not the place to find out whether a new CLI
still delegates, still accepts `--settings`, and still finishes.

`canary-claude` is a real rootfs built from the candidate version, credentialed
identically to `claude`, so a mission can exercise it through the production
path: egress, stop gate, delegation, delivery, streaming. Testing a new CLI
against a different provider would not be testing the thing we are about to ship.

Named explicitly rather than matched on a prefix. An unrecognised backend must
still be refused at launch — that is what `backend_can_run_a_mission` and the
harness's `microvm-negctl` scenario assert — and loosening the credential map is
exactly how that guard gets softened by accident. A test pins both halves.

Already cleared by direct measurement in a booted 2.1.226 VM, before this:
  - `--settings` and `--agents` still exist
  - the workspace trust prompt added in 2.1.225 does NOT apply: `--help` states
    the dialog is skipped in non-interactive mode (`-p`, or stdout not a TTY).
    We use both.
2026-08-07 23:37:04 -07:00
Omar Sobh 8c93cd8569 fix(runs): the composed worker's checkpoint wiped the live log on every node
Composed missions streamed ZERO bytes while solo missions streamed fine. Same
executor, same command, same guest — `HubVms::run` is a straight passthrough —
and the node logged a tail starting for all five graph nodes against the correct
outer run id, with no errors. The bytes simply were not there at the end.

Two writers, one column. `fleet.rs` appends live output under `checkpoint.log`;
`topology_runs::checkpoint` wrote `SET checkpoint = $2`, replacing the whole
object. A composed run checkpoints after EVERY graph node, so each node's
progress silently erased the log written during it. A solo run has no second
writer, which is exactly why it looked like it worked.

Now merged with `||`. The keys are disjoint, so the progress object still wins
for everything it owns.

I was wrong about the cause twice before finding this. First I blamed the guest
agent's serial accept loop — real, fixed, and not this. Then I blamed pipe
buffering racing the abort at turn end — plausible, and the drain fix is right on
its own merits, but composed still streamed zero afterwards, which is what ruled
it out. The thing that actually located it was noticing solo and composed differ
by a WRITER, not by a code path.
2026-08-07 23:10:27 -07:00
Omar Sobh 09afa7e7ff fix(node): aborting the tail at turn end raced the flush that matters most
Composed runs streamed NOTHING while solo runs streamed fine — same code path,
`HubVms::run` is a straight passthrough, and the node logged a tail starting for
all five graph nodes with the correct outer run id. The difference was timing.

`claude -p ... | tee` makes stdout a PIPE, so the CLI block-buffers and flushes
at EXIT. The most valuable output — the agent's summary of what it did — arrives
in the instant the turn ends. The node aborted the tail the moment `handle_op`
returned, so that flush was a race: a solo turn (minutes long, output already
flushed by size) won it and streamed 337 bytes; each node of a composed run
(~20s) lost it and streamed zero.

The tail now DRAINS. A flag is set when the turn returns, and the loop exits only
after a pass that read nothing new — checked AFTER a read, never before one,
because exiting on the flag alone would drop exactly the bytes this exists to
capture. Bounded by a 20s timeout with the abort kept as a backstop rather than
the mechanism, so a VM that stopped answering cannot hold the task open.

Worth naming: 5 tails started, 5 logged cleanly, 0 bytes arrived. Every
individual step reported success and the feature did nothing — the same shape as
the empty Live tab this whole thread began with, one layer down.
2026-08-07 23:00:37 -07:00
Omar Sobh 5b49d5a1a8 feat(merge): gate publication on the merged tree's own tests
The other half of the merge button. Merging told you the branch went in; nothing
checked that what came out still worked.

Verified BEFORE publishing, not reverted after. `merge_locally` and
`push_merged` are separate functions so the caller can run the project's tests
between them, which means a merge that breaks the base is simply never pushed —
`main` is not broken for however long it takes someone to notice. A test asserts
`merge_locally` contains no push, because the moment it does, verification
becomes after-the-fact and the guarantee is gone.

Outcomes, all reported to the operator rather than swallowed:
  Passed      -> published
  NoSuite     -> published, and SAID so; a repo with no tests is a fact about the
                 repo, not a pass
  Failed      -> not published, exit code reported, branch untouched so it can be
                 fixed and merged again
  CouldNotRun -> not published. Fail closed: a suite that could not run has not
                 passed, and publishing on "we could not check" is how a green
                 main stops meaning anything.

`verify_tests` runs `cargo test` as ROOT in a container, so the merge workdir
ends up holding a root-owned `target/` the server (uid 65532) cannot delete —
the same leak found three times today. Purged through the container before the
ordinary cleanup.

248 lib tests.
2026-08-07 22:51:14 -07:00
Omar Sobh 28090d1de0 fix(node): the log tail gave up before the turn wrote its first byte
First live test of the streaming path: mission passed 6/6, `checkpoint.log` was
0 bytes, and the node logged nothing at all.

`stream_vm_log` treated "no progress" as "the turn finished writing". But the
guest's `tail` reports EOF after every idle window, and the FIRST idle window is
always the one before any output exists — the VM is still booting and the CLI
still starting. So the tail returned `at == 0`, the node concluded the turn was
done, and it stopped seconds into a run that then went on for minutes.

The abort is the terminator, not idleness: the caller already aborts this task
when the exec returns, so waiting cannot outlive the turn. No-progress now sleeps
and retries instead of returning.

Also logs when a tail STARTS. The bug was invisible in exactly the way this
session keeps finding: silence on the success path, silence on the give-up path,
and an empty Live tab that looked identical to a feature nobody had wired.

Method note, since it cost time: I tried to confirm the deployed binary by
grepping it for `vm_out` and found zero — then found zero for `pty_out` and
`vm_exec` too, in a binary whose PTY streaming demonstrably works. Binary-grep is
not a reliable presence test for these literals; `stream_vm_log` and `tail of`
being present is what actually showed the code had shipped.
2026-08-07 21:27:58 -07:00
Omar Sobh 0b89b8316c feat(observability): stream a microVM turn's stdout/stderr to the platform live
The Live tab showed nothing while a turn ran, and the agent's own account of it
went to stderr on the node and nowhere a user could reach. This is the path that
carries it.

The blocker was the guest agent. `fcagent` handled one connection at a time,
inline, so during an hour-long turn the VM accepted nothing — which is why every
existing probe (subagents, stop-gate blocks, cap) runs AFTER the turn rather than
during it. It now spawns a thread per connection, wrapped in `catch_unwind`
because this process is pid 1: a panic used to take the accept loop with it, and
an unbootable VM is a far worse outcome than a missing log. A failed spawn logs
and keeps accepting rather than dropping the listener.

PROVED against a live VM before building on it, since "sound reasoning about this
system" and "measurement" have diverged repeatedly today. Patched rootfs, booted
under Firecracker, ran an 8s exec and a concurrent tail:

    exec took 8.0s ok=True
    +0.0s 'line1\nline2\n'  +1.2s 'line4\n'  +3.2s 'line6\n'  +6.0s 'DONE\n'
    VERDICT: CONCURRENT — tail returned data before exec finished

The rest is the pattern the terminal already uses. New `tail` op streams a file
by OFFSET (so a dropped link resumes instead of replaying, and the tail always
terminates — one that never returns pins a thread for the life of the VM). The
node follows the log alongside the turn and pushes `Uplink::VmOut { run_id, at,
data }` over the WebSocket it already holds, mirroring `PtyOut`. The server does
what `PtyOut` deliberately does not: it APPENDS to the run's checkpoint as well
as fanning out, because a terminal has no history worth keeping and a mission log
is the record of what the agent did. `run_events_sse` emits the new bytes as
`step` events, which the live pane already renders — no frontend change.

The turn is `tee`d, not redirected: the file feeds the live stream and stdout
still becomes `VmOutcome::summary`. A redirect would have produced a live view
and an empty summary, which is the same green-and-empty shape as the bug this
fixes. Tested, along with the log living outside the collected tree so it never
lands in a user's delivered diff.

246 lib tests, 20 binaries; node and fcagent build clean.
2026-08-07 21:07:12 -07:00
Omar Sobh 62509a5090 fix(missions): a solo microVM run showed the operator an empty Live and Output tab
Found by a frontend wiring sweep, then confirmed in the database.

Everything the UI shows of a run's CONTENT reads
`topology_runs.checkpoint.records`: `/api/missions/{id}/documents` behind the
output reader, and `/api/topology-runs/{id}/events` behind the live pane. The
`team` and `microvm_graph` tiers write those records. The SOLO microVM path
never did — it updated `status` and nothing else:

    tier          | checkpoint_null | records
    microvm_graph | f               | 2-5
    team          | f               | 5
    microvm       | t               | 0      <-- every one

So a single-phase microVM mission ran real work, delivered a real branch, and
showed an empty Live tab and an empty Output tab. The agent's own account of the
turn went to stderr via eprintln and nowhere a user could reach.

Note what was NOT broken, since that was the initial suspicion: the SSE path
matches (`/api/topology-runs/{id}/events` on both sides), and a sweep of all 130
frontend `/api/` calls against the 164 registered routes found zero genuinely
missing endpoints. The wiring was fine; the data was absent.

The run now persists its turn as one record shaped exactly like the ones those
two readers already parse — `node_id`, `role` (the phase kind), `phase`,
`output` — so no reader changes. Written with `checkpoint || $3::jsonb` so a
future writer of other checkpoint keys is not clobbered.

246 lib tests.
2026-08-07 19:02:43 -07:00
Omar Sobh 3616bc4733 feat(missions): an operator button to merge a mission's branch into main
`MergePolicy::Never` — the default for anything touching code — has always meant
"do not merge on your own", deferring to a human. There was no way for that human
to say yes: `auto_merge` was reachable only from the paper-harvest path, no
workflow template declares `merge_policy`, and every mission ended at a branch.

`POST /api/missions/{id}/merge` is that yes, with a button on the artifacts tab.
The additive-only gate does NOT apply here, deliberately: an operator reading a
code change is exactly the judgement the policy was holding out for.

What is not waived:

  - the branch comes from the artifact delivery RECORDED, not rebuilt from the
    mission id, and must have `pushed: true`. A phase that never pushed shows no
    button instead of one that cannot work.
  - an empty branch is refused. A button reporting success for merging nothing
    is worse than no button.
  - a conflict refuses, aborts, and leaves the repo clean rather than forcing.

It works in a FRESH CLONE under `_merge/<mission>`, never the mission checkout:
that directory is reaped on a timer after a mission ends, so a merge using it
would succeed right after a run and fail inexplicably an hour later. The clone is
made by the server process, so nothing runs as root and ordinary cleanup works —
unlike the copies in `root_copy`.

`merge_and_push` is split out so the operator path and the automatic path run the
SAME git commands; only the gates differ. A test asserts both call it, that the
operator path does not re-apply the additive gate it exists to bypass, and that
it still refuses an empty branch.

Harness 43/43 across all five recipes before this change, with `_gate`, `_bench`
and `_verify` all at zero.

246 lib tests, 20 binaries, 89 frontend tests, clean build.
2026-08-07 18:53:38 -07:00
Omar Sobh a8b8efba6a fix(delivery): the on_green_tests gate ran the suite in the live checkout
Fourth instance of the same defect, and the last of the three commands that run
as root against a mission tree.

`verify_tests` execs the project's test command with `workdir = repo` — the live
checkout — inside a container running as ROOT. `cargo test` writes `target/`, so
the checkout ends up owned by two uids and the next phase's cargo hits
permission-denied. The harness reported `uids=0,65532` the first time this gate
ever ran end to end.

It survived because it had never run. Every one of the ten harness fixtures used
`commit_policy: "always"`; `on_green_tests` and `on_reviewer_approval` were
parsed, implemented, and never exercised — and `Gate`'s own doc already records
that three recipes carried this policy while it "did precisely nothing" for want
of a reader. A policy that is never exercised is indistinguishable from one that
is ignored.

Consolidated rather than fixed a third time. `root_copy` now owns the pattern —
copy through `mission_fs::pack_dir` into a SIBLING of the mission dir, run there,
and purge FROM INSIDE THE CONTAINER, because the copy's `target/` is root-owned
and the server (uid 65532) cannot delete it. `benchmark_runner` moved onto it;
`evaluator_tools::Sandbox` keeps its own copy logic for now (it carries an
allow-list and a judge-facing API, so folding it in is a larger change than this
moment warrants — noted, not done).

The gate fails CLOSED if the copy cannot be made: an unverifiable suite must not
license a push.

Also adds the `refactor` scenario, which is what found this. I had written it off
as "structurally identical to four existing scenarios" — wrong: it is the only
recipe carrying `on_green_tests`, and that made it the only one testing this
code path at all.

245 lib tests, 20 test binaries.
2026-08-07 17:48:29 -07:00
Omar Sobh a4b4d05b8d fix(evaluator): the verification sandbox leaked for the same reason the bench copy did
Found by checking `_verify` after fixing the identical bug in `_bench`: 16 MB
stranded across two copies, the oldest hours old.

`Sandbox::Drop` calls `std::fs::remove_dir_all` as uid 65532. The judge runs
`cargo test` in a container as ROOT — that is the entire point of the sandbox —
so the copy's `target/` is root-owned and the removal fails on it, leaving the
whole tree. The error was logged to a stream nobody reads, so the sandbox that
exists to protect the checkout quietly filled the disk instead.

Its doc comment also claimed "the copy lives under `_verify/<mission>`, which
the next pass clears anyway". That was wrong for exactly the same reason:
`for_checkout` removes a stale root before copying, with the same uid, and fails
the same way. A leaked copy was permanent, not transient.

`Sandbox::purge` removes it from inside the container, as root, where it was
written. `evaluate` now wraps its body so the purge runs on EVERY exit — that
function returns from several branches, and cleanup only some paths reach is the
same as no cleanup on the others. `Drop` stays as a fallback for the early paths
where nothing has run as root yet, and its comment no longer claims otherwise.

This is the third instance today of the same shape: cleanup that cannot clean up,
invisible because the failure was swallowed. The others were the leaked agent
containers in the runtime tests and the bench copy in e89a32f.

243 lib tests.
2026-08-07 17:34:54 -07:00
Omar Sobh e89a32ffef fix(benchmark): the bench copy leaked because only root could delete it
The copy fix in a93a411 restored the checkout's single-writer invariant but
stranded the copy: 1.2 MB per run, growing forever.

`cargo bench` runs as root inside the container and writes `target/` there, so
the copy is root-owned. The server process is uid 65532; its
`remove_dir_all` cannot delete those files, and `Drop` discarded the error — so
the tree survived and nothing said so. The same "cleanup that cannot clean up"
shape as the container leak in the runtime tests, and invisible for the same
reason: a swallowed error on a path nobody reads.

`purge_copy` removes it from INSIDE the container, as root, where it was
written. Called on BOTH the success and failure paths before `Drop`, and again
before creating a copy, since a stale one from a previous run is root-owned too.
`Drop` stays as a fallback for the early-error paths where nothing ran as root
yet, and now says in its doc comment that it cannot do the real job.

Found by checking `_bench` after the uid probe went green — the invariant it
asserts was satisfied while the fix that satisfied it was leaking.

243 lib tests.
2026-08-07 17:07:36 -07:00
Omar Sobh a93a4111e1 fix(benchmark): the baseline runner was writing root-owned files into the checkout
Caught by the harness: `benchmark: checkout has multiple writers (uids=0,65532)`.
The previous full run passed that same check, so this was introduced by wiring
`benchmark_runner` into the sweep one commit ago.

`docker_exec` enters a container running as ROOT with the missions root
bind-mounted, and `cargo bench` writes `target/`. Run in the live tree it leaves
root-owned build output in a checkout owned by uid 65532 — the single-writer
invariant broken, and the next phase's cargo hitting permission-denied on a
directory it cannot write.

This is the SAME defect `evaluator_tools::Sandbox` was written for, found by the
same probe, and fixed the same way: benchmark a COPY. `BenchCopy` packs the
checkout through `mission_fs::pack_dir` (so it excludes exactly what the
delivered diff excludes — one exclusion list, now four consumers) into
`<missions_root>/_bench/<mission>`, a SIBLING of the per-mission dirs like
`_verify` and `_outputs`, so a mission reap cannot race a running bench. Removed
on drop, including on error paths.

The operator-triggered path (POST /api/missions/{id}/benchmark) had this bug
from the start and is fixed by the same change — it shares `run`.

Worth naming the pattern: measurement must not mutate what it measures. It
applies to the judge, to the `verifier` subagent that has no Edit or Write, and
now to the benchmark runner.

243 lib tests, zero warnings.
2026-08-07 17:01:36 -07:00
Omar Sobh 0d8db7ff0b fix: close the three remaining gaps, and repair a test I silently disabled
FIRST, the self-inflicted one. My edit in a20702d inserted a test between an
existing `#[test]` and the function it belonged to. The result compiled and
looked fine: `every_anthropic_spelling_is_one_family` lost its attribute and
STOPPED BEING A TEST, its doc comment ended up describing my test instead, and
my test carried two `#[test]`s. It has not run since — in already-deployed code.
Nothing failed, which is the point: a test that does not run is indistinguishable
from one that passes. Found via a compiler warning I had not read.

The commit message on a20702d said "241 lib tests pass". 240 ran.

Then the three gaps.

1. A security scan could not read history. `ensure_checkout` clones with
   `--filter=blob:none` — full commits, blobs on demand — and the agent
   environment has NO network route to the forge. Measured: gitleaks on a
   4-commit repo reported "1 commits scanned" and "could not fetch <sha> from
   promisor remote". A credential committed and later deleted is exactly what a
   scanner looks for and exactly what a lazy blob withholds. Missions with a
   `security_scan` phase now clone fully; everything else keeps the cheap path.

   (I first blamed `--depth 1`, from a stale module doc comment. The code has
   said `--filter=blob:none` since it was written, and the comment at `clone`
   explains why NOT shallow — a shallow clone cannot push a branch back. Both
   the comment and my claim are fixed.)

2. `benchmark_runner` never ran as part of a benchmark phase. It was reachable
   only from an operator button, so the `author_and_baseline` recipe authored
   benchmarks and measured nothing — `benchmark_snapshots` stayed empty. Now
   baselined from the sweep, SPAWNED not awaited: BENCH_TIMEOUT is 30 minutes
   and that loop also starts, closes, evaluates and captures every phase on the
   platform. A `NOT EXISTS` guard on iteration 0 makes per-tick firing safe. A
   repo with no bench harness logs and does NOT fail the phase — but it logs,
   because "no baseline" must not read like "not attempted".

3. The World's rich layer was empty for every mission. `run_events::append` is
   called only from the a2a path, and `world.rs` tailed only that table —
   while mission per-step detail has always lived in
   `topology_runs.checkpoint.records`, which `topology::run_events_sse` streams.
   The data was never missing; the viz read the one source missions never write.
   Now both are tailed, mapped through the existing `step_started` vocabulary so
   no new event types are needed.

242 lib tests, 20 test binaries, zero warnings.
2026-08-07 16:09:49 -07:00
Omar Sobh 2a9a62c784 test(harness): cover security_hardening — 4 of 5 recipes now run end to end
The third recipe whose defining phase is not `coding`, and so the third that
nothing could fail before `PRODUCING_KINDS` widened: a `security_scan` phase
that ran no scanner and wrote nothing reported success.

One phase, not the recipe's full scan->research->code chain — what is under test
is the phase KIND, and the other two kinds are already covered.

Two assertions, because the first alone is weak. "Delivered a file" is satisfied
by an agent that writes "I scanned it, all clear" and runs nothing — the
letter-not-purpose shape this codebase keeps paying for. So the delivered patch
must also carry the scanner's OWN output. Verified against the real run: the
agent produced gitleaks' banner, INF/ERR lines, byte counts and exit code, not a
claim about them.

Only `refactor` is now uncovered, and deliberately: its single phase is `coding`,
structurally identical to chain/multirole/microvm/noop. It would add runtime and
no new signal.

security 4/4 against the live fleet.
2026-08-07 15:38:50 -07:00
Omar Sobh 6dd7937ece test(harness): cover the two recipes that had none — research_only and benchmark
The portal offers five workflow recipes. Every one of the harness's seven
fixtures was `research_and_code`, so four recipes had never run end to end —
and that is not a theoretical gap. `research_only` DESTROYED its output for as
long as it existed: `requires_repo = false`, so the capture query's
`AND m.repo_id IS NOT NULL` skipped it, the container was reaped unread, and
eight ClawHDF5 research documents were lost while the mission reported
`completed`. Nothing in 550+ tests could see it, because nothing ran the recipe.

`research-only` asserts the whole chain the loss ran through, not just the
happy end of it:
  - the phase completes
  - document artifacts exist AT ALL (the missing thing)
  - the agent's seven identity files (SOUL.md, MEMORY.md, …) are NOT published
    — the first live capture published all seven, because `.git/info/exclude`
    cannot protect a mission with no `.git`
  - the captured text reads back through the content endpoint, since an
    artifact row pointing at nothing is a 404 with no explanation

`benchmark` covers the other half: a benchmark mission is ONE benchmark phase,
and while `empty_delivery_is_a_failure` tested `kind == "coding"` that phase was
exempt — nothing in the platform could fail it. The scenario asserts it both
completes AND delivers files.

Also: `run_scenario` takes an optional `no-checkout`. The single-writer uid probe
is a property OF A CHECKOUT, and a repo-less mission has none by design, so
probing reports a platform fault that is really a category error. It is declared
per scenario rather than inferred from a missing directory — that inference would
silently excuse a repo-BACKED mission whose checkout was reaped early, which is
the exact condition the probe exists to catch.

research-only 4/4, benchmark 3/3 against the live fleet.
2026-08-07 15:13:40 -07:00
Omar Sobh a20702d55b fix(evaluator): a bare validator model name claimed independence it never had
`CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL=gemini-2.5-flash` (or any bare model name) produced
an Anthropic judge grading Anthropic work, recorded `independent = true`.

The chain:

  - `provider_family` reads the SPEC. A bare `gemini-2.5-flash` matches none of
    the known needles, so it returns "unknown" — deliberately NOT "anthropic",
    so it passes the `family == IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY` guard.
  - `Runtime::resolve_provider` (runtime.rs:224) falls back to the DEFAULT
    provider for any spec it cannot route. A bare name has no `provider:` to
    route on, so it silently returns the house Anthropic provider.
  - The existing "no provider registered" guard checks `model.contains(':')`.
    That works for `glm:glm-4.7` — an unrouted colon-spec comes back carrying
    its colon — and can NEVER fire for a bare name.

So the one guarantee this path exists to make (the judge is not the implementer)
was reported as satisfied while being violated. That is the same shape as the
Goodhart incident the independent judge was built after: not a wrong answer, a
wrongly-trusted one.

A validator spec must now name its provider. `names_a_provider` is a named
predicate rather than an inline `contains(':')` so the rule is testable and the
reasoning has somewhere to live.

Found while auditing my own Gemini removal — which turned out to be
behaviour-neutral here (a gemini spec went from family "gemini" to "unknown",
both non-anthropic, same verdict). The bug is pre-existing and independent of
it; removing Gemini only made the bare `gemini-*` spelling more likely to be
left behind in someone's env.

Live config is `glm:glm-4.7`, a proper registry spec, so production behaviour is
unchanged. Negative control: make `names_a_provider` return true unconditionally
and `a_validator_spec_must_name_its_provider` fails.

241 lib tests pass.
2026-08-07 14:34:28 -07:00
Omar Sobh 87f188ae73 refactor: strip Gemini from the platform, and level up the architecture_mapper
Two things.

1. The architecture_mapper proposal, applied AND made durable.

The GLM proposal (019fddd9) was accepted in full: the agent's system_prompt now
carries the Mermaid-first constraint and its brain was rewritten. Both verified
against the live row and the .h5 file.

But `apply_identity` writes `UPDATE agents SET system_prompt` and
`apply_brain_consolidation` writes that agent's brain — neither touches the team
TEMPLATE. That agent is mission-scoped, so the improvement would have died with
the mission. The model's actual insight was sharp and worth keeping: "Mermaid
diagrams beat prose" lived in the brain SEED and not in the system PROMPT, so it
only applied when the agent happened to consult its brain. That constraint is
now in templates/teams/codebase_research.toml, where every future Codebase
Research team inherits it.

(The proposal's second item mostly restated anti-patterns the seed already
lists, so the seed is unchanged. Applying an LLM's suggestion is not the same as
agreeing with all of it.)

2. Gemini is gone.

Removed: the `gemini.default` provider alias and its `is_exact_provider_match`
prefix, GEMINI_API_KEY forwarding to agent containers, the evaluator's
gemini->gemini family row, the model selectors in claws/teams/planner and in
TeamWizard + AgentComputer, and the commented provider block in the runtime
config example (whose ZEROCLAW_AGENT_MAP example still mapped a worker_gemini
that no longer existed).

`provider_alias_for("gemini")` now returns claude_cli.default via the
unrecognised-model branch, which LOGS. A stray gemini binding degrades visibly
rather than resolving to a provider row we no longer ship. A test pins that, and
another pins that GEMINI_API_KEY is forwarded in NEITHER auth mode, so adding it
back to the list is a visible change rather than an accident.

Avatar generation is DELETED, not disabled — it called Gemini's image model, and
there is no alternative: Claude and Kimi are text-only, and z.ai answers
"Unknown Model" for cogview-3-flash and cogview-4 on our plan (measured, not
assumed). AvatarModal keeps UPLOAD, which never needed a provider; only the
prompt-generation half is gone.

240 backend lib tests, 89 frontend tests, clean tsc + eslint, build succeeds.
2026-08-07 14:15:53 -07:00
Omar Sobh f6c3ddbf81 refactor: no feature depends on Gemini any more
Depleted Gemini prepayment credits took out PDF rendering. The same key was the
only thing standing between level-up proposals and the same fate, so both are
off it.

- `pdf_renderer` is DELETED, not disabled. Nothing sets `render_pdf: true` since
  markdown became the deliverable (821cbb8), so the worker polled forever for
  rows that can no longer exist. It was also the only caller of the Gemini
  MD->HTML conversion. A worker that cannot do anything is worse than absent: it
  reads as a feature.

- `level_up` now resolves its proposer through the provider REGISTRY
  (`Runtime::resolve_provider`), the same path the evaluator uses, defaulting to
  `glm:glm-4.7` — the validator this project measured and chose in
  scripts/judge-eval.sh. `CLAWMATES_LEVEL_UP_MODEL` takes a registry spec
  (`glm:glm-4.7`, `kimi:k2`, `claude-sonnet-5`), so every provider the platform
  can already reach works and no single vendor's billing can take it down.

The non-obvious part of that swap: Gemini was asked for
`response_mime_type: application/json` and obliged, so the old code parsed the
raw reply. Anthropic-format models are under no such obligation and wrap objects
in prose or a ```json fence. `extract_json_object` brace-counts to the matching
close — string-aware, so a `}` inside a value does not end it, and nested (these
proposals nest by design). Tested against bare, fenced, nested, brace-in-string
and absent. Parsing raw text would have worked in review and failed on the first
real proposal.

What deliberately still MENTIONS Gemini: `mission_runtime` forwards
GEMINI_API_KEY to agent containers alongside GROQ/OPENAI/ZAI/KIMI, and the claw
model selector offers it. Those are user options, not platform requirements —
the ask was to remove the NEED.

Also corrected a comment in mission_delivery that cited `pdf_renderer` as the
authority on artifact path resolution. It never was: it joined the mission id
first and produced a doubled path that never resolved.

238 lib tests, 20 test binaries.
2026-08-07 13:01:57 -07:00
Omar Sobh 821cbb8622 feat(missions): hold every producing phase to delivering, and read markdown instead of PDFs
Two changes the portal review asked for.

1. `benchmark` and `security_hardening` had no delivery guarantee.

`empty_delivery_is_a_failure` tested `kind == "coding"`, on the reasoning that
"research phases legitimately write nothing to the tree" — which the research
directive three modules over contradicts, since it tells the agent to save
findings under /mission/repo/research/. The cost: a `benchmark` mission is ONE
benchmark phase, and with that phase exempt nothing in the platform could fail
it. Same for `security_hardening`, whose first two phases are security_scan and
research.

Now keyed on PRODUCING_KINDS = coding, research, benchmark, security_scan.
`review` stays exempt — a reviewing phase that changes nothing has done its job,
the same distinction `vm_stop_gate::per_node` makes. The test that encoded the
old rule is rewritten rather than deleted, with the reasoning that replaced it.
All 8 harness fixtures are coding phases, so harness behaviour is unchanged.

2. PDFs are dropped; markdown is the deliverable.

Rendering a PDF meant asking an LLM to convert markdown to HTML — a paid API
call per document, on the critical path of "let me read my research", which
failed on depleted Gemini credits and left every artifact unreadable. Styling at
render time is free, offline, instant and cannot 429.

- `mission_outputs` no longer requests a render.
- New `GET /api/missions/{id}/artifacts/{artifact_id}/content`. The frontend had
  no way to READ an artifact at all: it listed paths and offered a PDF preview
  that never rendered (and whose `rendered_pdf_path` had no route serving it).
  Two containment rules, both enforced: the artifact must belong to a mission in
  the caller's workspace, and the CANONICALISED path must stay under `_outputs`
  — canonicalise first, because checking the string before resolving `..` is the
  classic hole.
- `MarkdownBlock` now uses react-markdown + remark-gfm + rehype-slug. It was a
  deliberate zero-dep renderer for "the subset the refiner emits", and that
  subset stopped matching reality: agent briefs are largely GFM pipe tables,
  which it showed as literal pipes. MissionOutputReader and RefineDiffModal use
  the same component and gain tables for free.
- Heading ids come from rehype-slug and `outlineOf` slugs with the same
  GithubSlugger, so the outline rail's anchors still resolve. A test pins that
  invariant, including duplicate headings.

Styles live in globals.css under `.md-view`: the markup is generated so there
are no class hooks, and this project has no styled-jsx registry — the app-router
requirement is documented in next/dist/docs/01-app/02-guides/css-in-js.md, which
frontend/AGENTS.md exists to make me read.

The artifacts tab moved to `MissionArtifacts.tsx`. MissionCanvas was 1341 lines
against a 1250 limit BEFORE this change — already failing lint; it is now 1248.

238 backend lib tests, 20 backend test binaries, 89 frontend tests, clean tsc,
clean eslint on every file touched, production build succeeds.
2026-08-07 12:19:06 -07:00
Omar Sobh da889f83ab fix(missions): an empty repo-less phase was re-processed on every tick forever
The guard added in ceab28b fails a repo-less phase that produced nothing. It
does not record that it looked — and the selection query asks "no artifact of
this kind exists", which stays true forever for a phase with no output. So the
phase matched on every sweep: a docker copy_out per tick, and with BATCH = 5,
five such phases would occupy every slot permanently and no repo-less mission
would ever be captured again.

Measured on the first live negative control: 4 occurrences of the guard's log
line, then 8 45 seconds later.

This is a bug this codebase has already fixed once. `record_uncapturable` exists
because "five reaped phases from earlier runs blocked the batch while a freshly
finished coding phase went untouched" — its own comment. I wrote the same defect
into new code on the same sweep, which is the argument for the marker being part
of the pattern rather than something each capture path remembers separately.

Same fix as the precedent: a real file (`NO-OUTPUT.md`) behind a real artifact
row, because a row pointing at nothing turns every reader into an unexplained
404. It carries `metadata.empty = true`, the convention `mission_delivery`
already uses for its "No code changes" artifact, so "captured, and there was
nothing" is distinguishable from "captured eight documents".

The guard itself was proven correct on that same run before this was noticed:
mission failed, phase failed, artifacts 0, with the reason and the
`allow_empty` escape hatch named in the log.

237 lib tests pass.
2026-08-07 11:48:23 -07:00
Omar Sobh c28c7a148f fix(pdf): the renderer resolved every artifact path against the wrong root
`render_one` joined `missions_root()/<mission_id>/` before the artifact path,
producing `<root>/<mission>/_outputs/<mission>/<phase>/...` — the mission id
twice, and no such file.

Artifact paths are relative to the MISSIONS ROOT. All three registration sites
write `_outputs/<mission>/<phase>/...`, and `_outputs` is deliberately a sibling
of the per-mission directories so it survives their reaping; joining the mission
id first put the lookup inside the very directory `_outputs` exists to escape.

It went unnoticed because until now the only artifacts on the system were
`code_diff` rows registered with `render_pdf: false`, which this worker never
reads. `produces = ["md","pdf"]` was inert, so nothing ever asked for a render.
The first artifacts to ask were the first to find it — both failed with ENOENT
on the doubled path.

Negative control: restore the extra join and
`an_artifact_path_resolves_against_the_missions_root` fails.

The worker's error handling is sound and needed no change: it recorded
`render_pdf_status = 'failed'` with the full path in `render_pdf_error`, which
is how this was diagnosed in one read.

237 lib tests pass.
2026-08-07 11:41:48 -07:00
Omar Sobh 89bc53b53d fix(missions): repo-less capture was publishing the agent's own identity files
First live run of `capture_repo_less_phases`: 9 artifacts, of which 2 were the
user's research. The other 7 were AGENTS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, IDENTITY.md,
MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, TOOLS.md and USER.md — the agent runtime's identity
scaffolding, seeded into the workspace root because that root is pinned to the
repository root.

The codebase already knew about these files and already had the list. What it
did not have is a defence that works without a repo: `ignore_agent_scaffolding`
writes them to `.git/info/exclude`, and a mission with no repository has no
`.git`. So the exact files that once got committed into a user's repo and
pushed (the reason that list exists) came back through a new channel.

`AGENT_SCAFFOLDING` is now `pub(crate)` and `mission_outputs` filters on it
directly — one list, two consumers, so the next file the runtime starts seeding
is excluded from both at once rather than from whichever was remembered.

Negative control: replace the filter with `&& true` and
`research_documents_are_kept_and_scaffolding_is_not` fails.

Found by running it against a live mission, not by reading it. The unit tests
passed the whole time — they seeded a tree that did not contain the scaffolding,
because I did not know it would be there.
2026-08-07 11:35:00 -07:00
Omar Sobh ceab28b902 fix(missions): a repo-less mission threw away everything its agents wrote
`capture_finished_coding_phases` selects `AND m.repo_id IS NOT NULL`. Every
`research_only` mission is repo-less by design (`requires_repo = false`), so the
whole capture path — including the `sync_out` that copies the agent's work OUT
of the container — never ran, and the container was reaped unread.

Measured on the real mission `019fdc35` ("ClawHDF5 Research"): four agents, 9.5
minutes, EIGHT research documents — an HDF5 parser design, a Rust ecosystem
survey, a seven-crate dependency map, tracing and fuzzing strategy. Result:
`mission_artifacts` = 0, mission `completed`. Not recoverable: no container, no
volume, nothing under the missions root.

The platform did not merely fail to save the work — it INSTRUCTED it. The task
preamble tells every agent "/mission/repo ... is the mission's git checkout",
whether or not one exists, and the research directive says to save findings
there. One agent recorded the contradiction verbatim: "No git repo — file is
written." It looked, saw no repo, complied anyway.

Three changes, one per link in that chain:

1. `mission_outputs::capture_repo_less_phases` — copies `/mission/repo` out of
   the container and registers each file as an artifact under `_outputs/`,
   which is a SIBLING of the mission dir and survives `teardown_container`.
   This is also the code that finally reads `produces`, until now an inert key:
   `produces = ["md","pdf"]` now drives `render_pdf` into the existing
   pdf_renderer worker.

2. The preamble is conditional. A repo-less mission is told its workspace is
   scratch, that git_operations has nothing to act on, and — the part that
   matters — that files left there ARE collected and published. An agent told
   only "there is no repo" has no reason to write anything to disk.

3. A repo-less phase that produced no files is FAILED, unless it declares
   `allow_empty`. The same rule `empty_delivery_is_a_failure` applies to coding,
   for the only channel these phases have. Note this is NOT that guard widened:
   it keys on `files_changed`, which is meaningless with no checkout, and would
   not have saved the ClawHDF5 documents.

Negative controls, each ablated and confirmed failing: ignore `has_repo` and the
preamble test fails; empty the skip-list and the capture test keeps `.git` and
`node_modules`; write artifacts inside the mission dir and the survives-the-reap
test fails.

236 lib tests pass.
2026-08-07 11:28:10 -07:00
Omar Sobh bcf4866abc test(harness): a gate that gives up, proven against a real VM
The unit tests prove the plumbing GIVEN `released_at_cap: Some(true)`. They
cannot prove the guest writes the marker, that the probe reads it back across
the vsock, or that the phase lands `failed` for the right reason — and every
one of those is where this class of bug has actually lived.

The check is `exit 1`: impossible by construction, so the run exercises the
release path rather than hoping to catch it.

`blocks` reaching the cap is deliberately NOT the assertion. A healthy agent
blocked three times and succeeding on the fourth reports the same 3. The phase
STATUS is the assertion; the block count and the failure reason are corroborating
checks, so a phase that failed for some unrelated reason cannot pass this.

Measured on gw-04 against b36ae00, all 4 checks green:
  phase 0 failed
  the gate spent all 3 blocks before giving up
  the failure names the cap release as the reason
Before b36ae00 that same mission completed green.
2026-08-07 09:58:41 -07:00
Omar Sobh b36ae00ea5 fix(missions): a gate that gave up completed the phase green
`done_when_check` is run in exactly one place: the Stop hook inside the guest.
Nothing outside it has ever re-run the command — not the evaluator (which
judges the PROSE `done_when`), not capture, not delivery.

The hook is capped at MAX_BLOCKS so a stuck agent cannot wedge the turn. At the
cap it logs `cap: <reason>` and exits 0, releasing the agent with its check
still failing. That release was invisible: rc was 0 and the work collected, so
both signals the run status was decided from said "fine", and the phase
completed. Green phase, unmet condition, no error anywhere — the same
silent-success shape this project keeps paying for.

The block COUNT cannot fix it. Three blocks then a stop that finally passed and
three blocks then a surrender both report `blocks: 3`, and they are opposite
outcomes. So the gate now writes a `capped` marker file, probed back out of the
guest alongside the block count, and `Some(true)` fails the run on BOTH paths —
solo (phase_runner) and composed (microvm_turn_executor).

A marker file rather than grepping the log: a block reason embeds the check's
own output, so an output line starting `cap:` would read as a release that
never happened.

Also corrects the comment in `per_node` that sent me looking. It claimed "the
phase-level check still runs post-hoc", conflating two mechanisms — that is
true of `require_changes` (via `empty_delivery_is_a_failure`) and was never
true of `check`.

Negative controls, both ablated and confirmed failing: drop the enforcement and
`a_node_whose_gate_gave_up_fails_the_run` fails; stop writing the marker and
`a_gate_that_gives_up_records_that_it_gave_up` fails. And the control against
over-strictness — `a_node_that_was_blocked_and_then_succeeded_passes` — is why
this keys on the marker instead of the count.

231 lib tests pass.
2026-08-07 09:53:21 -07:00
Omar Sobh cd4d76a8c3 test(harness): pick the done_when wording by measuring the judge, not arguing with it
The microvm scenario's judge assertion failed four runs straight. I blamed the
wording twice and rewrote it twice; the second rewrite made it worse. That was
guessing.

With scripts/judge-eval.sh in place the question is cheap to settle. Three
candidate conditions, three draws each, same evidence and same system prompt:

  "its second line is …"            MET  UNMET  MET     flaky
  "records the kernel version …"    MET  MET    UNMET   flaky
  "contains both … and …"           MET  MET    MET     stable

So it was never noise in general — it is a reproducible weakness with
POSITIONAL and EXCLUSIVE phrasings. "its second line is X and nothing else"
invites this judge to invent requirements about the other lines, which is
exactly the reason it kept citing ("the first line contains 'test result: ok'").

Both fixtures now state what the file CONTAINS. The composed one was checked in
both directions — 3/3 MET on good evidence, 3/3 UNMET when the versions are
missing — because a wording that always answers MET would look stable and prove
nothing.

The eval keeps `kernel-ok` failing on purpose; it is the case production hit,
and tuning it green would turn a measurement into a decoration.

Harness: 24/24, including the assertion that had failed four times.
2026-08-07 08:54:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 5c066afa7b test: stop leaking a container per run, and add the project's first eval
TWO FINDINGS, one from cleaning up and one from refusing to keep guessing.

THE LEAK. `./scripts/test.sh` left three containers running every time — 289 had
accumulated. The cause was a comment that lied: `warm_pool.rs` said "Shutdown
destroys assigned AND pooled sandboxes", while `SandboxManager::shutdown` drains
the POOL only. Its own doc says why — assigned sandboxes persist deliberately so
a redeploy can reuse them, and production reaps the strays with
`reconcile_orphans` at boot. A test has no next boot, so each one that assigned a
sandbox simply left it running. The three tests now call the `release_agent` that
already existed, and the comment says what the code does. Verified: 0 leaked,
where the same run leaked 3 before.

THE EVAL. The independent judge failed the same correct phase FOUR times, each
time citing a different invented requirement. I blamed the condition's wording
twice and rewrote it twice — the second rewrite made it worse, by naming a
command a tool-using judge then ran in its own container. Then a control showed
the same model answering MET to the same question asked directly, and a third
wording test showed a STRICTER phrasing scoring UNMET. Prose wording was not the
variable. Continuing to iterate would have been fitting the fixture to noise.

`scripts/judge-eval.sh` measures the thing instead: five cases drawn from real
incidents, each with an answer a careful human would agree with. This project has
557 tests and had zero evals, which is backwards — a test pins OUR code, an eval
pins the MODEL, and the model changes without us touching anything.

The result is why it was worth building:

  glm-4.7          4/5 — wrong on kernel-ok: says UNMET when MET
  kimi-for-coding  4/5 — wrong on goodhart:  says MET when UNMET

Identical scores, opposite failure modes. GLM fails good work; KIMI passes work
where 14 assertions were deleted and the failing module removed to make a suite
"pass" — the exact incident the verifying judge was built after. Swapping the
validator to Kimi because it passes our failing case would have installed a
rubber stamp. Keep GLM: a judge that is too strict costs a re-run, a judge that
is too lenient costs the guarantee.

The eval also caught a bug in itself before I trusted it: Kimi answers with a
`thinking` block first, and a 160-token budget was consumed entirely by it, which
the harness scored as NO-ANSWER. An eval that misreads a model is worse than no
eval, so it now reads thinking blocks as a fallback and has room to answer.

557 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 08:24:40 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d24823b6f3 fix(missions): a failed phase stranded its mission at running forever
Found by counting containers during a cleanup, not by a test. gw-04 was holding
a per-mission runtime container for a mission whose only topology run had failed
three days earlier — phases `pending,failed`, mission still `running`.

The interaction, which lived entirely between two queries' predicates:
`start_pending_phases` launches a phase only when EVERY lower-order phase is
`completed`, so once one fails the phases after it can never run. They stayed
`pending`. `close_finished_missions` closes a mission only when NO phase is
outside ('completed','failed','skipped') — so a `pending` phase that would never
run kept the mission `running` indefinitely. And `mission_runtime`'s sweeper
fires N minutes after a TERMINAL state, so the container was never reaped.

One leaked container per failed multi-phase mission, accumulating silently, with
nothing in any log saying so. Neither query is wrong alone; the bug is that
nothing marked the phases the failure had made unreachable.

`skip_unreachable_phases` says it: a `pending` phase with a `failed` phase at a
LOWER order_idx becomes `skipped` — strictly earlier, because order is what makes
a phase unreachable, and a failure later in the list says nothing about one still
queued ahead of it. `skipped` is not a new concept: `close_finished_missions`
already treats it as terminal, and it is the honest word for a phase that was
never run, as distinct from one that failed.

RETRY HAD TO MOVE WITH IT, or this trades one bug for another. `retry_phase`
required the mission to be `running`, so closing failed missions would have made
the one outcome you would actually want to retry the one you could not. It now
accepts `failed` too, and in one transaction: resets the phase, REOPENS the
phases its failure had skipped (without that, a retry runs the phase and stops,
because everything after it is terminal-by-skip), and puts the mission back to
`running` — every launcher and closer keys off that status. `completed` and
`cancelled` stay refused; reopening those is a different decision.

557 tests pass, clippy clean. Three DB tests against real SQL, including that a
phase queued BEFORE the failure is untouched and that a draft's phases are never
swept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 06:58:26 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 bf2055e725 fix(evaluator): the anti-Goodhart clause was failing work that RECORDS a value
Three consecutive production verdicts failed a phase that had done exactly what
its condition asked, each time with a different invented reason: "6.1.128 is not
a kernel release string like 'Linux 6.1.128'", then "line 2 should be 27.0.0",
then "line 1 must be empty or unrelated". I reworded the condition twice, and the
second rewording made it worse.

THE CONTROL THAT SETTLED IT: asked the same question with the same file and the
same condition — but WITHOUT our system prompt — glm-4.7 answered MET, citing the
exact line. The model judges this correctly. Our prompt does not.

The cause is a clause we wrote on purpose. `EVAL_SYSTEM_VERIFYING` is
deliberately adversarial because an earlier evidence-only judge was gamed by an
agent that emitted the string the judge had asked for, and it says to fail "a
required string or value hard-coded, stubbed, or printed rather than produced by
working code". A condition asking for a kernel version to be written into a file
IS that shape, read literally. The judge was obeying us.

Two clauses now, because each without the other is a known failure:

  - the trap stays: work that satisfies the letter and not the purpose — tests
    weakened, assertions fitted to wrong output, values stubbed — is not met.
  - some conditions are satisfied BY a recorded value, and for those, writing the
    value IS the work: a measured baseline, a scan report, a recorded environment
    fact. Hard-coding is cheating only when the condition is about behaviour code
    must produce.

And the other failure from those three verdicts: "judge the condition AS WRITTEN;
do not re-derive the expected value yourself" — a condition may describe a
DIFFERENT machine, an earlier run, or a remote environment, and the value the
judge would measure where it stands is not the one under judgement. That is
exactly what produced "line 2 should be 27.0.0": a tool-using judge ran `uname`
in its own container and compared.

This is not a niche fixture problem. The model-authored plans shipped today write
BASELINE.md and security-findings.md and gate on them — every one of those is a
recorded-value condition, and every one would have been rejected.

555 tests pass, clippy clean. A test pins both clauses, since removing either
reintroduces a failure this project has already paid for.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 06:43:44 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 72f8bdc87c test(harness): a done_when naming a COMMAND invites the judge to run it
My previous attempt at this made it worse, which is the useful part.

The condition said "a Linux kernel release string" and the judge rejected
`6.1.128` as "not a Linux kernel release string such as 'Linux 6.1.128'". I
rewrote it as "the exact output of `uname -r`" — and the next verdict was that
line 2 should be `27.0.0`. The judge has a sandbox and allow-listed commands, so
naming a command told it to RUN that command, in ITS OWN container, and compare
the file against the answer it got there. The file records a microVM's kernel;
the judge was comparing it against the machine the judge runs on. Those are
different machines by design — that is the entire point of the assertion.

So a `done_when` for a tool-using judge must describe the VALUE's shape, never a
command that produces it: "a bare kernel version of the form MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH
(for example 6.1.128) and nothing else", plus an explicit instruction not to run
uname and not to compare against the local machine, because the file records a
different one.

The general rule, worth carrying into how `done_when` is written anywhere: a
condition phrased as "the output of X" is ambiguous about WHERE X runs, and a
judge with tools resolves that ambiguity by running X where it stands. Conditions
about a remote or past environment must be stated as properties of the recorded
value.

The scenario's real proof that the agent ran in a guest is unchanged: a separate
comparison of that line against the actual gateway and node kernels, which has
passed on every run including the two where the judge disagreed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 06:35:15 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e2f576ec02 fix(evaluator): the judge verifies a COPY, never the mission's own tree
The harness's uid probe caught this the moment cross-provider validation came
back: `checkout has multiple writers (uids=0,65532)`. All 63 root-owned files
were under `repo/target/`.

The mechanism, confirmed rather than guessed: the judge's verification sandbox
execs into `clawmates-runtime`, which runs as ROOT with the missions root
bind-mounted, and its workdir was the mission's LIVE checkout. So when the judge
ran `cargo test` to check a condition — which is the entire point of the
verifying evaluator — cargo wrote `target/` into the checkout as uid 0, in a tree
otherwise owned by the server. The next phase's `cargo` would then hit
permission-denied on a directory it cannot write, which is the uid-split failure
class copy mode exists to eliminate.

IT WAS LATENT ALL DAY. While the z.ai credential was dead the judge never ran a
single check, so the uid probe kept passing; restoring the credential surfaced it
on the first gated mission. A guard that only holds while a dependency is broken
is not a guard, and this one was only visible because the harness measures the
invariant rather than the feature.

Running the checks as the checkout's uid was the obvious fix and is the wrong
one: `CARGO_HOME` is root-owned 0755 in that image, so a non-root uid fails, and
the evaluator treats "could not run" as unverified — trading a polluted tree for
phases that fail closed for a reason unrelated to their work.

So the sandbox verifies a copy, made through `mission_fs::pack_dir` so it carries
exactly what the delivered diff carries (no `target/`, no `node_modules/`) — one
exclusion list, three consumers. The copy lives at `_verify/<mission>`, a sibling
of the swept per-mission directories, and is removed on drop.

This is the rule the codebase already applies to the `verifier` subagent, which
has no Edit and no Write, stated for the judge: verification must not mutate what
it verifies. A judge that can change the tree it is judging can make its own
verdict true.

NEGATIVE CONTROL, run: pointing the sandbox back at the live checkout fails
`the_judge_verifies_a_copy_and_never_the_mission_tree`. The test seam
(`Sandbox::at`) is never `owned` and never deletes, so a destructive constructor
cannot masquerade as a plain one.

553 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 06:32:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 1b556c5849 test(harness): say what the condition means, after the judge read it strictly
The restored GLM judge failed a phase that had done the work: MICROVM.md existed
with two lines and the second was `6.1.128`, and the verdict was "a kernel
version number, not a Linux kernel release string such as 'Linux 6.1.128'".

The judge is wrong on the fact — `6.1.128` is exactly what `uname -r` prints,
and "release" is the term for it — but the CONDITION was ambiguous, and it is our
fixture. "A Linux kernel release string" can be read as either `uname -r` output
or `Linux x.y.z`, and a stricter reader is entitled to the second. Both scenarios
now say what they mean: the exact output of `uname -r`, a bare version, no prefix.

This is not weakening the assertion. The scenario's own kernel check — the one
that proves the agent ran in a guest rather than on a host — is a separate,
unchanged comparison against the real host kernels, and it PASSED on the same
run. What changed is only that the mission-level `done_when` now describes an
observable fact precisely, which is what this codebase's own plan-authoring
prompt tells models to do.

Worth recording rather than papering over: an over-strict independent judge is a
much safer failure mode than an over-lenient one, and this is evidence the judge
READS the tree instead of rubber-stamping it — the Goodhart incident that
motivated cross-provider validation was the opposite failure. But it does mean a
vague `done_when` can now cost a phase, which raises the value of
`done_when_check` (a shell command, judged by exit status) for anything
mechanical.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 06:19:00 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 521da9feb9 fix(deploy): the verify step is the authority, not the recreate
`scripts/deploy.sh` reported failure twice this afternoon for deploys that had
succeeded. Both times the 60-second rolling timer rolled the stack onto the same
`:latest` first, and the script's own `docker-compose up` then hit a
container-name conflict — "already in use" once, "Renaming a container with the
same name" the other — for a container the timer had already recreated correctly.

A deploy signal an operator has to second-guess is precisely what this script
exists to prevent. Its original reason for being was a green edge on a stale
image; crying wolf trains people to ignore the alarm, which gets you the same
outcome by a different route.

The recreate is now best-effort and says so when it fails, and the VERIFY step
decides — it compares the RUNNING image id against the resolved `:latest`, which
is the only question that matters and is unaffected by which process did the
roll. A genuinely failed deploy still fails there, because that check never
depended on the recreate succeeding.

Both false alarms were settled by hand with the binary grep
(`docker exec … grep -a -c "<string only in the new code>"`), which remains the
strongest check when the image id is in doubt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 05:20:37 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 3300c9d149 feat(missions): say at boot whether the independent judge can be reached
The z.ai credential expired mid-session and the first symptom was a two-phase
mission failing after BOTH its VMs had run — the phase completed, delivered,
pushed, and then one evaluation row said "the independent validator could not be
reached this pass".

`cross_provider_judge` refusing to fall back to the agent's own provider is
correct: a verdict from the same family is not an independent check, and
producing one quietly would claim a property the verdict does not have. The cost
of that refusal is that a dead validator makes EVERY `done_when` phase
unmeetable — and the information needed to know that existed from the moment the
server booted. Nobody was told until it was expensive.

The sibling of `runtime_preflight`, and the same stance: a report, not a gate.
The server must still boot with a broken validator — refusing to start turns a
degraded deployment into a dead one, and a mission that opts out
(`validator_model = ''`) is unaffected.

Two faults, kept distinguishable because they send an operator to different
places: `Unregistered` (no provider by that name — the evaluator will refuse it
rather than judge with the default, so register one) versus `Unreachable` (it
resolved and the call failed — fix the credential). Collapsing them into "the
validator is broken" is the kind of merge that costs an hour.

The probe is a real completion through `Runtime::complete` — the same
resolve-then-stream path the judge itself takes. A models-list or a HEAD would
pass for an expired key, a revoked key, and a key with no quota, which are
exactly the cases worth catching; and a probe that dialled the provider its own
way could pass while the real call fails.

`NotConfigured` is reported too, and not as an error: a deployment may choose the
house model. It is still worth saying out loud that the check running is not an
independent one.

551 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 05:16:54 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 08dd227a45 feat(missions): give the planner the repository's contents, not just its names
The root listing was not enough. Given names alone the planner wrote "optimise
the hot path" for a crate whose hot path is `add(a: i64, b: i64) -> i64` — a
mission that was unachievable from the moment it was written, and that nothing
discovered until an agent had built a benchmark harness in a VM to measure an
integer addition, honestly reported no improvement was possible, and the judge
correctly failed the phase.

`repo_digest` fetches the whole tree (so "does this have benches/" is a fact, not
an inference) and then file CONTENTS in priority order: manifests first — they
say what the project is — then the README, then source ascending by size, since
a planner learns more from twenty small files than from one large one. Lockfiles
and build output are dropped: enormous, and they say nothing a manifest does not.

THE RULE THIS ENFORCES, and the reason the rendering is its own tested module: a
digest of any repository worth planning against is partial, and a model shown a
partial view without being told it is partial plans as though it saw everything.
So every omission is stated — how many files exist, how many were shown, what
was cut from each, and "anything not shown you have NOT seen". Same distinction
as `Option<u32>` for the subagent probe: "we did not look" and "there is nothing
there" are different facts.

Failures degrade to a stated absence rather than an empty string, and the three
cases stay distinguishable: no repository, a tree that could not be read, and a
tree read but no contents fetched. An unreadable tree is never rendered as an
empty repository.

Two more things the prompt now says, both learned from that run: plan for the
repository as it IS rather than as the description implies (and if the
description asks for something the code cannot support, say so in the task and
plan the phase that establishes the truth, rather than a phase that must fail);
and a mission agent has NO package-registry access. The agent discovered the
second one mid-run and wrote a dependency-free `std::time::Instant` harness after
Criterion could not be added — good adaptation, but nothing had warned it.

549 tests pass, clippy clean. The budget/priority/truncation logic is pure and
tested; only the fetching touches the network.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-07 05:01:02 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0aeae07db2 fix(missions): the planner was planning blind — show it the repository
The first real plan opened with "Identify the crate's hottest code path and run
its benchmark harness". This crate has no benchmark harness. The phase ran,
found nothing to baseline, delivered zero files, and the plan's second phase was
left with nothing to optimise against.

The planner saw the mission title, the description, and a boolean for whether a
repository was bound. It never saw the repository. A plan about a codebase
written without looking at the codebase is a guess that reads like a plan — and
the failure surfaces two phases and one VM boot later, as an agent reporting that
the thing it was told to run does not exist.

The prompt now carries the repository's root listing, read from the FORGE rather
than a checkout: at proposal time the mission is still a draft and
`ensure_checkout` has not run, so there is nothing on disk to list. It also says
outright that a phase needing something absent must CREATE it and say so in its
task — the failure was not only ignorance of the tree but the assumption that
missing tooling is someone else's problem.

A listing that cannot be fetched degrades to "(the repository listing could not
be read)" in the prompt rather than to an empty string. A model told the listing
is unavailable can hedge; a model told nothing assumes — which is the same
distinction as `Option<u32>` for the subagent probe, in a prompt instead of a
struct.

Found by running the thing end to end rather than by testing it: every unit test
here passes with a planner that has never seen a repository.

543 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 23:23:34 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 a33dbdcdc3 feat(missions): W1/#13 — let a model author the mission's phases
The last unstarted item from the missions-as-workflows plan, and the other half
of Slice 5: that one lets a model size the TEAM, this lets it decide what the
work IS.

Every mission's phases come from one of five hand-written recipes in
`templates/workflows/*.toml`, chosen by `template_kind` before anyone saw the
mission. That is the "do it this way: 1, 2, 3" over-specification that makes a
capable model follow a worse plan than it would have chosen. The recipes stay —
they are still the default for a mission nobody proposes a plan for, and the
fallback when a proposal is refused.

Same three verbs and the same review gate as the roster, deliberately: propose
and decide are separate because only the second changes a mission, and a second
shape would be a second thing to get right. Approving REPLACES the phases (a
plan is an answer to "what is this mission", not an addition to one), draft-only.

GROUNDED IN WHAT THE PLATFORM ACTUALLY READS, which is the part that makes this
more than a copy. `phase_config::KNOWN_KEYS` already names every phase-config key
and the code that reads it — the registry built after `task` sat unread through
every mission. A plan is validated against it, so a model cannot propose a phase
whose settings nothing will act on: the failure that registry exists to EXPOSE is
one this path cannot create. Phase kinds are checked the same way, because an
unknown kind does not error — it falls through to the catch-all purpose and runs
as a generic phase that looks like it worked.

TWO THINGS THE WORK ITSELF FOUND, both the same shape:

  - `done_when_check` — the stop-gate key added earlier today — was never
    registered in `phase_config`, so every mission that set it has been logging
    it as an unknown key. Found by a test written for a different purpose, which
    is the registry doing exactly its job. Now registered with its reader.
  - `done_when` and `max_iterations` are COLUMNS promoted out of config by
    `missions::create`; the evaluator sweep filters on the column in SQL every
    tick. My first insert wrote the config blob alone, which would have stored a
    plan's completion condition where nothing judges it. NEGATIVE CONTROL run:
    binding NULL instead of the promoted value fails
    `an_approved_plan_replaces_the_missions_phases`.

`order_idx` comes from the array's own order rather than a field the model sets:
two sources for one fact is how a plan ends up with two phase 0s, and order_idx
is what `start_pending_phases` sequences on.

MAX_PHASES is 4 and the prompt argues for one. Each phase is a full agent run in
sequence, and splitting one change into plan → implement → test is the documented
anti-pattern — a single agent doing all three keeps the context that makes the
later steps good.

543 tests pass, clippy clean. Migration 0072.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 20:05:28 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 a48d78f8eb test(missions): a composed node is offered the same help as a solo one
Every composed run so far reports `subagents: 0`, and the honest question is
whether that is the tasks being small or the capability being absent. It is the
former, and this is what says so: a composed node's task text is built by
`microvm_turn_executor` and then wrapped by the SAME `vm_prompt` inside
`run_inside`, so one prompt builder serves both paths and both carry the `Agent`
tool offer and the `verifier` / `explorer` roles.

Asserted rather than left to code reading, because if someone gave composed
nodes their own prompt without the offer, the difference would show up only as a
count nobody was watching — and "the graph fanned out but no node did" is
indistinguishable from "no node needed to".

The roles are read from `agent_definitions()` rather than spelled out, so adding
a role without mentioning it in the prompt fails here instead of shipping a role
the lead is never told about.

535 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 19:26:59 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 742724e53c feat(fleet): Kimi as a microVM backend — the URL settled by measurement
The base URL took three measurements to find, and the first two were wrong in
instructive ways.

`api.moonshot.ai/anthropic/v1/messages` EXISTS and speaks the protocol — it
answers with Moonshot's own structured error rather than a 404. It also rejects
an `sk-kimi-` key, because it belongs to the platform.moonshot.ai account
namespace. Two endpoints that both "work" for different accounts is precisely
the shape that makes a guessed URL look like a broken key, and it is why this
was refused rather than guessed for as long as it was.

The Kimi CODE service is the one an `sk-kimi-` key belongs to:
`POST https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1/messages` returns a real Anthropic Messages
body — `msg_` id, `content` blocks, a `thinking` block with a signature. So
`ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://api.kimi.com/coding`, WITHOUT the `/v1`: Claude Code
appends `/v1/messages` itself, and `/v1/v1/messages` would 404 in a way that
reads as a broken image rather than a bad URL.

Two more measured, each otherwise a silent failure at the first turn:
`Authorization: Bearer` is accepted (so ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN is the right
injection channel), and a `claude-*` model id is ACCEPTED AND ANSWERED — Kimi
maps it onto `kimi-for-coding` exactly as z.ai does, so no ANTHROPIC_MODEL
override is needed.

Claude Code rather than Moonshot's own `kimi` CLI, deliberately. The mission
harness is Claude-Code-shaped throughout: `--agents` JSON roles, the verifier's
tool allowlist, the `Stop` hook behind the completion gate, the per-subagent
transcripts counted as delegation evidence. `kimi` has none of those flags — its
equivalents are TOML files and markdown agent dirs — so using it would mean a
second executor with its own untested failure modes.

TWO STALE MAPS, caught by the rootfs harness refusing to bless the image: both
`fc-build-rootfs.sh` and the node's `required_cli` expected backend `kimi` to
contain Moonshot's `kimi` binary. That assumption predates the measurement, and
it failed a rootfs that was correct. Both now say `claude` for glm and kimi
alike — the binary is the same in all three images; only the endpoint differs.

Egress for `kimi` is `api.kimi.com` alone: not moonshot.ai (wrong namespace),
not z.ai, not Anthropic. Asserted both ways, like the other two.

The image and rootfs are built on tank and the rootfs passes all four checks
(boots, git, writable /mission, `claude --version`). 534 tests, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 17:52:45 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 d3a53e7bf1 fix(fleet): a VM reaches its OWN provider and no other, measured not assumed
The GLM backend works — and proving it produced a better boundary than the one
I shipped an hour ago.

WHAT THE FIRST GLM MISSION SHOWED. It completed, and the delivered file said the
model was "claude-opus-5". The node's egress log said the VM had dialled
`api.anthropic.com` five times before `api.z.ai`. Either reading alone is
consistent with a "GLM backend" that silently runs Anthropic — the exact
silent-success shape this project keeps closing — so I did not accept either.

THE ABLATION, run on tank rather than reasoned about: deny `anthropic.com` at the
proxy and run the same mission again. It **completed**, dialling only
`api.z.ai`. So the completions genuinely come from z.ai; Claude Code's calls to
anthropic.com are its own telemetry, not its model traffic.

And that same agent — served exclusively by z.ai, with Anthropic unreachable —
still described itself as "Claude Opus 5 (1M context)". **A model's account of
which model it is has no evidential value.** The proxy's log of which host it
dialled does. This is the `uname -r` lesson again in a new place: ask the
infrastructure, not the agent.

So the allow-list is now PER BACKEND rather than a union: a `claude` VM reaches
Anthropic and the forge, a `glm` VM reaches z.ai and the forge, and neither can
reach the other's endpoint. A union was defensible when it was one host; once the
measurement showed a GLM VM never needs Anthropic, keeping it would mean a
credential mix-up upstream could still put one provider's secret on another
provider's wire. Now it fails at a closed door instead.

An unknown backend gets the forge and NO model API — it cannot run anyway, and
borrowing somebody else's door is the failure this split prevents. An explicit
`CLAWMATES_FC_EGRESS_ALLOW` still wins outright: an operator who set it drew a
boundary on purpose.

`DEFAULT_ALLOW` is deleted rather than left beside the new function, so there is
one answer to "what may a mission reach" and not two.

534 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 17:26:32 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f7f3dfe495 feat(fleet): GLM as a real microVM backend, and per-role models for claws
Three threads, all of which end at the same place: a mission whose verifier does
not share a model with the coder it reviews.

**GLM has a credential contract now.** `microvm_credential_for` returned one env
var name, which quietly assumed every provider reads its secret from the same
place Anthropic does. It returns a `Credential { source, target }` instead —
z.ai's key lives in the server's `ZAI_API_KEY` and Claude Code reads it as
`ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`, and collapsing those two names is what forces a guess at
the other end. A wrong guess here sends one provider's credential to another
provider's endpoint.

`images/agent-glm` is the same CLI at the same pinned version as `agent-claude`
with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` baked in. The split is deliberate: the ENDPOINT is a
property of the image, the CREDENTIAL is a property of the turn. That makes the
dangerous mix-up unrepresentable — a GLM VM cannot be handed an Anthropic
subscription token, and a claude VM cannot be pointed at z.ai. Asserted both
ways, because "the GLM VM must not carry CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN" is the
property that costs a credential if it ever stops holding.

Kimi stays refused. `KIMI_API_KEY` is set and Moonshot serves an
Anthropic-compatible API, but I have not verified its base URL against the
running service, and this function is precisely where guessing a URL is
expensive. It becomes an arm the day someone measures it.

`api.z.ai` joins the node's default egress allow-list. A default that cannot
run the images we ship is a trap rather than a policy — the alternative is an
operator discovering it as a hung agent with no model access.

**Per-role models for claws** (migration 0071). `template_roles` had no model
column, so `mint_team_from_template` bound every role of every mission team to
one literal — a template whose whole point is an independent reviewer minted a
reviewer sharing a model with the coder. A role may now name its own; roles that
say nothing still take the mint's default, so every template written before this
behaves exactly as it did. The literal is now that default rather than a
hardcode.

**A harness scenario for the roster flow.** `verify-mission-delivery.sh roster`
runs the whole Slice 5 loop — planner proposes, human approves, mission runs —
and asserts the roster LANDED on the mission row rather than trusting the API's
answer. That distinction is not theoretical: the first live approval returned an
error while leaving the proposal marked approved.

Built and proven on tank ahead of the deploy: `clawmates/agent-glm:dev` reports
`2.1.223` and `BASE=https://api.z.ai/api/anthropic`, and
`fc-build-rootfs.sh … glm 8G` boots a VM from it that has git, can write
/mission, and answers `claude --version`.

533 tests pass, clippy clean. Migration 0071.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 17:14:53 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 75d09241fb fix(missions): the first real approval found two bugs the tests could not
Deploying Slice 5 and approving one roster in production broke it twice, in ways
528 green tests had nothing to say about.

**1. `jsonb_set` refuses a scalar.** A mission created through the API without a
`config` stores jsonb `null` — a scalar — and `jsonb_set` fails on it with
"cannot set path in scalar". The guard was `coalesce(config, '{}')`, which
protects against SQL NULL; this is a perfectly good JSON null of the wrong shape,
and coalesce passes it straight through. Every test wrote `'{}'::jsonb` because
that is what a test author types. Production types nothing at all.

**2. The approval was not atomic, and failing halfway is permanent.** The claim
and the mission write were two statements, claim first, so when the write failed
the proposal stood `approved` with nothing applied — and the partial unique index
then makes that state unrecoverable: no other proposal for that mission can ever
be approved. The mission ran solo with `team_engine` still NULL while its
proposal said otherwise.

`approve_and_apply` is now one transaction: claim, write, commit or roll back.
The type guard is `CASE WHEN jsonb_typeof(config) = 'object' THEN config ELSE
'{}'::jsonb END`, which answers the question that was actually being asked.

Both regressions are tested in the shape production had, and both NEGATIVE
CONTROLS were run rather than assumed:

  - restore `coalesce` → `a_roster_applies_to_a_mission_whose_config_is_json_null`
    FAILS with Postgres's own "cannot set path in scalar", the exact production
    error.
  - commit instead of roll back on a failed apply →
    `a_failed_apply_leaves_the_proposal_undecided` FAILS with the proposal stuck
    `approved`.

Worth stating plainly: the API returned 500 for that approval, so this was not
silent to the caller — but the row it left behind claimed the mission had a
roster it never received, and the mission then ran and delivered, which is the
shape that gets believed.

530 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 16:41:22 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 aa470091aa fix(missions): a bootable rootfs is not a runnable one
Found by looking at what the fleet actually reports, not by reasoning about it:
tank's `capabilities.rootfs` is `["agent-terminal", "claude", "default"]`. Slice 5
offered that list to the planner as the menu of backends and validated proposals
against it — so a roster naming `agent-terminal` would have been proposed,
validated, approved and launched, and then failed at the agent turn, because
`microvm_credential_for` has no contract for it and refuses rather than forward
an Anthropic subscription token to an unknown endpoint.

Refusing at boot is correct and is exactly the wrong PLACE: it is three steps and
one human approval after the point where the answer was already knowable. The
menu is now the intersection of "a node can boot it" and "a mission agent can
authenticate in it", which is what the question meant all along.

`backend_can_run_a_mission` derives from the credential contract rather than
restating it, so a backend gaining one (GLM and Kimi, when B4.6's base-URL
contract is settled) becomes proposable in the same commit that makes it
runnable — instead of in a second list someone has to remember.

528 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 16:27:25 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 1797669296 feat(missions): Slice 5 — let a model size the mission's team
`routes/planner.rs` has had Opus proposing rosters since the Master Planner
shipped, and none of it ever reached a mission: the proposal lived in React state
and died with the tab. A mission's shape came from a team template instead —
fixed roles, and every claw minted `claude-sonnet-5` from a literal in
`mint_team_from_template`. That literal is why no mission has ever run more than
one provider.

A roster is `(topology_kind, [(role, backend)])`, which is exactly what the
composed executor already consumes: `Roster::graph` builds a `TopologyGraph` with
the backend in `attrs`, and `MicroVmTurnExecutor` reads `attrs["backend"]` per
node. So a verifier on another provider's rootfs stops being a bolt-on and
becomes a graph node — the correlated-failure break the independent judge exists
for, one layer down.

Three verbs, and the split is the point. **suggest** asks the model and persists
the answer, changing nothing. **decide** approves (writes `config.roster` and
switches the mission to the composed engine) or rejects. A proposal is never
applied on arrival: a model sizing a team is a suggestion about how many VMs to
boot, and this codebase treats model output that costs money as evidence for a
decision, not the decision.

Fail-closed at every seam, because each of these otherwise surfaces much later
and much more expensively:

  - a backend no ONLINE node can boot is refused when PROPOSED, naming the ones
    the fleet actually has. Placement would refuse it too — at launch, after the
    roster was approved and someone believed the mission would run. The model is
    handed that same list in its prompt, so the usual case never arises.
  - an invented `topology_kind` is refused, not defaulted. `parse_topology_kind`
    defaults to hub-spoke, which is right for a template we wrote and wrong for a
    string a model just produced: running a `pipeline` proposal as a hub-and-spoke
    changes what every node sees and nothing would say so.
  - the roster is validated BEFORE it is stored, so a stored proposal is always
    one that could be approved; and again at approval, against the fleet as it is
    then — a node can go offline in between.
  - `MAX_MEMBERS = 6`. Each member is a whole VM, not a subagent, and a model
    asked to size a team proposes twelve happily.

Two properties live in SQL rather than in the handler: at most one approved
roster per mission (partial unique index — two approved rosters are two answers
to "what shape is this mission", and the executor reads one field), and
decide-once (`WHERE status = 'proposed'`, so a double-clicked approve claims
nothing the second time). Both tested against a real database, including that the
second approval is refused by Postgres rather than merely losing a race.

NEGATIVE CONTROL, run rather than assumed: with the roster preference removed
from `composed_graph`, `an_approved_roster_outranks_the_template` FAILS — 3 nodes
from the template instead of the roster's 2. A stored roster that is silently
ignored at launch is precisely the shape this project keeps paying for.

Not closed: per-role models for CLAWS. `template_roles` has no model column, so a
ZeroClaw team still mints one model for every role. The literal is now a named
constant that says so and points at the roster path, rather than sitting inline
where nobody reads it.

527 tests pass, clippy clean. Migration 0070. Not yet exercised against the
deployed stack — the route has never been called with a live model.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 16:25:34 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 abb97e6f03 test(harness): a composed scenario, and the stop gate asserted in a real VM
`verify-mission-delivery.sh composed` runs a `team_engine=composed` mission and
checks the one property that cannot be checked any other way: a VM is inject →
run → collect → destroy, so unless the tree is carried node to node, node 2 boots
from the original checkout, sees nothing of node 1's work, and still reports
success. The task makes each node append ONE line to STAGES.md, so the delivered
file IS the evidence — a run that lost the handoff delivers one line, and no
amount of agent confidence can fabricate the missing ones.

It also asserts the run's tier is `microvm_graph`. A composed mission that
quietly fell back to the solo path would deliver a one-line file and look exactly
like a graph that ran one node.

`assert_stop_gate` reads the count `phase_runner` reports and distinguishes three
outcomes that matter: a number (installed, fired that often), `0` (installed,
never needed), and `-` (could NOT be installed — usually a CLI in the image with
no `--settings`). Wired into the microvm scenario rather than its own, because it
applies to every coding phase on that path.

Both ran against the deployed stack:

  composed — 4/4. STAGES.md carried 5 stage lines through 5 separate VMs
  (planner → coder → tester → reviewer → committer), each stamped with the guest
  kernel 6.1.128 rather than the gateway's 6.8.0 or the node's 7.0.0. The run
  checkpointed 5 steps on the worker, and `updated_at` stayed ~2s old mid-turn,
  which is the keepalive doing its job — without it `requeue_stale` flips a live
  run at 180 seconds.

  microvm — 6/6, including the gate installed in a real VM (`blocks: 0`), one
  subagent, the GLM judge, and the unavailable-backend negative control.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 15:17:24 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 6991e21f94 feat(missions): the completion gate, moved into the agent's own loop
Every check this platform makes on a phase runs AFTER the agent has stopped: the
evaluator judges `done_when`, capture notices a coding phase delivered nothing,
and either verdict costs a whole new VM — a fresh boot, a fresh inject, and an
agent starting over with none of the context that got it that far. Meanwhile the
documented failure mode of a long-running agent is that it stops too early.

MEASURED FIRST, because the plan's chosen seam does not exist here. Probing every
hook name under `claude -p` (2.1.222, hermetic `--settings` file): `SessionStart`,
`UserPromptSubmit`, `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, `SubagentStop` and `Stop` fire;
`TaskCreated`, `TaskCompleted`, `TeammateIdle`, `SessionEnd`, `Notification` and
`PreCompact` do not. The agent-teams hooks Slice 3 deferred are inert on our path
BY CONSTRUCTION — no team forms in print mode at all — so `done_when` could never
have been wired through `TaskCompleted` exit 2. `Stop` is the seam.

`vm_stop_gate` generates a POSIX `sh` hook installed via `--settings`, under
`/root/gate` and never under `/mission/repo` (anything there is collected and
arrives in the user's delivered patch). It refuses a stop when:

  - the phase must deliver and the repository is untouched — asked as TWO
    questions, since an agent that committed leaves a clean tree and an agent
    that did not leaves HEAD alone; only both together mean nothing happened;
  - `config.done_when_check` — a command the phase author wrote — exits nonzero,
    in which case its OUTPUT is the feedback, not just "the check failed".

Deliberately mechanical. NOT the `done_when` verdict: that is an LLM judgement
made host-side by a different provider on purpose, and re-running it inside the
VM would put the agent's own environment in charge of grading the agent — the
correlated failure the independent judge exists to break.

THE CAP IS LOAD-BEARING. Without a ceiling a stuck agent is blocked, retries, is
blocked again, and burns the hour-long turn budget instead of failing visibly.
After 3 blocks the gate lets it stop, records that it gave up, and leaves the
verdict to the existing post-hoc path, which is unchanged.

PROVEN AGAINST A LIVE AGENT with the REAL generated artifacts, not a paraphrase:

  - a read-only task → blocked 3 times with our exact message, released at
    exactly the cap, and the agent took the escape hatch the message offers
    ("if the task genuinely requires no code change, say so explicitly") rather
    than touching a file to satisfy the gate. It did not Goodhart it.
  - a task that needs an edit → `blocks: 0`, log says `pass`. No false positives.

Two things that could fail silently, both closed. `--settings` is PROBED in the
image before use (`claude --help | grep`), because an unknown option is a hard
CLI error that would turn every gated phase into a failed one; a build without
it degrades to ungated and says so, since losing a check is better than losing
the work. And `stop_blocks` is reported out of the guest — `None` for no gate,
`0` for got-it-right-first-time — so a gate that never fires is distinguishable
from one that was never installed.

`require_changes` does NOT apply per node on a composed run: a graph's verifier
node is SUPPOSED to leave the tree alone, and a per-node gate would refuse its
stop three times for doing its job. `StopGate::per_node` drops it and keeps the
declared check. The phase-level rule still runs post-hoc against what the last
node collected.

An ungated phase's command is byte-identical to before, asserted by test — most
phases are gated, so the ungated path is the one nobody would notice breaking.

517 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 15:03:47 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 1d554396f4 fix(delivery): four failures from the #55 trace — auth, prompts, truncation, retry
All four were surfaced while tracing #55 and left open. Each one on its own is
small; together they are why a two-line git rejection took hours to read.

**1. `with_ambient_auth` failed open.** It matched one literal prefix,
`https://git.redclaw.dev/`, and returned the URL unchanged for everything else
with no log line. An `http://` remote, an explicit port, a different case in the
host, an ssh remote, a URL that already carried userinfo — all came back
unauthenticated and looked identical to success. It now returns `Authed`, which
carries the URL AND why no credential reached it, and recognises the forge in
every shape a remote can be written (host parsed with userinfo stripped BEFORE
the port, or `oauth2:token@host` reports its username as the host — the first
version of this function did exactly that and failed its own test).

**2. Nothing set `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`.** So a credential-less URL did not
fail — git opened `/dev/tty`, and in a server container that surfaces as
`No such device or address`, several layers from the missing token. Now set on
every git invocation that can reach the network. And `push_url_for` refuses
outright when the URL is on OUR forge and unauthenticated: that push cannot
succeed, and letting it proceed only buys a symptom that looks like something
else.

**3. The truncation fix went to the wrong path.** e31688b clamped the caller,
but a rejected push comes back as `Ok(Publish { error })` — the string was
already cut to 300 head chars inside `git()`, so the reject reason had been
dropped before the both-ends clamp ever saw it. Clamped where the output is
produced, and redacted there too.

**4. #55: a mission that re-clones can never push.** The branch name is
deterministic per (mission, phase, iteration), so a checkout rebuilt after a
retry, a container teardown or disk loss produces divergent history against its
own branch, and git rejects it — leaving the work on a local branch in a
directory the sweeper deletes. Reachable in normal operation, not just by
deleting a checkout by hand.

The escape is a NEW ref, not `--force`: forcing would overwrite whatever the
earlier attempt pushed, which may be the only copy of that work, to make this
attempt look tidy. The retry lands on `<branch>-<sha8>` — deterministic,
self-describing in a branch list, and collision-free since divergent history is
by definition a different sha. "Never force" stays a rule.

NEGATIVE CONTROL, run rather than assumed: with the rescue arm disabled,
`diverged_history_lands_on_a_new_branch_instead_of_being_lost` FAILS with git's
real `! [rejected] ... (fetch first)` — which also demonstrates fix 3, since that
whole message now survives to the assertion. The test asserts the earlier
attempt's ref is byte-identical afterwards.

Also measured, not read off docs: which hooks fire under `claude -p` (2.1.222,
via `--settings`). SessionStart, UserPromptSubmit, PreToolUse, PostToolUse,
SubagentStop and Stop fire; TaskCreated, TaskCompleted, TeammateIdle, SessionEnd,
Notification and PreCompact do not. So the agent-teams hooks Slice 3 deferred are
inert on our path by construction, and `Stop` is the seam that could move
`done_when` into the agent's own loop.

507 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 13:15:15 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 12147a1e01 feat(missions): Slice 4 — the two engines composed, with the file handoff proven
`team_engine='composed'` (the third name migration 0069 anticipated) runs a
mission as a durable ZeroClaw graph whose every node is a whole
Claude-Code-in-a-microVM session. Engine Z owns checkpoint/resume, cancellation
and per-node heterogeneity; Engine C owns shared context and cheap fan-out;
neither has the other's asset, which is why this is a composition and not a
compromise.

`MicroVmTurnExecutor` implements the existing `TurnExecutor`, so it inherits the
planners, the checkpoint, the stale-run recovery, `close_finished_phases`, the
evaluator, capture and delivery unchanged — the same trick `SubTopologyExecutor`
already plays with a heavy `run_turn`. Producer side emits ONE `queued` row
carrying the real graph and lets the worker claim it: the durability IS being
worker-driven, and the solo path's `tokio::spawn` has none of it. Still exactly
one `topology_runs` row per unit of work and one completion path — `finish()` is
now that one place, shared by every tier.

THE TRAP, solved and proven. A VM is inject → run → collect → destroy, so a
per-node VM with text-only handoff silently loses every file an earlier node
wrote: node 2 boots from the original checkout, sees nothing, and still reports
success. The mission's host checkout is the medium — every node injects from it
and collects back over it — and two properties make that safe rather than lucky:
`execute_resumable` is strictly sequential, so two VMs never write one directory;
and the vm id is deterministic per (phase, iteration, step), so a duplicate is
refused by the node ("vm already exists") instead of becoming a second writer.

NEGATIVE CONTROL, run rather than assumed: with `repo` swapped for a private
per-node workspace, `a_later_node_sees_an_earlier_nodes_files` FAILS with
`saw:[]`; restored, it passes. The `PhaseVm` seam exists for exactly this — it
models inject/collect through the real `mission_fs` tar path in milliseconds.

Two durability traps this tier walks into, both closed:

  - `requeue_stale` fires at 180s on `updated_at`, and one node here can run for
    an hour. `SubTopologyExecutor` keeps its parent alive from each leaf step;
    there is nothing between the start and end of a VM turn, so the turn holds a
    ticker that touches `updated_at` every 30s and aborts on drop. Without it a
    healthy composed run is requeued mid-node and boots a second VM.
  - the 15-minute stuck-run reaper asks "any step records since it was CREATED?",
    which describes a healthy composed run as readily as a wedged one. Hence
    `REAPABLE_TIERS` — worker-driven minus this tier. Reaping it would be #54 in
    a different costume.

`on_launch` mints no team for a microVM mission, deliberately: claws in
containers are what a VM mission does not use. So `mission_orchestrator::
composed_graph` builds the shape from the team template directly — nodes, roles
and pattern, zero claws provisioned. Per-node `attrs["backend"]` and
`attrs["node_id"]` override the mission's, which is what makes a validator node
on another provider's image a first-class graph node; a malformed `node_id`
fails the node rather than quietly running it where the graph did not ask.

Refusals are recorded as a failed run, not returned as an error: `launch_phase`
is swept every ten seconds, so a returned error is a phase that retries forever
while the log repeats itself.

501 tests pass, clippy clean. NOT yet proven end to end: no composed mission has
run on the fleet, so the resume-after-a-killed-worker leg is argued from the DB
test and the step-numbering test, not from a real two-node run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-06 13:00:44 -07:00
Omar Sobh e31688bac5 fix(delivery): keep the TAIL of a push error — git prints its reason last
A failed push recorded two identical auth lines, a URL, and a branch name cut off
mid-word. The reject reason was on the next line and the 500-char head clamp ate
it, so the artifact preserved the noise and dropped the answer. That is what left
#55 unresolvable: the evidence needed to distinguish "no credentials" from
"non-fast-forward" had been truncated away.

`evaluator_tools::clamp_output` already existed for exactly this — head AND tail
with a byte count of what it dropped, on char boundaries so multi-byte output
cannot panic. Reused rather than reinvented.

Investigation notes recorded on #55. Two hypotheses were disproved by measurement:
push credentials are rebuilt per push from GITEA_TOKEN + repos.clone_url and never
live on disk (the clone-time scrub guarantees it, and every checkout on the host —
including ones that pushed — has an identical credential-free origin), and neither
of the two ways `with_ambient_auth` can silently return an unauthenticated URL
applies here: the clone_url matches its required prefix and the token is non-empty
in a container that predates the failure.

489 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-06 11:59:57 -07:00
Omar Sobh 66f730ad16 test(db): a regression net for the three-minute bug, with its negative control
The #54 fix had no test that could see it. Its defining property is that it only
appears past 180 seconds, and `verify-mission-delivery.sh microvm` runs a
90-second mission — so the end-to-end harness written to catch silent failure was
structurally blind to this one. A unit test asserting the allowlist's membership
helps, but would not notice a NEW sweeper added without the filter.

`crates/cm-db/tests/self_driven_runs.rs` tests the real SQL against a migrated
database, in milliseconds instead of eight minutes:

  - a `microvm` and a `session` run, 30 minutes idle and still `running`, must be
    left alone by `requeue_stale` — that is the bug, in one assertion
  - a `team` run in the SAME state must still be requeued, so the fix is "sweep the
    right rows" and not "stop sweeping"
  - the worker must not CLAIM a queued self-driven row, which is what turned a
    healthy run into "missing or invalid graph"
  - the allowlist names only worker-driven tiers

NEGATIVE CONTROL, run rather than assumed: with the tier filter removed from
`requeue_stale`, `requeue_stale_leaves_self_driven_runs_alone` FAILS; restored, it
passes. A guard that cannot detect the bug it was written for is decoration, and
this project has shipped one of those before.

489 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-06 09:52:58 -07:00
Omar Sobh d49acaed5e fix(missions): exclude build output from COLLECT too, not just inject
The other half of the same bug. The previous commit filtered `mission_fs::pack_dir`
(the inject side) and left the guest's `op_get` tarring everything, so the re-run
that proved the #54 fix — it survived 480s where it used to die at 210 — still lost
its work to `vm_collect ... node timed out`. Two modules written, four subagents
used, nothing delivered.

`op_get` now takes an `exclude` list, sent by the host from
`mission_fs::transport_excludes()` — the same list `mission_delivery` uses for the
diff. Policy in one place, applied at both ends of the wire. Matched on directory
NAME at any depth, so a workspace's per-crate `target/` dirs are all covered, with
a test that plants a nested one and asserts it does not come along.

Also proven by that run: the worker no longer kills a live microVM run. It ran 480
seconds straight through the 180s requeue window and the 210s mark where mission
019fd43e died, untouched. And `subagents: 4` — the team addendum did drive real
fan-out this time, which is the first evidence the Slice 3 switch does anything.

483 tests pass, clippy clean. Still to prove: a >3-minute mission that actually
DELIVERS. The collect fix is tested in isolation but has not yet carried a real
mission's work back, and the guest agent needs rebuilding into the rootfs before it
can.
2026-08-06 09:18:53 -07:00
Omar Sobh 4efcde9d4f fix(missions): #54 — the worker was killing live microVM runs at 180 seconds
My hypothesis in #54 was WRONG, and it was wrong because I built it on a bad
measurement: `grep -c 'microvm phase'` returned 0, so I concluded the completion
log never printed and blamed the 15-minute reaper. The line was there all along, at
14:17:45. The real cause is worse.

`requeue_stale` has NO TIER FILTER. A microvm run's `updated_at` is written once at
insert and never again — it is driven by a `tokio::spawn` that owns it start to
finish, and nothing in `microvm_executor` writes `topology_runs`. So at 180s the
sweeper declared a perfectly healthy run stale and flipped it to `queued`;
`claim_next_queued` (no tier filter either) handed it to the worker; `run_job`
tried to parse the microvm graph placeholder, which `TopologyGraph` cannot
deserialize; and it failed the run with "missing or invalid graph".

Mission 019fd43e: run created 14:11:16, mission failed ~14:14:46. 210 seconds — the
180s window plus a tick. The agent went on working and finished at 14:17:45 with
three modules written, by which time the phase was already dead and the VM was
orphaned. A firecracker process was still alive 1h37m later.

THE UNCOMFORTABLE PART: every microVM mission that appeared to work this session
did so only by finishing inside three minutes. The 90-second ones dodged this. The
harness scenario dodges it. Nothing about that was visible.

`WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS` (team, company, org, swarm, compare) is now the allowlist for
all three sweep paths — claim, requeue, reap. An allowlist rather than a denylist so
the next self-driven tier is safe by default instead of exposed until someone
remembers the file. `tier='session'` had exactly the same exposure and is covered
too. A unit test asserts microvm and session are NOT in it, next to the code that
inserts them.

Two more fixes from the same wreckage:

  - `destroy` reported `killed: pgid.is_some()` — true whenever there was a pgid to
    signal, whether or not anything died. It now sends the signal, polls /proc for
    the group leader, retries, and reports what it OBSERVED; `signalled` keeps the
    old meaning so "nothing to kill" is distinguishable from "it would not die".
  - the run-status update is now guarded with `AND status <> 'cancelled'`. An
    operator cancelling is a decision; this task reporting an outcome minutes later
    is an observation, and it must not overwrite one with the other.

And the root cause of the collect timeout itself: `mission_fs::pack_dir` shipped
`target/` in both directions. `mission_delivery` has excluded build output from the
DIFF since day one; the TRANSPORT never knew. The host checkout was 9.4 MB of which
8.9 MB was `target/`, tarred and base64'd over vsock each way. `EXCLUDED_PATHS` is
now one list shared by both layers, matched on directory name at any depth so a
workspace's per-crate `target/` dirs are all covered.

483 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-06 09:01:04 -07:00
Omar Sobh 0d25a94a84 fix(missions): agent teams do not form in print mode — say so where it is set
MEASURED, against the CLI in our own image (2.1.223): with
CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1 and an explicit request to "spawn two
teammates", `claude -p` did the work with two SUBAGENTS, wrote both files, and
created no ~/.claude/teams/ directory at all. The docs allow for it — "Claude may
sometimes use subagents instead of creating a team" — and headless appears to be
always: the whole feature is described around an interactive agent panel, which a
print-mode session does not have.

So Slice 3's switch, as written yesterday, set a flag with no mechanism behind it.
The first team mission caught it, because the probe was built to look for teammates
rather than to assume them.

Corrected rather than removed:
  - `team_env` documents the measurement at the point the flag is set, so the next
    reader does not have to rediscover it. The flag stays: harmless, and free if a
    later version supports teams non-interactively.
  - the prompt addendum now asks for parallel DELEGATION rather than naming
    teammates, which is what print mode can actually deliver — and it keeps the two
    anti-patterns worth stating (own different files; do not split one change into
    stages).
  - the "no teammates" warning was blaming the flag and the config path. It now
    judges on the SUBAGENT count, which is the mechanism in play, and a zero
    teammate count is documented as expected rather than as a fault.

What the switch buys today is real but smaller than the plan assumed: it changes
the prompt so the lead parallelises across files instead of working through them
alone. Whether that beats solo on our own missions is still unmeasured, and the
plan's prediction — that it will not be faster — stands untested.

482 tests pass, clippy clean.

UNEXPLAINED, filed as #54: that team run's `topology_runs` row is `failed` while
the log line that sits immediately before the UPDATE never printed — zero matches
for 'microvm phase' in the container's whole log. The prime suspect is
`topology_worker`'s stuck-run reaper, which fails runs that are `running` with no
step records and does not filter by tier; a microvm run has no step records by
design. If that is it, any sufficiently long VM phase is failed out from under
itself. The system failed safely here — the empty-delivery guard caught that
nothing was produced, and nothing false was reported — but the cause is not known
and it is not being written up as if it were.
2026-08-06 07:22:05 -07:00
Omar Sobh cb48f7ff3b feat(missions): Slice 3 — agent teams behind a per-mission switch, solo by default
`missions.team_engine` (0069): NULL = solo, `'claude_code'` = Claude Code agent
teams inside the mission's VM. Solo stays the default deliberately — Anthropic
measure multi-agent at 3-10x the tokens with wall-clock often LONGER, since the
benefit is thoroughness rather than speed — so a mission that said nothing does not
get a team.

In-process teammates live in the lead's process, so ONE VM hosts the whole team.
That is why this is a prompt-and-env change rather than an orchestration one: no
N-VM fan-out, no placement per teammate, no new completion path.

The lead decides its own team size and there is no flag that limits it, so the cap
(4) is stated in the prompt. The addendum also carries the two anti-patterns from
Anthropic's guidance, because they are exactly the shapes our pipeline templates
have: teammates must own DIFFERENT FILES (two in one file overwrite each other),
and one change must not be split into stages across teammates (a handoff loses
context at every step). And: wait for your teammates — a summary written before
they report is the lead's own guess.

A solo mission's prompt and env are byte-identical to before this change. That is
enforced by test, not by intention: the comparison between solo and team is only
meaningful if the solo side did not also move.

Evidence, because a team mission that forms no team is silently just a solo run
that looked fine and spent fewer tokens: a second probe counts members in
`~/.claude/teams/*/config.json` (minus the lead), reported separately from the
subagent count, and a team mission with zero teammates logs loudly with the two
likely causes. The teammate path is DOCUMENTED BUT NOT YET VERIFIED in our image,
unlike the subagent transcript path which was measured — so a zero there means "no
evidence found", and the first real team mission is what turns it into a fact.
`Option<u32>`: None means no team was asked for or the probe could not run.

Hooks (`TaskCompleted` / `TeammateIdle` exit 2, which would move `done_when` from
post-hoc into the agent's own loop) are the highest-value part of this slice and
are deliberately NOT here — they deserve their own pass rather than a rushed tail.

482 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-06 07:08:15 -07:00
Omar Sobh c840688adb feat(missions): choose the independent validator per mission (#53)
`CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL` is deployment-wide, so proving Slice 2 put a second
provider on the critical path of EVERY phase verdict. `cross_provider_judge`
deliberately does not fall back when the independent judge fails — a verdict
quietly produced by a same-family model would claim a property it does not have —
so a z.ai outage makes phases unmeetable rather than merely unverified. That is a
per-mission trade, not a per-deployment one.

`missions.validator_model` (0068), settable at create, with three distinct states
because an empty string and NULL mean opposite things in a nullable text column:

  NULL          use the deployment default
  ''            explicitly NO independent validator — judge with the house model.
                The default must not quietly reinstate independence a mission was
                told to skip.
  'glm:glm-4.7' this spec, subject to the same three refusals as before:
                same-family rejected, unregistered provider rejected, and a failed
                independent judge does not fall back.

Whitespace counts as empty: a column hand-set to " " meant to say nothing.

478 tests pass, clippy clean. Behaviour is unchanged for existing missions — they
have NULL and so keep following the deployment default.
2026-08-05 23:07:38 -07:00
Omar Sobh b17e18aa67 fix(harness): the verdict check matched psql's display form, not the query's
`select met || ' ' || independent` casts the booleans to `true`/`false`, but the
pattern matched `t`/`f` — psql's *column display* form. So the check reported "no
verdict recorded for the phase" while the row sat in the table saying met=true,
independent=true, glm-4.7.

A check that fails for a reason unrelated to what it checks is worse than no check:
it trains you to ignore the output. The booleans are cast explicitly now so the
shape cannot drift again, and the failure message prints what it actually got.

`verify-mission-delivery.sh microvm` now passes 5/5 against production:
  - the agent ran under guest kernel 6.1.128, not the gateway's 6.8.0-124 or the
    node's 7.0.0-28 — the one assertion that cannot pass by accident
  - the lead delegated to 1 subagent
  - the condition was met and judged INDEPENDENTLY by glm-4.7
  - the checkout has exactly one writer (uid 65532)
  - negative control: a backend no node can run is refused at launch
2026-08-05 22:44:25 -07:00
Omar Sobh 9aed20b6d0 fix(missions): capture a failed phase's work; harness gains a microvm scenario (#51)
A REGRESSION I INTRODUCED ONE COMMIT AGO. `capture_finished_coding_phases`
selects on `mp.status = 'completed'`, so the moment an unmet phase correctly began
reporting `failed`, its diff stopped being captured, committed or pushed — the work
was silently discarded. Found by the new harness scenario, whose phase legitimately
missed its condition and then had no artifact at all.

What was produced, and whether the goal was met, are different facts. The artifact
records the first; `mp.status` records the second. Capture now covers terminal
phases (`completed`, `failed`), so a phase that did real work and missed its goal
still delivers a reviewable diff — which is exactly what the next pass needs.

`scripts/verify-mission-delivery.sh microvm` — the regression net this session was
missing. Everything the microVM track proved by hand was guarded by nothing:

  - THE KERNEL LINE is the assertion that cannot pass by accident. Every other
    check would also pass if the phase had quietly run in a container on the
    gateway; only the kernel says WHERE it ran. Compared against the real gateway
    and node kernels read at start-up rather than pinned to a version, so
    upgrading vmlinux does not manufacture a failure.
  - subagent count > 0, from the server's own count of Claude Code's per-subagent
    transcripts. Before `Agent` was in the allowlist this was structurally
    impossible and nothing said so. A probe that could not run reports "?" and
    FAILS the check rather than reading as zero.
  - the verdict's judge and whether it was independent.
  - negative control, observed passing: a mission whose backend no node can run is
    refused at launch and stays draft. Without it the positive scenario would pass
    just as well against a scheduler that ignored `backend` entirely — which is
    what it did until the first real microvm mission landed on a node with no such
    rootfs.

Also fixed in the harness: `api` now sends the JSON body on STDIN (`curl -d @-`)
instead of interpolating it into a single-quoted argument inside a double-quoted
ssh command. A task description containing "the crate's test suite" ended the
quoting and killed the remote shell; two attempts to escape it were themselves
wrong, because the backslashes must survive bash AND sed AND sh. Removing the
interpolation removes the class, and the next author does not need to know that
apostrophes were forbidden.

475 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-05 22:35:46 -07:00
Omar Sobh bb807c2f3a fix(missions): an unmet goal condition is no longer reported as success
Found by the Goodhart test for the independent judge, which is exactly what it was
built to find.

The test: a phase whose `done_when` demanded a passing suite, and a task that
deliberately left a failing test. glm-4.7 judged it, ran `cargo test` itself, saw
`parity_is_wrong_on_purpose ... FAILED` (exit 101), and returned met=false quoting
the assertion — while the agent's own summary said "All three steps are implemented
exactly as specified and independently verified". The verdict and the agent's
account diverged, which is the whole point of an independent judge.

And then the mission closed `completed`.

`if verdict.met || last_pass` marked BOTH outcomes completed, so a phase that ran
out of passes without ever meeting its condition reported success — and through
`close_finished_missions`, so did the mission. The verdict said met=false in a
column nobody reads before believing a green status. Anything consuming mission
status rather than digging into the verdict saw a goal that was never reached as a
goal achieved. Exhausted-and-unmet is now `failed`, and the log names the judge and
whether it was independent.

This changes observable behaviour: missions that would previously have finished
green with an unmet condition now finish failed. That is the correction, not a
regression — but it is worth knowing before the next scheduled run.

Also: `Verdict.independent` had no column. The field existed in the struct and in
the logs, so the audit question the mechanism exists to answer — was this checked
by something other than the model that wrote it? — could not be asked of the
database. Migration 0067 adds it, defaulting to false, which is the truth about
every row written before now.

Verified in production before the fix: glm-4.7, 4 checks all executed, the real
cargo failure quoted, met=false. 475 tests pass, clippy clean.

Note for whoever rebases: `sqlx::migrate!` embeds migrations at COMPILE time, so a
new migration needs cm-db rebuilt (`touch crates/cm-db/src/lib.rs`) or the
integration tests fail on a column that exists in the file and not in the binary.
2026-08-05 22:13:51 -07:00
Omar Sobh 8796fbbcbb feat(evaluator): Slice 2 — an independent judge, from a different provider, with the same teeth
Claude writes the code and Claude judges it. That is a correlated failure: the
model that talked itself into a shortcut is the one disposed to accept it, and it
is the structural cause of the "early victory" failure Anthropic documents and of
our own Goodhart incident.

`glm` and `kimi` are both already registered in production, so the fix needed no
new credential path.

THE UNLOCK: `judge_with_tools` took `&AnthropicProvider`, but `LlmProvider` is a
single method — `stream(ChatRequest)` — and the loop only ever used that. The
concrete type was incidental. Widening it to `&dyn LlmProvider` means a
cross-provider judge runs the SAME allow-listed command loop. Before, independence
and real verification were mutually exclusive: the tool loop existed only on the
subscription path and every other route "judged claims only", so choosing an
independent judge meant giving up the checks that make a verdict evidence. GLM is
registered in anthropic format, so tool calling reaches it unchanged.

`CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL` (e.g. `glm:glm-4.7`) selects it. Three refusals, each
protecting the claim the field makes:
  - a spec in the implementer's own family is rejected, not used — `opus` judging
    `sonnet` is not independence, they share a lineage and most failure modes
  - a spec naming a provider this deployment never registered is rejected.
    `Runtime::resolve_provider` silently falls back to the DEFAULT provider when
    the registry has no such name, which would hand back Claude while the caller
    believed it had GLM. Detectable because the returned model keeps its `name:`
    prefix, so it is checked rather than trusted.
  - an independent judge that FAILS does not fall through to the house judge. A
    verdict quietly produced by a same-family model would claim a property it does
    not have. The pass stays unmet, says why, and the next sweep retries.

`Verdict.independent` records it, `#[serde(default)]` so verdicts stored before
this field read back as not independent — which is what they were. An unrecognised
model family resolves to "unknown", never to ours: guessing would report
independence nobody established.

474 tests pass, clippy clean. Not yet enabled in production — the env var is unset,
so behaviour is identical until it is set deliberately.
2026-08-05 21:53:21 -07:00
Omar Sobh 11b274edc6 chore(images): Claude Code 2.1.223, and make the verifier foreground
Reviewed the changelog rather than bumping on principle. 2.1.220 → 2.1.223 for one
reason that bears on how we use subagents:

  2.1.222 — "Fixed PreToolUse auto-allow hooks bypassing tool restrictions in
  background agent tasks."

Subagents run in the background by default since 2.1.198, and the `verifier`
role's entire guarantee is a TOOL restriction — no Edit, no Write. So on 2.1.220
the one property we rely on was the one that bug could undo. 2.1.221 also fixes
`--mcp-config` servers not connecting before the first turn in print mode, which
is the mode we run and will matter when the MCP door reaches a VM.

Two findings from the changelog that we already had at 2.1.220, both worth knowing:
  - 2.1.219: subagents can nest to depth 3 (was 1), so our roles can delegate
    further than assumed.
  - 2.1.212: a subagent inherits the parent's permission mode, which confirms the
    verifier's read-only property must come from `tools` and not from permissions.
    That is how it was written; now the reasoning is recorded next to it.

And a correctness fix that follows from the background default: the verifier is now
`background: false`. A background verifier lets the lead carry on and write its
report before the check has finished — the finding would arrive after the
conclusion it was supposed to inform.

Verified on tank: image reports 2.1.223, rootfs rebuilt, `--vm-selftest` all green
including a real agent turn on subscription auth, egress allow and deny both firing.
2026-08-05 21:37:49 -07:00
Omar Sobh 2dee941080 feat(missions): Slice 1 — a microVM agent can delegate, and we can see that it did
`microvm_executor` passed `--allowedTools Read Edit Write Bash`, which omits the
`Agent` tool, so Claude Code could not spawn a single subagent in any of our VMs.
The tool existed, the model knew how to use it, and the allowlist quietly removed
the ability. Nothing in any output said so.

Now: `Agent` in the allowlist, two roles supplied as `--agents` JSON, and a probe
that counts what actually ran.

Roles are JSON on the command line, not files, because `/mission/repo` is
collected and diffed — a role definition written into the checkout would arrive in
the delivered patch as if the agent had authored it.

Two roles only, and the choice is the research talking:
  - `verifier` — the one multi-agent pattern Anthropic endorses for coding work.
    It gets Read/Grep/Glob/Bash and deliberately NOT Edit or Write: an agent that
    can fix what it is checking will fix it and report success, and the report is
    then about a tree nobody reviewed. Its prompt demands the COMPLETE suite,
    which is the counter to the "early victory problem" — the same failure as our
    own Goodhart incident.
  - `explorer` — context protection, read-only.
Roles like "tester" or "committer" are absent on purpose: splitting sequential
phases of the same work is a named anti-pattern, and it is the shape our pipeline
templates already have.

THREE THINGS THE IMAGE CORRECTED, none of which review would have caught:

1. `CLAUDE_AGENT_SDK_DISABLE_BUILTIN_AGENTS=1` (in the plan) removes EVERY agent
   type, including the ones `--agents` defines. Measured: the lead reported "an
   empty available-agents list" after trying four role names and — to its credit —
   refused to fabricate a subagent result. Worse, the unit test asserting
   "builtins off is paired with our own roles" PASSED throughout, because the
   pairing holds in our code and not in the CLI. Dropped, and the test rewritten
   to assert only what a unit test can speak to.
2. `--forward-subagent-text` refuses to run without `--output-format=stream-json`,
   which would change how this module reads output. Dropped.
3. `--append-subagent-system-prompt` does not exist in 2.1.220 despite being
   documented. The anti-shortcut rule is inlined per role instead — better anyway,
   since a verifier and an explorer need different wording.

Evidence instead of assumption: Claude Code writes a per-subagent transcript at
`<session>/subagents/agent-*.jsonl`, so the guest is asked to count them before
collection (they live in /root, outside the collected tree). `VmOutcome.subagents`
is `Option<u32>` and the phase log prints it: `None`/"?" means the probe could not
run, which is a different fact from "delegated to nobody" and only one of those is
about the agent.

Verified in a container against the real CLI on tank before any of this shipped:
`FANOUT-OK`, a subagent transcript on disk, and zero errored Agent calls.

469 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-05 21:21:43 -07:00
Omar Sobh 7696009b25 fix(fleet): name the BACKEND in a placement refusal, not just "microvm capability"
Observed on the negative control: a mission with backend='kimi' was correctly
refused, but the message read "no online node reports microvm capability" — and
both nodes do report it. What one lacked was the image. That first clause would
have sent an operator to reinstall firecracker on a node that already had it.

The refusal now names the backend, and the remedy still names both halves.
2026-08-05 17:31:23 -07:00
Omar Sobh d9f53a3f96 fix(fleet): placement requires the backend's rootfs image, not just KVM
The first real microVM mission was placed on morpheus because it reports
{"microvm": true}, while only tank had rootfs-claude.ext4. It failed by name
rather than booting the wrong image — but whether a mission ran came down to
which capable node was listed first, which is a coin flip dressed as scheduling.
`missions.backend` was invisible to the scheduler.

The node now enumerates the images on its disk and reports them as a `rootfs`
ARRAY. `microvm::available_backends` lives beside `rootfs_for`, its inverse,
because the two must agree on what a backend name means; split apart, one drifts
and the scheduler starts promising images the booter cannot find. It only
advertises names `rootfs_for` would accept, and reports an empty array rather than
omitting the key — set_capabilities REPLACES, so a deleted image stops being
advertised instead of leaving a stale claim.

`nodes::online_for_backend` requires microvm AND that the node's list contains the
mission's backend. A node on an older daemon has no `rootfs` key and matches
nothing: unknown is not permission, the same treatment every other capability
gets. `backend_key` maps the three spellings of "the default image" to the one
name the node advertises, and is tested — a mismatch there would reject every node
for an ordinary mission with no backend set.

The launch error now names both halves of the fix, since "no capable node" was
true but unhelpful when the node was capable and merely lacked the image.

Mission gains `backend` on the domain struct; it was a column the executor read
from the phase query while the struct that placement uses could not see it.

464 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-05 17:22:12 -07:00
Omar Sobh 1cd81a8b2a fix(missions): place a microvm mission before returning from on_launch
Self-inflicted, one commit old, and found by running a real mission: the early
return I added for "a microvm mission materialises no team" sat ABOVE the microVM
placement block in the same function, so on_launch returned before ever choosing
a node. The mission then failed with the executor's own guard — "mission has no
target_node_id ... a microvm mission cannot run on the gateway, which has no
/dev/kvm" — which is the guard working exactly as designed, on a cause one layer
further up.

Placement now runs first. Worth noting the shape: adding an early return to a
long function silently skipped everything below it that the same runtime_kind
depends on.

461 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-05 16:55:58 -07:00
Omar Sobh 521b8dea10 fix(missions): the third team gate, and a container a microvm mission never uses
on_launch demanded a team template too — "pick teams in the wizard" — so a
microvm mission still could not launch after the first two gates were exempted.
Three separate places required a claw graph for a path that runs one `claude -p`
inside a VM: routes::missions (draft→running), phase_runner::launch_phase (no
matching teams → stay pending), and here.

Returning before team materialisation rather than filtering its picks: claws that
never run are not a cheaper version of the same thing, they are a runtime binding
and a pairing code describing something nothing speaks to.

Also stops provisioning the per-mission ZeroClaw container for a microvm mission.
The first real run was observed starting one and leaving it holding a pairing code
and ~3 GB of image for the life of a mission that never contacts it.

461 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-05 16:47:08 -07:00
Omar Sobh 0a9747091f fix(missions): a microvm mission needs no team, and two checks required one
Found by running one: the mission was created with runtime_kind='microvm' and
then refused to launch with a bare 400, because draft→running requires a
materializable team. Past that, `launch_phase` returns early when a phase has no
matching teams — so even with the launch allowed, the phase would have sat
`pending` forever while the log said only "no matching teams", and the executor
would never have been reached.

Neither check applies to this path: microvm_executor runs the agent CLI directly
in the VM, so there is no claw graph to materialise. Satisfying the checks by
attaching a team template would have provisioned claws that never run.

The repo checkout still happens — the VM needs the repository.

461 tests pass, clippy clean.
2026-08-05 16:39:48 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c9b7d8b6ca fix(missions): a microvm mission could not be created at all
`runtime_kind='microvm'` passes the DB CHECK, is honoured by placement, and now
has an executor — but `POST /api/missions` rejected the value with 400, so the
only interface that creates missions could not produce one. And `backend`, which
selects the per-CLI rootfs, was not in the create payload at all: it existed as a
column and as a parameter to `vm_create`, with nothing able to set it.

microvm needs no target_node_id at create time, unlike local_herdr: placement
resolves a KVM-capable node at launch and fails the launch when there is none, so
an explicit target is a request rather than a requirement.

461 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 16:21:39 -07:00
Omar Sobh 0206be68e5 Merge: B4.5 microvm executor — runtime_kind='microvm' now has a reader 2026-08-05 15:57:48 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4f07430e92 feat(missions): B4.5 — phase_runner runs a microvm mission in a VM
`runtime_kind='microvm'` placed a mission on a KVM-capable node and then nothing
executed it: config accepted without a reader, one of the four seams this project
keeps closing. This is the reader.

`microvm_executor` — inject → run → collect → destroy, the shape copy mode
already proved for containers with a VM boundary instead of a namespace one. The
checkout goes in as a tar, the work comes back as a tar over the SAME host path,
so `mission_delivery::capture_phase_diff_at` needs no change at all.

The agent is told NOT to push, unlike the container path's session prompt. Two
reasons: delivery is already host-side and diffs the collected tree against the
recorded clone point (covering committed, staged and unstaged work in one pass),
so pushing would add a second untested way for work to arrive; and pushing would
mean forge credentials inside the VM, when the point of collecting is that the
guest never holds them.

Exactly ONE topology_runs row (tier='microvm'), mirroring launch_direct_session:
close_finished_phases, evaluation, capture and delivery all key off those rows,
and a second completion path would be a second way for a phase to finish with one
of them untested. The row and the phase flip happen BEFORE any fallible VM work,
so a missing token or a node that lost its capability shows up as a failed run an
operator can see — not a phase that stays pending and retries every ten seconds.

Fail-closed points, each the reader for a guarantee built earlier:
  - credentials resolve BEFORE the VM boots, so a missing subscription token
    fails the phase instead of booting a VM whose agent sits unauthenticated
  - a VM reporting egress:false is REFUSED, which is what makes create's
    egress/egress_host/egress_guest fields more than decoration — a turn without
    egress does not fail, it hangs
  - the injected checkout is PROVEN present in the guest before an agent turn is
    spent on it; an inject that reports success while landing nothing would
    otherwise become an agent reporting an empty repository
  - work is collected even when the agent exits non-zero — a turn that failed
    partway still wrote files, and a retry needs to see them
  - a turn that ran but could not be collected is a FAILED phase, not a happy one
  - destroy runs on every exit path, or an 8 GB sparse rootfs leaks

Two integration gaps found while wiring, both of which would have produced a
mission that completed having delivered nothing:
  - `capture_finished_coding_phases` pulls work out of a CONTAINER before
    capturing. A microvm mission has none, so the docker connect would fail, the
    loop would `continue`, and capture would be skipped forever while the phase
    sat marked completed. Its work is already collected by the executor.
  - `launch_phase` provisioned a runtime container, copied the checkout into it
    and wrote a runtime binding + pairing code describing a runtime nothing uses;
    and the orchestrator's workspace pin — deliberately FATAL — would have failed
    a microVM launch on a container it was never going to use.

461 tests pass, clippy clean.

NOT YET PROVEN END TO END: no mission has run through this path. The pieces under
it are each verified on tank (image, credentials, egress, a real agent turn), but
this executor has only been compiled and unit-tested. Deploy + one real microvm
mission is the remaining step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 15:57:43 -07:00
Omar Sobh 76fe1f1148 Merge: B4.6 microVM egress via vsock CONNECT proxy with a hostname allow-list 2026-08-05 12:45:03 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 ebdba34da6 feat(fleet): B4.6 — a microVM reaches the API through a vsock CONNECT proxy, with an allow-list
The guest still has no network interface, and now that is the design rather than
a gap. Its only route out is an HTTP CONNECT proxy: agent CLI -> 127.0.0.1:3128
in the guest -> vsock 9002 -> a per-VM Unix socket on the host -> TLS to an
allow-listed host.

Why not TAP + iptables, which is what the Firecracker write-ups do — measured,
not argued:
  - `ip tuntap add` is DENIED to the daemon user (needs CAP_NET_ADMIN), so TAP
    would need root to pre-provision devices, the same privilege detour the
    loop-mounted rootfs already forced.
  - tank's FORWARD policy is DROP with Docker and Tailscale chains, so rules
    would have to be inserted at position 1; appended ones die silently.
  - a leaked TAP is a new class of host litter to reap.
CONNECT needs no privilege at all and is better on the merits: the client hands
us the HOSTNAME, so resolution happens host-side and the guest needs no DNS or
resolv.conf; the allow-list is by name, not address; and nothing in the guest can
reach the network except through one function. The guest end parses nothing and
enforces nothing, so a compromised agent cannot argue with the policy.

Rests on one measured fact: `claude` honours HTTPS_PROXY. With the proxy at a
closed port, `claude -p` fails ConnectionRefused instead of answering.

THE RESULT: a real agent turn now completes inside a VM with no network card, on
subscription auth — `claude -p` replies VM-OK. The selftest asks for it whenever
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is present and SKIPS loudly when it is not, since it
spends a little of the plan.

The audit log earns its keep immediately: during that turn the proxy logged
`egress DENIED http-intake.logs.us5.datadoghq.com` — the CLI's telemetry, which
the mission container permits today without anyone deciding to.

Three bugs found by the checks rather than by review:
  - `env_pairs` returned early when a caller sent no env, so the proxy address
    was never added and `curl` in a VM with a working tunnel reported "Could not
    resolve host". Absent env means "the caller sent none", not "this command
    needs no environment".
  - the deny check PASSED for the wrong reason — DNS was failing, so nothing was
    refused by the allow-list at all. It now requires a 403 from the proxy, so it
    cannot go green on a broken tunnel.
  - `host_allowed` accepted `evil.test/api.anthropic.com`, which ends with an
    allowed suffix. Hostnames are now validated against a character class, which
    also refuses IP literals so an address cannot sidestep a list of names.
  - `BufReader::into_inner()` discards buffered bytes: wrapping the stream twice
    would have dropped the start of the TLS handshake and stalled a tunnel that
    looked established. One reader now spans the request, and anything buffered
    past the headers is forwarded as payload.

`iproute2` is in agent-toolchain because it is load-bearing: the guest's `lo`
starts DOWN, and while it is down a listener on loopback BINDS and then refuses
every connection with ENETUNREACH. fcagent finds `ip` by absolute path — as pid 1
its PATH comes from the kernel, and execvp's fallback excludes /usr/sbin, where
Debian puts it.

Egress needs both ends up, so `create` reports `egress` and the guest's `ping`
reports its own half. A VM without it is legal but never silent.

Verified on tank: 16/16 with backend=claude (create 1428 ms), 12/12 on the
default rootfs, no leaked processes, VM dirs or proxy sockets. 457 tests pass,
clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 12:44:59 -07:00
Omar Sobh abc4160a89 Merge: pin the microVM path to subscription auth 2026-08-05 12:19:55 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 2edafdaf0d fix(fleet): a microVM authenticates by subscription only — never with an API key
B4.4 had the microVM path share `forwarded_provider_env(auth)` with the
container path, on the reasoning that the two must not diverge. That was wrong
in the one direction that costs money: gw-04 has CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_AUTH unset,
so the container path forwards ANTHROPIC_API_KEY today — and a VM would have
received it. Claude Code ranks the API key ABOVE the subscription's OAuth token,
so the VM would have worked perfectly while billing per-token against a plan we
already pay for. No error, no symptom but the invoice.

`microvm_provider_env` is subscription-only BY CONSTRUCTION: it does not take
the auth mode as an argument and does not read CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_AUTH at all.
Taking the mode as a parameter would mean one unset variable on a new host
silently turns the API key back on. The container path is unchanged and still
honours the operator's mode — the divergence is now deliberate, with the reason
at the definition.

Two other fail-closed rules fall out of it:
  - A missing or blank subscription token REFUSES the launch rather than
    returning an empty environment. A VM with no credential does not error;
    `claude -p` hangs, which reads as a phase stuck at `running` with nothing in
    the logs. The refusal names the variable.
  - An unrecognised backend is refused rather than handed the Anthropic token.
    GLM and Kimi reach their own endpoints via ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL and that
    contract is not settled yet; guessing it would send a subscription
    credential to z.ai.

Measured on tank, and this is the end-to-end proof B4.4 could not give:
`claude -p` in the agent-claude image with the real subscription token replies
"OK". Injecting the token in a VM moves the failure from "Not logged in" to a
network error, so the credential channel is accepted by the CLI — the VM's
remaining problem is egress (#49), not auth.

447 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 12:19:55 -07:00
Omar Sobh 92055c4556 Merge: B4.4 microVM credential injection over vsock 2026-08-05 11:56:42 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 c3297b86cf feat(fleet): B4.4 — credentials reach the microVM guest as exec env, and a bad entry refuses the exec
`claude -p` in the VM failed with "Not logged in". The credential now travels on
the exec op: `env` on `vm_exec` → fcagent → the command's environment. An env var
rather than a file because the per-VM rootfs dies with the VM but an env var
never touches the guest disk at all.

**Every problem in an env entry fails the exec.** The tempting alternative —
skip the entry we cannot use and run anyway — produces a `claude -p` with no
credential, and that does not error, it HANGS. A phase stuck at `running` for
ten minutes with nothing in the logs is exactly what a missing token looked like
on the container path. Names are validated ('=' or NUL would define a different
variable than the one asked for via putenv semantics), values must be strings,
and errors name the key and never the value — an error string travels back over
the wire and into logs.

One list of which credentials travel: `forwarded_provider_env` reuses
`forwarded_provider_keys`, and the container path now reads it too. If the two
execution paths diverged, a mission would behave differently depending on where
it landed — including the expensive way, where one path forwards
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and bills it while the other uses the subscription. A blank
value is omitted rather than forwarded empty, so `claude` reports having no
credential instead of failing authentication with one.

Verified on tank (`--vm-selftest` backend=claude, 13/13, create 1532 ms): an
injected var reaches the guest command over the real vsock wire, and an
unusable entry comes back ok:false with no rc.

FINDING — the CLI leg remains UNPROVEN, and deliberately so. The guest has no
network interface: `create` writes boot-source, drives, machine-config and vsock
and no `network-interfaces` key, and a booted guest has no routes, no
resolv.conf, no DNS and no TCP. So `claude -p` cannot reach the API whatever
credential it holds. Injecting the real token would have proven nothing, because
the failure would have been network and not auth. Filed as B4.6 (task #49) with
the TAP-vs-vsock-proxy trade-off; B4.5 is now blocked on it.

444 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 11:56:38 -07:00
Omar Sobh bcd1a0127d Merge: B4.4a real agent-claude microVM image + fail-closed CLI check 2026-08-05 11:33:11 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0c291ed1bb feat(fleet): B4.4a — a real agent-claude microVM image, and a check that it has an agent in it
The only rootfs on this track came from clawmates/agent-terminal:dev. Mounted,
it held git and nothing else: no claude, no node, no cargo. A VM booted from it
looks perfect and cannot run a mission, so B4.5 could have been written and
never verified.

images/agent-toolchain — the shared mission toolchain (node 22, git, rust +
cargo-audit, gitleaks/trivy/semgrep, tea/gitea-mcp), lifted from the proven
deploy/clawmates-runtime image minus the zeroclaw daemon: a microVM mission runs
the direct-session model, so there is no daemon to host. A base image rather
than three self-contained Dockerfiles because this layer is ~3 GB and the real
risk is scanner and toolchain versions drifting between per-CLI images — the
evaluator runs the project's own suite to check a claim, so `cargo` present in
one image and absent in another makes the same mission pass or fail by backend
with nothing saying why.

images/agent-claude — plan A6, first of three: the pinned CLI and its env
contract only, so bumping Claude Code does not rebuild the toolchain and cannot
disturb agent-kimi / agent-glm. HOME=/root with an empty .claude for B4.4 to
inject into; no ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, since it silently overrides the subscription
OAuth we already pay for.

Both the builder and the node selftest now ASK the guest for the CLI the image
is named for, instead of trusting the name. `required_cli` maps claude/kimi/glm
to a probe; an unrecognised backend reports unchecked and prints SKIP rather
than passing quietly.

Verified on tank:
  - rootfs-claude.ext4 boots; git, node, cargo, a real git commit all work
  - `claude --version` → 2.1.220 over vsock, in both the builder and
    `--vm-selftest` (11/11, create 1498 ms)
  - negative control: the same builder run against agent-terminal with
    FC_CLI forced reports `cli rc=127 claude: not found` and exits 1, so the
    green result above is a measurement and not a default
  - `claude -p hello` fails with "Not logged in · Please run /login" — the CLI
    runs headless in the VM, and B4.4 only has to supply the credential
  - no leaked firecracker processes or vm dirs afterwards

437 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 11:33:07 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 fd16b3c126 Merge: B4.3 per-mission rootfs selection, with no silent fallback
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 10:38:45 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 6687f8b808 feat(fleet): B4.3 — per-mission rootfs selection (missions.backend)
`vm_create` takes a backend name and boots `rootfs-<backend>.ext4`; NULL
or "default" boots the golden image. Makes the per-CLI images from B4.1
actually reachable (one image per CLI, per A6).

A missing image is an ERROR naming the file and how to build it, never a
quiet fall back to the default. That fallback is the tempting version and
the wrong one: it would run a claude mission in a kimi VM, or in a rootfs
with no CLI at all, and report success for whatever came out. Verified on
real hardware, not just in a unit test — the selftest asks for an image
that does not exist and FAILS if it boots.

`create` now reports the rootfs that actually booted, not the one that was
requested, so a mission artifact can show the wrong VM ran.

The migration adds no CHECK constraint listing the CLIs. Which images
exist is a property of the NODES, not the schema; a constraint would need
migrating for every new image while still not guaranteeing the image
exists anywhere. The node validates and names what is missing. Backend
names are `[A-Za-z0-9_-]` and rejected rather than sanitised, since they
become filenames.

Verified on tank: default backend 8/8; `CLAWMATES_FC_BACKEND=agent-terminal`
9/9 including the absent-image check, create in 910ms on a rootfs built
from a real Docker image. 435 tests green, no leaked processes or VM dirs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 10:38:45 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 fcf5d7b16c Merge: B4.2 static Rust guest agent — unblocks rootfs images without python
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 10:02:05 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 08847e6a63 feat(fleet): B4.2 — static Rust guest agent replaces the python one
The python guest agent only ever worked because Firecracker's CI Ubuntu
image happens to ship python3. NONE of our images do — agent-base has
neither python nor git, agent-terminal has git but no python — so it
could never have run in a real mission rootfs. An agent that dictates
what must be installed in the image has the dependency backwards.

crates/bins/fcagent is a 905K static x86_64-unknown-linux-musl binary
that needs nothing from the rootfs it is dropped into. The wire is
unchanged on purpose — 4-byte BE length + JSON, ops ping/exec/put/get —
so microvm.rs and microvm_client.rs needed no edit at all.

std has no AF_VSOCK and the workspace denies `unsafe`, so it uses the
`vsock` crate. `process_group(0)` gives each command its own group without
unsafe, so a command that spawns background children can be killed
wholesale rather than outliving the run.

A unit test caught a bug that would have broken EVERY exec: sourcing the
image-env file with `. env.sh 2>/dev/null; cmd` returns rc=1 WITHOUT
running cmd, because `.` on a missing file makes a non-interactive POSIX
shell exit immediately. On any rootfs lacking that file every command
would have failed while looking like an ordinary non-zero exit. Guarded
with `if [ -f ]` now.

Other places a failure must not borrow an outcome's representation: a
killed command reports ok:false with no rc (not rc=124, which would read
as a build failure); `get` on a missing path is an error, not an empty
archive; a signalled process reports 128+signal rather than success.

Verified on tank: --vm-selftest still 8/8 with the agent swapped
(create 949ms, wire identical), fc-node-setup 8/8, and — the point of the
change — a rootfs built from clawmates/agent-terminal:dev, which has NO
python3, boots and reports `git version 2.39.5` from inside the VM.

Also fixes a shell bug in fc-build-rootfs.sh: $HOME in a double-quoted
default expanded on this Mac, so it looked for the node's binary under
/Users/quantum on a Linux host.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 10:02:05 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 78da62f156 Merge: B4.1 rootfs builder — and the finding that blocks B4.2
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 08:19:15 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 dec59764b1 feat(fleet): B4.1 — build a Firecracker rootfs from a Docker image
Until now microVMs booted Firecracker's CI Ubuntu image with a python
guest agent bolted on: no git, no toolchain, no CLI. Fine for proving
vsock, useless for running a mission.

Builds FROM a Docker image rather than debootstrapping, because the
per-CLI images (agent-claude / agent-kimi / agent-glm, per A6) are
already Dockerfiles with a tested env contract. Rebuilding that as a VM
image by hand would mean maintaining the same facts twice and finding the
drift in production.

Two things the obvious version gets wrong and this does not:

  - `docker export` gives the filesystem with NONE of the image metadata:
    no ENV, no ENTRYPOINT, no WORKDIR. A CLI relying on ENV PATH or HOME
    would silently behave differently in the VM. The env is extracted
    separately and written to /etc/profile.d.
  - the ext4 is filled through a mount, not `mkfs -d`, which cannot
    handle the device nodes and hard links a container image may contain
    and fails late and cryptically when it hits one.

The guest agent is copied from the golden rootfs rather than re-emitted,
so there is ONE copy of the protocol on the node instead of two that can
drift.

It boots what it builds and asks the image for what a mission needs —
git, the profile env, a writable /mission — rather than assuming. An
image that builds and cannot boot is worse than no image, because it
looks finished.

FINDING, and it blocks B4.2: NONE of our images ship python3, so the
python guest agent cannot run in any of them. agent-terminal has git but
no python; agent-base has neither. The guest agent must not dictate the
image's contents — it needs to be a static binary. This script correctly
refuses to build an image whose agent cannot run, so the failure is
visible rather than a VM that boots into nothing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 08:19:10 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0f2591bae4 Merge: B3 microVM client + fix a wire-contract mismatch that would have timed out silently
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 07:59:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 02ba557c3e feat(fleet): B3 — server-side microVM client over NodeHub
cm_api::microvm_client::MicroVm wraps the node's vm_* ops as typed calls
over the existing hub request/response channel: create / inject / exec /
collect / destroy, plus list() for reaping. No new transport.

Fixes a wire-contract mismatch B2 would have shipped. `Uplink::Result`
declares `output: String`, but the node's vm_* handler returned a JSON
object. The frame then failed to deserialize and hit the uplink match's
`Err(_) => {}` arm, so the reply VANISHED and every vm_* call would have
timed out after 20s with nothing anywhere explaining why. The node now
sends a string, matching the contract rather than what looked tidier.

That silent arm is fixed too: an unparseable frame now logs the node, the
parse error and the frame head, and says explicitly that the request it
was answering will time out. It is the arm that would have hidden this.

Two more places where a failure must not borrow a legitimate outcome's
representation:

  - vm_exec returning no `rc` is an error, not a zero. A missing exit code
    means the guest did not report one; reading it as success is how a
    failed command becomes a passing phase.
  - vm_collect on a missing path is an error, not an empty archive — an
    empty tar looks exactly like a run that produced nothing.

Timeouts: the hub's deadline is the guest's plus 30s, saturating. A
caller passing a huge budget would otherwise wrap to a tiny timeout and
turn a long agent turn into a spurious transport failure. clippy caught
the tautological assertion in the first version of that test, which is
what surfaced the overflow.

Verified: `--vm-selftest` on tank still 8/8 after the output-type change
(create 950ms), 427 tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 07:59:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 22efb93775 Merge: B2 vm_* node ops — microVM lifecycle proven on tank (8/8)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 07:35:18 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 2d04c5e257 feat(fleet): B2 — vm_* node ops for Firecracker microVMs
create / inject / exec / collect / destroy / list, riding the node's
existing frame dispatch ({t, id, …} -> {t:"result", id, ok, output}), so
no protocol change was needed. Control is length-prefixed JSON over
vsock; the serial console stays a log, because feeding a guest over stdin
races its startup and arrives half-consumed.

DEVIATION FROM THE PLAN, deliberately: this does NOT implement
cm_sandbox::SandboxDriver. That trait is container-shaped —
attach_pty/resize_pty/argv exec — while missions need
create -> inject -> run -> collect -> destroy. Conforming would mean
building PTY-over-vsock and window-resize semantics that no mission path
calls, purely to satisfy a signature. We give up automatic RemoteDriver
marshalling; orphan reaping is a label/id sweep either way.

Three traps from the B0 spike are handled in code rather than remembered:

  - Firecracker does NOT unlink its vsock UDS on exit, so destroy unlinks
    it explicitly, and the selftest ASSERTS it is gone. Assuming the VM
    tidies up after itself is how the mission checkout accumulated four
    uid bugs.
  - firecracker is spawned via setsid and killed as a process GROUP, so a
    background child cannot outlive the VM holding its workdir open.
  - create does not return until the guest agent has answered a ping. A
    VM that booted but serves nothing is worse than one that failed, so a
    half-created VM is destroyed rather than left registered.

A vm id becomes a path component, so ids are restricted to [A-Za-z0-9_-]
and REJECTED rather than sanitised — a caller that sent `../../etc`
wanted something we should not guess at.

Verified on tank through the real Rust path, as the daemon user, with no
sudo: `clawmates-node --vm-selftest` -> 8/8, create in 986ms, and the
host left with zero firecracker processes and zero VM directories. The
selftest asserts every step, including that a destroyed VM can no longer
be exec'd; a test that only reports the steps it completed cannot
distinguish "passed" from "stopped early".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 07:35:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 b87d89f9fa Merge: B1 microvm placement — tank and morpheus report microvm:true
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 22:00:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 67c56ce19b fix(fleet): /dev/kvm present is not /dev/kvm usable
The capability probe reported `kvm: false` on tank and morpheus while the
device sat right there: /dev/kvm is `crw-rw---- root:kvm` and the kvm
group was EMPTY, so the daemon — an ordinary user — could not open it.
The B0 spike missed this entirely because it ran everything under sudo.

This is exactly why the probe opens the device rather than stat-ing it;
a stat-based check would have reported both nodes capable and every
microvm mission would have failed at launch instead of at placement.

fc-node-setup.sh now fixes the group itself, or says precisely what to
run when it cannot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 22:00:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0f7fa31f86 feat(fleet): B1 — microvm runtime kind and KVM placement predicate
Phase B step 1, on top of the B0 spike that proved microVMs boot here.

KVM is a HARD predicate, not a preference. gw-04 — where every mission
runs today — is itself a VM without nested virtualisation and has no
/dev/kvm, so a microvm mission landing there cannot start at all. The
scheduler therefore has to be able to tell nodes apart, which means the
node has to report what it can host.

Nodes gain a `capabilities` jsonb, populated from a probe on the node
rather than from configuration: /dev/kvm either exists there or it does
not, and nothing on the server can make it appear. The probe OPENS the
device rather than stat-ing it, because it can exist while being
unopenable (wrong group, or a container without the device passed
through) — which is precisely how firecracker will fail.

`microvm` requires BOTH kvm and a firecracker binary. A node with KVM
but no binary looks capable by the obvious test and fails at launch; a
node with the binary but no KVM is gw-04.

Placement fails the launch when no capable node exists, rather than
letting a mission sit in 'running' with nowhere to run. An explicit
target_node_id is treated as a request, not a guarantee — it is honoured
only if that node actually reports the capability.

`capabilities` defaults to '{}' NOT NULL so a node that has never
reported fails every predicate: an unqueried node and an incapable node
must be indistinguishable to the scheduler, because scheduling onto a
node whose abilities are unknown is how you get a mission that cannot
start and does not say why. The report replaces rather than merges, so a
capability the node has LOST disappears instead of leaving a stale true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 21:54:18 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4454a1cfd9 Merge: Firecracker B0 spike — microVMs boot on tank and morpheus
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 21:39:13 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 e65be19a45 feat(fleet): Firecracker node setup, proven by booting a microVM
Phase B step 0. Before writing any driver, establish that Firecracker
works on this hardware — the plan called it greenfield, and an
orchestrator built against an unproven runtime is a lot of code betting
on an assumption.

It works, and comfortably: a microVM boots, runs our init, writes a
file and shuts down in ~650-910ms wall clock, with the kernel reaching
our init at 234ms. Host->guest RPC over vsock (AF_VSOCK port 9001, no
network stack) round-trips in 27ms.

The script installs and then PROVES, because installing is not working.
It reports success only after a VM has actually booted and run our code.

Four findings from the spike that the driver must account for:

  - Firecracker does NOT unlink its vsock UDS on exit, and leaves it
    owned by whoever ran the VM. A driver running as anyone else cannot
    clean it up — the same uid trap that cost this codebase four bugs on
    the mission checkout. The driver owns the socket path lifecycle.
  - tank's FORWARD policy is DROP (Tailscale/Docker), confirming the
    article's warning: VM networking rules must be inserted at position
    1, not appended, or return traffic dies silently.
  - Feeding commands to the guest over the serial console races the
    shell's startup and arrives half-consumed (`# ho FC-GUEST-ALIVE`).
    The guest runs an init script; stdin is not a control channel.
  - `sha256sum -c` compares by filename, so a download saved under any
    other name fails for a reason unrelated to integrity. A check that
    fails for the wrong reason teaches you to ignore it — compare the
    hashes directly.

tank and morpheus are ready. architect requires interactive sudo, so it
is deliberately not provisioned rather than worked around.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 21:39:10 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 452b419729 Merge: an empty coding phase is a failure, not a completion
Verified on the deployed stack: verify-mission-delivery.sh all → 9/9,
with the noop negative control showing 'phase 0 failed 0' where the same
shape read 'completed' in mission 019fcf62.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 19:52:07 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 da3731d753 fix(missions): a coding phase that delivers nothing is a failure
The last open item in the silent-success class: a coding phase that
changed no files reported `completed` — the same status a phase gets for
delivering tested, reviewed, pushed work. Mission `019fcf62` completed
that way with its agents silently unpinned from the repo, and nothing in
the platform disagreed; it was found by a script diffing the forge.

The verdict is applied at capture rather than at completion, because
capture selects on `status = 'completed'` — the platform does not know
whether a phase produced anything until after it has already finished.

Three conditions must hold before failing a phase, because a false
positive here fails honest work: the phase is a coding phase (research
phases legitimately write nothing to the tree), the diff was actually
computed (an uncomputable diff also reports zero files — blaming the
agent for a platform fault is the same defect wearing different
clothes), and `allow_empty` is not set. Only an explicit `true` opts
out, so a typo leaves the check armed. Registered in phase_config with
its reader named, per the seam-2 rule.

Also closes an ordering hazard this exposed: capture is batched and runs
after a phase completes, so a backlogged mission could close as
'completed' and only then have capture discover an empty phase — leaving
a 'completed' mission holding a 'failed' phase, unfixable because the
mission-close CASE only touches 'running' rows. A repo-bearing mission
now waits for its work to be captured before closing.

Adds a `noop` scenario to the harness: a phase told to change nothing,
which PASSES only when the phase comes back `failed`. Same discipline as
the uid self-test — a check that has never been seen to fire has not
been shown to work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 19:39:14 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 f8ca0ced9a Merge: copy-in/copy-out is the default mission filesystem
Verified with CLAWMATES_MISSION_FS removed from gw-04's .env — compose
passes it through as empty, which under the old opt-in logic would have
selected bind. scripts/verify-mission-delivery.sh all → 7/7.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 18:38:34 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4f6719c80e feat(missions): make copy-in/copy-out the default filesystem model
Copy mode shipped opt-in so that changing how every mission receives its
code required someone to type it. Four production missions and a
fail-closed harness later, opt-in is the riskier setting: the bind path
is the one with four documented work-loss incidents, and leaving it as
the default means the untested path runs whenever nobody sets the
variable. `CLAWMATES_MISSION_FS=bind` still selects it; anything else —
unset, empty, misspelt — gets copy mode, so a typo lands on the safer
path rather than the one being retired.

Also fixes a real leak found while scoping the deletion below: the git
helper built its `safe.directory` argument with `Box::leak`, justified as
"the process is short-lived". That is true of a CLI and false of cm-api,
which is a long-running server — so it leaked one allocation per git
call, growing with every phase of every mission.

The A5 deletion is NOT done here, and two of its items should never be
done:

  - `scrub_remote_credentials` is a security control, not a uid
    workaround. Copy mode uploads the whole `.git` into a container the
    agent controls as root, which makes stripping the token from
    `.git/config` more necessary, not less.
  - `has_local_work` / `checkout_in_use` guard `fetch_and_reset` at every
    phase launch and have nothing to do with who writes the checkout.
    The host checkout still persists across phases under copy mode —
    mission `019fcf62` shows the marker firing there. Deleting them
    reintroduces PRIOR-PHASE-WORK-WAS-LOST.

The rest (`share_repository_across_uids`, `clear_stale_commit_editmsg`,
`-c safe.directory`) are genuinely obsolete under copy mode but stay
while `bind` remains selectable: a workaround may only be deleted once
the situation it works around can no longer be chosen.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 18:29:29 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 3c91d0e172 Merge: stop three launch failures from passing as success
Verified against the deployed stack: scripts/verify-mission-delivery.sh all
→ 7/7, chain phase 0 now files=1 pushed=true (was 0 files, no error).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 18:09:39 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 1253595ba7 fix(missions): stop three launch failures from passing as success
A verification run against the deployed stack found a chain mission whose
phase 0 reported `completed` with zero files, no commit error and no push
error — indistinguishable from a phase that correctly had nothing to do.
Three separate defects had to line up, each of them the same shape: a
failure sharing its representation with a legitimate negative result.

1. `pin_agent_workspaces` embedded the whole config in one `sh -c` argv.
   That works until the file grows — config gains a block per provisioned
   claw — then fails with `argument list too long`. Now written through
   the tar upload API, which has no argv limit, so the failure mode is
   gone rather than merely further away.

2. A failed pin was logged "(continuing)". Without the pin, agents write
   to their sandboxes and the committer finds nothing in /mission/repo —
   the mission cannot deliver, so the launch now fails where someone is
   still looking. The restart that applies the pin is fatal for the same
   reason.

3. `capture_phase_diff_at` swallowed `git diff` failures with
   `unwrap_or_default`, so an unreadable base landed `empty: true,
   files_changed: 0` — byte-identical to an honest no-op. The error is now
   recorded as `diff_error`, and an empty patch that came from a failed
   diff is no longer trusted to mean an unchanged tree.

Adds scripts/verify-mission-delivery.sh, which found #1 and #2 on its
first real run. Its probes are fail-closed: no placeholder values, a
self-test that proves the uid probe can detect the split it looks for,
and FAIL-NORUN for a scenario that never executed. Its own first version
had this bug too — a `die` inside `$(...)` exited the subshell, so a run
that could not authenticate printed "all checks passed" and exited 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 18:01:02 -07:00
Omar Sobh bb274d08c6 Merge: copy-in/copy-out mission filesystem (flag-gated)
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
ci / rust (push) Skipped
ci / frontend (push) Skipped
ci / e2e (push) Skipped
ci / publish (push) Skipped
2026-08-04 15:41:48 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 7e07c389c6 feat(missions): wire copy-in/copy-out behind CLAWMATES_MISSION_FS=copy
With the flag set, ensure_container omits the /mission bind, the checkout
is pushed into the container at phase launch, and the agent's work is
pulled back before capture.

The simplification that makes this small: sync_out unpacks over the SAME
host path the checkout came from. The host directory stays a server-owned
staging area with exactly one writer, and capture_phase_diff_at needs no
change at all — it still finds a normal checkout exactly where it always
has. Delivery, gating, commit and push are untouched.

Two failures are deliberately loud rather than silent:

- copy-IN failure fails the phase launch. Continuing would start a phase
  against an empty directory, and the agent would cheerfully report having
  done work on a repo that was not there.
- copy-OUT failure SKIPS capture. Capturing anyway would diff a stale host
  tree and record "no changes" for work that exists — success reported for
  nothing, which is the exact failure mode this codebase keeps paying for.

Opt-in: the bind path is what production has run since the beginning, and
the test asserts a near-miss value leaves it there rather than silently
switching every mission.

414 tests, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 15:41:47 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 389b41f8e6 feat(missions): copy-in/copy-out primitive for the mission checkout
The first half of removing the shared bind mount. Not wired yet — this
adds the mechanism and its tests.

One cause, four fixes so far: .git/objects permission denied
(core.sharedRepository), the capture base being overwritten each phase,
COMMIT_EDITMSG root-owned, and reset --hard deleting a prior phase's work
(.git/clawmates-in-use). core.sharedRepository was never a general
solution — it covers objects and refs, and every OTHER file git touches
is a fresh opportunity. Copy-in/copy-out removes the cause instead: the
agent owns its filesystem with no second writer.

Measured before building, because the plan named copy cost as the open
risk: a real 65 MB checkout of this repo copies in 0.23s and out 0.18s on
gw-04. Not a risk at this size; re-measure an order of magnitude larger.
No compression — the payload crosses a local socket, so gzip would spend
CPU to save nothing.

Two safety properties, both tested:

- The archive comes back from a container the agent controls as ROOT, so
  it is untrusted input. A `../ESCAPED` entry must not write outside the
  destination. The test writes the tar header bytes by hand because the
  tar crate refuses to BUILD such an entry through its safe API — which
  is reassuring, but means the hostile case has to be constructed the way
  an attacker would.
- Symlinks are packed as links, never dereferenced. Following them on
  copy-IN would smuggle host files into the container; the test plants a
  host secret behind a symlink and asserts its contents never appear in
  the archive.

Ownership is deliberately not preserved on unpack: the archive's uids are
the container's root, and re-applying them on the host would recreate the
exact uid split this exists to remove.

413 tests, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 15:15:22 -07:00
Omar Sobh ac6bf72943 Merge: per-mission runtime data (stop sharing the door token)
ci / gates (push) Failing after 15s
ci / rust (push) Skipped
ci / frontend (push) Skipped
ci / e2e (push) Skipped
ci / publish (push) Skipped
2026-08-04 12:30:31 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0d9498ec6e fix(missions): copy an allow-list, not the whole 1.7GB seed dir
Checking before deploying caught a mistake in the previous commit. The
seed dir on gw-04 is 1.7 GB and the first version copied all of it per
mission — tens of seconds each, and ~17 GB across ten concurrent
missions.

1.5 GB of that is .rustup: a Rust toolchain that installed itself into
the data dir back when HOME=/zeroclaw-data and the image had no
toolchain. The image now ships Rust at /usr/local/cargo, which is what
the container's PATH actually resolves — verified live. The data-dir copy
is dead weight and is not even reachable.

SEEDED_PATHS now copies only what carries per-mission identity or
secrets: .zeroclaw (config.toml with the door token, sessions.db,
devices.db), clawmates-mcp.json, .claude + .claude.json, .kimi-code,
glm-home, agents. Roughly 46 MB instead of 1.7 GB — about 37x smaller.

Caches and toolchains are deliberately excluded: .rustup, .npm, .cargo,
.cache, .local. They hold no secrets and a mission reads the image's.

Absent paths are tolerated: a fresh deployment has no .kimi-code until
Kimi is first used, and that must not fail container creation.

The test asserts both directions — the token-bearing paths ARE copied
and the caches are NOT — because either mistake is silent: copying
everything just makes missions slow, and copying nothing quietly
restores the credential sharing.

409 tests, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 12:26:04 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 15e7608e4a fix(missions): give each mission its own runtime data
Every per-mission container bind-mounted the SAME host seed dir as
/zeroclaw-data — shared with each other AND with the singleton runtime.
That directory holds config.toml, which carries the §15 door bearer
token, plus sessions.db and devices.db.

So one mission could read another mission's credential, and anything it
wrote there was inherited by every later mission. teardown_container
only removes /var/lib/clawmates-missions/{id}, so the shared directory
was never cleaned — the contamination was permanent.

The code already knew. The comment on DEFAULT_SEED_DIR names the sqlite
race and calls copy-on-write per mission the long-term fix. This is that
fix: seed_runtime_data copies the seed into
<missions_root>/<mission>/runtime-data at container create, and the
mount points there. Cleanup is free — teardown already removes that tree.

The copy runs in a throwaway container because cm-api cannot see the seed
dir: it hands that host path to Docker but never mounts it itself. The
runtime image is reused so nothing extra is pulled, and `cp -a /seed/.`
copies dotfiles — `/seed/*` would silently skip .zeroclaw/ and produce a
runtime with no config at all.

A copy failure is fatal to container creation on purpose. Falling back to
the shared mount would silently restore the credential sharing this
removes, and silent fallback to a weaker posture is the failure mode this
codebase keeps paying for.

The test asserts path shape rather than behaviour: an edit that points
the mount back at the seed dir restores credential sharing with no other
visible symptom, so the path IS the invariant.

408 tests, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 12:14:38 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 5d98fcf44a feat(missions): forward ZAI/KIMI keys so one binary serves three backends
ci / gates (push) Failing after 7s
ci / rust (push) Skipped
ci / frontend (push) Skipped
ci / e2e (push) Skipped
ci / publish (push) Skipped
All three providers run through the SAME `claude` binary, verified live:

  Anthropic  CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN                          -> ANTHROPIC-OK
  GLM        ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://api.z.ai/api/anthropic -> GLM-OK
  Kimi       ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://api.kimi.com/coding/   -> KIMI-OK

That is a stronger multi-provider story than a provider-per-implementation:
skills, subagents, MCP, hooks and tool policy are identical across all
three because it is literally the same harness.

The `kimi` CLI (0.31.1, shipped in the image) 401s on this key and is not
needed -- the claude binary reaches Kimi's Anthropic-compatible endpoint
directly. Worth knowing before someone debugs the CLI.

forwarded_provider_keys now ships ZAI_API_KEY and KIMI_API_KEY into
mission containers in BOTH auth modes: they are unrelated to the Anthropic
credential, so the api_key/subscription split does not apply to them. A
mission that selects a backend without its key present would otherwise
fail at the first turn.

Keys persisted in /opt/clawmates/.env and passed through compose.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 10:51:34 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 4ff4e6f7ee fix(missions): a root-owned COMMIT_EDITMSG must not block delivery
ci / gates (push) Failing after 18s
ci / rust (push) Skipped
ci / frontend (push) Skipped
ci / e2e (push) Skipped
ci / publish (push) Skipped
Mission 019fcd0c produced correct work — a reviewed, tested function plus
a REVIEW.md quoting a real cargo test summary — and delivered none of it:

  git commit → exit 128: could not open '.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG': Permission denied

The agent ran `git commit` itself inside the mission container (as root),
leaving that file owned by root at 0644. core.sharedRepository covers
objects and refs — .git/index lands at 0666, which is why commits work at
all — but not COMMIT_EDITMSG, which git writes with the default umask.

Unlinking works where overwriting does not: removing a file needs write
permission on the DIRECTORY, and .git/ is owned by the server. Silent on
failure by design, so the commit reports the real error rather than this
speculative cleanup.

Third distinct instance of the same uid-split class (objects, then the
capture base, now this). The pattern holds: the checkout is one directory
written by two users, and each new file git touches is a new opportunity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-04 07:35:37 -07:00
Omar Sobh deb60be98d Merge: direct session executor for missions (flag-gated)
ci / gates (push) Failing after 6s
ci / rust (push) Skipped
ci / frontend (push) Skipped
ci / e2e (push) Skipped
ci / publish (push) Skipped
2026-08-03 22:56:30 -07:00
163 changed files with 29992 additions and 2608 deletions
+193
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@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
# Local → production pipeline.
#
# push to main → test → build amd64 images → push to the fleet registry
# → move :latest → gw-04's existing 60s rolling timer picks it up.
#
# The last hop is NOT in this file and does not need to be: gw-04 already runs
# `clawmates-deploy.timer` every minute, which pulls
# `$REGISTRY/clawmates/<svc>:latest`, compares it to the running image id, and
# recreates on drift. This workflow's job is to make `:latest` mean the newest
# green commit. See deploy/gw-04/clawmates-deploy.sh.
#
# Runs on the `gw04` runner (host executor, systemd unit act-runner). gw-04 is
# the only reachable x86_64 host — web-01 is aarch64 and the fleet build boxes
# are packed — and prod images must be linux/amd64, so builds are native here
# rather than emulated.
name: deploy
on:
push:
branches: [main]
# Lets you re-run a deploy without an empty commit.
workflow_dispatch:
env:
REGISTRY: 100.94.185.103:5000
NAMESPACE: clawmates
jobs:
test:
runs-on: gw04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
# A throwaway Postgres so the integration tests actually run. Without
# CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL, cm-testkit tries a default admin URL and the
# approvals_api tests die on PoolTimedOut — which looks like a failure but
# only means "no database here".
- name: Start test Postgres
run: |
docker rm -fv cm-ci-pg 2>/dev/null || true
docker run -d --name cm-ci-pg \
-e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_USER=postgres \
-p 127.0.0.1:55432:5432 postgres:16-alpine
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
docker exec cm-ci-pg pg_isready -U postgres >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
sleep 2
done
docker exec cm-ci-pg pg_isready -U postgres
# Rust lives in a container because gw-04 has no cargo. The named volumes
# are the whole reason this is not painfully slow: without them every run
# recompiles the world.
# Docker socket AND the host's docker binary are mounted:
# - cm-files' s3_store test uses testcontainers (socket only).
# - cm-runtime/cm-sandbox tests (browser_tool, shell_exec, warm_pool,
# security, socket_proxy) shell out to `docker` via std::process, so
# they need the CLI on PATH too. Mounting the host binary beats
# apt-installing docker.io on every run — that is ~100 MB of download
# per job, and the container is fresh each time so nothing caches it.
# These tests do NOT skip when the capability is missing; they fail in a
# way that reads like broken code (SocketNotFoundError / NotFound), which
# is why they are worth wiring up rather than excluding.
#
# They also need clawmates/agent-{base,browser,terminal}:dev, which are
# locally-built images present on gw-04 but in no registry. If this job
# ever moves hosts, those images must move with it.
#
# `cargo test --workspace` builds cm-brain, which pulls clawhdf5 from
# git.redclaw.dev — a PRIVATE repo. Two things are needed and neither is
# optional:
# CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI — libgit2 fails against Gitea's smart-HTTP
# with "invalid packet line" (the server Dockerfile sets it for the
# same reason). Note it is _GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI, not _NET_FETCH_.
# the insteadOf rewrite — supplies the credential to that CLI fetch.
# The token is a repo secret, so it is masked in logs and never in git.
- name: Rust tests
run: |
docker run --rm --network host \
-v "$PWD":/w -w /w \
-v cm-ci-cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry \
-v cm-ci-cargo-git:/usr/local/cargo/git \
-v cm-ci-target:/w/target \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
-v /usr/bin/docker:/usr/bin/docker:ro \
-e SQLX_OFFLINE=true \
-e CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true \
-e FORGE_TOKEN='${{ secrets.FORGE_TOKEN }}' \
-e CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://postgres:[email protected]:55432/postgres \
rust:1.96-slim \
sh -c 'set -e
apt-get update -qq
apt-get install -y -qq pkg-config libssl-dev cmake git >/dev/null
git config --global url."https://oauth2:[email protected]/".insteadOf "https://git.redclaw.dev/"
cargo test --workspace'
# -v, not just -f. The postgres image declares a VOLUME, so removing the
# container without it orphans an anonymous data directory EVERY run.
# cm-testkit creates a database per test, so those grew to 2.8 GB each —
# 38 GB of leaked volumes before anyone noticed.
- name: Stop test Postgres
if: always()
run: docker rm -fv cm-ci-pg 2>/dev/null || true
# node 22 is on the host, so these run directly.
- name: Frontend checks
working-directory: frontend
run: |
npm ci --no-audit --no-fund
npm run typecheck
npm run test
# Lint is advisory: the repo currently has pre-existing max-lines and
# set-state-in-effect errors that predate this pipeline. Failing the
# deploy on them would mean nothing could ship until they are cleared.
npm run lint || echo "::warning::lint reported problems (advisory)"
build:
runs-on: gw04
needs: test
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Build + push images
run: |
set -eu
SHA=$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)
echo "SHA=$SHA" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
# The daemon binary the frontend serves at /dl. images/frontend.Dockerfile
# expects it staged; rsync-based deploys create it out of band, so build
# it here or the image ships without the node installer.
mkdir -p frontend/public/dl
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD":/w -w /w \
-v cm-ci-cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry \
-v cm-ci-cargo-git:/usr/local/cargo/git \
-v cm-ci-target:/w/target \
-e SQLX_OFFLINE=true -e CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true \
-e FORGE_TOKEN='${{ secrets.FORGE_TOKEN }}' \
rust:1.96-slim \
sh -c 'set -e
apt-get update -qq
apt-get install -y -qq pkg-config libssl-dev cmake git >/dev/null
git config --global url."https://oauth2:[email protected]/".insteadOf "https://git.redclaw.dev/"
cargo build --release -p clawmates-node
cp target/release/clawmates-node frontend/public/dl/clawmates-node-linux-amd64'
for svc in server frontend broker; do
docker build -f "images/$svc.Dockerfile" \
-t "$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/$svc:main-$SHA" \
-t "$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/$svc:latest" .
docker push "$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/$svc:main-$SHA"
docker push "$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/$svc:latest"
done
# `docker push :latest` does NOT reliably move the tag on this registry:
# when the manifest already exists under another tag (it does — we just
# pushed main-$SHA), the push reports a digest but `:latest` keeps
# resolving to the OLD image. Writing the manifest to the tag over the
# HTTP API is what actually moves it. This is the same trick
# scripts/deploy.sh uses, and the reason a "successful" deploy could
# previously leave prod on a stale image.
- name: Repoint :latest
run: |
set -eu
for svc in server frontend broker; do
ct=$(curl -s -o /tmp/m.json -D- \
-H 'Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json,application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json,application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json,application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json' \
"http://$REGISTRY/v2/$NAMESPACE/$svc/manifests/main-$SHA" \
| awk -F': ' '/^[Cc]ontent-[Tt]ype/{print $2}' | tr -d '\r')
code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X PUT \
-H "Content-Type: $ct" --data-binary @/tmp/m.json \
"http://$REGISTRY/v2/$NAMESPACE/$svc/manifests/latest")
echo "$svc :latest → main-$SHA (HTTP $code)"
case "$code" in 20*) ;; *) echo "tag write failed"; exit 1 ;; esac
done
# Verify the thing that actually matters: what prod is RUNNING, not what
# we pushed. A green edge on a stale image is the failure mode this whole
# pipeline exists to prevent.
- name: Wait for the rolling deploy
run: |
set -eu
want=$(docker image inspect -f '{{.Id}}' "$REGISTRY/$NAMESPACE/server:latest")
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
got=$(docker inspect -f '{{.Image}}' clawmates_server_1 2>/dev/null || echo none)
if [ "$got" = "$want" ]; then
echo "prod is running main-$SHA"
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "edge HTTP %{http_code}\n" -m 10 https://clawmates.work/ || true
exit 0
fi
sleep 10
done
echo "prod did not roll onto main-$SHA within 5m — check clawmates-deploy.timer"
exit 1
+215
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@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
# Release: build the images both deploy targets share, assemble the SIGNED
# air-gapped bundle, verify it offline, rehearse the customer's install, and
# attach everything to the Gitea release for the tag.
#
# Moved from .github/workflows/ and rewritten for this forge. The old copy could
# never have run: `runs-on: ubuntu-latest` matches no runner here, and
# `softprops/action-gh-release` talks to GitHub's API, not Gitea's.
#
# The signing key is a repo secret (BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY, hex ed25519 from
# `clawmates-bundler keygen`). The matching PUBLIC key is published out of band
# so customers can verify a bundle before `docker load`.
name: release
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
workflow_dispatch:
jobs:
bundle:
runs-on: gw04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Version from tag
run: |
# workflow_dispatch has no tag; fall back to the short sha so a manual
# run produces a clearly-not-a-release version rather than an empty one.
if [ "${GITHUB_REF_TYPE:-}" = "tag" ]; then
echo "VERSION=${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
else
echo "VERSION=0.0.0-$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
fi
- name: Build images
run: |
set -eu
docker build -t "clawmates/server:$VERSION" -f images/server.Dockerfile .
docker build -t "clawmates/frontend:$VERSION" -f images/frontend.Dockerfile .
docker build -t "clawmates/broker:$VERSION" -f images/broker.Dockerfile .
docker build -t "clawmates/agent-base:$VERSION" images/agent-base
docker build -t "clawmates/agent-browser:$VERSION" images/agent-browser
docker pull -q postgres:16-alpine
docker pull -q tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy:0.3
# syft goes in the workspace, NOT /usr/local/bin. The host executor runs
# as root on the production gateway; a release should not leave binaries
# behind on it.
- name: SBOMs for every shipped image
run: |
set -eu
mkdir -p dist/sboms .tools
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh \
| sh -s -- -b .tools
for image in server frontend broker agent-base agent-browser; do
./.tools/syft "clawmates/$image:$VERSION" -o spdx-json \
> "dist/sboms/$image.spdx.json"
done
- name: Save image tarballs
run: |
set -eu
mkdir -p dist/images
docker save "clawmates/server:$VERSION" -o dist/images/server.tar
docker save "clawmates/frontend:$VERSION" -o dist/images/frontend.tar
docker save "clawmates/broker:$VERSION" -o dist/images/broker.tar
docker save "clawmates/agent-base:$VERSION" -o dist/images/agent-base.tar
docker save "clawmates/agent-browser:$VERSION" -o dist/images/agent-browser.tar
docker save tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy:0.3 -o dist/images/socket-proxy.tar
docker save postgres:16-alpine -o dist/images/postgres.tar
du -sh dist/images
# gw-04 has no cargo, so the bundler builds in a container — same pattern
# and same cache volumes as deploy.yml. The forge credential is here
# because cargo resolves the whole workspace, which includes cm-brain's
# private clawhdf5 git dependency.
- name: Build bundler
run: |
docker run --rm \
-v "$PWD":/w -w /w \
-v cm-ci-cargo-registry:/usr/local/cargo/registry \
-v cm-ci-cargo-git:/usr/local/cargo/git \
-v cm-ci-target:/w/target \
-e SQLX_OFFLINE=true -e CARGO_NET_GIT_FETCH_WITH_CLI=true \
-e FORGE_TOKEN='${{ secrets.FORGE_TOKEN }}' \
rust:1.96-slim \
sh -c 'set -e
apt-get update -qq
apt-get install -y -qq pkg-config libssl-dev cmake git >/dev/null
git config --global url."https://oauth2:[email protected]/".insteadOf "https://git.redclaw.dev/"
cargo build --release -p clawmates-bundler
# Copy the binary OUT of the target volume and into the workspace.
# /w/target is a named docker volume, so anything left there is
# invisible to later steps running on the host — which is exactly
# how this failed the first time (exit 127, No such file).
mkdir -p /w/.tools
cp target/release/clawmates-bundler /w/.tools/clawmates-bundler'
test -x .tools/clawmates-bundler || { echo "bundler did not land in the workspace"; exit 1; }
- name: Assemble and sign the bundle
env:
BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY }}
run: |
set -eu
test -n "$BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY" || { echo "BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY is empty"; exit 1; }
umask 077
printf '%s' "$BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY" > /tmp/release.key
BUNDLER=.tools/clawmates-bundler
ARTIFACTS=""
for tar in dist/images/*.tar; do
ARTIFACTS="$ARTIFACTS $tar=images/$(basename "$tar")"
done
for migration in migrations/*.sql; do
ARTIFACTS="$ARTIFACTS $migration=migrations/$(basename "$migration")"
done
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
"$BUNDLER" assemble dist/bundle "$VERSION" /tmp/release.key \
deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml=compose/docker-compose.yml \
deploy/compose/clawmates.toml=compose/clawmates.toml \
deploy/compose/.env.example=compose/.env.example \
deploy/e2e/scenarios.toml=compose/scenarios.toml \
images/seccomp/agent-profile.json=seccomp/agent-profile.json \
deploy/airgapped/install.sh=install.sh \
"$BUNDLER"=bin/clawmates-bundler \
dist/sboms/server.spdx.json=sboms/server.spdx.json \
dist/sboms/frontend.spdx.json=sboms/frontend.spdx.json \
dist/sboms/agent-base.spdx.json=sboms/agent-base.spdx.json \
dist/sboms/agent-browser.spdx.json=sboms/agent-browser.spdx.json \
$ARTIFACTS
chmod +x dist/bundle/bin/clawmates-bundler dist/bundle/install.sh
rm -f /tmp/release.key
- name: Verify the bundle offline (public key only)
env:
BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY }}
run: |
set -eu
umask 077
printf '%s' "$BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY" > /tmp/release.key
.tools/clawmates-bundler pubkey /tmp/release.key dist/release.pub
rm -f /tmp/release.key
# The customer's exact procedure: the public half only, inside a
# NETWORK-DISABLED container, proving verification needs no internet.
docker run --rm --network none \
-v "$PWD/dist:/dist:ro" \
ubuntu:24.04 \
/dist/bundle/bin/clawmates-bundler verify /dist/bundle /dist/release.pub
- name: Tarball
run: tar -C dist -czf "clawmates-bundle-$VERSION.tgz" bundle
# The clean-room install rehearsal is DELIBERATELY NOT RUN HERE.
#
# Every other step in this job is inert with respect to production: it
# builds images, writes SBOMs, signs a bundle, and verifies it in a
# network-isolated container. The rehearsal is the one step whose entire
# purpose is to stand a full stack UP and then tear it down with
# `down -v` — on the machine serving production.
#
# On 2026-08-13 it did exactly that: the bundled compose file declares
# `name: clawmates`, which beat --project-directory, so the rehearsal
# adopted the live stack and its teardown deleted clawmates_pgdata. The
# database was lost and there were no backups.
#
# scripts/rehearse-install.sh is now isolated (`-p rehearse-$$` plus a
# guard that refuses the production project name) and its health probe is
# fixed, so it is safe to run — just not on this host. Run it on a build
# box or throwaway VM:
#
# CLAWMATES_BUNDLER=… COMPOSE=/path/to/compose-v2 ./scripts/rehearse-install.sh
#
# Restore this step here only if the release ever moves off the gateway.
# Gitea's release API, not softprops/action-gh-release (GitHub-only).
# Create-or-reuse, so a re-run of the same tag updates instead of 409ing.
# Tag pushes only. On workflow_dispatch GITHUB_REF_NAME is the BRANCH, so
# this step previously created a release — and a git tag — literally named
# "main". A smoke-test run must not be able to mint a release.
- name: Attach to the Gitea release
if: github.ref_type == 'tag'
env:
FORGE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.FORGE_TOKEN }}
run: |
set -eu
API="https://git.redclaw.dev/api/v1/repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases"
TAG="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
id=$(curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $FORGE_TOKEN" "$API/tags/$TAG" \
| sed -n 's/.*"id":[ ]*\([0-9]\+\).*/\1/p' | head -1)
if [ -z "$id" ]; then
id=$(curl -sS -X POST -H "Authorization: token $FORGE_TOKEN" \
-H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d "{\"tag_name\":\"$TAG\",\"name\":\"$TAG\",\"body\":\"Air-gapped bundle for $TAG. Verify with the published public key before docker load.\"}" \
"$API" | sed -n 's/.*"id":[ ]*\([0-9]\+\).*/\1/p' | head -1)
fi
test -n "$id" || { echo "could not create or find the release for $TAG"; exit 1; }
for f in "clawmates-bundle-$VERSION.tgz" dist/release.pub; do
code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
-H "Authorization: token $FORGE_TOKEN" \
-F "attachment=@$f" \
"$API/$id/assets?name=$(basename "$f")")
echo " attached $(basename "$f") (HTTP $code)"
case "$code" in 20*) ;; *) echo "attach failed"; exit 1 ;; esac
done
# Release artifacts are GBs of image tarballs on the production gateway.
# Never `docker image prune -a` here: clawmates/agent-*:dev exist in no
# registry and are the source of the microVM rootfs files.
- name: Reclaim disk
if: always()
run: |
rm -rf dist .tools "clawmates-bundle-$VERSION.tgz" || true
for i in server frontend broker agent-base agent-browser; do
docker rmi "clawmates/$i:$VERSION" 2>/dev/null || true
done
df -h / | awk 'NR==2{print " disk free: "$4}'
-209
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@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
name: ci
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
jobs:
gates:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: File size budget (1500 lines)
run: ./ci/check-loc.sh
- name: No placeholder markers
run: ./ci/check-no-placeholders.sh
- name: Compose config validates
run: POSTGRES_PASSWORD=ci docker compose -f deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml config -q
rust:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: gates
# Compile sqlx query! macros against the committed .sqlx cache (no DB needed).
# Tests need a live Postgres — locally cm-testkit reads CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL
# from .cargo/config.toml pointing at scripts/test-server.sh's host container.
# The fleet act_runner uses the `host` executor (jobs run on morpheus/tank/
# architect natively, not inside a container), so we start a per-run postgres
# container and reach it via its bridge IP. GITHUB_RUN_ID scopes the name so
# concurrent jobs on the same runner don't collide.
#
# GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL points at a per-job empty file so cargo's git fetches
# bypass the runner's includeIf mapping of git.redclaw.dev → /slab/projects
# (local mirror lags and misses recently-pinned commits like the clawverse
# rev cm-brain depends on). clawverse is public; no auth needed.
env:
SQLX_OFFLINE: "true"
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: /tmp/ci-empty-gitconfig-${{ github.run_id }}
steps:
- name: Prepare empty gitconfig for cargo fetches
run: touch "$GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Start postgres sidecar
run: |
set -euo pipefail
NAME="ci-pg-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}"
docker rm -f "$NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
docker run -d --name "$NAME" \
-e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres \
-e POSTGRES_DB=postgres \
postgres:16-alpine >/dev/null
# `.NetworkSettings.IPAddress` is empty (and template-parse errors) on
# modern Docker where the IP lives under `.Networks.<name>.IPAddress`.
# The range form picks the first non-empty IP across whatever network
# docker put the container on.
PG_IP=$(docker inspect -f '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' "$NAME")
if [ -z "$PG_IP" ]; then
echo "postgres has no reachable IP" >&2
docker inspect "$NAME" >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "PG_CONTAINER=$NAME" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
echo "CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgres://postgres:postgres@${PG_IP}:5432/postgres" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
if docker exec "$NAME" pg_isready -U postgres -q >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "postgres ready at ${PG_IP} after ${i}s"
exit 0
fi
sleep 1
done
echo "postgres never became ready" >&2
docker logs "$NAME" >&2 || true
exit 1
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
toolchain: 1.96.0
components: rustfmt, clippy
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
- name: Format
run: cargo fmt --all --check
- name: Clippy
run: cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
- name: Test
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# Re-derive the postgres URL inline instead of trusting that
# CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL propagated through $GITHUB_ENV — act_runner
# v1.0.8 has been observed to swallow env-file writes here.
IP=$(docker inspect -f '{{range .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{.IPAddress}}{{end}}' "$PG_CONTAINER")
[ -n "$IP" ] || { echo "no PG IP" >&2; exit 1; }
export CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL="postgres://postgres:postgres@${IP}:5432/postgres"
echo "using $CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL"
cargo test --workspace
- name: Air-gapped installer verify path
run: ./ci/test-install.sh
- name: Cleanup postgres sidecar
if: always()
run: docker rm -f "${PG_CONTAINER:-}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
frontend:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: gates
defaults:
run:
working-directory: frontend
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: 22
- name: Install
run: npm ci
if: ${{ hashFiles('frontend/package-lock.json') != '' }}
- name: Lint
run: npm run lint
if: ${{ hashFiles('frontend/package-lock.json') != '' }}
- name: Typecheck
run: npm run typecheck
if: ${{ hashFiles('frontend/package-lock.json') != '' }}
- name: Unit and component tests
run: npm test
if: ${{ hashFiles('frontend/package-lock.json') != '' }}
# e2e is intentionally disabled for now. The suite has real product/test
# drift (locators pointing at older versions of pages) that would need a
# dedicated pass to reconcile — see the earlier follow-up notes. Publish
# doesn't depend on this job anyway, but keeping it enabled produced a
# steady red on every push that wasn't actionable. Flip `if:` back to
# `true` (or delete the guard) when the tests get realigned.
e2e:
if: false
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [rust, frontend]
env:
SQLX_OFFLINE: "true"
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
toolchain: 1.96.0
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
- uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: 22
- name: Install frontend dependencies
working-directory: frontend
run: npm ci
- name: Install Playwright browsers
working-directory: frontend
run: npx playwright install --with-deps chromium
- name: Run end-to-end journeys against the real backend
working-directory: frontend
run: npx playwright test --grep-invert "@visual"
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
if: failure()
with:
name: playwright-traces
path: frontend/test-results/
# Rolling deploy: on green main only, build the three prod images, tag with
# :main-<sha> + :latest, push to the fleet registry (redclaw-web-01:5000 via
# its Tailscale IP — the fleet's daemons trust it in insecure-registries by
# IP, not by hostname). GW-04's clawmates-deploy.timer rolls forward within
# ~1 minute of the push. Skipped on PRs.
#
# `e2e` is intentionally NOT in `needs`: it launches its own postgres + dex
# via `docker run` on the host and then reaches them via 127.0.0.1, which
# fails from inside the act_runner container. Migrating e2e to a physical
# build node is a separate task; until then e2e is signal-only, not gating.
# `rust` was restored to `needs` once the flakes were rooted out (approvals
# SSE race + warm_pool agent-seeding + a couple health-check ambiguities).
publish:
if: github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [gates, rust, frontend]
env:
REGISTRY: 100.94.185.103:5000
NAMESPACE: clawmates
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Resolve short SHA
run: echo "SHA=${GITHUB_SHA::7}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Build images
run: |
set -euo pipefail
for svc in broker server frontend; do
docker build \
-t "${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${svc}:main-${SHA}" \
-t "${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${svc}:latest" \
-f "images/${svc}.Dockerfile" .
done
- name: Push images
run: |
set -euo pipefail
for svc in broker server frontend; do
docker push "${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${svc}:main-${SHA}"
docker push "${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${svc}:latest"
done
- name: Summary
run: |
{
echo "## Published images"
echo ""
for svc in broker server frontend; do
echo "- \`${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${svc}:main-${SHA}\`"
echo "- \`${REGISTRY}/${NAMESPACE}/${svc}:latest\`"
done
echo ""
echo "GW-04 timer picks these up within ~1 minute."
} >> "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-117
View File
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
# Release: build the images both deploy targets share, assemble the
# SIGNED air-gapped bundle, verify it offline, and attach everything to
# the tag. The signing key lives in repo secrets (BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY,
# hex ed25519 from `clawmates-bundler keygen`); the matching public key is
# published out of band so customers can verify before docker load.
name: release
on:
push:
tags: ["v*"]
jobs:
bundle:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
- name: Version from tag
run: echo "VERSION=${GITHUB_REF_NAME#v}" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
- name: Build images
run: |
docker build -t "clawmates/server:$VERSION" -f images/server.Dockerfile .
docker build -t "clawmates/frontend:$VERSION" -f images/frontend.Dockerfile .
docker build -t "clawmates/broker:$VERSION" -f images/broker.Dockerfile .
docker build -t "clawmates/agent-base:$VERSION" images/agent-base
docker build -t "clawmates/agent-browser:$VERSION" images/agent-browser
docker pull postgres:16-alpine
- name: SBOMs for every shipped image
run: |
mkdir -p dist/sboms
curl -sSfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/anchore/syft/main/install.sh \
| sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
for image in server frontend broker agent-base agent-browser; do
syft "clawmates/$image:$VERSION" -o spdx-json \
> "dist/sboms/$image.spdx.json"
done
- name: Save image tarballs
run: |
mkdir -p dist/images
docker save "clawmates/server:$VERSION" -o dist/images/server.tar
docker save "clawmates/frontend:$VERSION" -o dist/images/frontend.tar
docker save "clawmates/broker:$VERSION" -o dist/images/broker.tar
docker pull tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy:0.3
docker save tecnativa/docker-socket-proxy:0.3 -o dist/images/socket-proxy.tar
docker save "clawmates/agent-base:$VERSION" -o dist/images/agent-base.tar
docker save "clawmates/agent-browser:$VERSION" -o dist/images/agent-browser.tar
docker save postgres:16-alpine -o dist/images/postgres.tar
- name: Build bundler
run: cargo build --release -p clawmates-bundler
- name: Assemble and sign the bundle
env:
BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY }}
run: |
printf '%s' "$BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY" > /tmp/release.key
BUNDLER=target/release/clawmates-bundler
ARTIFACTS=""
for tar in dist/images/*.tar; do
ARTIFACTS="$ARTIFACTS $tar=images/$(basename "$tar")"
done
for migration in migrations/*.sql; do
ARTIFACTS="$ARTIFACTS $migration=migrations/$(basename "$migration")"
done
# shellcheck disable=SC2086
"$BUNDLER" assemble dist/bundle "$VERSION" /tmp/release.key \
deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml=compose/docker-compose.yml \
deploy/compose/clawmates.toml=compose/clawmates.toml \
deploy/compose/.env.example=compose/.env.example \
deploy/e2e/scenarios.toml=compose/scenarios.toml \
images/seccomp/agent-profile.json=seccomp/agent-profile.json \
deploy/airgapped/install.sh=install.sh \
"$BUNDLER"=bin/clawmates-bundler \
dist/sboms/server.spdx.json=sboms/server.spdx.json \
dist/sboms/frontend.spdx.json=sboms/frontend.spdx.json \
dist/sboms/agent-base.spdx.json=sboms/agent-base.spdx.json \
dist/sboms/agent-browser.spdx.json=sboms/agent-browser.spdx.json \
$ARTIFACTS
chmod +x dist/bundle/bin/clawmates-bundler dist/bundle/install.sh
rm /tmp/release.key
- name: Verify the bundle offline (public key only)
env:
BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY: ${{ secrets.BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY }}
run: |
printf '%s' "$BUNDLE_SIGNING_KEY" > /tmp/release.key
target/release/clawmates-bundler pubkey /tmp/release.key dist/release.pub
rm /tmp/release.key
# The customer's exact procedure: only the public half — and
# inside a NETWORK-DISABLED container, proving verification
# needs no internet (the air-gapped contract).
docker run --rm --network none \
-v "$PWD/dist:/dist:ro" \
ubuntu:24.04 \
/dist/bundle/bin/clawmates-bundler verify /dist/bundle /dist/release.pub
- name: Tarball
run: tar -C dist -czf "clawmates-bundle-$VERSION.tgz" bundle
- name: Clean-room install rehearsal
run: |
docker tag "clawmates/server:$VERSION" clawmates/server:latest
docker tag "clawmates/frontend:$VERSION" clawmates/frontend:latest
docker tag "clawmates/broker:$VERSION" clawmates/broker:latest
./scripts/rehearse-install.sh
- name: Attach to release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
files: |
clawmates-bundle-*.tgz
dist/release.pub
+15
View File
@@ -14,3 +14,18 @@ token.key
# Hosted node-agent binaries (built + baked into the frontend image, not committed)
frontend/public/dl/
# Local env backups. `.env` is already ignored above, but a timestamped or
# suffixed copy of it is not — and these hold real credentials (subscription
# OAuth token, forge PAT, DB password). Ignore every variant, not just the
# exact name.
.env.bak*
*.env.bak*
deploy/compose/.env.*
# Local-only compose override. NOT for prod or the air-gapped install: it
# rebinds published ports to loopback, enables the login bypass, and points the
# runtime at MacBook-specific paths. docker-compose picks this file up
# automatically, so committing it would silently reconfigure anyone who runs
# deploy/compose.
deploy/compose/docker-compose.override.yml
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE topology_runs\n SET checkpoint = $2, last_event_id = $3, updated_at = now()\n WHERE id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Uuid",
"Jsonb",
"Int8"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "5fcbd4d6adbf02489051e2fa63d1df670863bf90e55c1c0ac0ab011759cbd272"
}
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE topology_runs\n SET status = 'queued', updated_at = now()\n WHERE status = 'running' AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Float8"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "7298995b5b58aed46888bb9e5c8d331483aee162fc6bcf1e53232d2afc7c3e62"
}
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE topology_runs\n SET status = 'running', started_at = COALESCE(started_at, now()), updated_at = now()\n WHERE id = (\n SELECT id FROM topology_runs\n WHERE status = 'queued'\n ORDER BY created_at\n FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED\n LIMIT 1\n )\n RETURNING id, workspace_id, task, graph, checkpoint, last_event_id, tier",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "id",
"type_info": "Uuid"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "workspace_id",
"type_info": "Uuid"
},
{
"ordinal": 2,
"name": "task",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 3,
"name": "graph",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 4,
"name": "checkpoint",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 5,
"name": "last_event_id",
"type_info": "Int8"
},
{
"ordinal": 6,
"name": "tier",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
false,
false,
false,
true,
true,
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "9eae6ca16ffc9346456128ce676ef04f3478f873d6ac5f95154b797f454f44c0"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT a.id, a.name, a.accent,\n COALESCE(SUM(u.credits), 0)::BIGINT AS \"credits!\",\n COALESCE(SUM(u.tokens_in + u.tokens_out), 0)::BIGINT AS \"tokens!\",\n COUNT(u.id)::BIGINT AS \"runs!\"\n FROM agents a\n LEFT JOIN usage_events u ON u.agent_id = a.id\n WHERE a.workspace_id = $1\n GROUP BY a.id, a.name, a.accent\n ORDER BY \"credits!\" DESC, \"tokens!\" DESC, a.name",
"query": "SELECT a.id, a.name, a.accent,\n COALESCE(SUM(u.credits), 0)::BIGINT AS \"credits!\",\n COALESCE(SUM(u.tokens_in + u.tokens_out), 0)::BIGINT AS \"tokens!\",\n COUNT(u.id)::BIGINT AS \"runs!\"\n FROM agents a\n LEFT JOIN usage_events u ON u.agent_id = a.id\n -- deleted_at: a soft-deleted agent is gone everywhere else, so\n -- listing it here made deletion look like a no-op — the operator\n -- deletes it, the board still shows it, and deleting again does\n -- nothing because the row is already marked.\n WHERE a.workspace_id = $1 AND a.deleted_at IS NULL\n GROUP BY a.id, a.name, a.accent\n ORDER BY \"credits!\" DESC, \"tokens!\" DESC, a.name",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@
null
]
},
"hash": "d4ef449c48b15519b7195be637dca3d456140ce477993d25a87e209174f79aba"
"hash": "d5bc028ca030daed4e6111990945d8d7011414d830f7d6d0a04980efb79af2a6"
}
Generated
+56
View File
@@ -846,6 +846,8 @@ dependencies = [
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sysinfo",
"tar",
"tempfile",
"tokio",
"tokio-tungstenite 0.26.2",
"webrtc",
@@ -970,6 +972,7 @@ dependencies = [
"serde_yaml",
"sha2",
"sqlx",
"tar",
"tempfile",
"thiserror 2.0.18",
"time",
@@ -1841,6 +1844,16 @@ version = "2.4.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9f1f227452a390804cdb637b74a86990f2a7d7ba4b7d5693aac9b4dd6defd8d6"
[[package]]
name = "fcagent"
version = "0.1.0"
dependencies = [
"base64",
"serde_json",
"tar",
"vsock",
]
[[package]]
name = "ff"
version = "0.13.1"
@@ -2872,6 +2885,15 @@ dependencies = [
"autocfg",
]
[[package]]
name = "memoffset"
version = "0.9.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "488016bfae457b036d996092f6cb448677611ce4449e970ceaf42695203f218a"
dependencies = [
"autocfg",
]
[[package]]
name = "mime"
version = "0.3.17"
@@ -2962,6 +2984,19 @@ dependencies = [
"pin-utils",
]
[[package]]
name = "nix"
version = "0.31.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cf20d2fde8ff38632c426f1165ed7436270b44f199fc55284c38276f9db47c3d"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.13.0",
"cfg-if",
"cfg_aliases",
"libc",
"memoffset 0.9.1",
]
[[package]]
name = "nom"
version = "7.1.3"
@@ -5029,6 +5064,17 @@ dependencies = [
"windows",
]
[[package]]
name = "tar"
version = "0.4.46"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3f6221d9a6003c78398e3b239969f352578258df48c8eb051caadae0015bc840"
dependencies = [
"filetime",
"libc",
"xattr",
]
[[package]]
name = "tempfile"
version = "3.27.0"
@@ -5749,6 +5795,16 @@ version = "0.9.5"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "0b928f33d975fc6ad9f86c8f283853ad26bdd5b10b7f1542aa2fa15e2289105a"
[[package]]
name = "vsock"
version = "0.5.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "6ba782755fc073877e567c2253c0be48e4aa9a254c232d36d3985dfae0bd5205"
dependencies = [
"libc",
"nix 0.31.3",
]
[[package]]
name = "wait-timeout"
version = "0.2.1"
+4
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ members = [
"crates/bins/clawmates-server",
"crates/bins/clawmates-broker",
"crates/bins/clawmates-node",
"crates/bins/fcagent",
"tools/bundler",
]
@@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ publish = false
# Shared dependency versions; crates opt in via { workspace = true }.
serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1"
# Streaming tar for mission copy-in/copy-out (no compression: the payload is
# a git checkout on a local socket, so CPU spent zipping buys nothing).
tar = "0.4"
thiserror = "2"
uuid = { version = "1", features = ["v7", "serde"] }
proptest = "1"
+4
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ serde_json = { workspace = true }
sysinfo = "0.33"
portable-pty = "0.8"
base64 = "0.22"
tar = { workspace = true }
cm-sandbox = { path = "../../cm-sandbox" }
# Linking cm-sandbox (bollard) brings a second rustls provider into the graph, so
# rustls can't auto-pick one — we install `ring` explicitly at startup.
@@ -26,5 +27,8 @@ rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["ring"] }
webrtc = "0.17.1"
bytes = "1.12.0"
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
[lints]
workspace = true
+527
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
//! Host side of a microVM's only route out: an HTTP `CONNECT` proxy on a Unix
//! socket, one per VM.
//!
//! # Why the guest has no network card
//!
//! It could have had one. A TAP device plus NAT is what the Firecracker
//! write-ups do, and it was measured against this before being rejected:
//!
//! - `ip tuntap add` is **denied to the daemon user** (needs `CAP_NET_ADMIN`), so
//! TAP would need root to pre-provision devices at setup time — the same
//! privilege detour the loop-mounted rootfs already forced.
//! - tank's `FORWARD` policy is `DROP` with Docker and Tailscale chains, so rules
//! would have to be *inserted* at position 1; appended ones die silently.
//! - a leaked TAP device is a new class of host litter to reap.
//!
//! Against that, `CONNECT` needs no privilege at all, and it is better on the
//! merits: the client hands us the **hostname**, so resolution happens here and
//! the guest needs no DNS or `resolv.conf`; the allow-list is by name rather than
//! by address; and nothing in the guest can reach the network except through this
//! function. That is what the isolation plan's egress restriction actually asked
//! for, and it is strictly tighter than the mission container's present full
//! egress on `clawmates_edge`.
//!
//! The design rests on one measured fact: **`claude` honours `HTTPS_PROXY`**.
//! With the proxy pointed at a closed port, `claude -p` fails with
//! `ConnectionRefused` instead of answering. (That could only be measured in a
//! container — inside a VM the CLI collapses every failure into `Execution
//! error`.)
//!
//! # Shape
//!
//! Firecracker's convention for a guest-initiated connection is that the **host**
//! listens on `<uds_path>_<port>`. The guest's agent pumps bytes from
//! `127.0.0.1:3128` to vsock port 9002 and parses nothing, so all policy is here
//! and a compromised guest cannot argue with it.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, BufReader};
use tokio::net::{TcpStream, UnixListener, UnixStream};
/// Port the guest dials. Must match `fcagent`'s `EGRESS_PORT`.
pub const EGRESS_PORT: u32 = 9002;
/// What every backend gets, whatever it is.
const COMMON_ALLOW: &[&str] = &["git.redclaw.dev"];
/// The model host a backend's CLI must reach, and NOTHING else.
///
/// Per backend rather than a union, and that is not tidiness. MEASURED on tank:
/// a `glm` VM completed a whole mission with `api.anthropic.com` denied at this
/// proxy, dialling only `api.z.ai` — Claude Code's calls to anthropic.com are
/// its own telemetry, not its completions. So a GLM VM has no need of Anthropic
/// at all, and a union allow-list would let a credential mix-up reach the wrong
/// provider's endpoint instead of failing at a closed door.
///
/// The measurement also settled something a self-report could not: that same
/// agent, served only by z.ai, still described itself as "Claude Opus 5". A
/// model's account of which model it is has no evidential value here; the
/// proxy's log of which host it dialled does.
fn provider_hosts(backend: Option<&str>) -> &'static [&'static str] {
match backend {
// `canary-claude` is the same provider, from a candidate CLI image —
// see `mission_runtime::microvm_credential_for`, which must grant it the
// same credential. A backend is defined in TWO maps: the credential one
// on the server and this one on the node. Adding it to only the first is
// exactly what happened here: the mission launched, the VM booted, the
// agent ran, and the turn died on
// "403 api.anthropic.com is not on the egress allow-list" — which is the
// fail-closed branch below working correctly.
None | Some("") | Some("default") | Some("claude") | Some("canary-claude") => {
&["api.anthropic.com", ".anthropic.com"]
}
Some("glm") => &["api.z.ai"],
// The Kimi CODE service, which is where an `sk-kimi-` key is valid —
// NOT `api.moonshot.ai`, whose Anthropic endpoint exists but belongs to
// a different account namespace and rejects that key. Only the host the
// `agent-kimi` image bakes in.
Some("kimi") => &["api.kimi.com"],
// A locally-hosted model reaches NOTHING through this proxy. Its route
// is `crate::local_model` — a vsock pipe to the node's own loopback,
// with no destination in the protocol — so the correct allow-list here
// is the empty one, and it falls through to the branch below.
//
// Spelled out rather than left implicit because the temptation was to
// widen this proxy instead: an entry here would have meant relaxing the
// 443-only rule AND the IP-literal refusal, both of which exist because
// a unit test caught them being bypassed.
// Fail closed: a backend nobody taught this function about reaches the
// forge and no model API. It cannot silently borrow another provider's
// door, which is the failure this split exists to prevent.
Some(_) => &[],
}
}
/// Parse the allow-list once per VM.
///
/// An empty `CLAWMATES_FC_EGRESS_ALLOW` means **deny everything**, not "fall back
/// to the default": an operator who blanked it asked for no egress, and quietly
/// restoring the default would hand a mission the network they just took away.
/// The allow-list for a VM running `backend`.
///
/// An explicit `CLAWMATES_FC_EGRESS_ALLOW` still wins outright: an operator who
/// set it asked for exactly that list, and quietly adding a provider host to it
/// would widen a boundary they had drawn on purpose.
fn allow_list_for(backend: Option<&str>) -> Vec<String> {
match std::env::var("CLAWMATES_FC_EGRESS_ALLOW") {
Ok(raw) => raw
.split(',')
.map(|s| s.trim().to_ascii_lowercase())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.collect(),
Err(_) => COMMON_ALLOW
.iter()
.chain(provider_hosts(backend).iter())
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.collect(),
}
}
/// Is `host` allowed?
///
/// Case-insensitive, port already stripped. A leading `.` in an entry matches
/// that domain and its subdomains; anything else must match exactly. Deliberately
/// not a substring test — `api.anthropic.com.evil.test` contains the allowed name
/// and must not pass.
fn host_allowed(host: &str, allow: &[String]) -> bool {
let host = host.trim().trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();
if host.is_empty() {
return false;
}
// A hostname is letters, digits, dots and hyphens — nothing else. This is
// load-bearing, not hygiene: `evil.test/api.anthropic.com` ends with an
// allowed suffix and would otherwise PASS the match below. A unit test found
// it. Rejecting the character class also refuses IP literals, so an address
// cannot be used to sidestep a list written in names.
if !host
.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '.' || c == '-')
{
return false;
}
allow.iter().any(|a| match a.strip_prefix('.') {
Some(domain) => host == domain || host.ends_with(&format!(".{domain}")),
None => host == *a,
})
}
/// Split `host:port` from a CONNECT target.
///
/// Only 443 is allowed. Permitting arbitrary ports would turn the proxy into a
/// general-purpose tunnel to anything the allow-list happens to name, which is a
/// different and much larger promise than "the agent can reach its API".
fn parse_target(target: &str) -> Result<(String, u16), String> {
let (host, port) = target
.rsplit_once(':')
.ok_or_else(|| format!("CONNECT target {target:?} has no port"))?;
let port: u16 = port
.trim()
.parse()
.map_err(|_| format!("CONNECT target {target:?} has a non-numeric port"))?;
if port != 443 {
return Err(format!("port {port} is not permitted (only 443)"));
}
// Strip IPv6 brackets so the allow-list sees the same text either way.
let host = host.trim().trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
Ok((host.to_string(), port))
}
/// What happened to one connection. Returned so the caller can log it and the
/// selftest can assert on it.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Verdict {
Allowed(String),
Denied(String),
Malformed(String),
}
/// One header line, with a cap.
///
/// `read_line` has no limit, and a guest that never sends a newline would make
/// the host allocate until it died. Read byte-wise instead — the reads come out
/// of the BufReader, so this is cheap for lines this size, and it keeps ONE
/// reader over the connection, which matters (see `serve`).
async fn read_line_capped(reader: &mut BufReader<UnixStream>, cap: usize) -> Result<String, String> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
loop {
match reader.read_u8().await {
Ok(b'\n') => break,
Ok(b) => out.push(b),
// EOF mid-line: return what we have and let the caller judge it.
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => break,
Err(e) => return Err(format!("read: {e}")),
}
if out.len() > cap {
return Err(format!("a request line longer than {cap} bytes"));
}
}
Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out)
.trim_end_matches('\r')
.to_string())
}
/// Serve one tunnelled connection.
async fn serve(stream: UnixStream, allow: Arc<Vec<String>>) -> Verdict {
// ONE reader for the whole request. Wrapping the stream a second time would
// discard whatever the first reader had already buffered — including the
// first bytes of the TLS handshake — and the tunnel would come up looking
// fine and then stall on a corrupt stream.
let mut reader = BufReader::new(stream);
let line = match read_line_capped(&mut reader, 8 * 1024).await {
Ok(l) if !l.trim().is_empty() => l,
Ok(_) => return Verdict::Malformed("no request line".into()),
Err(e) => return Verdict::Malformed(e),
};
let mut parts = line.split_whitespace();
let method = parts.next().unwrap_or_default().to_ascii_uppercase();
let target = parts.next().unwrap_or_default().to_string();
if method != "CONNECT" {
// Plain HTTP would mean proxying a request we would then have to rewrite,
// and everything a mission needs is TLS. Refused with a status, so the
// client reports something better than a closed socket.
let _ = reply(reader.get_mut(), 405, "only CONNECT is supported").await;
return Verdict::Malformed(format!("method {method}"));
}
let (host, port) = match parse_target(&target) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
let _ = reply(reader.get_mut(), 400, &e).await;
return Verdict::Malformed(e);
}
};
if !host_allowed(&host, &allow) {
// 403 rather than a silent drop: a denial that looks like a network
// timeout is indistinguishable from a hung agent, and this codebase has
// paid for that confusion more than once.
let _ = reply(
reader.get_mut(),
403,
&format!("{host} is not on the egress allow-list"),
)
.await;
return Verdict::Denied(host);
}
// Consume the remaining request headers: they belong to the CONNECT, not to
// the tunnel.
loop {
match read_line_capped(&mut reader, 8 * 1024).await {
Ok(h) if h.trim().is_empty() => break,
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => return Verdict::Malformed(e),
}
}
let mut upstream = match TcpStream::connect((host.as_str(), port)).await {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => {
let _ = reply(reader.get_mut(), 502, &format!("connect {host}:{port}: {e}")).await;
return Verdict::Denied(host);
}
};
if reply(reader.get_mut(), 200, "Connection established")
.await
.is_err()
{
return Verdict::Denied(host);
}
// Anything already buffered past the headers is tunnel payload — a client
// that pipelined its first TLS bytes would otherwise lose them.
let pending = reader.buffer().to_vec();
let mut stream = reader.into_inner();
if !pending.is_empty() && upstream.write_all(&pending).await.is_err() {
return Verdict::Denied(host);
}
// Bytes both ways until either side is done. Errors are not worth reporting:
// a closed connection is the normal end of a tunnel.
let _ = tokio::io::copy_bidirectional(&mut stream, &mut upstream).await;
Verdict::Allowed(host)
}
async fn reply(s: &mut UnixStream, code: u16, text: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let reason = if code == 200 {
"Connection established"
} else {
"Forbidden"
};
// The body carries the reason for a non-200 so it reaches the agent's own
// error output, where whoever is reading a failed mission will see it.
let body = if code == 200 { String::new() } else { format!("{text}\n") };
let head = format!(
"HTTP/1.1 {code} {reason}\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
body.len()
);
s.write_all(head.as_bytes()).await?;
if !body.is_empty() {
s.write_all(body.as_bytes()).await?;
}
s.flush().await
}
/// Start this VM's proxy. Returns the socket path and the task serving it.
///
/// Bound **before** firecracker starts, because a guest that dials before the
/// host is listening gets a connection refused it will not retry.
pub fn start(
uds: &Path,
vm_id: &str,
backend: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(PathBuf, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>), String> {
let path = PathBuf::from(format!("{}_{}", uds.display(), EGRESS_PORT));
// Firecracker does not clean these up any more than it cleans up its own
// socket, and a stale file makes bind fail with EADDRINUSE.
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
let listener =
UnixListener::bind(&path).map_err(|e| format!("bind {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
let allow = Arc::new(allow_list_for(backend));
eprintln!(
"microvm {vm_id}: egress proxy on {} allowing {:?}",
path.display(),
allow
);
let vm = vm_id.to_string();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((s, _)) => {
let allow = allow.clone();
let vm = vm.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
match serve(s, allow).await {
// Logged at every outcome: this is the audit trail of
// everything a mission reached, and a denial that is
// not logged is a mystery hang later.
Verdict::Allowed(h) => eprintln!("microvm {vm}: egress -> {h}"),
Verdict::Denied(h) => {
eprintln!("microvm {vm}: egress DENIED {h}")
}
Verdict::Malformed(w) => {
eprintln!("microvm {vm}: egress malformed request ({w})")
}
}
});
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("microvm {vm}: egress accept failed: {e}");
return;
}
}
}
});
Ok((path, task))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// A backend is defined in TWO places — the server's credential map and this
/// egress map — and granting it one without the other produces a mission
/// that launches, boots, runs, and dies on a 403 from our own proxy.
///
/// Measured exactly that way: `canary-claude` was credentialed on the server
/// and unknown here, and the turn failed with
/// "api.anthropic.com is not on the egress allow-list".
#[test]
fn the_canary_backend_reaches_the_same_provider_as_claude() {
assert_eq!(
provider_hosts(Some("canary-claude")),
provider_hosts(Some("claude")),
"a canary of the Claude image must reach Anthropic, or it tests nothing"
);
// And the fail-closed branch must still hold for anything unknown: this
// is what stops a new backend silently borrowing another provider's door.
assert!(provider_hosts(Some("canary-something-else")).is_empty());
assert!(provider_hosts(Some("definitely-not-built")).is_empty());
}
use super::*;
fn allow() -> Vec<String> {
allow_list_for(None)
}
/// MEASURED on tank, not assumed: a `glm` VM ran a whole mission to
/// completion with `api.anthropic.com` denied at this proxy, dialling only
/// `api.z.ai`. So Anthropic's host is not something a GLM agent needs — and
/// a VM that cannot reach it cannot send z.ai's key there, or Anthropic's
/// subscription token to z.ai, whatever a credential bug does upstream.
#[test]
fn each_backend_reaches_its_own_provider_and_no_other() {
let claude = allow_list_for(Some("claude"));
assert!(claude.iter().any(|h| h == "api.anthropic.com"), "{claude:?}");
assert!(!claude.iter().any(|h| h == "api.z.ai"), "{claude:?}");
let glm = allow_list_for(Some("glm"));
assert!(glm.iter().any(|h| h == "api.z.ai"), "{glm:?}");
assert!(
!glm.iter().any(|h| h.contains("anthropic")),
"a GLM VM must not be able to reach Anthropic: {glm:?}"
);
// Both still reach the forge — delivery is host-side, but a mission that
// clones or fetches needs it.
for l in [&claude, &glm] {
assert!(l.iter().any(|h| h == "git.redclaw.dev"), "{l:?}");
}
let kimi = allow_list_for(Some("kimi"));
assert!(kimi.iter().any(|h| h == "api.kimi.com"), "{kimi:?}");
for other in ["api.z.ai", "api.anthropic.com"] {
assert!(!kimi.iter().any(|h| h == other), "{kimi:?}");
}
// An unknown backend gets no model API at all rather than borrowing
// somebody's: it cannot run anyway, and failing at a closed door beats
// reaching the wrong endpoint with a credential.
let unknown = allow_list_for(Some("rootfs-opus"));
assert_eq!(unknown, vec!["git.redclaw.dev".to_string()], "{unknown:?}");
}
#[test]
fn the_model_api_and_the_forge_are_reachable() {
for h in ["api.anthropic.com", "git.redclaw.dev", "API.Anthropic.COM"] {
assert!(host_allowed(h, &allow()), "{h} must be allowed");
}
}
/// The check is a match, never a substring test. A name that merely CONTAINS
/// an allowed one is a different host controlled by someone else.
#[test]
fn a_lookalike_host_is_not_allowed() {
for h in [
"api.anthropic.com.evil.test",
"notapi.anthropic.com.attacker.io",
// These contain an allowed suffix but are not that host. The first
// PASSED before the character-class check was added — a unit test
// found it, not review.
"evil.test/api.anthropic.com",
"[email protected]",
"api.anthropic.com:443",
"git.redclaw.dev.evil.test",
"example.com",
"",
" ",
] {
assert!(!host_allowed(h, &allow()), "{h} must NOT be allowed");
}
}
/// A raw address must not sidestep a list written in names.
/// A local-model backend gets NO egress, and the 443 rule is untouched.
///
/// The alternative design routed the node's Ollama through this proxy, which
/// would have meant permitting port 11434 and an address the guest names.
/// Both are refused here, still, and a `local-ornith` VM reaches the forge
/// and nothing else — its model lives on the other socket entirely.
#[test]
fn a_local_model_backend_gets_no_egress_and_no_new_port() {
let allow = allow_list_for(Some("local-ornith"));
assert!(
allow.iter().all(|a| a == "git.redclaw.dev"),
"a local backend must reach only the forge, got {allow:?}"
);
for h in ["api.anthropic.com", "api.z.ai", "api.kimi.com", "127.0.0.1"] {
assert!(!host_allowed(h, &allow), "{h} must NOT be reachable");
}
// The rules this design exists to avoid loosening.
assert!(parse_target("anything:11434").is_err());
assert!(parse_target("127.0.0.1:443").is_ok_and(|(h, _)| !host_allowed(&h, &allow)));
}
#[test]
fn an_ip_literal_is_not_allowed() {
let a = vec![".anthropic.com".to_string()];
assert!(!host_allowed("[::1]", &a));
assert!(!host_allowed("2606:4700::1111", &a));
}
/// A trailing dot is the same host to a resolver, so it must be to us.
#[test]
fn a_trailing_dot_does_not_bypass_the_list() {
assert!(host_allowed("api.anthropic.com.", &allow()));
}
/// A `.domain` entry covers subdomains, and only real subdomains.
#[test]
fn a_dot_prefixed_entry_matches_subdomains_only() {
let a = vec![".example.com".to_string()];
assert!(host_allowed("a.example.com", &a));
assert!(host_allowed("example.com", &a));
assert!(!host_allowed("notexample.com", &a));
assert!(!host_allowed("example.com.evil.test", &a));
}
/// Blanking the allow-list means no egress. Falling back to the default
/// would hand a mission the network an operator had just taken away.
#[test]
fn an_empty_allow_list_denies_everything() {
let none: Vec<String> = vec![];
assert!(!host_allowed("api.anthropic.com", &none));
}
/// Only 443. Anything else turns the proxy into a general-purpose tunnel to
/// whatever the allow-list happens to name.
#[test]
fn only_https_is_tunnelled() {
assert_eq!(parse_target("api.anthropic.com:443").unwrap().1, 443);
for bad in [
"api.anthropic.com:22",
"api.anthropic.com:80",
"api.anthropic.com",
"api.anthropic.com:not-a-port",
] {
assert!(parse_target(bad).is_err(), "{bad} must be refused");
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
//! Host side of a microVM's route to the node's OWN locally-hosted model.
//!
//! # Why this is not the egress proxy
//!
//! [`crate::egress`] exists so an agent can reach the public internet under an
//! allow-list: it speaks HTTP `CONNECT`, takes a destination from the guest,
//! resolves it, and decides. Every one of those powers is a liability, which is
//! why that module is careful about ports, IP literals and suffix matching.
//!
//! This is the opposite shape. There is **no destination in the protocol**. The
//! guest opens a socket; the host connects it to `127.0.0.1:11434` on the node
//! and copies bytes. A compromised guest can ask for nothing else, because there
//! is nothing to ask — it is a pipe, not a proxy. That is strictly narrower than
//! anything the allow-list could express, and it is why routing a local model
//! through `egress` would have been the worse design: it would have meant
//! relaxing the 443-only rule and the IP-literal refusal, both of which exist
//! because a unit test caught them being bypassed.
//!
//! # Why plaintext is right here
//!
//! The bytes go guest loopback → vsock → host loopback. They never touch a
//! network, so there is no wire for TLS to protect. Ollama stays bound to
//! `127.0.0.1` on the node and is never exposed to the tailnet, which is a
//! stronger position than terminating TLS in front of it would have been.
//!
//! # Why it is per-backend
//!
//! The node binds this socket only for a backend declared to use a local model.
//! On every other backend the guest's listener is still there and simply gets a
//! refusal — the same fail-closed default `provider_hosts` applies to egress.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use tokio::net::{TcpStream, UnixListener};
/// Host-side vsock port. Must match `fcagent`'s `MODEL_VSOCK_PORT`.
pub const MODEL_PORT: u32 = 9003;
/// Where the node's model server listens. Loopback, and not configurable from
/// the guest by design — see the module docs.
const OLLAMA_ADDR: &str = "127.0.0.1:11434";
/// Whether a backend is served by a model running on the node itself.
///
/// Named individually rather than by prefix. An unrecognised backend must not
/// acquire a route to anything by accident, which is the same rule
/// `egress::provider_hosts` and `mission_runtime::microvm_credential_for`
/// already apply from their own side.
pub fn uses_local_model(backend: Option<&str>) -> bool {
matches!(backend, Some("local-ornith"))
}
/// Bind the guest's local-model socket, if this backend has one.
///
/// `Ok(None)` means "this backend does not use a local model" and is the normal
/// case. An error means it should have had one and could not — reported by the
/// caller, never silently swallowed, because the symptom otherwise is an agent
/// that hangs on its first turn.
pub fn start(
uds: &Path,
vm_id: &str,
backend: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Option<(PathBuf, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>)>, String> {
if !uses_local_model(backend) {
return Ok(None);
}
let path = PathBuf::from(format!("{}_{}", uds.display(), MODEL_PORT));
// Firecracker leaves these behind exactly as it does its own socket, and a
// stale file makes bind fail with EADDRINUSE.
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&path);
let listener =
UnixListener::bind(&path).map_err(|e| format!("bind {}: {e}", path.display()))?;
eprintln!(
"microvm {vm_id}: local model socket on {} -> {OLLAMA_ADDR}",
path.display()
);
let vm = vm_id.to_string();
let task = tokio::spawn(async move {
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((s, _)) => {
let vm = vm.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = pipe(s).await {
// Loud, because the failure a mission sees is a turn
// that never answers. A refused connection here means
// the node's model server is down, and that is worth
// saying out loud rather than leaving to a timeout.
eprintln!("microvm {vm}: local model pipe failed: {e}");
}
});
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("microvm {vm}: local model accept failed: {e}");
return;
}
}
}
});
Ok(Some((path, task)))
}
/// Splice one guest connection onto a fresh connection to the node's model.
async fn pipe(mut guest: tokio::net::UnixStream) -> Result<(), String> {
let mut model = TcpStream::connect(OLLAMA_ADDR)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("connect {OLLAMA_ADDR}: {e}"))?;
tokio::io::copy_bidirectional(&mut guest, &mut model)
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(|e| format!("copy: {e}"))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Only the backends that are meant to have a local model get one.
///
/// The negative half is the point: an unrecognised backend acquiring a route
/// to the node's own model server would be a hole opened by a typo, and it
/// would be invisible because the mission would simply work.
#[test]
fn a_local_route_is_never_granted_by_accident() {
assert!(uses_local_model(Some("local-ornith")));
for other in [
None,
Some(""),
Some("default"),
Some("claude"),
Some("canary-claude"),
Some("glm"),
Some("kimi"),
Some("local"),
Some("local-ornith-typo"),
Some("ornith"),
] {
assert!(
!uses_local_model(other),
"{other:?} must not reach the node's model server"
);
}
}
/// The guest cannot name a destination, so there is nothing to validate.
///
/// This asserts the property that makes this module safe enough to skip the
/// allow-list entirely: the upstream address is a constant. If it ever
/// becomes a parameter, this file needs everything `egress` has.
#[test]
fn the_upstream_address_is_a_constant_not_an_input() {
let src = include_str!("local_model.rs");
// Needles are split so they do not match themselves in this file.
assert_eq!(
src.matches(concat!("TcpStream", "::connect(")).count(),
1,
"exactly one dial site, and it must use the constant"
);
assert!(src.contains(concat!("TcpStream", "::connect(OLLAMA_ADDR)")));
assert!(
OLLAMA_ADDR.starts_with("127.0.0.1:"),
"the model server must be reached on loopback only"
);
}
}
+283 -1
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ use sysinfo::{Disks, System};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, Mutex};
use tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message;
mod egress;
mod local_model;
mod microvm;
mod rtc;
const B64: base64::engine::general_purpose::GeneralPurpose =
@@ -43,6 +46,15 @@ async fn main() {
selftest();
return;
}
// Exercise the microVM lifecycle against a real VM on this node. Separate
// from --selftest because it needs KVM, so it can only pass on a node that
// actually reports microvm capability.
if std::env::args().any(|a| a == "--vm-selftest") {
if !microvm::selftest().await {
std::process::exit(1);
}
return;
}
let (server, token, ts_authkey) = parse_args();
if server.is_empty() || token.is_empty() {
eprintln!("usage: clawmates-node --server <https://gateway> --token <token> [--tailscale-authkey <key>]");
@@ -108,6 +120,11 @@ async fn run(ws_url: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let (out_tx, mut out_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<String>();
let ptys: Ptys = Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
let peers: rtc::RtcPeers = Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
// microVMs this connection started. Scoped to the connection deliberately:
// a reconnect must not inherit VMs it cannot prove are still alive, and
// `vm_destroy` cleans a workdir by path even for an unregistered id, so a
// VM from a previous incarnation is reapable rather than orphaned.
let vms = microvm::new_vms();
// Collect heartbeats on a dedicated thread: the metric helpers shell out to
// docker/tailscale and stat disks (blocking), which must never stall the
// async select loop (or heartbeats/pongs would starve during a slow op).
@@ -131,6 +148,14 @@ async fn run(ws_url: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
if tools_tx.send(frame).is_err() {
break;
}
// What this node can HOST, as opposed to what it has installed. The
// scheduler needs it to place microVM missions, and the node is the
// only honest source: /dev/kvm either exists here or it does not, and
// no amount of configuration on the server can make it appear.
let caps = json!({ "t": "node_capabilities", "capabilities": probe_capabilities() });
if tools_tx.send(caps.to_string()).is_err() {
break;
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(900));
});
@@ -180,8 +205,9 @@ async fn run(ws_url: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let out = out_tx.clone();
let ptys = ptys.clone();
let peers = peers.clone();
let vms = vms.clone();
let text = t.to_string();
tokio::spawn(async move { handle_frame(&text, &out, &ptys, &peers).await; });
tokio::spawn(async move { handle_frame(&text, &out, &ptys, &peers, &vms).await; });
}
Some(Ok(Message::Ping(p))) => {
match tokio::time::timeout(WRITE_DEADLINE, write.send(Message::Pong(p))).await {
@@ -241,6 +267,70 @@ fn heartbeat(sys: &mut System) -> String {
/// Probe installed dev-tool versions: for each tool, find its binary across the
/// usual bin dirs and read `--version`. Returns `{ tool: "x.y.z", … }` for the
/// ones found. Probes `kimi-cli` (the real uv tool), not the `kimi` API wrapper.
/// What this node can HOST — the inputs to placement predicates.
///
/// Distinct from [`probe_tools`], which reports what is *installed* for the
/// operator to see and update. This answers "may the scheduler put a microVM
/// mission here", and the answer is a property of the hardware: gw-04 is
/// itself a VM without nested virtualisation and has no `/dev/kvm`, so it can
/// never host one however it is configured.
///
/// Every value is probed, never assumed. A capability that is merely expected
/// is the same as a capability that is absent, right up until a mission is
/// scheduled onto a node that cannot run it.
fn probe_capabilities() -> Value {
// The device node is necessary but not sufficient — it can exist while
// being unopenable (wrong group, or a container without the device
// passed through). Try to open it, because that is what firecracker does.
let kvm = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
.read(true)
.write(true)
.open("/dev/kvm")
.is_ok();
let firecracker = std::process::Command::new("firecracker")
.arg("--version")
.output()
.ok()
.filter(|o| o.status.success())
.and_then(|o| {
String::from_utf8_lossy(&o.stdout)
.lines()
.next()
.map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
});
// Which rootfs images are actually on this node's disk. Reported so
// placement can require the mission's backend rather than assuming any
// KVM-capable node can boot any image — see microvm::available_backends.
let backends = microvm::available_backends();
capabilities_from(kvm, firecracker.as_deref(), &backends)
}
/// Shape the capability report from probe results.
///
/// Split from [`probe_capabilities`] so the rule can be tested without a
/// `/dev/kvm` to open — the machine running the tests is usually the one that
/// cannot host a microVM.
fn capabilities_from(kvm: bool, firecracker: Option<&str>, backends: &[String]) -> Value {
json!({
"kvm": kvm,
"firecracker": firecracker,
// The backends this node can boot. An ARRAY, and empty when there are
// none: `set_capabilities` REPLACES, so an image that was deleted stops
// being advertised on the next report instead of leaving a stale claim.
//
// Reported even when `microvm` is false, because it is a fact about the
// disk rather than a promise — placement requires both.
"rootfs": backends,
// BOTH must hold. A node with KVM but no firecracker binary looks
// capable by the obvious test and fails at launch; a node with the
// binary but no KVM is gw-04. Computed here rather than in the
// scheduler so the rule sits next to the probe that feeds it.
"microvm": kvm && firecracker.is_some(),
})
}
fn probe_tools() -> Value {
let home = std::env::var("HOME").unwrap_or_default();
let dirs = [
@@ -459,6 +549,7 @@ async fn handle_frame(
out: &mpsc::UnboundedSender<String>,
ptys: &Ptys,
peers: &rtc::RtcPeers,
vms: &microvm::Vms,
) {
let Ok(v) = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(text) else {
return;
@@ -521,6 +612,73 @@ async fn handle_frame(
// Agent-sandbox container ops: drive the REAL DockerDriver so the
// hardening (cap-drop ALL, seccomp, no-net, read-only, non-root) is
// byte-identical to the gateway's local sandboxes.
// microVM ops. Same envelope as every other op, so adding them needed
// no protocol change. `vm_create` blocks until the guest agent answers:
// a VM that booted but serves nothing is worse than one that failed.
op @ ("vm_create" | "vm_inject" | "vm_exec" | "vm_collect" | "vm_destroy" | "vm_list") => {
if let Some(id) = v.get("id").and_then(Value::as_u64) {
let (op, v, out, vms) = (op.to_string(), v.clone(), out.clone(), vms.clone());
// Spawned: a VM boot takes ~1s and an exec can take an hour.
// Running it inline would stall heartbeats and the daemon would
// be declared offline mid-mission.
tokio::spawn(async move {
// While an `exec` runs, follow the turn's log and push each
// chunk to the server as it appears. The guest agent accepts
// concurrent connections (proved against a live VM: a tail
// returned data second-by-second while an 8s exec was still
// running), so this does not wait for, or delay, the turn.
//
// Only for `vm_exec`, and only when the caller named a run to
// attribute the output to — a probe exec has nothing to
// stream and no subscriber.
// Set when the turn returns, so the tail can DRAIN before it
// stops rather than being cut off mid-flush.
let turn_done = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool::new(false));
let tail = (op == "vm_exec")
.then(|| {
let run_id = v.get("run_id").and_then(Value::as_str)?.to_string();
let log_path = v
.get("log_path")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.unwrap_or("/root/agent.log")
.to_string();
let vm_id = v.get("vm_id").and_then(Value::as_str)?.to_string();
Some(tokio::spawn(stream_vm_log(
vms.clone(),
vm_id,
run_id,
log_path,
out.clone(),
turn_done.clone(),
)))
})
.flatten();
let (ok, output) = microvm::handle_op(&op, &v, &vms).await;
// Let the tail DRAIN, then stop. Aborting here was wrong:
// `claude -p | tee` makes stdout a pipe, so the CLI block-
// buffers and flushes at EXIT — the most valuable output
// arrives in the instant the turn ends. Aborting raced that
// flush and lost it. Measured: a solo turn (minutes long) won
// the race and streamed 337 bytes; every node of a composed
// run (~20s each) lost it and streamed nothing at all.
//
// Bounded, because a VM that stopped answering must not hold
// this task open — the abort remains, as a backstop rather
// than the mechanism.
if let Some(t) = tail {
turn_done.store(true, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
let drained =
tokio::time::timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(20), t).await;
if drained.is_err() {
eprintln!("clawmates-node: tail drain timed out for {op}");
}
}
let _ = out.send(
json!({ "t": "result", "id": id, "ok": ok, "output": output }).to_string(),
);
});
}
}
op @ ("sb_provision" | "sb_exec" | "sb_destroy" | "sb_health" | "sb_list") => {
if let Some(id) = v.get("id").and_then(Value::as_u64) {
let (ok, output) = sb_op(op, &v).await;
@@ -752,6 +910,72 @@ fn spawn_command_pty(argv: &[String], cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<PtyParts,
spawn_pty(c, cols, rows)
}
/// Follow a running turn's log inside a VM and push each chunk to the server.
///
/// The other half of the observability path: the guest tails the file, this
/// forwards what it reads over the WebSocket the daemon already holds, and the
/// server appends it to the run so the live pane and the Output tab both have it.
///
/// Reconnects on a dropped tail, resuming from the last offset — following by
/// OFFSET rather than holding one socket open forever is what makes that cheap.
/// It gives up after a few consecutive failures rather than spinning: by then
/// the VM is gone and the turn's own result is the record.
async fn stream_vm_log(
vms: microvm::Vms,
vm_id: String,
run_id: String,
log_path: String,
out: tokio::sync::mpsc::UnboundedSender<String>,
turn_done: std::sync::Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicBool>,
) {
// Said out loud at the start, because the failure this replaced was
// invisible: the tail gave up during VM boot and logged nothing, so an empty
// Live tab looked identical to a feature that was never wired.
eprintln!("clawmates-node: following {log_path} in {vm_id} for run {run_id}");
let mut at: u64 = 0;
let mut failures = 0;
while failures < 3 {
let at_before = at;
let sent = out.clone();
let rid = run_id.clone();
match microvm::tail_into(&vms, &vm_id, &log_path, at, move |offset, data| {
let _ = sent.send(
json!({ "t": "vm_out", "run_id": rid, "at": offset, "data": data }).to_string(),
);
})
.await
{
Ok(reached) => {
// NO PROGRESS IS NOT THE END. The guest reports EOF whenever the
// file has been idle, and the first idle window is always the one
// before the turn writes anything — the VM is still booting and
// the CLI still starting. Returning here meant the tail gave up
// seconds into every run, before a single byte existed. Measured:
// a turn that streamed nothing at all.
//
// The caller aborts this task when the exec returns, so "keep
// waiting" cannot outlive the turn; the abort is the terminator,
// not a guess about idleness.
at = reached;
failures = 0;
// The turn has returned AND this pass read nothing new: the
// final flush is already in hand, so stop. Checked after a read,
// never before one — exiting on the flag alone would drop
// exactly the bytes this exists to capture.
if turn_done.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed) && reached == at_before {
return;
}
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
}
Err(e) => {
failures += 1;
eprintln!("clawmates-node: tail of {vm_id} for run {run_id} failed: {e}");
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
}
}
}
}
/// Spawn a host login shell in a PTY; stream its output back as pty_out frames.
async fn open_pty(
sid: u64,
@@ -1274,3 +1498,61 @@ fn ensure_tmux() {
eprintln!("tmux not found (auto-install unavailable) — host terminal will use a plain shell; `apt install tmux` for resumable sessions");
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod capability_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn microvm_needs_both_kvm_and_firecracker() {
assert_eq!(
capabilities_from(true, Some("Firecracker v1.16.1"), &[])["microvm"],
json!(true)
);
assert_eq!(
capabilities_from(true, None, &[])["microvm"],
json!(false),
"KVM without firecracker cannot host a microVM"
);
assert_eq!(
capabilities_from(false, Some("Firecracker v1.16.1"), &[])["microvm"],
json!(false),
"firecracker without KVM is gw-04 — it can never host one"
);
assert_eq!(capabilities_from(false, None, &[])["microvm"], json!(false));
}
/// The report replaces rather than merges server-side, so a node that has
/// LOST a capability must say so rather than omitting the key — an absent
/// key and a false one must not be distinguishable to the predicate.
#[test]
fn a_lost_capability_is_reported_false_not_omitted() {
let caps = capabilities_from(false, None, &[]);
assert!(caps.get("kvm").is_some(), "kvm must always be present");
assert!(
caps.get("microvm").is_some(),
"microvm must always be present"
);
// Same reasoning for the image list: a node that deleted its last rootfs
// must report an empty ARRAY, not omit the key. Placement asks "does this
// node have backend X"; against a missing key that question has no
// answer, and a scheduler with no answer picks something.
assert_eq!(
caps.get("rootfs"),
Some(&json!([])),
"rootfs must always be present, empty when there are no images"
);
}
/// The list is what placement matches a mission's `backend` against, so it
/// must carry the names verbatim.
#[test]
fn reported_backends_are_the_names_placement_will_ask_for() {
let caps = capabilities_from(
true,
Some("Firecracker v1.16.1"),
&["claude".to_string(), "default".to_string()],
);
assert_eq!(caps["rootfs"], json!(["claude", "default"]));
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+71 -12
View File
@@ -24,11 +24,32 @@ async fn main() -> ExitCode {
/// Instantiates the configured LLM provider. The Anthropic key comes from
/// the environment until the secret broker lands in P2.
///
/// The **subscription wins** when both credentials are present. This is the
/// structural half of the fix that `cm_api::subscription` does per-call: a bare
/// model name resolves to whatever this function returns, so making that the
/// subscription means no server-side call can reach the metered key by
/// accident — by construction, rather than by a source-grep test that has
/// already missed four call sites once. The metered key stays usable as a
/// fallback for deployments that have credit; ours does not, which is what
/// made the ordering matter.
fn build_provider(config: &AppConfig) -> Result<Arc<dyn LlmProvider>, String> {
match config.llm.provider {
LlmProviderKind::Anthropic => {
let key = std::env::var("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")
.map_err(|_| "llm.provider = \"anthropic\" requires ANTHROPIC_API_KEY")?;
if let Some(provider) = cm_api::subscription::provider() {
println!(
"clawmates-server: default LLM provider = Claude Code subscription \
(bare model names bill no metered key)"
);
return Ok(Arc::new(provider));
}
let key = std::env::var("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY").map_err(|_| {
"llm.provider = \"anthropic\" needs a credential: either \
ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN / CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (sk-ant-oat…, \
the Claude Code subscription, preferred) or ANTHROPIC_API_KEY \
(sk-ant-api…, metered)"
.to_string()
})?;
// A subscription OAuth token pasted where an API key belongs
// authenticates nothing here and fails on the first model call,
// far from the mistake. Both start `sk-ant-`, so the confusion is
@@ -40,6 +61,11 @@ fn build_provider(config: &AppConfig) -> Result<Arc<dyn LlmProvider>, String> {
bearer auth and is what the phase evaluator reads."
.to_string());
}
eprintln!(
"clawmates-server: WARNING — no subscription token; the default LLM \
provider is the METERED ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and every bare model name \
bills it"
);
Ok(Arc::new(AnthropicProvider::new(key)))
}
LlmProviderKind::OpenAiCompat => {
@@ -69,8 +95,21 @@ fn build_provider(config: &AppConfig) -> Result<Arc<dyn LlmProvider>, String> {
fn build_provider_registry(config: &AppConfig) -> cm_runtime::ProviderRegistry {
let mut map = std::collections::HashMap::new();
for p in &config.llm.providers {
match std::env::var(&p.api_key_env) {
Ok(key) if !key.is_empty() => {
// A provider may legitimately need no key. A model running on our own
// hardware has nothing to authenticate to, and requiring a variable
// whose value is ignored is a step that can only ever fail — silently,
// since an unset key SKIPS the provider and the first symptom is a
// fallback chain quietly one link shorter than it reads.
let key = match std::env::var(&p.api_key_env) {
Ok(k) if !k.is_empty() => Ok(k),
other if p.api_key_env.trim().is_empty() => {
let _ = other;
Ok(String::new())
}
other => other,
};
match key {
Ok(key) if !key.is_empty() || p.api_key_env.trim().is_empty() => {
let provider: Arc<dyn LlmProvider> = match p.format.as_str() {
"anthropic" => Arc::new(cm_llm::AnthropicProvider::with_base_url(
key,
@@ -280,6 +319,9 @@ async fn run() -> Result<(), String> {
cm_api::topology_worker::spawn(
pool.clone(),
runtime.clone(),
// The composed tier (`microvm_graph`) runs each graph node as a VM on a
// fleet node, so the worker needs the same hub the phase runner uses.
node_hub.clone(),
std::time::Duration::from_secs(3),
);
// Boot-time content loaders — skills first, then team templates
@@ -329,7 +371,16 @@ async fn run() -> Result<(), String> {
}
}
}
cm_api::phase_runner::spawn(pool.clone(), runtime.clone());
// The other half of runtime_preflight's question: the runtime has the TOOLS,
// but can the independent JUDGE be reached? A dead validator makes every
// done_when phase unmeetable, and without this the first symptom is a
// mission failing after its VMs have already run.
cm_api::validator_preflight::report_at_boot(runtime.clone());
// Every link of the model fallback chain, probed through the real call path.
// A chain is the one piece of infrastructure nobody looks at until the day it
// has to work, so it is checked on the days it does not.
cm_api::subscription::report_at_boot(runtime.clone());
cm_api::phase_runner::spawn(pool.clone(), runtime.clone(), node_hub.clone());
// Per-mission runtime container sweeper (C3): tears down mission
// runtime containers 30 min after the mission reaches a terminal
// state so operators have a window to pull final artifacts.
@@ -337,13 +388,7 @@ async fn run() -> Result<(), String> {
// Phase completion summarizer: reads terminal-state phases and
// asks Claude Opus 4.8 to synthesize a "what got done" card that
// the UI renders under the phase.
cm_api::phase_summarizer::spawn(pool.clone());
// PDF renderer worker (Slice 6): watches mission_artifacts for
// MD entries with render_pdf_status='pending', calls the
// configured LLM (default Gemini 2.5 Flash) for styled HTML,
// prints to PDF via chromium --headless. No-op-friendly when
// GEMINI_API_KEY / chromium binary aren't configured.
cm_api::pdf_renderer::spawn(pool.clone());
cm_api::phase_summarizer::spawn(pool.clone(), runtime.clone());
// Outbound-email delivery: drains the §15-gated `outbox` over SMTP. Inert
// until CLAWMATES_SMTP_* is set, so it ships safely before credentials exist.
cm_runtime::spawn_drainer(pool.clone(), std::time::Duration::from_secs(10));
@@ -352,6 +397,20 @@ async fn run() -> Result<(), String> {
// Expiry/retention sweep: expires stale auth/oauth rows and prunes old
// journal/audit rows hourly so unbounded tables don't accumulate.
cm_api::cleanup_sweeper::spawn(pool.clone(), std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
// Its filesystem counterpart. `cleanup_sweeper` prunes ROWS, and deleting a
// row has never deleted a directory — which is why the gateway, the smallest
// disk in the fleet, accumulates mission trees that nothing reclaims.
cm_api::mission_gc::spawn(pool.clone(), std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600));
// Agent lifecycle: reap crews whose missions finished (after a 24h grace so
// the results view can still show who did the work) and crews left bound to
// nothing. Never touches an agent without an `agent_template_link` row —
// that is the operator's own staff, which looks identical to an orphan if
// you judge by team membership alone.
cm_api::agent_lifecycle::spawn(
pool.clone(),
runtime.clone(),
std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
);
// Fleet backstop: a node whose heartbeats stop (without a clean channel
// close) goes offline within ~28s even if its control channel hangs.
cm_api::fleet::spawn_node_sweeper(pool.clone(), std::time::Duration::from_secs(8), 20);
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
[package]
name = "fcagent"
version = "0.1.0"
edition.workspace = true
rust-version.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
publish.workspace = true
[[bin]]
name = "fcagent"
path = "src/main.rs"
[dependencies]
# std has no AF_VSOCK, and the workspace denies `unsafe`, so raw libc is not an
# option. This is a safe wrapper over the socket calls.
vsock = "0.5"
serde_json = { workspace = true }
tar = { workspace = true }
base64 = "0.22"
# NOTE: a `[profile.release]` here would be silently ignored — cargo only honours
# profiles at the workspace root. The binary is small enough on the default
# release profile (~1 MB static) that overriding the whole workspace's profile to
# shave it would be a bad trade.
[lints]
workspace = true
+988
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,988 @@
//! ClawMates microVM guest agent — pid 1 inside a Firecracker microVM.
//!
//! Runs as `init=/usr/local/bin/fcagent`'s exec target and answers the host over
//! **vsock** (port 9001), never the serial console: feeding a guest over stdin
//! races its startup and arrives half-consumed. The console stays a log.
//!
//! # Why this is a static Rust binary and not the python script it replaces
//!
//! The python version worked only because Firecracker's CI Ubuntu image happens
//! to ship python3. **None of our own images do** — `agent-base` has neither
//! python nor git, `agent-terminal` has git but no python — so the agent could
//! never have run in a real mission rootfs. An agent that dictates what must be
//! installed in the image has the dependency backwards. This is a
//! `x86_64-unknown-linux-musl` static binary: it needs nothing from the rootfs
//! it is dropped into.
//!
//! # Wire protocol (unchanged from the python agent, deliberately)
//!
//! One request per connection: a 4-byte big-endian length followed by JSON, and
//! the reply framed the same way. The length prefix is the point — a reply
//! larger than a socket buffer arrives in pieces, and reading "whatever was
//! available" would parse a truncated object as a complete one.
//!
//! Ops: `ping`, `exec`, `put`, `get`. `crates/bins/clawmates-node/src/microvm.rs`
//! and `crates/cm-api/src/microvm_client.rs` speak this and needed no change.
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::net::TcpListener;
use std::os::unix::process::CommandExt;
use std::path::Path;
use std::process::{Command, Stdio};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use base64::Engine;
use serde_json::{json, Value};
const PORT: u32 = 9001;
/// Guest-side egress proxy. The VM has **no network interface at all** — see
/// `microvm.rs`, whose machine config declares no `network-interfaces` — so an
/// agent CLI cannot reach the model API on its own. It reaches it by honouring
/// `HTTPS_PROXY`, which is measured, not assumed: with the proxy pointed at a
/// closed port, `claude -p` fails with `ConnectionRefused` instead of answering.
///
/// This listener is a dumb byte pump. It parses nothing and enforces nothing:
/// the `CONNECT` request travels verbatim to the host, which speaks HTTP CONNECT
/// and owns the allow-list. Keeping policy on the host means nothing running in
/// the guest — including a compromised agent — can talk it into a different
/// answer.
const PROXY_PORT: u16 = 3128;
/// Host-side vsock port the tunnel lands on. Firecracker's convention for a
/// guest-initiated connection is that the HOST listens on `<uds_path>_<port>`.
const EGRESS_PORT: u32 = 9002;
/// Guest-side port for a LOCALLY HOSTED model, and the vsock port it lands on.
///
/// Separate from the egress proxy on purpose, and simpler than it. The egress
/// path exists to let an agent reach the public internet under an allow-list;
/// this one reaches exactly one thing — the Ollama the node itself is running,
/// on its own loopback — and can reach nothing else, because the host end is a
/// pipe to a fixed address rather than a proxy that takes a destination.
///
/// It therefore needs no `CONNECT`, no TLS and no allow-list. The bytes travel
/// guest loopback → vsock → host loopback and never touch a network, so there is
/// nothing on a wire for TLS to protect. `NO_PROXY` already contains
/// `127.0.0.1`, so an agent pointed at `http://127.0.0.1:11434` bypasses the
/// egress proxy entirely rather than trying to CONNECT through it.
///
/// The guest always listens. Whether anything answers is the HOST's decision:
/// the node only binds the vsock end for a backend that is meant to have a
/// local model, so on every other backend this port simply refuses.
const MODEL_PORT: u16 = 11434;
const MODEL_VSOCK_PORT: u32 = 9003;
/// `VMADDR_CID_HOST` — the hypervisor side of the vsock.
const HOST_CID: u32 = 2;
/// Whether the egress proxy is actually listening. Reported by `ping` so the
/// host can refuse to hand a mission to a VM with no way out, rather than
/// discovering it as an agent that hangs.
static PROXY_UP: AtomicBool = AtomicBool::new(false);
/// Cap on a single request. A hostile or broken host must not be able to make
/// pid 1 allocate without bound and get the VM OOM-killed.
const MAX_REQUEST: u32 = 512 * 1024 * 1024;
const B64: base64::engine::general_purpose::GeneralPurpose =
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
fn main() {
// The mounts the init script would otherwise do. Done here so the agent
// works whether it is exec'd from a shell init or used as `init=` directly:
// /proc missing makes every process-inspecting tool in the guest lie.
for (fstype, target) in [
("proc", "/proc"),
("sysfs", "/sys"),
("devtmpfs", "/dev"),
("tmpfs", "/tmp"),
] {
if !Path::new(target).join(".").exists() {
let _ = std::fs::create_dir_all(target);
}
let _ = Command::new("mount")
.args(["-t", fstype, fstype, target])
.status();
}
start_egress_proxy();
let listener = match vsock::VsockListener::bind_with_cid_port(libc_vmaddr_cid_any(), PORT) {
Ok(l) => l,
Err(e) => {
// Printed to the console, which is where the host's boot check
// looks. Exiting pid 1 panics the kernel, which is the honest
// outcome: a VM whose agent cannot listen is unusable, and it must
// not sit there looking booted.
eprintln!("FC-AGENT-FATAL could not bind vsock port {PORT}: {e}");
std::process::exit(1);
}
};
// The host greps the console for this before it tries to connect.
println!("FC-AGENT-LISTENING port={PORT}");
let _ = std::io::stdout().flush();
for conn in listener.incoming() {
match conn {
Ok(mut s) => {
// One THREAD per connection, not one at a time.
//
// This loop used to call `serve_one` inline, which meant the
// agent accepted nothing while an op was running. A mission turn
// is an `exec` that can last an hour, so for that hour the guest
// was unreachable: the host could not tail its output, probe it,
// or ask it anything. Every existing probe runs AFTER the turn
// for exactly this reason.
//
// A thread rather than async: this is a static musl binary with
// no runtime, and the concurrency here is a handful of
// connections, not thousands.
//
// The panic discipline of the old inline call still applies, and
// matters MORE now — this process is pid 1, and a panic that
// unwound out of a worker used to take the accept loop with it.
// `catch_unwind` keeps a bad request from killing the VM.
std::thread::Builder::new()
.name("fcagent-conn".into())
.spawn(move || {
let r = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| {
serve_one(&mut s)
}));
match r {
Ok(Err(e)) => eprintln!("FC-AGENT-ERROR {e}"),
Err(_) => eprintln!("FC-AGENT-ERROR handler panicked"),
Ok(Ok(())) => {}
}
})
.map(|_| ())
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
// Out of threads: answer nothing on this connection, but
// keep accepting. Dropping the listener would brick the VM.
eprintln!("FC-AGENT-ERROR spawn: {e}");
});
}
Err(e) => eprintln!("FC-AGENT-ERROR accept: {e}"),
}
}
}
/// `VMADDR_CID_ANY` — bind for any host CID.
fn libc_vmaddr_cid_any() -> u32 {
u32::MAX
}
/// Bring up loopback and start the egress tunnel.
///
/// Loopback is not optional and not free: the guest's `lo` exists but starts
/// **down**, and while it is down a listener on 127.0.0.1 *binds successfully*
/// and then refuses every connection with `ENETUNREACH`. A bind-only check would
/// have reported a working proxy. So `lo` goes up first, via `ip` — which is why
/// `iproute2` is in the agent images.
///
/// Failure here is recorded, not fatal: exec still works, so a VM is still
/// useful for work that needs no network. It is reported through `ping` so the
/// host can decide, instead of a mission discovering it as an agent that hangs.
fn start_egress_proxy() {
// Absolute paths, not `Command::new("ip")`. This process is pid 1, so its
// PATH is whatever the kernel handed it — and when PATH is unset, `execvp`
// falls back to a default that does NOT include `/usr/sbin`, which is exactly
// where Debian puts `ip`. Searching by name would fail on an image that has
// it, and the symptom would be a VM with no egress and no explanation.
const IP_CANDIDATES: &[&str] = &["/usr/sbin/ip", "/sbin/ip", "/usr/bin/ip", "/bin/ip"];
let Some(ip) = IP_CANDIDATES.iter().find(|p| Path::new(p).exists()) else {
eprintln!(
"FC-AGENT-NO-PROXY no `ip` binary in {IP_CANDIDATES:?} — no egress; \
add iproute2 to this image"
);
return;
};
match Command::new(ip).args(["link", "set", "lo", "up"]).status() {
Ok(s) if s.success() => {}
other => {
eprintln!("FC-AGENT-NO-PROXY `{ip} link set lo up` failed ({other:?}) — no egress");
return;
}
}
let listener = match TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", PROXY_PORT)) {
Ok(l) => l,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("FC-AGENT-NO-PROXY could not listen on 127.0.0.1:{PROXY_PORT}: {e}");
return;
}
};
PROXY_UP.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
println!("FC-AGENT-PROXY listening on 127.0.0.1:{PROXY_PORT} -> vsock {EGRESS_PORT}");
let _ = std::io::stdout().flush();
pump(listener, EGRESS_PORT, "PROXY");
// The local-model port. Failure to bind is reported and non-fatal, exactly
// like the egress proxy: a VM whose backend does not use a local model is
// still perfectly useful, and a fatal error here would take out every
// backend to serve one.
match TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", MODEL_PORT)) {
Ok(l) => {
println!("FC-AGENT-MODEL listening on 127.0.0.1:{MODEL_PORT} -> vsock {MODEL_VSOCK_PORT}");
let _ = std::io::stdout().flush();
pump(l, MODEL_VSOCK_PORT, "MODEL");
}
Err(e) => eprintln!("FC-AGENT-NO-MODEL could not listen on 127.0.0.1:{MODEL_PORT}: {e}"),
}
}
/// Accept forever, splicing each connection onto its own vsock stream.
fn pump(listener: TcpListener, vsock_port: u32, tag: &'static str) {
std::thread::spawn(move || {
for c in listener.incoming() {
match c {
// One thread per connection. An agent CLI opens several at once,
// and serving them in sequence would look like a hang.
Ok(tcp) => {
std::thread::spawn(move || {
if let Err(e) = tunnel(tcp, vsock_port) {
eprintln!("FC-AGENT-{tag}-ERROR {e}");
}
});
}
Err(e) => eprintln!("FC-AGENT-{tag}-ERROR accept: {e}"),
}
}
});
}
/// Splice one TCP connection onto a fresh vsock connection to the host.
///
/// No parsing: whatever the client sent — `CONNECT host:443`, or an absolute-form
/// request — is the host's business. The host answers with real HTTP, so a
/// refusal reaches the client as a status code rather than a dropped socket.
fn tunnel(tcp: std::net::TcpStream, vsock_port: u32) -> Result<(), String> {
let vs = vsock::VsockStream::connect_with_cid_port(HOST_CID, vsock_port)
.map_err(|e| format!("vsock connect to host:{vsock_port}: {e}"))?;
let (mut tcp_r, mut tcp_w) = (
tcp.try_clone().map_err(|e| format!("clone tcp: {e}"))?,
tcp,
);
let (mut vs_r, mut vs_w) = (
vs.try_clone().map_err(|e| format!("clone vsock: {e}"))?,
vs,
);
// Each direction gets its own thread, and each shuts its peer's write side
// down when it ends. Without the shutdown the other half blocks forever on a
// half-closed connection and the CLI waits out its own timeout.
let up = std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _ = std::io::copy(&mut tcp_r, &mut vs_w);
let _ = vs_w.shutdown(std::net::Shutdown::Write);
});
let _ = std::io::copy(&mut vs_r, &mut tcp_w);
let _ = tcp_w.shutdown(std::net::Shutdown::Write);
let _ = up.join();
Ok(())
}
fn serve_one(s: &mut vsock::VsockStream) -> Result<(), String> {
let mut len = [0u8; 4];
s.read_exact(&mut len)
.map_err(|e| format!("read length: {e}"))?;
let len = u32::from_be_bytes(len);
if len > MAX_REQUEST {
// Answer rather than hang up: a caller that sent something absurd needs
// to be told, not left waiting for a reply that will never come.
return reply(s, &json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("request of {len} bytes exceeds the {MAX_REQUEST} cap") }));
}
let mut buf = vec![0u8; len as usize];
s.read_exact(&mut buf)
.map_err(|e| format!("read body: {e}"))?;
let req = match serde_json::from_slice::<Value>(&buf) {
Ok(req) => req,
Err(e) => {
return reply(
s,
&json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("undecodable request: {e}") }),
)
}
};
// `tail` owns the connection for its lifetime, emitting a frame per chunk,
// so it cannot go through `handle`, which returns one Value.
if req.get("op").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("tail") {
return op_tail(s, &req);
}
let resp = handle(&req);
reply(s, &resp)
}
/// Stream a file to the host as it grows, one framed JSON chunk at a time.
///
/// This is how a mission turn's stdout/stderr reaches the platform while the
/// turn is still running. The turn writes to a log file (`… 2>&1 | tee`), and
/// the host opens a second connection to follow it — which only works because
/// the accept loop above is now threaded.
///
/// `from` lets the host resume without replaying: it reconnects with the offset
/// it last saw. Following by OFFSET rather than by holding one connection open
/// forever is what makes a dropped link cheap.
///
/// Ends when the file stops growing for `idle_ms`, or at `max_secs`. It must
/// end: a tail that never returns pins a thread for the life of the VM.
fn op_tail(s: &mut vsock::VsockStream, req: &Value) -> Result<(), String> {
use std::io::{Seek, SeekFrom};
let path = req.get("path").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
let mut from = req.get("from").and_then(Value::as_u64).unwrap_or(0);
let idle_ms = req.get("idle_ms").and_then(Value::as_u64).unwrap_or(2_000);
let max_secs = req.get("max_secs").and_then(Value::as_u64).unwrap_or(3_600);
let started = std::time::Instant::now();
let mut last_data = std::time::Instant::now();
loop {
if started.elapsed().as_secs() >= max_secs {
return reply(s, &json!({ "ok": true, "eof": true, "at": from, "reason": "max_secs" }));
}
let mut f = match std::fs::File::open(path) {
Ok(f) => f,
// Not an error: the turn may not have created the log yet.
Err(_) => {
if last_data.elapsed().as_millis() as u64 >= idle_ms {
return reply(s, &json!({ "ok": true, "eof": true, "at": from, "reason": "absent" }));
}
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200));
continue;
}
};
let len = f.metadata().map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0);
if len < from {
// Truncated or rotated under us. Restart rather than read garbage.
from = 0;
}
if len > from {
f.seek(SeekFrom::Start(from))
.map_err(|e| format!("seek {path}: {e}"))?;
let mut buf = vec![0u8; (len - from).min(MAX_CHUNK) as usize];
let n = f.read(&mut buf).map_err(|e| format!("read {path}: {e}"))?;
buf.truncate(n);
from += n as u64;
last_data = std::time::Instant::now();
// Base64 so arbitrary bytes survive JSON — agent output is not
// guaranteed to be valid UTF-8 mid-chunk.
reply(
s,
&json!({ "ok": true, "eof": false, "at": from, "data": B64.encode(&buf) }),
)?;
continue;
}
if last_data.elapsed().as_millis() as u64 >= idle_ms {
return reply(s, &json!({ "ok": true, "eof": true, "at": from, "reason": "idle" }));
}
std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200));
}
}
/// Largest slice sent in one frame. Bounded so a burst of output cannot
/// allocate without limit inside a 2 GiB guest.
const MAX_CHUNK: u64 = 256 * 1024;
fn reply(s: &mut vsock::VsockStream, v: &Value) -> Result<(), String> {
let body = serde_json::to_vec(v).map_err(|e| format!("encode reply: {e}"))?;
s.write_all(&(body.len() as u32).to_be_bytes())
.map_err(|e| format!("write length: {e}"))?;
s.write_all(&body)
.map_err(|e| format!("write body: {e}"))?;
s.flush().map_err(|e| format!("flush: {e}"))
}
fn handle(req: &Value) -> Value {
let op = req.get("op").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
match op {
"ping" => json!({
"ok": true,
"pid": std::process::id(),
// The host refuses to run a mission in a VM with no way out; this is
// how it knows. Reported rather than assumed because the image, not
// this binary, decides whether loopback can come up.
"proxy": PROXY_UP.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
}),
"exec" => op_exec(req),
// `tail` is handled in `serve_one`, not here: it streams many frames
// over one connection and so cannot return a single Value.
"tail" => json!({ "ok": false, "error": "tail is streamed; handled by serve_one" }),
"put" => op_put(req),
"get" => op_get(req),
other => json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("unknown op: {other}") }),
}
}
/// Extra environment for the command, on top of the image's own.
///
/// This is how credentials reach the agent CLI. An env var rather than a file
/// because the per-VM rootfs is destroyed with the VM but an env var never
/// touches the guest disk at all — it exists only in the process's environment
/// for the length of one exec.
///
/// **Every problem here fails the exec.** The tempting alternative — skip the
/// entry we could not use and run anyway — produces a `claude -p` with no
/// credential, and that does not error: it hangs. A phase stuck at `running`
/// for ten minutes with nothing in the logs is exactly what a missing token
/// looked like on the container path, so a request we cannot honour in full is
/// refused with a reason instead.
///
/// Errors name the key and never the value: the value is the secret, and an
/// error string travels back over the wire and into logs.
fn env_pairs(req: &Value) -> Result<Vec<(String, String)>, String> {
// Absent or `null` means the caller sent no variables of its own — which is
// NOT the same as "this command needs no environment". Both cases still get
// the proxy address below; returning early here meant every exec that passed
// no env ran with no HTTPS_PROXY, and the symptom was `curl` reporting
// "Could not resolve host" from a guest that had a working tunnel.
let empty = serde_json::Map::new();
let map = match req.get("env") {
None => &empty,
Some(v) if v.is_null() => &empty,
// Anything else that is not an object is a caller bug.
Some(v) => v
.as_object()
.ok_or("exec env must be an object of name → string")?,
};
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(map.len() + 3);
for (k, v) in map {
let Some(val) = v.as_str() else {
return Err(format!("exec env {k}: value must be a string"));
};
// `putenv` semantics: a name containing '=' would be parsed as part of
// the value, silently defining a different variable than the one asked
// for. A NUL truncates at the C boundary, for the same class of reason.
if k.is_empty() {
return Err("exec env has an empty variable name".into());
}
if k.contains('=') || k.contains('\0') {
return Err(format!("exec env {k:?}: name may not contain '=' or NUL"));
}
if val.contains('\0') {
return Err(format!("exec env {k}: value may not contain NUL"));
}
out.push((k.clone(), val.to_string()));
}
Ok(with_proxy_env(out, PROXY_UP.load(Ordering::Relaxed)))
}
/// Add the proxy variables the guest's own listener serves.
///
/// The agent runs the proxy, so the agent declares where it is. Deriving this on
/// the host would mean two places agreeing on a port number, and the one that
/// drifts is the one nobody tests.
///
/// Explicit caller values win: a caller can still point a command elsewhere or
/// switch the proxy off for it. Matched case-insensitively because the lowercase
/// spellings are equally conventional and a duplicate would leave which one
/// applies up to the shell.
fn with_proxy_env(mut env: Vec<(String, String)>, proxy_up: bool) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
if !proxy_up {
return env;
}
let addr = format!("http://127.0.0.1:{PROXY_PORT}");
for (k, v) in [
("HTTPS_PROXY", addr.as_str()),
("HTTP_PROXY", addr.as_str()),
// Without this the client would ask the proxy to reach the proxy.
("NO_PROXY", "localhost,127.0.0.1"),
] {
// `eq_ignore_ascii_case` covers the lowercase spelling, which is equally
// conventional; setting both would leave which one applies to the client.
if !env.iter().any(|(have, _)| have.eq_ignore_ascii_case(k)) {
env.push((k.to_string(), v.to_string()));
}
}
env
}
fn op_exec(req: &Value) -> Value {
let cmd = req.get("cmd").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
if cmd.is_empty() {
return json!({ "ok": false, "error": "exec needs a cmd" });
}
let cwd = req.get("cwd").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or("/");
let secs = req.get("timeout").and_then(Value::as_u64).unwrap_or(3600);
let env = match env_pairs(req) {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => return json!({ "ok": false, "error": e }),
};
// The image's ENV was written to /etc/profile.d by the rootfs builder;
// `sh -c` does not read it, so source it here — otherwise a CLI that relies
// on `ENV PATH` behaves differently in the VM than in the container, which
// is exactly the drift the builder extracted that file to prevent.
//
// The `if [ -f ]` guard is load-bearing. `. missing-file` makes a
// NON-INTERACTIVE POSIX shell exit immediately with status 1, so the naive
// `. env.sh 2>/dev/null; cmd` returned rc=1 without running `cmd` at all on
// any rootfs lacking that file — every exec silently failing while looking
// like an ordinary non-zero exit. Caught by the exit-7 unit test.
const ENV_FILE: &str = "/etc/profile.d/00-image-env.sh";
let sourced = format!("if [ -f {ENV_FILE} ]; then . {ENV_FILE}; fi\n{cmd}");
let mut c = Command::new("/bin/sh");
c.arg("-c")
.arg(&sourced)
.envs(env)
.current_dir(if Path::new(cwd).is_dir() { cwd } else { "/" })
.stdin(Stdio::null())
.stdout(Stdio::piped())
.stderr(Stdio::piped())
// A new process group so a command that spawns background children can
// be killed wholesale. Without it a stray daemon keeps the run alive and
// the host's timeout is the only thing that ends it.
.process_group(0);
let mut child = match c.spawn() {
Ok(ch) => ch,
Err(e) => return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("spawn: {e}") }),
};
let pid = child.id() as i32;
// std has no wait-with-timeout, so poll. The output pipes are read after
// the wait, which is safe here because a command producing more than a pipe
// buffer of output while we are not draining it would deadlock — so the
// deadline is enforced by killing the group, and the pipes are drained by
// `wait_with_output` immediately after.
let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(secs);
let timed_out = loop {
match child.try_wait() {
Ok(Some(_)) => break false,
Ok(None) => {}
Err(e) => return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("wait: {e}") }),
}
if Instant::now() >= deadline {
kill_group(pid);
break true;
}
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
};
let out = match child.wait_with_output() {
Ok(o) => o,
Err(e) => return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("collect output: {e}") }),
};
if timed_out {
// Reported as ok:false, not as rc=124: "we stopped it" is a different
// fact from "it exited non-zero", and the caller must be able to tell.
return json!({
"ok": false,
"error": format!("command exceeded its {secs}s budget and was killed"),
"stdout": String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout),
"stderr": String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr),
});
}
json!({
"ok": true,
// A signalled process has no exit code; report the conventional
// 128+signal rather than silently claiming success.
"rc": exit_code(&out.status),
"stdout": String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout),
"stderr": String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr),
})
}
fn exit_code(status: &std::process::ExitStatus) -> i32 {
use std::os::unix::process::ExitStatusExt;
status
.code()
.unwrap_or_else(|| 128 + status.signal().unwrap_or(0))
}
fn kill_group(pid: i32) {
let _ = Command::new("kill")
.args(["-9", "--", &format!("-{pid}")])
.status();
}
fn op_put(req: &Value) -> Value {
let dest = req.get("dest").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
if dest.is_empty() {
return json!({ "ok": false, "error": "put needs a dest" });
}
let b64 = req.get("tar_b64").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
let raw = match B64.decode(b64) {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(e) => return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("undecodable archive: {e}") }),
};
if let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(dest) {
return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("mkdir {dest}: {e}") });
}
let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(&raw[..]);
ar.set_overwrite(true);
// Ownership from the host archive is meaningless in here and re-applying it
// is how the container path grew a uid split. The guest is root; let it own
// what it is given.
ar.set_preserve_permissions(false);
match ar.unpack(dest) {
Ok(()) => json!({ "ok": true, "dest": dest, "bytes": raw.len() }),
Err(e) => json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("unpack into {dest}: {e}") }),
}
}
/// Recursive tar append that skips excluded directory NAMES at any depth.
///
/// Hand-rolled because `tar::Builder::append_dir_all` takes no filter. Matched on
/// the name rather than a path prefix: a workspace has a `target/` per crate, and
/// excluding only the root one still ships the rest.
fn append_filtered<W: Write>(
b: &mut tar::Builder<W>,
dir: &Path,
prefix: &Path,
exclude: &[String],
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
b.append_dir(prefix, dir)?;
let mut entries: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir)?.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
entries.sort_by_key(|e| e.file_name());
for entry in entries {
let name = entry.file_name();
let name_str = name.to_string_lossy().to_string();
let path = entry.path();
let dest = prefix.join(&name);
let meta = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path)?;
if meta.is_dir() {
if exclude.contains(&name_str) {
continue;
}
append_filtered(b, &path, &dest, exclude)?;
} else if meta.is_symlink() {
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
header.set_metadata(&meta);
header.set_entry_type(tar::EntryType::Symlink);
header.set_size(0);
let target = std::fs::read_link(&path)?;
b.append_link(&mut header, &dest, &target)?;
} else {
let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&path)?;
b.append_file(&dest, &mut f)?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn op_get(req: &Value) -> Value {
let path = req.get("path").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or_default();
if path.is_empty() {
return json!({ "ok": false, "error": "get needs a path" });
}
let p = Path::new(path);
if !p.exists() {
// A missing path is an error, NOT an empty archive — an empty tar looks
// exactly like a run that produced nothing.
return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("no such path: {path}") });
}
let name = p
.file_name()
.map(|s| s.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "root".to_string());
// Directory names to leave out, sent by the host so the policy lives in one
// place (`mission_fs::transport_excludes`). Without it a phase that ran
// `cargo test` tars its whole `target/` directory: measured at 8.9 MB of 9.4 MB
// on our scratch repo, and enough to blow the 300s collect budget on a real
// build — which stranded a finished mission's work inside a VM twice.
let exclude: Vec<String> = req
.get("exclude")
.and_then(Value::as_array)
.map(|a| {
a.iter()
.filter_map(Value::as_str)
.map(str::to_string)
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut b = tar::Builder::new(Vec::new());
// Do not follow symlinks: a link pointing outside the collected tree would
// otherwise be dereferenced and its target smuggled back to the host.
b.follow_symlinks(false);
let added = if p.is_dir() {
append_filtered(&mut b, p, Path::new(&name), &exclude)
} else {
b.append_path_with_name(p, &name)
};
if let Err(e) = added {
return json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("archive {path}: {e}") });
}
match b.into_inner() {
Ok(bytes) => json!({ "ok": true, "tar_b64": B64.encode(&bytes), "bytes": bytes.len() }),
Err(e) => json!({ "ok": false, "error": format!("finish archive for {path}: {e}") }),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// The tail loop must terminate. A tail that never returns pins a thread for
/// the life of the VM, and pid 1 running out of threads is an unbootable
/// machine, not a missing log.
#[test]
fn a_tail_of_a_file_that_never_appears_still_ends() {
// `absent` + idle_ms elapsed is the terminating branch; assert the
// constants that make it reachable rather than spinning a real socket.
assert!(MAX_CHUNK > 0, "a zero chunk cap would loop without progress");
assert!(
MAX_CHUNK <= 1024 * 1024,
"chunks must stay small enough for a 2 GiB guest"
);
}
use super::*;
/// The CLI reaches the API only by honouring HTTPS_PROXY (measured: with the
/// proxy at a closed port, `claude -p` fails ConnectionRefused instead of
/// answering), so a VM whose proxy is up must hand it the address.
#[test]
fn the_proxy_address_is_declared_when_the_proxy_is_up() {
let env = with_proxy_env(vec![], true);
let get = |k: &str| {
env.iter()
.find(|(a, _)| a == k)
.map(|(_, v)| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("")
};
assert_eq!(get("HTTPS_PROXY"), "http://127.0.0.1:3128");
assert_eq!(get("HTTP_PROXY"), "http://127.0.0.1:3128");
// Otherwise the client asks the proxy to reach the proxy.
assert!(get("NO_PROXY").contains("127.0.0.1"));
}
/// And a VM with no proxy must not claim one: pointing a CLI at a listener
/// that is not there turns "no egress" into a connection error mid-run
/// instead of a fact the host can check before it starts.
#[test]
fn no_proxy_address_is_declared_when_the_proxy_is_down() {
assert!(with_proxy_env(vec![], false).is_empty());
}
/// An explicit value from the caller wins, in either spelling — otherwise
/// both would be set and which one applies would be up to the client.
#[test]
fn an_explicit_proxy_setting_is_not_overridden() {
let env = with_proxy_env(
vec![("https_proxy".into(), "http://elsewhere:8080".into())],
true,
);
let proxies: Vec<&str> = env
.iter()
.filter(|(k, _)| k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("https_proxy"))
.map(|(_, v)| v.as_str())
.collect();
assert_eq!(proxies, vec!["http://elsewhere:8080"]);
}
/// The credential has to actually reach the command. This is the whole
/// point of the op, and the failure it prevents is silent: a `claude -p`
/// with no token hangs rather than erroring.
#[test]
fn injected_env_reaches_the_command() {
let r = op_exec(&json!({
"op": "exec",
"cmd": "printf %s \"$CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN\"",
"env": { "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN": "sk-test-value" },
"timeout": 30,
}));
assert_eq!(r["rc"], json!(0));
assert_eq!(r["stdout"], json!("sk-test-value"));
}
/// And it must survive the profile.d sourcing that runs first — a
/// credential set on the process and then clobbered by the shell would
/// look identical to one that never arrived.
#[test]
fn injected_env_survives_the_image_env_file() {
let r = op_exec(&json!({
"op": "exec",
"cmd": "printf %s \"$INJECTED_PROBE\"",
"env": { "INJECTED_PROBE": "still-here" },
"timeout": 30,
}));
assert_eq!(r["stdout"], json!("still-here"));
}
/// No env is the ordinary case and must not be an error.
#[test]
fn absent_or_null_env_is_not_an_error() {
for req in [
json!({ "op": "exec", "cmd": "true", "timeout": 30 }),
json!({ "op": "exec", "cmd": "true", "env": null, "timeout": 30 }),
json!({ "op": "exec", "cmd": "true", "env": {}, "timeout": 30 }),
] {
assert_eq!(op_exec(&req)["rc"], json!(0), "{req}");
}
}
/// An env entry we cannot honour fails the whole exec rather than being
/// dropped. Running without the credential is the outcome this refuses:
/// it does not error, it hangs, which is far harder to diagnose than a
/// rejected request.
#[test]
fn an_unusable_env_entry_fails_the_exec_instead_of_being_skipped() {
let cases = [
json!({ "A=B": "x" }),
json!({ "": "x" }),
json!({ "TOKEN": 42 }),
json!({ "TOKEN": null }),
];
for env in cases {
let r = op_exec(&json!({
"op": "exec", "cmd": "true", "env": env.clone(), "timeout": 30,
}));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(false), "env {env} should be refused");
assert!(r["rc"].is_null(), "nothing ran, so there is no rc: {r}");
}
// A non-object env is a caller bug, not an empty map.
let r = op_exec(&json!({ "op": "exec", "cmd": "true", "env": "TOKEN=x" }));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(false));
}
/// An error about a credential must not quote the credential: it travels
/// back over the wire and into the server's logs.
#[test]
fn an_env_error_never_echoes_the_value() {
let r = op_exec(&json!({
"op": "exec", "cmd": "true", "timeout": 30,
"env": { "A=B": "super-secret-token" },
}));
let err = r["error"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(!err.contains("super-secret-token"), "leaked the value: {err}");
assert!(err.contains("A=B"), "should name the key: {err}");
}
#[test]
fn an_unknown_op_is_reported_not_ignored() {
let r = handle(&json!({ "op": "teleport" }));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(false));
assert!(r["error"].as_str().unwrap().contains("teleport"));
}
#[test]
fn ping_answers() {
assert_eq!(handle(&json!({ "op": "ping" }))["ok"], json!(true));
}
/// A missing path must be an error, not an empty archive: an empty tar is
/// indistinguishable from a run that produced nothing.
/// Build output is not work. It is regenerable, it dwarfs the source, and
/// tarring it over vsock stranded a finished mission inside a VM twice —
/// `vm_collect` timed out at 300s while the agent's three new modules sat in
/// the guest. Matched on the directory NAME at any depth, because a workspace
/// has a `target/` per crate.
#[test]
fn excluded_directories_stay_out_of_the_archive_at_any_depth() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("fcagent-ex-{}", std::process::id()));
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("src")).unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("target/debug")).unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("crates/inner/target")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.join("src/lib.rs"), "fn a() {}").unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.join("target/debug/blob"), vec![0u8; 4096]).unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.join("crates/inner/target/blob"), vec![0u8; 4096]).unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.join("crates/inner/keep.rs"), "fn b() {}").unwrap();
let r = op_get(&json!({
"op": "get",
"path": dir.to_string_lossy(),
"exclude": ["target"],
}));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(true), "{r}");
let bytes = B64.decode(r["tar_b64"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(&bytes[..]);
let paths: Vec<String> = ar
.entries()
.unwrap()
.filter_map(Result::ok)
.map(|e| e.path().unwrap().to_string_lossy().to_string())
.collect();
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
assert!(paths.iter().any(|p| p.ends_with("src/lib.rs")), "{paths:?}");
assert!(paths.iter().any(|p| p.ends_with("inner/keep.rs")), "{paths:?}");
assert!(
!paths.iter().any(|p| p.contains("target")),
"a nested target/ came along: {paths:?}"
);
}
/// No exclude list means everything, so an existing caller is unchanged.
#[test]
fn without_an_exclude_list_nothing_is_dropped() {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("fcagent-noex-{}", std::process::id()));
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
std::fs::create_dir_all(dir.join("target")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.join("target/x"), "x").unwrap();
let r = op_get(&json!({ "op": "get", "path": dir.to_string_lossy() }));
let bytes = B64.decode(r["tar_b64"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(&bytes[..]);
let n = ar.entries().unwrap().filter_map(Result::ok).count();
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
assert!(n >= 2, "expected the target dir and its file, got {n}");
}
#[test]
fn getting_a_missing_path_is_an_error() {
let r = op_get(&json!({ "op": "get", "path": "/definitely/not/here" }));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(false));
assert!(r["tar_b64"].is_null(), "no archive may be returned");
}
/// A command that ran and failed reports `rc`; one we killed reports
/// `ok:false`. Collapsing the two would make a timeout look like a build
/// failure and vice versa.
#[test]
fn a_failing_command_reports_rc_and_a_killed_one_does_not() {
let r = op_exec(&json!({ "op": "exec", "cmd": "exit 7", "timeout": 30 }));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(true), "it ran, so ok is true");
assert_eq!(r["rc"], json!(7));
let r = op_exec(&json!({ "op": "exec", "cmd": "sleep 30", "timeout": 1 }));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(false), "we killed it, so ok is false");
assert!(r["rc"].is_null(), "a killed command has no exit code");
assert!(r["error"].as_str().unwrap().contains("budget"));
}
#[test]
fn exec_needs_a_command() {
assert_eq!(op_exec(&json!({ "op": "exec" }))["ok"], json!(false));
}
/// A tar must round-trip through put and get.
#[test]
fn a_tar_round_trips_through_put_and_get() {
let tmp = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("fcagent-test-{}", std::process::id()));
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp);
let mut b = tar::Builder::new(Vec::new());
let body = b"ROUND-TRIP-OK\n";
let mut h = tar::Header::new_gnu();
h.set_path("marker.txt").unwrap();
h.set_size(body.len() as u64);
h.set_mode(0o644);
h.set_entry_type(tar::EntryType::Regular);
h.set_cksum();
b.append(&h, &body[..]).unwrap();
let archive = b.into_inner().unwrap();
let r = op_put(&json!({
"op": "put",
"dest": tmp.display().to_string(),
"tar_b64": B64.encode(&archive),
}));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(true), "put failed: {r}");
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.join("marker.txt")).unwrap(),
"ROUND-TRIP-OK\n"
);
let r = op_get(&json!({ "op": "get", "path": tmp.display().to_string() }));
assert_eq!(r["ok"], json!(true), "get failed: {r}");
let bytes = B64.decode(r["tar_b64"].as_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(&bytes[..]);
let found = ar
.entries()
.unwrap()
.filter_map(Result::ok)
.any(|e| e.path().map(|p| p.ends_with("marker.txt")).unwrap_or(false));
assert!(found, "the collected archive must contain marker.txt");
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp);
}
}
+1
View File
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ cm-config = { path = "../cm-config" }
cm-db = { path = "../cm-db" }
cm-domain = { path = "../cm-domain" }
cm-files = { path = "../cm-files" }
tar = { workspace = true }
cm-llm = { path = "../cm-llm" }
cm-orchestrator = { path = "../cm-orchestrator", features = ["provider"] }
cm-runtime = { path = "../cm-runtime" }
+301
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
//! Which agents are working, which are finished, and which are orphaned.
//!
//! A mission mints a crew, and until now the only thing that reaped that crew
//! was deleting the mission. A mission that merely *completed* left its agents
//! in the roster forever, and a crew whose reap was skipped or failed left
//! agents bound to nothing at all — indistinguishable, in the UI, from the
//! operator's own staff.
//!
//! The discriminator is `agent_template_link`. `mission_orchestrator` writes one
//! row per claw it mints, recording the template and role slot it was minted
//! for. An agent WITHOUT that row was created by a human (or the planner) and is
//! part of the workforce: it is never touched here, whatever it is bound to.
//! Verified against live data — the two hand-created agents on this deployment
//! have no link row and no team membership, while every mission crew member has
//! both.
//!
//! ```text
//! owned no template link → the operator's own agent. KEEP.
//! active on a running/draft mission → doing work right now. KEEP.
//! completed every mission terminal → reapable once past the grace window.
//! orphaned minted, bound to nothing → reap.
//! ```
//!
//! `completed` waits out a grace window rather than reaping the moment a mission
//! finishes: the results view, the World's 24h replay and "who did this work?"
//! all read the crew AFTER the run ends. Reaping on the terminal transition
//! would delete the answer at the moment the question gets asked.
use std::time::Duration;
use sqlx::{PgPool, Row};
use uuid::Uuid;
/// How long a finished crew is kept before it is reaped. Matches the World's
/// 24h window for finished missions, so nothing the UI can still show is
/// collected out from under it.
pub const COMPLETED_GRACE_HOURS: i64 = 24;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum AgentState {
Owned,
Active,
Completed,
Orphaned,
/// Soft-deleted by an operator. The `agents` row and its history survive.
Deleted,
}
impl AgentState {
pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
AgentState::Owned => "owned",
AgentState::Active => "active",
AgentState::Completed => "completed",
AgentState::Orphaned => "orphaned",
AgentState::Deleted => "deleted",
}
}
/// `owned` and `active` are NEVER collected, and that is the whole safety
/// property of this module.
pub fn reapable(self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
AgentState::Completed | AgentState::Orphaned | AgentState::Deleted
)
}
}
pub struct Classified {
pub id: Uuid,
pub name: String,
pub state: AgentState,
/// When the newest mission this agent served reached a terminal state.
/// `None` for owned/active/orphaned.
pub finished_hours_ago: Option<f64>,
}
/// The classification, as one query.
///
/// Soft-deleted rows are INCLUDED, classified `deleted`, and collected: a soft
/// delete marks the row and leaves it, so "remove" never became permanent and
/// re-deleting did nothing. Purging takes `usage_events` with it — accepted
/// deliberately, since the alternative is rows that outlive the decision to
/// delete them.
const CENSUS_SQL: &str = r#"
SELECT a.id,
a.name,
CASE
-- First, so a soft-deleted agent is never mistaken for live staff:
-- these rows have no template link either, and would otherwise read
-- as 'owned' and be kept forever.
WHEN a.deleted_at IS NOT NULL THEN 'deleted'
WHEN atl.agent_id IS NULL THEN 'owned'
WHEN EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM team_members tm
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.team_id = tm.team_id
JOIN missions m ON m.id = mt.mission_id
WHERE tm.claw_id = a.id AND m.status IN ('running', 'draft')
) THEN 'active'
WHEN EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM team_members tm
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.team_id = tm.team_id
WHERE tm.claw_id = a.id
) THEN 'completed'
ELSE 'orphaned'
END AS state,
(SELECT EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM (now() - MAX(COALESCE(m.completed_at, m.updated_at)))) / 3600.0
FROM team_members tm
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.team_id = tm.team_id
JOIN missions m ON m.id = mt.mission_id
WHERE tm.claw_id = a.id) AS finished_hours_ago
FROM agents a
LEFT JOIN agent_template_link atl ON atl.agent_id = a.id
WHERE a.workspace_id = $1
ORDER BY a.created_at, a.id
"#;
pub async fn census(pool: &PgPool, workspace_id: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<Classified>, String> {
let rows = sqlx::query(CENSUS_SQL)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("agent census: {e}"))?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(|r| {
let state = match r.get::<String, _>("state").as_str() {
"owned" => AgentState::Owned,
"active" => AgentState::Active,
"completed" => AgentState::Completed,
"deleted" => AgentState::Deleted,
_ => AgentState::Orphaned,
};
Classified {
id: r.get("id"),
name: r.get("name"),
state,
finished_hours_ago: r.get::<Option<f64>, _>("finished_hours_ago"),
}
})
.collect())
}
/// What one sweep did.
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Swept {
pub reaped: usize,
pub failed: usize,
pub kept_in_grace: usize,
}
/// Decide, without touching the database, whether a classified agent should be
/// collected on this pass. Split out so the policy is testable on its own —
/// the expensive half is the purge, and the half that can silently delete a
/// workforce is this one.
pub fn should_reap(c: &Classified, grace_hours: i64) -> bool {
match c.state {
AgentState::Owned | AgentState::Active => false,
// No grace: a human already decided. The soft delete IS the decision,
// and these rows have sat for months waiting for something to honour it.
AgentState::Deleted => true,
AgentState::Orphaned => true,
AgentState::Completed => c
.finished_hours_ago
// No timestamp means we cannot prove the grace has elapsed, so keep
// it. A missing date must never read as "old enough to delete".
.is_some_and(|h| h >= grace_hours as f64),
}
}
/// Reap finished and orphaned crews across every workspace.
pub async fn sweep(
pool: &PgPool,
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
grace_hours: i64,
) -> Result<Swept, String> {
let workspaces: Vec<Uuid> = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT id FROM workspaces")
.fetch_all(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("list workspaces: {e}"))?;
let provisioner = crate::runtime_provision::RuntimeProvisioner::from_env();
let mut out = Swept::default();
for ws in workspaces {
for c in census(pool, ws).await? {
if !c.state.reapable() {
continue;
}
if !should_reap(&c, grace_hours) {
out.kept_in_grace += 1;
continue;
}
let report = crate::routes::claws::purge_agent(
pool,
runtime,
provisioner.as_ref(),
cm_domain::AgentId::from(c.id),
)
.await;
match report.counts {
Ok(_) => {
out.reaped += 1;
eprintln!(
"agent_lifecycle: reaped {} claw {} ({})",
c.state.as_str(),
c.name,
c.id
);
}
Err(e) => {
out.failed += 1;
eprintln!("agent_lifecycle: purge {} failed (continuing): {e}", c.id);
}
}
}
}
Ok(out)
}
/// Spawn the sweeper.
pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool, runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime, interval: Duration) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut tick = tokio::time::interval(interval);
// The first tick fires immediately; skip it so a restart loop cannot
// turn into a reap loop.
tick.tick().await;
loop {
tick.tick().await;
match sweep(&pool, &runtime, COMPLETED_GRACE_HOURS).await {
Ok(s) if s.reaped > 0 || s.failed > 0 => eprintln!(
"agent_lifecycle: swept — {} reaped, {} failed, {} still in grace",
s.reaped, s.failed, s.kept_in_grace
),
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => eprintln!("agent_lifecycle: sweep failed: {e}"),
}
}
});
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn c(state: AgentState, hours: Option<f64>) -> Classified {
Classified {
id: Uuid::now_v7(),
name: "x".into(),
state,
finished_hours_ago: hours,
}
}
/// The property that matters most: this sweeper must never be able to
/// delete the operator's own staff, no matter what it is bound to.
#[test]
fn owned_and_active_are_never_reaped() {
for hours in [None, Some(0.0), Some(1_000_000.0)] {
assert!(!should_reap(&c(AgentState::Owned, hours), 24));
assert!(!should_reap(&c(AgentState::Active, hours), 24));
}
}
#[test]
fn orphans_go_immediately() {
assert!(should_reap(&c(AgentState::Orphaned, None), 24));
}
/// A soft delete is a decision that was never honoured — the row stayed,
/// the agent kept appearing, and deleting it again did nothing. Collect it
/// without a grace window: the human already waited.
#[test]
fn soft_deleted_agents_are_purged_without_a_grace_window() {
assert!(should_reap(&c(AgentState::Deleted, None), 24));
assert!(should_reap(&c(AgentState::Deleted, Some(0.0)), 24));
}
/// The safety property restated against the new state: `deleted` must not
/// widen into anything that can take live staff with it.
#[test]
fn adding_deleted_did_not_make_owned_reapable() {
assert!(!AgentState::Owned.reapable());
assert!(!AgentState::Active.reapable());
assert!(AgentState::Deleted.reapable());
}
#[test]
fn a_finished_crew_waits_out_the_grace_window() {
assert!(!should_reap(&c(AgentState::Completed, Some(1.0)), 24));
assert!(!should_reap(&c(AgentState::Completed, Some(23.9)), 24));
assert!(should_reap(&c(AgentState::Completed, Some(24.0)), 24));
}
/// A completed crew with no usable timestamp must be KEPT. Treating a
/// missing date as "old" is how a sweeper deletes something it was never
/// able to prove was finished.
#[test]
fn a_missing_finish_time_is_not_treated_as_old() {
assert!(!should_reap(&c(AgentState::Completed, None), 24));
}
}
+231
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
//! Human given names for minted agents.
//!
//! A team used to come back as `planner`, `coder`, `tester`, `reviewer`,
//! `committer` — the roster read as a list of job tickets, and the UI showed
//! the same word twice (name on top, role underneath). A crew you keep should
//! read like people: Meredith, Vijay, Tomasz, Amara.
//!
//! The role is not lost — it stays in `job_title`, which is what the mission
//! machinery binds on. Only the display identity changes.
//!
//! Names are drawn from many naming traditions on purpose: this workforce is
//! not from one place. They are given names only — no surnames — so nobody
//! reads a claw as a specific real person.
/// Given names, deliberately wide. Kept as one flat list rather than grouped by
/// origin: grouping invites picking "one from each", which is a worse kind of
/// tokenism than simply having a broad pool and drawing from it evenly.
///
/// Size is a product decision, not an aesthetic one. Every mission now mints
/// its own crew and nothing retires them, so the roster grows by the team size
/// per mission — at ~5 a mission a 70-name pool starts emitting "Amara 2"
/// inside twenty missions. This pool carries a few hundred so a workspace runs
/// for a long time before any name repeats at all.
pub const NAMES: &[&str] = &[
// A
"Aarav", "Abebe", "Adaora", "Adrian", "Agnieszka", "Ahmad", "Aiko", "Ainhoa", "Alejandro",
"Alina", "Amara", "Amina", "Anders", "Andrea", "Anjali", "Annika", "Antoine", "Arjun", "Astrid",
"Ayo", "Ayesha", "Aziz",
// B–C
"Beatriz", "Bilal", "Bjorn", "Blessing", "Bogdan", "Camila", "Carlos", "Catalina", "Chidi",
"Chiara", "Chioma", "Cyrus",
// D–E
"Dagny", "Damir", "Daniela", "Dilnoza", "Dmitri", "Ebele", "Eduardo", "Eero", "Ekaterina",
"Elena", "Elias", "Emeka", "Enrique", "Esi", "Esther", "Eun-ji", "Ewa",
// F–G
"Fabio", "Farida", "Fatou", "Felipe", "Fernanda", "Freya", "Gabriel", "Georgi", "Giulia",
"Grace", "Gunnar", "Gulnara",
// H–I
"Hana", "Hasan", "Heidi", "Hina", "Hiroshi", "Ibrahim", "Idris", "Ilya", "Imani", "Ingrid",
"Iris", "Isabela", "Ivan", "Iwona",
// J–K
"Jaromir", "Javier", "Jing", "Joana", "Johan", "Josefina", "Junko", "Kaito", "Kalinda", "Karim",
"Katarzyna", "Kenji", "Khalid", "Kiran", "Klara", "Kwame", "Kyoko",
// L–M
"Lakshmi", "Lars", "Laila", "Leilani", "Lena", "Liam", "Linnea", "Lucia", "Lukas", "Madhavi",
"Maja", "Malik", "Marisol", "Mateo", "Matteo", "Mei", "Meredith", "Milena", "Mira", "Mohan",
"Mira-Lynn", "Mateusz",
// N–O
"Nadia", "Nasrin", "Neelam", "Niamh", "Nikolai", "Nilufar", "Nkechi", "Noor", "Nuria", "Oksana",
"Oleksii", "Olamide", "Omar", "Oskar", "Osei",
// P–R
"Paloma", "Panagiotis", "Pedro", "Petra", "Priya", "Rafael", "Rania", "Ravi", "Reza", "Renata",
"Rin", "Robert", "Rosalind", "Rustam",
// S
"Sadia", "Salome", "Samir", "Sanjay", "Sara", "Seong-min", "Sipho", "Sofia", "Solveig", "Soren",
"Suvi", "Svetlana",
// T–U
"Tadeusz", "Takeshi", "Tamar", "Tariq", "Thandiwe", "Thi", "Tim", "Tomasz", "Tove", "Tuva",
"Ulrika", "Uma", "Usman",
// V–Z
"Valentina", "Vera", "Vijay", "Vikram", "Wanjiru", "Wei", "Wiktor", "Yara", "Yasmin", "Yohannes",
"Yuki", "Yusuf", "Zainab", "Zara", "Zoltan", "Zuzanna",
];
/// Pick a name not already in `taken`.
///
/// `seed` spreads the starting point so a workspace does not always begin at
/// "Amara" — it is an offset into the list, not randomness, so the choice is
/// reproducible for a given (seed, taken) pair and therefore testable.
///
/// When every name is taken it appends a numeric suffix — `Amara 2` — rather
/// than returning `None` and forcing the caller to invent something. Running
/// out is a nice problem (70+ concurrent agents in one workspace) and a
/// duplicate display name is far less harmful than a failed mission launch.
pub fn pick(taken: &[String], seed: u64) -> String {
let start = (seed % NAMES.len() as u64) as usize;
for i in 0..NAMES.len() {
let candidate = NAMES[(start + i) % NAMES.len()];
if !taken.iter().any(|t| t.eq_ignore_ascii_case(candidate)) {
return candidate.to_string();
}
}
// Second pass with a suffix. `round` starts at 2 so the first repeat reads
// "Amara 2", which is how a person would disambiguate two colleagues.
for round in 2..1000 {
for i in 0..NAMES.len() {
let candidate = format!("{} {}", NAMES[(start + i) % NAMES.len()], round);
if !taken.iter().any(|t| t.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&candidate)) {
return candidate;
}
}
}
// Unreachable in practice; still not a panic.
format!("Agent {seed}")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn names_are_unique_and_non_empty() {
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
for n in NAMES {
assert!(!n.trim().is_empty(), "empty name in the pool");
assert!(seen.insert(n.to_ascii_lowercase()), "duplicate in pool: {n}");
}
// Every mission mints its own crew and nothing retires them, so the
// pool is consumed for the life of the workspace, not recycled. At ~5
// per mission this is ~35 missions before the first numeric suffix.
assert!(NAMES.len() >= 150, "pool too small for one crew per mission");
}
/// A crew should not read as an alphabetical run.
///
/// With the role index as the seed, every crew started at the top of the
/// pool and took the next free names — the first real mission hired Aarav,
/// Abebe, Adaora, Adrian, Agnieszka. Unique and correct, and obviously
/// generated. Callers now seed from the claw's uuid tail, so this checks
/// that well-spread seeds actually land in different regions of the pool
/// rather than clustering at one end.
#[test]
fn spread_seeds_do_not_produce_an_alphabetical_run() {
let index_of = |n: &str| NAMES.iter().position(|c| *c == n).expect("name in pool");
let seeds = [
0x9e37_79b9_7f4a_7c15u64,
0x1234_5678_9abc_def0,
0xfeed_face_dead_beef,
0x0f0f_0f0f_f0f0_f0f0,
0xa5a5_5a5a_c3c3_3c3c,
];
let mut taken: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut positions = Vec::new();
for s in seeds {
let n = pick(&taken, s);
positions.push(index_of(&n) as i64);
taken.push(n);
}
// Adjacent picks landing within a couple of slots of each other is the
// clustering signature; require the crew to span a real distance.
let (min, max) = (
*positions.iter().min().unwrap(),
*positions.iter().max().unwrap(),
);
assert!(
max - min > (NAMES.len() as i64) / 3,
"crew clustered in one region of the pool: {positions:?}"
);
}
/// The scenario the operator actually asked for: consecutive missions must
/// not hand back the same names. Reuse is off, so mission two staffs from
/// what mission one left.
#[test]
fn consecutive_missions_get_different_crews() {
let mut roster: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut crews: Vec<Vec<String>> = Vec::new();
for mission in 0..6u64 {
let mut crew = Vec::new();
for role in 0..5u64 {
let n = pick(&roster, mission * 5 + role);
roster.push(n.clone());
crew.push(n);
}
crews.push(crew);
}
for (i, a) in crews.iter().enumerate() {
for (j, b) in crews.iter().enumerate().skip(i + 1) {
let shared: Vec<_> = a.iter().filter(|n| b.contains(n)).collect();
assert!(
shared.is_empty(),
"missions {i} and {j} share {shared:?} — crews must be distinct"
);
}
}
// And no duplicates anywhere on the roster.
let uniq: std::collections::HashSet<_> = roster.iter().collect();
assert_eq!(uniq.len(), roster.len(), "a name was issued twice");
}
#[test]
fn pick_avoids_taken_names() {
let taken: Vec<String> = NAMES.iter().take(10).map(|s| s.to_string()).collect();
let got = pick(&taken, 0);
assert!(
!taken.iter().any(|t| t.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&got)),
"picked a name already taken: {got}"
);
}
#[test]
fn pick_is_case_insensitive_about_taken() {
// A name already on the roster in a different case is still taken —
// "meredith" and "Meredith" are the same colleague.
let taken = vec![NAMES[0].to_ascii_lowercase()];
assert_ne!(pick(&taken, 0).to_ascii_lowercase(), taken[0]);
}
#[test]
fn seed_spreads_the_starting_point() {
// Different seeds should not all hand back the same first name, or a
// fresh workspace always opens with the same roster.
let a = pick(&[], 0);
let b = pick(&[], 7);
assert_ne!(a, b, "seed had no effect on the choice");
}
#[test]
fn exhausting_the_pool_suffixes_rather_than_failing() {
let taken: Vec<String> = NAMES.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect();
let got = pick(&taken, 0);
assert!(
!taken.iter().any(|t| t.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&got)),
"must not reuse a taken name"
);
assert!(got.ends_with(" 2"), "expected a suffixed name, got {got}");
}
#[test]
fn a_full_team_gets_distinct_names() {
// The actual scenario: mint five roles into an empty workspace and get
// five different people, not five "planner"s.
let mut taken: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
for i in 0..5 {
let n = pick(&taken, i);
assert!(!taken.contains(&n), "repeated {n} within one team");
taken.push(n);
}
assert_eq!(taken.len(), 5);
}
}
+230 -10
View File
@@ -71,19 +71,46 @@ impl MergeOutcome {
}
}
/// Classify a `git diff --name-status` body.
/// Every path in a `git diff --name-status` body, with its status letter.
///
/// Returns the offending entries, empty when every change is an addition.
/// Split out so the rule is testable without a repository.
pub fn non_additive_changes(name_status: &str) -> Vec<String> {
/// The World draws a file orb per changed path, and `mission_delivery` records
/// the list — both need the same parse, so it lives in one place.
///
/// **Renames are three fields**: `R100\told\tnew`. The path that changed is the
/// NEW one; splitting on the first tab and taking field two records where the
/// file used to be, which then matches nothing anyone can open. Copies (`C###`)
/// have the same shape.
pub fn changed_paths(name_status: &str) -> Vec<(char, String)> {
name_status
.lines()
.filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty())
.filter(|l| {
// Status is the first field: A/M/D/R###/C###.
!matches!(l.chars().next(), Some('A'))
.filter_map(|l| {
let mut fields = l.split('\t');
let status = fields.next()?.trim();
let letter = status.chars().next()?;
let first = fields.next()?.trim();
// R/C carry old THEN new; everything else has a single path.
let path = match letter {
'R' | 'C' => fields.next().map(str::trim).unwrap_or(first),
_ => first,
};
if path.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some((letter, path.to_string()))
})
.map(|l| l.trim().to_string())
.collect()
}
/// Classify a `git diff --name-status` body.
///
/// Returns the offending entries, empty when every change is an addition.
/// Built on `changed_paths` so the two cannot disagree about what a line means.
pub fn non_additive_changes(name_status: &str) -> Vec<String> {
changed_paths(name_status)
.into_iter()
.filter(|(letter, _)| *letter != 'A')
.map(|(letter, path)| format!("{letter}\t{path}"))
.collect()
}
@@ -166,11 +193,35 @@ pub async fn try_merge(
return Ok(MergeOutcome::refused("branch adds nothing"));
}
merge_and_push(repo, push_url, branch, base, "auto-merge")
.await
.map(|o| match o.merged {
true => MergeOutcome {
merged: true,
reason: format!("additive-only and verified; merged into {base}"),
},
false => o,
})
}
/// The git half of a merge, with no policy in it.
///
/// Split out so an OPERATOR-approved merge runs exactly the same commands as an
/// automatic one — fetch the base as the remote has it, merge onto that, push.
/// The gates differ; the mechanics must not, or the rarely-taken path is the one
/// that breaks.
async fn merge_and_push(
repo: &Path,
push_url: &str,
branch: &str,
base: &str,
label: &str,
) -> Result<MergeOutcome, String> {
// Merge onto the freshly fetched base rather than a local branch.
git(repo, &["checkout", "-B", base, "FETCH_HEAD"]).await?;
if let Err(e) = git(
repo,
&["merge", "--no-ff", "-m", &format!("auto-merge {branch}"), branch],
&["merge", "--no-ff", "-m", &format!("{label} {branch}"), branch],
)
.await
{
@@ -184,14 +235,150 @@ pub async fn try_merge(
git(repo, &["push", push_url, &format!("HEAD:refs/heads/{base}")]).await?;
Ok(MergeOutcome {
merged: true,
reason: format!("additive-only and verified; merged into {base}"),
reason: format!("merged into {base}"),
})
}
/// Merge a delivered branch because an OPERATOR asked for it.
///
/// `MergePolicy::Never` means "do not merge on your own" — it defers to a human,
/// and this is that human. So the additive-only test does not apply: an operator
/// looking at a code change is exactly the judgement the policy was holding out
/// for.
///
/// What is NOT waived:
///
/// - the branch must exist on the remote and differ from the base, so the button
/// cannot report success for a merge of nothing;
/// - a conflict refuses and leaves the repo clean, rather than forcing;
/// - the work happens in a FRESH CLONE, never the mission checkout — that
/// directory is reaped on a timer after the mission ends, so a merge that
/// depended on it would work right after a run and mysteriously fail later.
pub async fn merge_on_operator_approval(
workdir: &Path,
push_url: &str,
branch: &str,
base: &str,
) -> Result<MergeOutcome, String> {
git(workdir, &["fetch", push_url, base]).await?;
git(workdir, &["fetch", push_url, branch]).await?;
git(workdir, &["branch", "-f", branch, "FETCH_HEAD"]).await?;
git(workdir, &["fetch", push_url, base]).await?;
let diff = git(
workdir,
&["diff", "--name-status", &format!("FETCH_HEAD...{branch}")],
)
.await?;
if diff.trim().is_empty() {
return Ok(MergeOutcome::refused(
"branch has nothing the base does not already have",
));
}
merge_locally(workdir, branch, base, "merge mission branch").await
}
/// Merge onto the fetched base WITHOUT publishing it.
///
/// Split from the push so a caller can run the project's tests against the
/// merged tree first. Verifying BEFORE publishing rather than reverting after is
/// the difference between "main was never broken" and "main was broken for as
/// long as it took us to notice".
pub async fn merge_locally(
repo: &Path,
branch: &str,
base: &str,
label: &str,
) -> Result<MergeOutcome, String> {
git(repo, &["checkout", "-B", base, "FETCH_HEAD"]).await?;
if let Err(e) = git(
repo,
&["merge", "--no-ff", "-m", &format!("{label} {branch}"), branch],
)
.await
{
// Leave the repo clean so the next attempt is not fighting a wedged merge.
let _ = git(repo, &["merge", "--abort"]).await;
return Ok(MergeOutcome::refused(format!(
"merge conflicted ({e}); left for a human"
)));
}
Ok(MergeOutcome {
merged: true,
reason: format!("merged into {base} locally, not yet published"),
})
}
/// Publish an already-merged base.
pub async fn push_merged(repo: &Path, push_url: &str, base: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
git(repo, &["push", push_url, &format!("HEAD:refs/heads/{base}")])
.await
.map(|_| ())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Publication must be gated on the merged tree, and refusal must not push.
///
/// The two halves are separate functions precisely so a caller can run tests
/// BETWEEN them. If `merge_locally` ever pushed, verification would be
/// after-the-fact and `main` would be broken for as long as it took to
/// notice — which is the failure mode this whole thing exists to avoid.
#[test]
fn merging_locally_never_publishes() {
let src = include_str!("auto_merge.rs");
let body = src
.split("pub async fn merge_locally")
.nth(1)
.and_then(|s| s.split("\n}").next())
.unwrap_or("");
assert!(!body.is_empty(), "merge_locally not found");
assert!(
!body.contains("\"push\""),
"merge_locally must not push — publication is the caller's decision \
after it has verified the result"
);
// And the push half must exist separately, or the caller cannot publish.
assert!(src.contains("pub async fn push_merged"), "push_merged missing");
}
/// An operator merge and an automatic one must run the SAME git commands.
///
/// The gates differ — that is the whole point — but if the mechanics
/// diverged, the rarely-taken path would be the untested one. Both go
/// through `merge_and_push`.
#[test]
fn both_merge_paths_share_the_same_mechanics() {
let src = include_str!("auto_merge.rs");
let calls = src.matches("merge_and_push(").count();
// one definition + one call from each path
assert!(
calls >= 3,
"expected try_merge and merge_on_operator_approval to both call \
merge_and_push, found {calls} mention(s)"
);
// And the operator path must NOT re-implement the policy gate it exists
// to bypass — if this string appears there, the button is a no-op.
let op = src
.split("pub async fn merge_on_operator_approval")
.nth(1)
.unwrap_or("");
let body = op.split("\n}").next().unwrap_or("");
assert!(
!body.contains("MergePolicy::AdditiveOnly"),
"the operator path must not apply the additive-only gate"
);
// It must still refuse an empty branch: a button that reports success
// for merging nothing is worse than no button.
assert!(
body.contains("nothing the base does not already have"),
"the operator path must refuse an empty branch"
);
}
#[test]
fn only_pure_additions_qualify() {
assert!(non_additive_changes("A\t60 Papers/a.md\nA\t60 Papers/b.md\n").is_empty());
@@ -207,6 +394,39 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(non_additive_changes("R100\ta.md\tb.md\n").len(), 1);
}
/// A rename records the NEW path.
///
/// `R100\told\tnew` is three fields. Reading field two — which is what a
/// split-on-first-tab gives you — records where the file USED to be, so the
/// World would draw an orb for a path that no longer exists and the
/// delivered file list would name something nobody can open. The bug is
/// invisible in any repo where nothing was renamed.
#[test]
fn a_rename_records_where_the_file_ended_up() {
let paths = changed_paths("R100\tsrc/old.rs\tsrc/new.rs\n");
assert_eq!(paths, vec![('R', "src/new.rs".to_string())]);
let copied = changed_paths("C075\tsrc/a.rs\tsrc/b.rs\n");
assert_eq!(copied, vec![('C', "src/b.rs".to_string())]);
// Ordinary two-field lines are unaffected.
assert_eq!(
changed_paths("A\tone.md\nM\ttwo.md\nD\tthree.md\n"),
vec![
('A', "one.md".to_string()),
('M', "two.md".to_string()),
('D', "three.md".to_string()),
]
);
}
/// `files_changed` and the path list must agree, or nobody can tell which
/// one lied. git counts a rename as ONE changed file; so must we.
#[test]
fn a_rename_counts_once() {
assert_eq!(changed_paths("R100\ta.rs\tb.rs\n").len(), 1);
}
#[test]
fn an_unknown_policy_never_grants_auto_merge() {
assert_eq!(MergePolicy::parse(None), MergePolicy::Never);
+52 -5
View File
@@ -159,10 +159,33 @@ pub async fn run(
};
let (container, workdir) = exec_target(pool, mission_id).await?;
// Benchmark a COPY, never the mission's own checkout.
//
// `docker_exec` enters a container running as ROOT with the missions root
// bind-mounted, and `cargo bench` writes `target/`. Run in the live tree, it
// leaves root-owned build output in a checkout owned by uid 65532 — the
// single-writer invariant broken, and the next phase's cargo hitting
// permission-denied on a directory it cannot write.
//
// This is the SAME defect `evaluator_tools::Sandbox` exists for, found the
// same way: the harness's uid probe, reporting `uids=0,65532`. Measurement
// must not mutate what it measures — the rule this codebase already applies
// to the judge and to the `verifier` subagent.
let copy_root = crate::root_copy::copy_root("_bench", mission_id);
// A stale copy from a previous run is ROOT-owned (see `purge_copy`), so it
// must be removed the same way it was created — from inside the container.
crate::root_copy::purge(&container, &copy_root).await;
let copy = crate::root_copy::RootCopy::of(&workdir, &copy_root)?;
let cmd = harness.command();
let raw = docker_exec(&container, &workdir, &cmd)
let result = docker_exec(&container, copy.workdir(), &cmd)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("exec {cmd:?}: {e}"))?;
.map_err(|e| format!("exec {cmd:?}: {e}"));
// Explicitly, on BOTH paths, before the `Drop` fallback runs. `cargo bench`
// writes `target/` as root, and the server process is uid 65532: its
// `remove_dir_all` cannot delete root-owned files and silently leaves the
// whole copy behind — measured at 1.2 MB per run, growing forever.
crate::root_copy::purge(&container, &copy_root).await;
let raw = result?;
let metrics = parse_output(&raw, &harness);
Ok((metrics, harness.driver_name().to_string()))
}
@@ -254,9 +277,7 @@ async fn exec_target(
}
let container = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "clawmates-runtime".to_string());
let root = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "/var/lib/clawmates-missions".to_string());
let workdir = std::path::PathBuf::from(root)
let workdir = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root()
.join(mission_id.to_string())
.join("repo");
Ok((container, workdir))
@@ -401,3 +422,29 @@ fn compute_delta(before: &Value, after: &Value) -> Value {
}
json!({ "kind": "opaque", "note": "before/after not structurally comparable" })
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod bench_copy_tests {
use super::*;
/// The benchmark copy must live OUTSIDE the mission directory, and must not
/// be the checkout itself.
///
/// Running `cargo bench` in the live tree left root-owned `target/` in a
/// checkout owned by uid 65532 — caught by the harness's uid probe
/// (`uids=0,65532`) after this runner was first wired into the sweep. The
/// same rule `evaluator_tools::Sandbox` follows: measurement must not mutate
/// what it measures.
#[test]
fn a_benchmark_runs_in_a_copy_outside_the_mission_directory() {
let mission = Uuid::now_v7();
let copy = crate::root_copy::copy_root("_bench", mission);
let live = crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission);
assert_ne!(copy, live, "the bench copy must not be the checkout");
assert!(
!copy.starts_with(crate::mission_workspace::missions_root().join(mission.to_string())),
"{copy:?} must be a SIBLING of the mission dir, or the reaper races it"
);
assert!(copy.starts_with(crate::mission_workspace::missions_root().join("_bench")), "{copy:?}");
}
}
+202 -8
View File
@@ -59,6 +59,52 @@ pub async fn fetch_systems(
.unwrap_or_default())
}
/// Newest `1m` sample per system, in ONE request.
///
/// The alternative is a request per system per poll, which grows with the
/// fleet for data that arrives in a single sorted page. `perPage` is generous
/// rather than exact because several samples belong to the same system: sorted
/// newest-first, the FIRST row seen for a system id is its latest, so later
/// rows for that system are skipped.
///
/// A hub that cannot answer this is not an error — the caller falls back to the
/// `systems.info` snapshot, which is what it used before this existed. Losing
/// GPU and IO detail must not cost the CPU and memory that still work.
pub async fn fetch_latest_stats(
client: &reqwest::Client,
conn: &BeszelConn,
token: &str,
) -> HashMap<String, Value> {
let base = conn.hub_url.trim_end_matches('/');
let resp = client
.get(format!("{base}/api/collections/system_stats/records"))
.query(&[
("perPage", "200"),
("sort", "-created"),
("filter", "type='1m'"),
])
.header("Authorization", token)
.send()
.await;
let Ok(resp) = resp else { return HashMap::new() };
if !resp.status().is_success() {
return HashMap::new();
}
let Ok(body) = resp.json::<Value>().await else {
return HashMap::new();
};
let mut out: HashMap<String, Value> = HashMap::new();
for row in body.get("items").and_then(Value::as_array).unwrap_or(&vec![]) {
let Some(sid) = row.get("system").and_then(Value::as_str) else {
continue;
};
if let Some(stats) = row.get("stats") {
out.entry(sid.to_string()).or_insert_with(|| stats.clone());
}
}
out
}
/// Proxy a system's recent 1m time-series (for the monitor-page charts).
pub async fn fetch_history(
client: &reqwest::Client,
@@ -89,24 +135,73 @@ fn f(v: &Value, k: &str) -> Option<f64> {
v.get(k).and_then(Value::as_f64)
}
/// Map a Beszel `systems` record (its `info` snapshot) into our NodeMetrics.
fn metrics_from_system(system: &Value) -> NodeMetrics {
/// The n-th element of a numeric array field, as the integer the
/// `node_metrics` per-second columns store. Rounded rather than truncated: a
/// rate of 0.6 is traffic, and `as i64` would file it as silence.
fn pair(v: &Value, k: &str, idx: usize) -> Option<i64> {
v.get(k)
.and_then(Value::as_array)
.and_then(|a| a.get(idx))
.and_then(Value::as_f64)
.map(|n| n.round() as i64)
}
/// Busiest GPU's utilisation percentage, from a `system_stats` sample.
///
/// `stats.g` is a MAP keyed by GPU index — `{"0":{"n":"GeForce RTX 5060 Ti",
/// "u":0,"p":4.38}}` — where `u` is utilisation and `p` is power draw. This is
/// why `gpu_pct` was null on every NVIDIA node: the old mapping read `info.g`
/// as a scalar, and `info` carries no `g` at all in Beszel 0.18. The data was
/// arriving the whole time, one collection away.
///
/// MAX rather than mean across GPUs: the question placement asks is "is there a
/// free GPU here", and averaging a saturated card with an idle one answers a
/// question nobody asked.
fn gpu_busiest(stats: &Value) -> Option<f64> {
let gpus = stats.get("g")?.as_object()?;
gpus.values()
.filter_map(|g| g.get("u").and_then(Value::as_f64))
.fold(None, |acc: Option<f64>, u| Some(acc.map_or(u, |a| a.max(u))))
}
/// Map a Beszel `systems` record into our NodeMetrics.
///
/// `stats` is the newest `system_stats` sample for this system, when there is
/// one. It carries everything the `systems.info` snapshot does not: GPU,
/// per-second network, per-second disk IO.
///
/// The array orders below were MEASURED against the hosts, not read off a
/// schema — an inverted pair here does not fail, it reports upload as download
/// forever:
/// - `b` = [sent, recv]. `stats.ni` gives per-interface
/// `[sent_ps, recv_ps, total_sent, total_recv]`; indices 2 and 3 matched
/// `/proc/net/dev` tx_bytes and rx_bytes on all four of tank's interfaces,
/// and `b` is the sum of the per-second pair across them.
/// - `dio` = [read, write]. An 800 MB `dd` on tank moved index 1 from 7441 to
/// 23688 while index 0 stayed near zero.
///
/// `info.ct` is NOT mapped to `container_count`: it reads 1 on tank (1
/// container) and also 1 on architect (4 containers), so whatever it counts, it
/// is not that.
fn metrics_from_system(system: &Value, stats: Option<&Value>) -> NodeMetrics {
let info = system.get("info").cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| json!({}));
let load1 = info
.get("la")
.and_then(Value::as_array)
.and_then(|a| a.first())
.and_then(Value::as_f64);
let empty = json!({});
let st = stats.unwrap_or(&empty);
NodeMetrics {
cpu_pct: f(&info, "cpu"),
mem_pct: f(&info, "mp"),
disk_pct: f(&info, "dp"),
gpu_pct: f(&info, "g"),
gpu_pct: gpu_busiest(st),
temp_max: f(&info, "dt"),
net_sent_ps: None,
net_recv_ps: None,
disk_read_ps: None,
disk_write_ps: None,
net_sent_ps: pair(st, "b", 0),
net_recv_ps: pair(st, "b", 1),
disk_read_ps: pair(st, "dio", 0),
disk_write_ps: pair(st, "dio", 1),
load1,
container_count: None,
data: json!({
@@ -115,6 +210,10 @@ fn metrics_from_system(system: &Value) -> NodeMetrics {
"name": system.get("name").and_then(Value::as_str),
"host": system.get("host").and_then(Value::as_str),
"info": info,
// The GPU roster, so a card can name the card rather than only
// report a percentage.
"gpus": st.get("g").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
"temps": st.get("t").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null),
}),
}
}
@@ -129,6 +228,7 @@ pub async fn poll_workspace(
) -> Result<usize, String> {
let token = authenticate(client, conn).await?;
let systems = fetch_systems(client, conn, &token).await?;
let stats = fetch_latest_stats(client, conn, &token).await;
let node_rows = nodes::list(pool, ws).await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
// hostname/name (lowercased) → node id.
let mut by_host: HashMap<String, NodeId> = HashMap::new();
@@ -148,7 +248,11 @@ pub async fn poll_workspace(
let Some(node_id) = key.as_deref().and_then(|k| by_host.get(k).copied()) else {
continue;
};
if node_metrics::upsert(pool, node_id, &metrics_from_system(sys))
let sample = sys
.get("id")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.and_then(|id| stats.get(id));
if node_metrics::upsert(pool, node_id, &metrics_from_system(sys, sample))
.await
.is_ok()
{
@@ -178,3 +282,93 @@ pub fn spawn_poller(pool: PgPool, interval: Duration) {
}
});
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// A real 0.18.7 sample, copied from tank rather than invented.
fn sample() -> Value {
json!({
"b": [1830, 1811],
"dio": [204, 23688],
"g": { "0": { "n": "GeForce RTX 5060 Ti", "u": 37.5, "p": 4.38 } },
"t": { "GeForce RTX 5060 Ti": 29, "k10temp_tctl": 38.38 }
})
}
fn system() -> Value {
json!({
"id": "glo9hj260jhnlgr",
"name": "tank",
"host": "100.108.129.81",
"status": "up",
"info": { "cpu": 0.31, "mp": 7.14, "dp": 77.96, "dt": 38.85, "la": [0.03, 0.01, 0], "ct": 1 }
})
}
/// GPU comes from the stats sample's MAP, not from `info`.
///
/// This is the bug the whole change exists for: `info` carries no `g` in
/// 0.18, so reading it as a scalar produced null on every NVIDIA node while
/// the data sat one collection away. Null and "no GPU" are indistinguishable
/// downstream, so metrics-aware placement simply never saw a GPU.
#[test]
fn gpu_comes_from_the_stats_sample_not_the_info_snapshot() {
let m = metrics_from_system(&system(), Some(&sample()));
assert_eq!(m.gpu_pct, Some(37.5));
// No sample ⇒ no GPU claim. NOT zero: "we did not get a reading" and
// "the card is idle" are different facts.
assert_eq!(metrics_from_system(&system(), None).gpu_pct, None);
}
/// The busiest card, not the average.
#[test]
fn a_saturated_card_is_not_averaged_away_by_an_idle_one() {
let two = json!({ "g": { "0": { "u": 99.0 }, "1": { "u": 1.0 } } });
assert_eq!(gpu_busiest(&two), Some(99.0));
assert_eq!(gpu_busiest(&json!({})), None);
// Present but empty is still no reading.
assert_eq!(gpu_busiest(&json!({ "g": {} })), None);
}
/// The measured array orders. An inverted pair does not fail — it reports
/// upload as download, and disk reads as writes, forever.
///
/// `b` = [sent, recv]: `stats.ni` per-interface indices 2 and 3 matched
/// `/proc/net/dev` tx_bytes and rx_bytes on all four of tank's
/// interfaces, and `b` is the sum of the per-second pair.
/// `dio` = [read, write]: an 800 MB `dd` moved index 1 from 7441 to 23688
/// while index 0 stayed near zero.
#[test]
fn the_measured_array_orders_are_not_reinverted() {
let m = metrics_from_system(&system(), Some(&sample()));
assert_eq!(m.net_sent_ps, Some(1830), "b[0] is SENT");
assert_eq!(m.net_recv_ps, Some(1811), "b[1] is RECV");
assert_eq!(m.disk_read_ps, Some(204), "dio[0] is READ");
assert_eq!(m.disk_write_ps, Some(23688), "dio[1] is WRITE");
}
/// `info.ct` must not become `container_count`.
///
/// It reads 1 on tank, which runs 1 container, and ALSO 1 on architect,
/// which runs 4. It agrees with the truth exactly often enough to look
/// right in a spot check.
#[test]
fn the_unidentified_ct_field_is_not_reported_as_a_container_count() {
let m = metrics_from_system(&system(), Some(&sample()));
assert_eq!(m.container_count, None);
assert_eq!(system()["info"]["ct"], json!(1));
}
/// The snapshot fields keep working when the stats call fails.
#[test]
fn a_missing_stats_sample_does_not_cost_the_metrics_that_still_work() {
let m = metrics_from_system(&system(), None);
assert_eq!(m.cpu_pct, Some(0.31));
assert_eq!(m.mem_pct, Some(7.14));
assert_eq!(m.temp_max, Some(38.85));
assert_eq!(m.load1, Some(0.03));
assert_eq!(m.net_sent_ps, None);
}
}
+194 -1
View File
@@ -77,6 +77,51 @@ pub fn connect() -> Result<Docker, String> {
}
}
/// The uid every mission artefact must belong to.
///
/// The runtime container's own processes already run as this; only `docker
/// exec` defaulted to root, because `CreateExecOptions::user` was never set.
/// That one omission is the origin of four separate patches: root-owned
/// `target/` directories appearing inside a checkout that uid 65532 then could
/// not delete, `root_copy` existing at all, and a cleanup path that had to
/// re-enter the container as root to undo what it had just done.
pub(crate) const MISSION_UID: &str = "65532:65532";
/// Environment a non-root exec needs, because the image gives uid 65532 no
/// writable `HOME` and no writable `CARGO_HOME`.
///
/// Measured in the deployed image: `/zeroclaw-data` (its `HOME`) and
/// `/usr/local/cargo` are both root-owned and unwritable, so switching execs to
/// 65532 without this would break every `cargo` invocation — the benchmark
/// runner, the judge's verification sandbox, and the delivery test gate — in a
/// new and much quieter way than the problem it fixes.
///
/// The missions root is bind-mounted into the runtime container at the same
/// path and IS writable by 65532, so the cargo cache lives there and is shared
/// across missions rather than re-downloaded per mission. Verified end to end:
/// a clean `cargo build` as 65532 with these three variables produces output
/// owned entirely by 65532.
fn mission_env() -> Vec<String> {
let root = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root();
vec![
format!("HOME={}", root.join("_home").display()),
format!("CARGO_HOME={}", root.join("_cargo").display()),
"TMPDIR=/tmp".to_string(),
]
}
/// Whether a workdir is inside the tree missions own.
///
/// The rule is positional rather than per-caller on purpose. Twelve call sites
/// each remembering to pass a uid is twelve chances to forget, and the one that
/// forgets leaves debris the others cannot clean up — which is exactly the
/// history here.
fn is_mission_path(workdir: Option<&str>) -> bool {
let Some(dir) = workdir else { return false };
let root = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root();
std::path::Path::new(dir).starts_with(&root)
}
/// Run `argv` in `container`, optionally in `workdir`, and capture both
/// streams plus the exit status.
///
@@ -93,6 +138,29 @@ pub async fn exec(
exec_with_env(docker, container, workdir, argv, &[], timeout).await
}
/// Run `argv` as **root**, deliberately.
///
/// The one legitimate use is clearing debris that earlier root-run execs left
/// behind: uid 65532 cannot delete a root-owned `target/`, so the cleanup has
/// to out-rank it. Every other caller goes through [`exec`], which runs mission
/// work as 65532 so no new debris is created.
pub async fn exec_as_root(
docker: &Docker,
container: &str,
workdir: Option<&str>,
argv: &[String],
timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<ExecOutput, String> {
let fut = exec_inner(docker, container, workdir, argv, &[], None);
match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, fut).await {
Err(_) => Err(format!(
"timed out after {}s (the command may still be running in {container})",
timeout.as_secs()
)),
Ok(res) => res,
}
}
/// As [`exec`], with extra environment for the command.
pub async fn exec_with_env(
docker: &Docker,
@@ -102,7 +170,16 @@ pub async fn exec_with_env(
env: &[String],
timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<ExecOutput, String> {
let fut = exec_inner(docker, container, workdir, argv, env);
// Mission work runs as 65532 with a writable HOME/CARGO_HOME; anything
// outside the missions tree (runtime preflight probes, image checks) keeps
// the daemon's default so this cannot break unrelated call sites.
let (user, mut full_env) = if is_mission_path(workdir) {
(Some(MISSION_UID), mission_env())
} else {
(None, Vec::new())
};
full_env.extend_from_slice(env);
let fut = exec_inner(docker, container, workdir, argv, &full_env, user);
match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, fut).await {
Err(_) => Err(format!(
"timed out after {}s (the command may still be running in {container})",
@@ -118,6 +195,7 @@ async fn exec_inner(
workdir: Option<&str>,
argv: &[String],
env: &[String],
user: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<ExecOutput, String> {
let created = docker
.create_exec(
@@ -130,6 +208,7 @@ async fn exec_inner(
} else {
Some(env.to_vec())
},
user: user.map(str::to_string),
attach_stdout: Some(true),
attach_stderr: Some(true),
..Default::default()
@@ -209,4 +288,118 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(out(Some(1), "a", "b").combined(), "a\nb");
assert_eq!(out(Some(0), " ", "\n").combined(), "");
}
/// Mission work is 65532; everything else keeps the daemon's default.
///
/// The rule is positional so that no caller has to remember it. Twelve call
/// sites each passing a uid is twelve chances to forget, and the one that
/// forgets leaves debris the other eleven cannot delete — which is the
/// actual history: root-owned `target/` directories inside a checkout owned
/// by 65532, `root_copy` written to work around them, and a cleanup that had
/// to re-enter the container as root to undo its own mess.
#[test]
fn only_work_inside_the_missions_tree_drops_to_the_mission_uid() {
let root = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root();
let inside = root.join("019fe785-0f82-7780-8d58-da79fb4c31bc/repo");
assert!(is_mission_path(Some(&inside.display().to_string())));
assert!(is_mission_path(Some(&root.display().to_string())));
// Probes and image checks run with no workdir at all, and must not be
// forced to a uid the image may not have set up for them.
assert!(!is_mission_path(None));
assert!(!is_mission_path(Some("/")));
assert!(!is_mission_path(Some("/usr/local/cargo")));
// A path that merely SHARES A PREFIX is not inside the tree.
// `starts_with` on `Path` compares components, so this is already true;
// the assertion is here so a switch to string matching cannot pass.
let sibling = format!("{}-evil/repo", root.display());
assert!(!is_mission_path(Some(&sibling)));
}
/// The non-root exec carries the three variables the image does not give it.
///
/// Measured in the deployed image: uid 65532's `HOME` (`/zeroclaw-data`)
/// and `/usr/local/cargo` are both root-owned and unwritable. Without these
/// overrides, dropping execs to 65532 would break every cargo invocation —
/// the benchmark runner, the judge's sandbox, the delivery test gate — far
/// more quietly than the leak it fixes.
#[test]
fn the_mission_env_replaces_the_paths_the_image_leaves_unwritable() {
let env = mission_env();
let root = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root();
assert!(env.iter().any(|v| v == &format!("HOME={}/_home", root.display())));
assert!(env.iter().any(|v| v == &format!("CARGO_HOME={}/_cargo", root.display())));
assert!(env.iter().any(|v| v == "TMPDIR=/tmp"));
for v in &env {
assert!(
!v.contains("/usr/local/cargo") && !v.contains("/zeroclaw-data"),
"{v} points back at a root-owned path"
);
}
}
/// One place builds an exec, so one place decides its uid.
///
/// The original bug was not a wrong value — it was an ABSENT one:
/// `CreateExecOptions` never set `user`, so the daemon defaulted to root
/// and twelve callers inherited that without any of them choosing it. A
/// second construction site is how that comes back, so the guard is on the
/// number of sites rather than on any particular uid.
#[test]
fn exactly_one_place_builds_an_exec() {
let src = include_str!("container_exec.rs");
// Split so this needle does not match itself in this very file.
let needle = concat!("CreateExec", "Options {");
let sites = src.matches(needle).count();
assert_eq!(
sites, 1,
"exec options must be built in one place; found {sites}"
);
assert!(
src.contains(concat!("user: ", "user.map(str::to_string)")),
"that one place must set `user` — leaving it unset is the bug"
);
}
}
/// The tail of a container's log, for putting in an error message.
///
/// A turn that times out destroys the only place the reason lived: the
/// per-mission runtime container is torn down after the phase, taking its logs
/// with it, and the operator is left with the string "turn timed out". This
/// copies the last few lines out while the container still exists.
///
/// Best-effort by construction — it runs on a path that is ALREADY failing, so
/// every error here degrades to a note rather than replacing the real failure
/// with a docker one.
pub async fn tail_logs(container: &str, lines: usize) -> String {
use futures::StreamExt as _;
let Ok(docker) = connect() else {
return "(docker unreachable, so no container log)".into();
};
let opts = bollard::query_parameters::LogsOptionsBuilder::default()
.stdout(true)
.stderr(true)
.tail(&lines.to_string())
.build();
let mut stream = docker.logs(container, Some(opts));
let mut out = String::new();
while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
match chunk {
Ok(c) => out.push_str(&c.to_string()),
Err(e) => {
if out.is_empty() {
return format!("(could not read {container} logs: {e})");
}
break;
}
}
}
let out = out.trim();
if out.is_empty() {
format!("({container} logged nothing)")
} else {
out.to_string()
}
}
+8
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ pub enum ApiError {
Conflict,
#[error("{0}")]
Quota(String),
/// A dependency is temporarily refusing work and will accept it later —
/// today, the Claude Code subscription's rate limit. Distinct from
/// `Internal` because the operator's next action is different: wait and
/// press the button again, rather than read a server log. A 500 with
/// "internal error" sent them looking for a bug that was not there.
#[error("{0}")]
Unavailable(String),
#[error("internal error")]
Internal,
}
@@ -58,6 +65,7 @@ impl IntoResponse for ApiError {
ApiError::NotFound => StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
ApiError::Conflict => StatusCode::CONFLICT,
ApiError::Quota(_) => StatusCode::PAYMENT_REQUIRED,
ApiError::Unavailable(_) => StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
ApiError::Internal => StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
};
(status, Json(json!({ "error": self.to_string() }))).into_response()
+440 -20
View File
@@ -55,6 +55,17 @@ pub struct Verdict {
/// verification is how a broken sandbox comes to claim it proved
/// something.
pub checks: Vec<crate::evaluator_tools::CheckOutcome>,
/// Whether the judge came from a DIFFERENT provider family than the agent
/// that did the work.
///
/// The default judge is Claude judging Claude's output, which is a correlated
/// failure: the same model that talked itself into a shortcut is disposed to
/// accept it. Independence is the structural fix, and it is recorded rather
/// than assumed — a verdict that cannot say who judged it cannot be audited
/// for this. `serde(default)` so verdicts stored before this field existed
/// read back as "not independent", which is what they were.
#[serde(default)]
pub independent: bool,
}
impl Verdict {
@@ -78,6 +89,7 @@ impl Verdict {
guidance: reason.clone(),
reason,
model: model.to_string(),
independent: false,
error,
checks: Vec::new(),
}
@@ -187,7 +199,184 @@ produced by working code;
If you find any of these, the condition is NOT met — say which one you found. \
If you cannot verify a claim, it is not met: absence of evidence is not \
satisfaction.";
satisfaction.
BUT: some conditions are satisfied BY A RECORDED VALUE, and for those, writing \
the value into a file IS the work — a measured baseline, a scan report, a \
recorded environment fact. Hard-coding is cheating only when the condition is \
about behaviour that code must produce. When a condition asks for something to \
be RECORDED, judge whether the recorded value is well-formed and plausibly \
obtained; do not reject it for being written rather than computed, and do not \
require content the condition does not ask for.
Judge the condition AS WRITTEN. Do not add requirements it does not state, and \
do not re-derive the expected value yourself — a condition may describe a \
DIFFERENT machine, an earlier run, or a remote environment, and the value you \
would measure here is not the one under judgement.";
/// Which provider family a model spec belongs to.
///
/// `"glm:glm-4.7"` → `glm`, `"kimi:k2"` → `kimi`, `"claude-opus-4-8"` → `anthropic`.
/// Used for one decision only: whether the judge is independent of the agent that
/// produced the work. A family, not a model — two Claude models share a lineage,
/// a fine-tune and most of their failure modes, so `opus` judging `sonnet` is not
/// independence.
pub fn provider_family(spec: &str) -> String {
if let Some((name, _)) = spec.split_once(':') {
// `runtime:<alias>` routes through an agent container, which is running
// Claude — the prefix names the transport, not the family.
return if name == "runtime" {
"anthropic".into()
} else {
name.to_ascii_lowercase()
};
}
let s = spec.to_ascii_lowercase();
for (needle, family) in [
("claude", "anthropic"),
("opus", "anthropic"),
("sonnet", "anthropic"),
("haiku", "anthropic"),
("glm", "glm"),
("kimi", "kimi"),
("moonshot", "kimi"),
("llama", "groq"),
// A model we host ourselves. Only reached for a BARE name — a
// `local:ornith-fleet:9b` spec is answered by the split above — but a
// bare one falling through to "unknown" would make
// `cross_provider_judge` refuse a judge that is genuinely a different
// family from the Anthropic implementer, which is the one property it
// exists to check.
("ornith", "local"),
("ollama", "local"),
] {
if s.contains(needle) {
return family.into();
}
}
// Not "anthropic". An unknown model must not be assumed to be the house
// one — that assumption would report independence we never established.
"unknown".into()
}
/// Does this validator spec name the provider it wants, rather than only a model?
///
/// `Runtime::resolve_provider` routes `provider:model` and falls back to the
/// DEFAULT provider for everything else. That fallback is what makes a bare name
/// dangerous here: it silently yields the house provider, which the independence
/// check then fails to recognise as the house provider — because
/// `provider_family` reads the SPEC, and a bare `gemini-2.5-flash` reads as
/// "unknown", not "anthropic".
fn names_a_provider(spec: &str) -> bool {
spec.contains(':')
}
/// The provider family the mission's agent ran on.
///
/// Today every mission backend is Claude Code (`agent-claude`), including the
/// microVM path. When `agent-glm` / `agent-kimi` images exist this should read
/// `missions.backend`; until then, hardcoding the truth is better than plumbing a
/// parameter that only ever has one value.
const IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY: &str = "anthropic";
/// Which validator spec applies, given the mission's own setting and the
/// deployment default.
///
/// The three cases are distinct on purpose, and an empty string is not the same
/// as unset:
/// - `Some("")` on the mission — an explicit opt OUT. This mission wants the house
/// judge, and the deployment default must not quietly reinstate independence it
/// was told to skip.
/// - `Some(spec)` — this mission's choice, which wins.
/// - `None` — nothing said, so the deployment default applies.
///
/// Whitespace counts as empty: a column set to `" "` by hand meant to say nothing.
fn resolve_validator_spec(mission: Option<&str>, deployment: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
match mission {
Some(s) if s.trim().is_empty() => None,
Some(s) => Some(s.trim().to_string()),
None => deployment
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.map(str::to_string),
}
}
/// A judge from a different provider family, if one is configured and REGISTERED.
///
/// `CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL` holds a registry spec such as `glm:glm-4.7`.
/// Returns `None` — never a same-family judge — when it is unset, names the
/// implementer's own family, or names a provider this deployment did not register.
///
/// That last case is the trap worth naming: `Runtime::resolve_provider` falls back
/// to the DEFAULT provider when the registry has no such name, which would hand
/// back Claude while the caller believed it had asked for GLM. The fallback is
/// detectable because the returned model still carries the `name:` prefix, and it
/// is checked here rather than trusted.
async fn cross_provider_judge(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
mission_id: Uuid,
) -> Option<(std::sync::Arc<dyn cm_llm::LlmProvider>, String)> {
// Read per mission rather than widening `Mission` for one caller. One extra
// query per evaluation, against a path that is about to make a model call.
let per_mission: Option<String> =
sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT validator_model FROM missions WHERE id = $1")
.bind(mission_id)
.fetch_optional(runtime.pool())
.await
.unwrap_or(None)
.flatten();
let spec = resolve_validator_spec(
per_mission.as_deref(),
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL").ok().as_deref(),
)?;
let spec = spec.as_str();
let family = provider_family(spec);
if family == IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY {
eprintln!(
"evaluator: CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL={spec} is the same provider family as the \
agent ({IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY}) — that is not an independent check, ignoring it"
);
return None;
}
// A validator spec MUST name its provider. `resolve_provider` falls back to
// the DEFAULT provider for anything it cannot route (runtime.rs), and for a
// bare model name that fallback is silent: `gemini-2.5-flash` has no colon,
// so it resolved to the house Anthropic provider while `provider_family`
// reported "unknown" — not "anthropic" — and the verdict was recorded
// `independent = true`. An Anthropic judge grading Anthropic work, labelled
// independent, which is the one claim this whole path exists to make honestly.
//
// The check below caught the same fallback for `glm:glm-4.7` when the `glm`
// provider was missing, because an unrouted spec comes back WHOLE. It could
// never catch a bare name.
if !names_a_provider(spec) {
eprintln!(
"evaluator: CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL={spec} is not a registry spec \
(expected `provider:model`, e.g. `glm:glm-4.7`) — refusing to judge with \
the default provider and call it independent"
);
return None;
}
let (provider, model) = runtime.resolve_provider(spec);
// Compared against the WHOLE spec, not tested for a colon.
//
// `resolve_provider` returns the spec unchanged when it does not recognise
// the provider, and returns the part after the FIRST colon when it does. The
// old test — "does the model half still contain a colon" — assumed model
// names never do. `local:ornith-fleet:9b` resolves correctly to provider
// `local`, model `ornith-fleet:9b`, and was rejected as unregistered. The
// chain preflight found it by reporting a provider it had just registered as
// UNREGISTERED.
if model == spec {
eprintln!(
"evaluator: no provider registered for {spec} — refusing to judge with the \
default provider and call it independent"
);
return None;
}
Some((provider, model))
}
/// The model spec to judge with.
///
@@ -221,20 +410,10 @@ fn subscription_model() -> String {
/// case in the platform for a bare model call: fixed prompt, no tools, no
/// memory, one JSON answer.
fn subscription_judge() -> Option<cm_llm::AnthropicProvider> {
let token = std::env::var("ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN").ok()?;
let token = token.trim();
if token.is_empty() {
return None;
}
if !token.starts_with("sk-ant-oat") {
eprintln!(
"evaluator: ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN is set but is not a setup token \
(expected sk-ant-oat…) — ignoring it and using {}",
evaluator_model()
);
return None;
}
Some(cm_llm::AnthropicProvider::new(token.to_string()))
// One definition of "the subscription", shared with the planner. This
// carried its own copy; two of them is how one gets a prefix check the
// other lacks.
crate::subscription::provider()
}
/// Judge whether `condition` holds given `evidence`.
@@ -252,6 +431,53 @@ pub async fn evaluate(
"COMPLETION CONDITION:\n{condition}\n\nEVIDENCE (agent claims — verify them):\n{evidence}"
);
let sandbox = crate::evaluator_tools::Sandbox::for_mission(mission_id);
// Purged explicitly at every exit below: `Drop` runs as uid 65532 and cannot
// delete the root-owned `target/` the judge's own `cargo test` leaves behind.
// Wrapped so the purge below runs on EVERY exit: this function returns
// from several branches, and a cleanup only some paths reach is the same
// as no cleanup on the others.
let verdict = async {
// Most preferred: a judge from a DIFFERENT provider family, with the same
// allow-listed tool loop. Claude judging Claude's work is a correlated
// failure — the model that talked itself into a shortcut is the one disposed
// to accept it — and the tool loop is what makes the check evidence rather
// than opinion, so an independent judge must have it too.
if let Some((provider, model)) = cross_provider_judge(runtime, mission_id).await {
let system = match &sandbox {
Some(_) => format!("{EVAL_SYSTEM_VERIFYING}\n\n{VERDICT_CONTRACT}"),
None => format!("{EVAL_SYSTEM_EVIDENCE_ONLY}\n\n{VERDICT_CONTRACT}"),
};
eprintln!(
"evaluator: mission {mission_id} judged independently by {} ({})",
model,
provider_family(&model)
);
match judge_with_tools(provider.as_ref(), &system, &user, &model, sandbox.as_ref()).await {
Ok((text, checks)) => {
let mut v = parse_verdict(&model, &text);
v.guidance = sanitize_guidance(condition, evidence, &v.guidance);
v.checks = checks;
v.independent = true;
return v;
}
// Deliberately NOT a silent fall-through to the house judge. An
// independent check that failed and was quietly replaced by a
// same-family one would leave a verdict claiming a property it does
// not have. The phase stays unmet this pass and says why; the next
// sweep retries.
Err(e) => {
eprintln!(
"evaluator: the independent judge ({model}) failed — NOT falling back to the agent's own provider: {e}"
);
return Verdict::not_met(
&model,
"the independent validator could not be reached this pass",
Some(e),
);
}
}
}
// Preferred: a bare Messages API call on the subscription token. See
// `subscription_judge` for why this beats routing through an agent.
@@ -262,6 +488,7 @@ pub async fn evaluate(
None => format!("{EVAL_SYSTEM_EVIDENCE_ONLY}\n\n{VERDICT_CONTRACT}"),
};
let outcome = judge_with_tools(&provider, &system, &user, &model, sandbox.as_ref()).await;
// Same family as the agent; `independent` stays false below.
return match outcome {
Err(e) => Verdict::not_met(
&model,
@@ -307,6 +534,12 @@ pub async fn evaluate(
v
}
}
}
.await;
if let Some(sb) = &sandbox {
sb.purge().await;
}
verdict
}
/// Ceiling on verification commands per verdict. A judge that has run twelve
@@ -346,14 +579,22 @@ fn verify_tool() -> cm_llm::ToolDescriptor {
///
/// With no sandbox this degenerates to a single call — same shape, no tools
/// offered — so there is one code path for both kinds of phase.
/// `&dyn LlmProvider`, not `&AnthropicProvider`.
///
/// The trait is a single method — `stream(ChatRequest)` — and this loop only ever
/// used that, so the concrete type was incidental. Widening it is what lets a
/// CROSS-PROVIDER judge run the same allow-listed checks: before this, independence
/// and real verification were mutually exclusive, because the tool loop lived only
/// on the subscription path and every other route "judged claims only".
/// GLM is registered in anthropic format, so tool calling reaches it unchanged.
async fn judge_with_tools(
provider: &cm_llm::AnthropicProvider,
provider: &dyn cm_llm::LlmProvider,
system: &str,
user: &str,
model: &str,
sandbox: Option<&crate::evaluator_tools::Sandbox>,
) -> Result<(String, Vec<crate::evaluator_tools::CheckOutcome>), String> {
use cm_llm::{ChatMessage, ChatRequest, ChatRole, ContentPart, LlmEvent, LlmProvider};
use cm_llm::{ChatMessage, ChatRequest, ChatRole, ContentPart, LlmEvent};
use futures::StreamExt as _;
let tools = match sandbox {
@@ -507,6 +748,8 @@ fn parse_verdict(model: &str, text: &str) -> Verdict {
reason,
guidance,
model: model.to_string(),
// Set by the caller: only `evaluate` knows which provider judged.
independent: false,
error: None,
checks: Vec::new(),
}
@@ -531,12 +774,14 @@ pub async fn record(
) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_phase_evaluations
(id, mission_id, phase_id, iteration, met, reason, guidance, model, error, checks)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10)
(id, mission_id, phase_id, iteration, met, reason, guidance, model, error,
checks, independent)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10, $11)
ON CONFLICT (phase_id, iteration) DO UPDATE
SET met = EXCLUDED.met, reason = EXCLUDED.reason,
guidance = EXCLUDED.guidance, model = EXCLUDED.model,
error = EXCLUDED.error, checks = EXCLUDED.checks",
error = EXCLUDED.error, checks = EXCLUDED.checks,
independent = EXCLUDED.independent",
)
.bind(Uuid::now_v7())
.bind(mission_id)
@@ -548,6 +793,7 @@ pub async fn record(
.bind(&v.model)
.bind(v.error.as_deref())
.bind(serde_json::json!(v.checks))
.bind(v.independent)
.execute(pool)
.await
.map(|_| ())
@@ -581,6 +827,180 @@ pub async fn latest(
}))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod cross_provider_tests {
use super::*;
/// A bare model name must never be accepted as a validator spec.
///
/// `resolve_provider` falls back to the DEFAULT provider for anything it
/// cannot route, and for a bare name that fallback is invisible: the spec
/// has no `provider:` prefix to come back with, so the existing
/// "no provider registered" check cannot see it. The result was an
/// Anthropic judge grading Anthropic work with `independent = true`.
#[test]
fn a_validator_spec_must_name_its_provider() {
for good in ["glm:glm-4.7", "kimi:kimi-for-coding", "runtime:some-alias"] {
assert!(names_a_provider(good), "{good} is a registry spec");
}
// These are the dangerous ones: they resolve to the DEFAULT provider.
for bare in ["gemini-2.5-flash", "claude-sonnet-5", "glm-4.7", ""] {
assert!(
!names_a_provider(bare),
"{bare:?} names no provider and must be refused"
);
}
}
/// A family, not a model. Two Claude models share a lineage and most of their
/// failure modes, so `opus` judging `sonnet` is not an independent check.
#[test]
fn every_anthropic_spelling_is_one_family() {
for spec in [
"claude-opus-4-8",
"claude-sonnet-5",
"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"opus",
"runtime:claw_1234", // routes through an agent container running Claude
] {
assert_eq!(provider_family(spec), "anthropic", "{spec}");
}
}
/// The registry prefix is what actually selects a different provider.
#[test]
fn a_registry_prefix_names_the_family() {
assert_eq!(provider_family("glm:glm-4.7"), "glm");
assert_eq!(provider_family("kimi:kimi-k2"), "kimi");
assert_eq!(provider_family("GLM:GLM-4.7"), "glm");
}
/// An unrecognised model must NOT be assumed to be the house one. Guessing
/// "anthropic" would understate independence; guessing anything else would
/// claim independence we never established. So: unknown.
#[test]
fn an_unrecognised_model_is_not_assumed_to_be_ours() {
assert_eq!(provider_family("some-new-model-v9"), "unknown");
assert_ne!(provider_family("some-new-model-v9"), IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY);
}
/// The whole point: a judge in the implementer's own family is not
/// independent, whichever model it is.
#[test]
fn a_same_family_judge_is_never_independent() {
for spec in ["claude-opus-4-8", "runtime:claw_x", "sonnet"] {
assert_eq!(
provider_family(spec),
IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY,
"{spec} would have to be rejected as a validator"
);
}
for spec in ["glm:glm-4.7", "kimi:kimi-k2"] {
assert_ne!(provider_family(spec), IMPLEMENTER_FAMILY, "{spec}");
}
}
/// A mission's own choice wins over the deployment default.
#[test]
fn a_mission_can_choose_its_validator() {
assert_eq!(
resolve_validator_spec(Some("kimi:kimi-k2"), Some("glm:glm-4.7")).as_deref(),
Some("kimi:kimi-k2")
);
assert_eq!(
resolve_validator_spec(None, Some("glm:glm-4.7")).as_deref(),
Some("glm:glm-4.7"),
"nothing said on the mission means the deployment default applies"
);
}
/// An EMPTY value on the mission is an explicit opt-out, not "unset". The
/// deployment default must not quietly reinstate independence a mission was
/// told to skip — the two cases look the same in a nullable text column and
/// mean opposite things.
#[test]
fn an_empty_mission_setting_opts_out_rather_than_falling_back() {
for spelling in [Some(""), Some(" ")] {
assert_eq!(
resolve_validator_spec(spelling, Some("glm:glm-4.7")),
None,
"{spelling:?} asked for no independent validator"
);
}
}
/// And with neither set, there is no independent judge — which is the state
/// every deployment starts in.
#[test]
fn no_setting_anywhere_means_no_independent_judge() {
assert_eq!(resolve_validator_spec(None, None), None);
assert_eq!(resolve_validator_spec(None, Some(" ")), None);
}
/// A phase that ran out of passes without meeting its condition did NOT
/// succeed. It used to be recorded `completed` alongside a verdict saying
/// `met=false`, so mission status reported a goal that was never reached as a
/// goal achieved. Found by the Goodhart test: an independent judge refused the
/// phase, and the mission closed green anyway.
#[test]
fn an_unmet_condition_does_not_close_a_phase_as_completed() {
// Mirrors the decision in `phase_runner::evaluate_finished_phases`.
let outcome = |met: bool| if met { "completed" } else { "failed" };
assert_eq!(outcome(true), "completed");
assert_eq!(
outcome(false),
"failed",
"an exhausted, unmet phase must not share a status with a met one"
);
}
/// A verdict that has not been marked independent must not read as one. This
/// is the field's default, and old rows stored before it existed deserialize
/// to exactly that.
/// The anti-Goodhart clause and the recorded-value clause must BOTH be in
/// the verifying prompt, because each without the other is a known failure.
///
/// Without the first, an agent emits the string the judge asked for and the
/// judge accepts it — that is the incident the verifying judge was built
/// after. Without the second, the judge rejects work whose whole point is a
/// recorded value: three consecutive production verdicts failed a phase for
/// writing a kernel version into a file, which is precisely "a value printed
/// rather than produced by working code" as the clause describes it. Asked
/// the same question WITHOUT this prompt, the same model answered MET.
#[test]
fn the_verifying_prompt_distinguishes_cheating_from_recording() {
let p = EVAL_SYSTEM_VERIFYING;
// The trap it must still catch.
assert!(p.contains("hard-coded, stubbed, or printed"), "{p}");
// The legitimate case it must not mistake for the trap.
assert!(p.contains("RECORDED VALUE"), "{p}");
assert!(
p.contains("do not reject it for being written rather than computed"),
"{p}"
);
// And the second failure mode from the same three verdicts: the judge
// re-deriving the expected value in its own environment.
assert!(p.contains("do not re-derive the expected value yourself"), "{p}");
assert!(p.contains("Judge the condition AS WRITTEN"), "{p}");
}
#[test]
fn a_verdict_defaults_to_not_independent() {
let v = Verdict::not_met("claude-opus-4-8", "nope", None);
assert!(!v.independent);
let stored = serde_json::json!({
"met": true, "reason": "r", "guidance": "", "model": "claude-opus-4-8",
"error": null, "checks": []
});
let old: Verdict = serde_json::from_value(stored).expect("an old verdict still reads");
assert!(
!old.independent,
"a verdict written before independence was recorded was not independent"
);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
+169 -5
View File
@@ -195,11 +195,39 @@ pub fn clamp_output(s: &str) -> String {
)
}
/// Where a verification copy lives: a sibling of the per-mission directories,
/// so the sweeper that deletes `<root>/<mission_id>` never races it and nothing
/// under it is ever collected or delivered.
fn verify_path(mission_id: Uuid) -> PathBuf {
crate::mission_workspace::missions_root()
.join("_verify")
.join(mission_id.to_string())
}
/// A checkout the judge may run verification commands against.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
///
/// A COPY of the mission's checkout, never the checkout itself. The judge runs
/// real commands — `cargo test` is the whole point — and the container it execs
/// into runs as ROOT with the missions root bind-mounted, so running them in the
/// live tree left `repo/target/` owned by uid 0 in a checkout otherwise owned by
/// the server. That breaks the single-writer invariant copy mode exists to
/// guarantee, and the next phase's `cargo` would hit permission-denied on a
/// directory it cannot write.
///
/// It stayed invisible all day because a dead validator credential meant the
/// judge never ran a single check; restoring the credential surfaced it on the
/// first gated mission, via the harness's uid probe.
///
/// The deeper rule is the one this codebase already applies to the `verifier`
/// subagent, which has no Edit and no Write: **verification must not mutate what
/// it verifies.** A judge that can change the tree it is judging can make its own
/// verdict true.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct Sandbox {
container: String,
workdir: PathBuf,
/// Whether this sandbox created `workdir` and must remove it.
owned: bool,
}
impl Sandbox {
@@ -208,22 +236,59 @@ impl Sandbox {
///
/// Returning `None` rather than an empty sandbox matters: the evaluator
/// prompt changes shape depending on whether verification is possible, and
/// a judge must never be told it can check something it cannot.
/// a judge must never be told it can check something it cannot. A copy that
/// fails to materialise is also `None` for the same reason — an unverifiable
/// phase must not be told it can verify.
pub fn for_mission(mission_id: Uuid) -> Option<Sandbox> {
let workdir = crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission_id);
if !workdir.is_dir() {
Sandbox::for_checkout(
&crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission_id),
&verify_path(mission_id),
)
}
/// The testable half of [`Sandbox::for_mission`]. The paths are parameters
/// because `missions_root()` reads process environment, and this workspace
/// does not mutate that in tests — the same split as
/// `mission_runtime::provider_env_from` and
/// `mission_workspace::auth_with_token`.
pub fn for_checkout(source: &Path, root: &Path) -> Option<Sandbox> {
if !source.is_dir() {
return None;
}
// `root_copy` owns this pattern for all four callers — the judge, the
// benchmark runner, the on_green_tests gate, and this. It packs through
// the transport packer (one exclusion list, so a copy carries exactly
// what a delivered diff carries) and its `purge` is the only thing that
// can remove the root-owned `target/` a run leaves behind.
//
// A stale copy would otherwise be verified instead of this pass's work —
// the "judged a tree nobody wrote" shape the evaluator exists to prevent
// — so the caller purges before constructing.
// `into_workdir` because the judge has not run yet: letting the handle's
// Drop fire on return would delete the tree out from under it. `Sandbox`
// owns the lifetime from here, and `Sandbox::purge` clears it.
let workdir = crate::root_copy::RootCopy::of(source, root)
.ok()?
.into_workdir();
let container = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "clawmates-runtime".to_string());
Some(Sandbox { container, workdir })
Some(Sandbox {
container,
workdir,
owned: true,
})
}
/// Construct against an explicit path. Test seam.
///
/// Never `owned`: a caller-supplied directory is the caller's, and deleting
/// it on drop would make this seam destructive in a way its users could not
/// see.
pub fn at(container: impl Into<String>, workdir: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Sandbox {
Sandbox {
container: container.into(),
workdir: workdir.as_ref().to_path_buf(),
owned: false,
}
}
@@ -329,6 +394,53 @@ fn git_ownership_env(workdir: &str) -> Vec<String> {
]
}
impl Sandbox {
/// Remove the copy, from inside the container that wrote it.
///
/// `Drop` cannot do this. The judge runs `cargo test` in a container as
/// ROOT, so the copy's `target/` is root-owned, and the server process is
/// uid 65532 — its `remove_dir_all` fails on those files and leaves the
/// whole tree behind. Measured: 16 MB across two stranded copies, the oldest
/// hours old, while `Drop` logged nothing anyone read.
///
/// The claim that "the next pass clears anyway" was wrong for the same
/// reason: `for_checkout` removes a stale root before copying, with the same
/// uid, and fails the same way.
///
/// Still best-effort — a housekeeping error must not cost a real verdict —
/// but now attempted by something that can actually succeed.
pub async fn purge(&self) {
if !self.owned {
return;
}
let Some(root) = self.workdir.parent() else {
return;
};
// The same purge as the other three copy sites, not a fourth copy of
// it: an inlined duplicate is how the reap paths drifted apart before.
crate::root_copy::purge(&self.container, root).await;
}
}
impl Drop for Sandbox {
/// Fallback only — see [`Sandbox::purge`], which is what actually clears a
/// copy the judge has run commands in. This still catches the early paths
/// where nothing has run as root yet.
fn drop(&mut self) {
if !self.owned {
return;
}
if let Some(root) = self.workdir.parent() {
if let Err(e) = std::fs::remove_dir_all(root) {
eprintln!(
"evaluator_tools: could not remove the verification copy at {} ({e})",
root.display()
);
}
}
}
}
/// One verification command and what became of it.
///
/// This exists because the first version recorded *attempted* commands. The
@@ -427,6 +539,58 @@ mod tests {
}
}
/// THE regression. The judge runs real commands in a container that runs as
/// ROOT with the missions root bind-mounted, so verifying the live checkout
/// left `repo/target/` owned by uid 0 in a tree owned by the server — the
/// single-writer invariant broken by the thing that was supposed to be
/// checking the work. Verifying a COPY makes it unrepresentable.
#[test]
fn the_judge_verifies_a_copy_and_never_the_mission_tree() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let root = tmp.path().join("missions-root");
let mission = Uuid::now_v7();
let checkout = root.join(mission.to_string()).join("repo");
std::fs::create_dir_all(checkout.join("src")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(checkout.join("Cargo.toml"), "[package]\nname='x'\n").unwrap();
std::fs::write(checkout.join("src/lib.rs"), "pub fn a() {}").unwrap();
// Build output the transport already excludes; the copy must not carry
// it either, or the judge measures a stale artifact.
std::fs::create_dir_all(checkout.join("target/debug")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(checkout.join("target/debug/junk"), "x").unwrap();
let sandbox = Sandbox::for_checkout(&checkout, &root.join("_verify").join(mission.to_string()))
.expect("a checkout on disk yields a sandbox");
assert_ne!(
sandbox.workdir(),
checkout,
"the judge must not be pointed at the mission's own checkout"
);
assert!(sandbox.workdir().join("src/lib.rs").is_file(), "the copy has the source");
assert!(
!sandbox.workdir().join("target").exists(),
"the copy must not carry build output: {}",
sandbox.workdir().display()
);
// And dropping it takes the copy with it, leaving the mission untouched.
let copy_root = sandbox.workdir().parent().unwrap().to_path_buf();
drop(sandbox);
assert!(!copy_root.exists(), "the copy outlived its sandbox");
assert!(checkout.join("src/lib.rs").is_file(), "the mission tree is intact");
assert!(checkout.join("target/debug/junk").is_file());
}
/// The test seam must not delete a directory it was handed. A destructive
/// constructor that looks like a plain one is how a test wipes a real tree.
#[test]
fn an_explicit_workdir_is_never_deleted() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::write(tmp.path().join("keep.txt"), "x").unwrap();
drop(Sandbox::at("c", tmp.path()));
assert!(tmp.path().join("keep.txt").is_file());
}
#[test]
fn refuses_programs_off_the_list() {
assert_eq!(
+78 -1
View File
@@ -364,6 +364,15 @@ enum Uplink {
Result { id: u64, ok: bool, output: String },
#[serde(rename = "pty_out")]
PtyOut { sid: u64, data: String },
/// A chunk of a microVM turn's stdout/stderr, as it happens.
///
/// Keyed by RUN id rather than a session id: a mission run is the thing a
/// browser subscribes to, and unlike a PTY there is no interactive session
/// to allocate. `at` is the byte offset AFTER this chunk, so the node can
/// resume a dropped tail without replaying — the same contract `fcagent`'s
/// `tail` op exposes.
#[serde(rename = "vm_out")]
VmOut { run_id: String, at: u64, data: String },
#[serde(rename = "pty_exit")]
PtyExit { sid: u64 },
#[serde(rename = "webrtc_answer")]
@@ -381,6 +390,11 @@ enum Uplink {
NodeTools {
tools: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
},
/// What the node can HOST, as opposed to what it has installed — the
/// inputs to placement predicates. Free-form so a new predicate does not
/// need a migration; see `migrations/0065_microvm_placement.sql`.
#[serde(rename = "node_capabilities")]
NodeCapabilities { capabilities: serde_json::Value },
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -482,6 +496,44 @@ pub async fn run_channel(pool: PgPool, hub: Arc<NodeHub>, node_id: NodeId, socke
let _ = s.send(ExecOutput { ok, output });
}
}
// A chunk of a microVM turn's output, live.
//
// Appended to the run's checkpoint rather than only fanned
// out: `PtyOut` above is deliberately ephemeral because a
// terminal has no history worth keeping, but a mission's log
// is the record of what the agent did — the Output tab has
// to still show it an hour later. Live and durable are
// different requirements and this needs both.
//
// `jsonb ||` merges into whatever else the checkpoint holds
// (`records`, written by the turn itself), so the two writers
// do not clobber each other.
Ok(Uplink::VmOut { run_id, at, data }) => {
if let (Ok(rid), Ok(bytes)) =
(uuid::Uuid::parse_str(&run_id), B64.decode(&data))
{
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(&bytes).to_string();
if let Err(e) = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE topology_runs
SET checkpoint = COALESCE(checkpoint, '{}'::jsonb)
|| jsonb_build_object(
'log',
COALESCE(checkpoint->>'log', '') || $2::text,
'log_at', $3::bigint
),
updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(rid)
.bind(&text)
.bind(at as i64)
.execute(&pool)
.await
{
eprintln!("fleet: appending vm_out for run {rid}: {e}");
}
}
}
Ok(Uplink::PtyOut { sid, data }) => {
if let Ok(bytes) = B64.decode(&data) {
let sink = conn.pty_sinks.lock().await.get(&sid).cloned();
@@ -539,7 +591,32 @@ pub async fn run_channel(pool: PgPool, hub: Arc<NodeHub>, node_id: NodeId, socke
let pairs: Vec<(String, String)> = tools.into_iter().collect();
let _ = cm_db::repo::node_tools::upsert(&pool, node_id, &pairs).await;
}
Err(_) => {}
Ok(Uplink::NodeCapabilities { capabilities }) => {
if let Err(e) = nodes::set_capabilities(&pool, node_id, &capabilities).await
{
// Loud: a node whose capabilities never land looks
// exactly like a node that has none, and will be
// passed over for every microVM mission forever
// while appearing perfectly healthy.
eprintln!(
"fleet: could not record capabilities for node {node_id} ({e}) — \
it will not be selected for microvm placement"
);
}
}
// An unparseable frame used to vanish here. That is the
// worst possible handling: a node op whose reply does not
// match `Uplink` never resolves its pending request, so the
// caller times out after 20s with nothing anywhere saying
// why. Caught exactly that way while wiring the vm_* ops —
// `output` was an object where the wire declares a String.
Err(e) => {
let head: String = t.as_str().chars().take(160).collect();
eprintln!(
"fleet: node {node_id} sent a frame we could not parse ({e}); \
any request it was answering will time out. Frame: {head}"
);
}
}
},
}
+147 -44
View File
@@ -13,16 +13,28 @@
//! reviewer picked. Rejected proposals move to status='rejected';
//! partial approvals move to status='partial'.
//!
//! Uses Gemini 2.5 Flash as the default proposer model — cheap,
//! JSON-mode-native, plenty of room for structured output. Configurable
//! via CLAWMATES_LEVEL_UP_MODEL.
//! The proposer model resolves through the provider REGISTRY
//! (`Runtime::resolve_provider`), the same path the evaluator uses, and defaults
//! to `glm:glm-4.7`. Configurable via `CLAWMATES_LEVEL_UP_MODEL` as a registry
//! spec (`glm:glm-4.7`, `kimi:k2`, `claude-sonnet-5`, …).
//!
//! It used to call Gemini directly over bespoke HTTP with `GEMINI_API_KEY`. Two
//! problems with that, one fatal: it was the only thing standing between this
//! feature and a dead prepayment balance, and it duplicated a provider client
//! the codebase already has. Going through the registry means every provider the
//! platform can already reach works here, and no single vendor's billing can
//! take the feature down.
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sqlx::PgPool;
use sqlx::Row;
use uuid::Uuid;
const DEFAULT_MODEL: &str = "gemini-2.5-flash";
/// Registry spec, not a bare model name — the registry needs the provider.
///
/// GLM: cheap, reliable at structured output, and already the validator this
/// project measured and chose (see `scripts/judge-eval.sh`).
const DEFAULT_MODEL: &str = "glm:glm-4.7";
fn model_name() -> String {
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_LEVEL_UP_MODEL").unwrap_or_else(|_| DEFAULT_MODEL.to_string())
@@ -31,6 +43,7 @@ fn model_name() -> String {
/// Analyze an agent + insert a pending proposal. Returns the proposal id.
pub async fn propose_agent(
pool: &PgPool,
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
workspace_id: cm_domain::WorkspaceId,
created_by: cm_domain::UserId,
agent_id: Uuid,
@@ -50,6 +63,7 @@ pub async fn propose_agent(
.flatten();
let payload = call_llm_for_agent(
runtime,
&agent.name,
&agent.job_title,
&agent.system_prompt,
@@ -79,6 +93,7 @@ pub async fn propose_agent(
/// Analyze a team + insert a pending proposal. Returns the proposal id.
pub async fn propose_team(
pool: &PgPool,
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
workspace_id: cm_domain::WorkspaceId,
created_by: cm_domain::UserId,
team_id: Uuid,
@@ -115,7 +130,7 @@ pub async fn propose_team(
}));
}
let payload = call_llm_for_team(&member_summaries).await?;
let payload = call_llm_for_team(runtime, &member_summaries).await?;
let model = model_name();
let id = cm_db::repo::level_up::insert(
@@ -418,6 +433,7 @@ async fn recent_run_summary(pool: &PgPool, agent_id: Uuid, limit: i64) -> Result
}
async fn call_llm_for_agent(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
name: &str,
role: &str,
system_prompt: &str,
@@ -462,10 +478,13 @@ the sake of proposing."#;
})
.to_string();
call_gemini_json(system, &user).await
call_llm_json(runtime, system, &user).await
}
async fn call_llm_for_team(members: &[Value]) -> Result<Value, String> {
async fn call_llm_for_team(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
members: &[Value],
) -> Result<Value, String> {
let system = r#"You review an AI team's roster + recent history and propose
targeted improvements. Return ONLY JSON:
{
@@ -482,47 +501,90 @@ prompts over adding skills. Only add skills when a clear
"the team keeps getting stuck on <X>" pattern appears."#;
let user = json!({ "members": members }).to_string();
call_gemini_json(system, &user).await
call_llm_json(runtime, system, &user).await
}
async fn call_gemini_json(system: &str, user: &str) -> Result<Value, String> {
let api_key =
std::env::var("GEMINI_API_KEY").map_err(|_| "GEMINI_API_KEY unset".to_string())?;
let model = model_name();
let url = format!(
"https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/{}:generateContent?key={}",
model, api_key
);
let body = json!({
"system_instruction": { "parts": [{ "text": system }] },
"contents": [{ "role": "user", "parts": [{ "text": user }] }],
"generationConfig": {
"temperature": 0.2,
"response_mime_type": "application/json",
"maxOutputTokens": 8192,
}
});
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(60))
.build()
.map_err(|e| format!("http client: {e}"))?;
let resp = client
.post(&url)
.json(&body)
.send()
/// Ask the configured proposer model for one JSON object.
///
/// Goes through the provider registry rather than a vendor's HTTP API, so any
/// model the platform can already reach works and no single vendor's billing can
/// take level-up down.
///
/// The JSON is extracted rather than assumed: an anthropic-format model is not
/// bound by Gemini's `response_mime_type: application/json`, and will happily
/// wrap an object in prose or a ```json fence. Parsing the raw reply worked
/// against Gemini and would fail on everything else.
async fn call_llm_json(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
system: &str,
user: &str,
) -> Result<Value, String> {
use cm_llm::{ChatMessage, ChatRequest, ChatRole, ContentPart, LlmEvent};
use futures::StreamExt as _;
let spec = model_name();
let (provider, model) = runtime.resolve_provider(&spec);
let request = ChatRequest {
system: system.to_string(),
model: model.to_string(),
messages: vec![ChatMessage {
role: ChatRole::User,
parts: vec![ContentPart::text(user)],
}],
tools: vec![],
max_tokens: 8192,
web_search: false,
};
let mut stream = provider
.stream(request)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("gemini call: {e}"))?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let code = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!("gemini {code}: {}", &body[..body.len().min(500)]));
.map_err(|e| format!("level-up call ({spec}): {e}"))?;
let mut text = String::new();
while let Some(event) = stream.next().await {
match event {
Ok(LlmEvent::TextDelta(t)) => text.push_str(&t),
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => return Err(format!("level-up stream ({spec}): {e}")),
}
let json: Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| format!("gemini json: {e}"))?;
let text = json
.pointer("/candidates/0/content/parts/0/text")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| "gemini response missing text".to_string())?;
serde_json::from_str(text).map_err(|e| format!("parse suggestion json: {e}"))
}
let body = extract_json_object(&text)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("no JSON object in {spec} reply: {}", excerpt(&text, 300)))?;
serde_json::from_str(body).map_err(|e| format!("parse suggestion json: {e}"))
}
/// The outermost `{...}` in a reply, so a fenced or prose-wrapped object parses.
///
/// Brace-counting rather than a regex: a nested object would end a lazy match at
/// the first inner `}`, and these proposals are nested by design (items carry
/// per-role objects).
fn extract_json_object(text: &str) -> Option<&str> {
let start = text.find('{')?;
let mut depth = 0usize;
let mut in_string = false;
let mut escaped = false;
for (i, c) in text[start..].char_indices() {
if in_string {
match c {
_ if escaped => escaped = false,
'\\' => escaped = true,
'"' => in_string = false,
_ => {}
}
continue;
}
match c {
'"' => in_string = true,
'{' => depth += 1,
'}' => {
depth -= 1;
if depth == 0 {
return Some(&text[start..start + i + 1]);
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
None
}
fn excerpt(s: &str, max: usize) -> String {
@@ -546,3 +608,44 @@ fn workspace_skill_id(workspace_id: Uuid, name: &str) -> Uuid {
bytes[8] = (bytes[8] & 0x3f) | 0x80;
Uuid::from_bytes(bytes)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// Gemini was asked for `response_mime_type: application/json` and obliged.
/// Anthropic-format models are under no such obligation and routinely wrap
/// the object in prose or a fenced block, so the reply is EXTRACTED, not
/// assumed. Parsing the raw text worked against Gemini and would fail
/// everywhere else — exactly the shape of bug a provider swap hides until
/// the first real proposal.
#[test]
fn a_json_object_is_extracted_from_however_the_model_wrapped_it() {
let bare = r#"{"items":[]}"#;
assert_eq!(super::extract_json_object(bare), Some(bare));
let fenced = "Here is my proposal:\n```json\n{\"items\":[1]}\n```\nDone.";
assert_eq!(super::extract_json_object(fenced), Some(r#"{"items":[1]}"#));
// Nested objects: a lazy match would stop at the first inner brace and
// hand back invalid JSON. These proposals are nested by design.
let nested = r#"prose {"a":{"b":{"c":1}},"d":2} trailing"#;
assert_eq!(
super::extract_json_object(nested),
Some(r#"{"a":{"b":{"c":1}},"d":2}"#)
);
// A brace inside a string must not close the object.
let stringy = r#"{"note":"an unmatched } here","ok":true}"#;
assert_eq!(super::extract_json_object(stringy), Some(stringy));
assert_eq!(super::extract_json_object("no object here"), None);
}
/// The default must not be a vendor whose billing already took a feature
/// down. It is a REGISTRY SPEC (`provider:model`), not a bare model name —
/// `resolve_provider` needs the provider half.
#[test]
fn the_default_proposer_is_a_registry_spec_and_not_gemini() {
assert!(super::DEFAULT_MODEL.contains(':'), "{}", super::DEFAULT_MODEL);
assert!(!super::DEFAULT_MODEL.contains("gemini"), "{}", super::DEFAULT_MODEL);
}
}
+78 -11
View File
@@ -1,42 +1,56 @@
//! REST API for Clawmates (spec §13). One route resource per module.
pub mod agent_lifecycle;
pub mod agent_names;
pub mod auto_merge;
pub mod benchmark_runner;
pub mod beszel;
pub mod brain_seed;
pub mod cleanup_sweeper;
pub mod container_exec;
pub mod corpus;
mod error;
pub mod evaluator;
pub mod evaluator_tools;
mod extract;
pub mod fleet;
pub mod fleet_herdr;
pub mod harvest;
pub mod level_up;
pub mod library;
pub mod live_bus;
mod mcp_door;
mod mcp_skills;
pub mod mission_orchestrator;
pub mod mission_refiner;
pub mod auto_merge;
pub mod corpus;
pub mod harvest;
pub mod library;
pub mod microvm_client;
pub mod microvm_executor;
pub mod microvm_turn_executor;
pub mod mission_delivery;
pub mod papers;
pub mod phase_config;
pub mod session_executor;
pub mod runtime_preflight;
pub mod mission_events;
pub mod mission_fs;
pub mod mission_gc;
pub mod mission_orchestrator;
pub mod mission_outputs;
pub mod mission_plan;
pub mod mission_refiner;
pub mod mission_roster;
pub mod mission_runtime;
pub mod mission_workspace;
pub mod node_rules;
pub mod pdf_renderer;
pub mod papers;
pub mod phase_config;
pub mod phase_runner;
pub mod phase_summarizer;
pub mod quota;
mod recursive_exec;
pub mod repo_digest;
pub mod root_copy;
mod routes;
pub mod runtime_preflight;
mod runtime_provision;
pub mod security_scan;
pub mod session_executor;
pub mod skills_loader;
pub mod subscription;
pub mod swarm;
pub mod task_card_parser;
pub mod task_card_worker;
@@ -44,6 +58,10 @@ pub mod team_template_loader;
pub mod tool_versions;
mod topology_exec;
pub mod topology_worker;
pub mod validator_preflight;
pub mod vm_placement;
pub mod vm_stop_gate;
pub mod vm_tool_tap;
pub mod workflow_registry;
use axum::routing::{delete, get, patch, post};
@@ -159,6 +177,8 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
.route("/api/world/live", get(routes::world::world_live))
.route("/api/world/replay", get(routes::world::world_replay))
.route("/api/nodes", get(routes::nodes::list))
.route("/api/fleet/capacity", get(routes::nodes::capacity))
.route("/api/fleet/backends", get(routes::nodes::backends))
.route("/api/nodes/pair", post(routes::nodes::pair))
.route("/api/nodes/live", get(routes::nodes::live))
.route("/api/nodes/agent", get(routes::nodes::agent_ws))
@@ -224,6 +244,11 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
.route("/api/user/me", get(routes::identity::me))
.route("/api/claws", post(routes::claws::create))
.route("/api/claws/batch-delete", post(routes::claws::batch_delete))
.route("/api/claws/lifecycle", get(routes::claws::lifecycle_census))
.route(
"/api/claws/lifecycle/sweep",
post(routes::claws::lifecycle_sweep),
)
.route("/api/claws/{id}", patch(routes::claws::patch))
.route("/api/claws/{id}", delete(routes::claws::delete))
.route("/api/claws/{id}/model", patch(routes::claws::set_model))
@@ -467,6 +492,8 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
"/api/missions",
get(routes::missions::list).post(routes::missions::create),
)
// The roster grouped by mission — what "My Workforce" renders.
.route("/api/workforce", get(routes::missions::workforce))
// The workflow recipe catalog (templates/workflows/*.toml). Serving it
// lets the client stop mirroring the phase composition table inline.
.route("/api/workflows", get(routes::missions::list_workflows))
@@ -481,6 +508,46 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
axum::routing::patch(routes::missions::set_status),
)
.route("/api/missions/{id}/refine", post(routes::missions::refine))
// Draft-less sibling: the wizard polishes a description before any
// mission exists, so there is no id to route on. Declared BEFORE the
// `{id}` routes would otherwise be ambiguous — axum matches literal
// segments first, but keeping them adjacent makes the pair obvious.
.route(
"/api/missions/refine-draft",
post(routes::missions::refine_draft),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/merge",
post(routes::missions::merge_branch),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/artifacts/{artifact_id}/content",
get(routes::missions::artifact_content),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/artifacts/{artifact_id}/download",
get(routes::missions::artifact_download),
)
// Slice 5: let a model size the mission's team. Proposing, listing and
// deciding are separate verbs because only the last one spends money.
// W1/#13: let a model author the phases, on the same propose → review →
// approve shape as the roster above.
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/plan-proposals",
get(routes::mission_plan::list).post(routes::mission_plan::suggest),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/plan-proposals/{pid}/decide",
post(routes::mission_plan::decide),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/team-proposals",
get(routes::mission_roster::list).post(routes::mission_roster::suggest),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/team-proposals/{pid}/decide",
post(routes::mission_roster::decide),
)
.route(
"/api/missions/{id}/herdr-dispatch",
post(routes::missions::herdr_dispatch),
+20 -8
View File
@@ -93,9 +93,13 @@ pub async fn clone_vault(clone_url: &str, work_root: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, S
.map_err(|e| format!("mkdir {}: {e}", work_root.display()))?;
let auth = mission_workspace::with_ambient_auth(clone_url);
let out = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["clone", "--quiet", "--depth", "1", &auth])
.arg(&path)
if let Some(why) = &auth.unauthenticated {
eprintln!("library: cloning the vault WITHOUT credentials — {why}");
}
let mut cmd = tokio::process::Command::new("git");
cmd.args(["clone", "--quiet", "--depth", "1", &auth.url])
.arg(&path);
let out = mission_workspace::no_terminal_prompt(&mut cmd)
.output()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("spawn git clone: {e}"))?;
@@ -103,16 +107,15 @@ pub async fn clone_vault(clone_url: &str, work_root: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf, S
return Err(format!(
"clone vault → {}: {}",
out.status,
mission_workspace::redact_token(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr))
.chars()
.take(300)
.collect::<String>()
crate::evaluator_tools::clamp_output(&mission_workspace::redact_token(
&String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
))
));
}
// The token must not stay in .git/config: the checkout may be handed to a
// container later, and a credential in a file an agent can read is a
// credential an agent has.
mission_workspace::scrub_remote_credentials(&path, &auth);
mission_workspace::scrub_remote_credentials(&path, &auth.url);
Ok(path)
}
@@ -186,6 +189,15 @@ pub async fn run_to_vault(
git(&vault, &["commit", "--no-verify", "-m", &message]).await?;
let auth = mission_workspace::with_ambient_auth(clone_url);
if let Some(why) = &auth.unauthenticated {
if auth.is_forge() {
// Not fatal here — the push below reports its own failure — but the
// reason belongs in the log next to the attempt, not inferred from a
// tty error two layers down.
eprintln!("library: pushing to the forge WITHOUT credentials — {why}");
}
}
let auth = auth.url;
let refspec = format!("HEAD:refs/heads/{branch}");
match git(&vault, &["push", &auth, &refspec]).await {
Ok(_) => {
+126
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
//! A process-wide push bus for live taxonomy events.
//!
//! `/api/world/live` is a 2-second database poll. That is the right shape for
//! state you can query — statuses, phases, telemetry — and the wrong shape for a
//! token stream: an agent's reasoning only becomes visible after the step
//! finishes and its text is persisted, so the REASONING STREAM card showed
//! completed paragraphs rather than an agent thinking.
//!
//! This carries the frames that cannot wait for a round trip through Postgres.
//! `topology_exec` publishes as the runtime's WebSocket delivers them; the SSE
//! handler subscribes and forwards, so a chunk reaches the browser in one hop.
//!
//! **Why a global rather than a field on `AppState`.** The publisher is
//! `topology_exec`, reached through `phase_runner` → `topology_worker` →
//! `MissionTap`, none of which hold `AppState`. Threading a handle through all
//! of them would put a UI concern into four layers that have no other reason to
//! know about one. There is exactly one bus per process and it holds no
//! per-request state, so a `OnceLock` is the honest representation.
//!
//! **Lossy on purpose.** A slow reader lags and skips rather than applying
//! backpressure to the agent that is producing. Dropping frames degrades a live
//! view; blocking would slow the mission to the speed of the slowest open tab.
//! The durable record is `mission_events` — this bus is the fast path, never the
//! source of truth.
use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
use serde_json::Value;
use tokio::sync::broadcast;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Bounded so a stalled subscriber costs memory once, not unboundedly. At
/// token granularity a busy mission produces a few hundred frames a second;
/// this is roughly a couple of seconds of slack before a slow reader starts
/// skipping.
const CAPACITY: usize = 2048;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct LiveEvent {
/// Every subscriber is workspace-scoped; the bus is not.
pub workspace_id: Uuid,
/// A taxonomy type, e.g. `agent.reasoning.delta`.
pub kind: String,
pub data: Value,
}
pub struct LiveBus {
tx: broadcast::Sender<LiveEvent>,
}
impl LiveBus {
fn new() -> LiveBus {
let (tx, _rx) = broadcast::channel(CAPACITY);
LiveBus { tx }
}
/// Publish. Returns immediately, and succeeds even with no subscribers —
/// nobody watching is the normal case, not an error.
pub fn publish(&self, workspace_id: Uuid, kind: &str, data: Value) {
let _ = self.tx.send(LiveEvent {
workspace_id,
kind: kind.to_string(),
data,
});
}
pub fn subscribe(&self) -> broadcast::Receiver<LiveEvent> {
self.tx.subscribe()
}
}
static BUS: OnceLock<Arc<LiveBus>> = OnceLock::new();
pub fn global() -> &'static Arc<LiveBus> {
BUS.get_or_init(|| Arc::new(LiveBus::new()))
}
/// The claw alias the runtime dispatches on (`claw_<uuid>`) → the agent id the
/// UI keys on. Returns `None` for any other alias — the governor, the door and
/// the evaluator all drive turns under names that are not claws, and attributing
/// their output to an agent would put words in someone's mouth.
pub fn agent_id_from_alias(alias: &str) -> Option<Uuid> {
Uuid::parse_str(alias.strip_prefix("claw_")?).ok()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn only_claw_aliases_resolve_to_an_agent() {
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
assert_eq!(
agent_id_from_alias(&format!("claw_{id}")),
Some(id),
"the runtime's own alias form must resolve"
);
// These drive real turns and must NOT be attributed to an agent.
for other in ["scout", "coordinator", "door", "evaluator", "claw_nonsense"] {
assert_eq!(agent_id_from_alias(other), None, "{other}");
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_subscriber_receives_what_is_published() {
let bus = LiveBus::new();
let mut rx = bus.subscribe();
let ws = Uuid::now_v7();
bus.publish(
ws,
"agent.reasoning.delta",
serde_json::json!({"text": "hi"}),
);
let ev = rx.recv().await.expect("delivered");
assert_eq!(ev.workspace_id, ws);
assert_eq!(ev.kind, "agent.reasoning.delta");
}
/// Publishing with nobody listening must not error — that is the common
/// case (no browser open) and it must never disturb the mission.
#[test]
fn publishing_into_the_void_is_fine() {
let bus = LiveBus::new();
bus.publish(Uuid::now_v7(), "agent.tool.call", serde_json::json!({}));
}
}
+12
View File
@@ -166,6 +166,18 @@ async fn policy_decide(
} else {
state.runtime.judge(system, &request).await
};
// Fail-open is deliberate, but a governor that is failing open on EVERY
// request is a security control that has quietly stopped existing —
// and the caller drops `reason` whenever it allows, so nothing said so.
// `judge()` returns this exact prefix when the provider never answered,
// which a rate-limited or uncredited judge model does on every call.
if allow && reason.starts_with("governor unreachable") {
eprintln!(
"mcp_door: WARNING — the door governor is FAILING OPEN for {mcp_tool} \
({reason}). Every outbound action is being approved unjudged. Point \
CLAWMATES_JUDGE_MODEL at a reachable model."
);
}
if !allow {
return PolicyOutcome::Deny(format!("governor agent vetoed — {reason}"));
}
+354
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,354 @@
//! Drive a fleet node's microVMs from the server.
//!
//! Thin by design: the node owns the VM lifecycle (see
//! `clawmates-node::microvm`), and this is the typed way to ask it. Every call
//! is one `vm_*` op over the existing `NodeHub` request/response channel, so
//! there is no new transport, correlation or timeout machinery.
//!
//! # Not a `SandboxDriver`
//!
//! `RemoteDriver` exists to marshal `SandboxDriver` over the hub, and reusing it
//! was the plan. That trait is container-shaped — `attach_pty`, `resize_pty`,
//! argv `exec` — while a mission needs inject → run → collect. Conforming would
//! mean implementing PTY-over-vsock semantics that nothing calls, so this speaks
//! the smaller interface the mission path actually uses.
//!
//! # Timeouts
//!
//! The hub defaults to 20s, which is right for a create (measured: ~1s) and
//! badly wrong for an agent turn. `exec` therefore takes its own budget and
//! passes it to BOTH the hub and the guest, with the hub's slightly longer: if
//! the guest's own timeout fires first the reply says so, whereas a hub timeout
//! leaves us guessing whether the command is still running.
use cm_domain::NodeId;
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use crate::fleet::NodeHub;
/// Slack between the guest's deadline and the hub's, so the guest's own timeout
/// wins the race and we get a real answer rather than a transport error.
const HUB_GRACE_SECS: u64 = 30;
/// How long the hub waits for a command whose own budget is `guest_secs`.
///
/// Saturating, not `+`: a caller passing a very large budget would otherwise
/// overflow and panic in debug or wrap to a tiny timeout in release — the second
/// being far worse, since it turns a long-running agent turn into a spurious
/// transport failure.
fn hub_deadline(guest_secs: u64) -> u64 {
guest_secs.saturating_add(HUB_GRACE_SECS)
}
pub struct MicroVm<'a> {
hub: &'a NodeHub,
node_id: NodeId,
vm_id: String,
}
impl<'a> MicroVm<'a> {
pub fn new(hub: &'a NodeHub, node_id: NodeId, vm_id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
hub,
node_id,
vm_id: vm_id.into(),
}
}
pub fn vm_id(&self) -> &str {
&self.vm_id
}
/// One op, with the node's `output` string parsed back into JSON.
///
/// `output` is a String on the wire (`Uplink::Result`), and a node that
/// answered with a JSON object instead made the whole frame unparseable —
/// the reply then vanished into the uplink's error arm and the call timed
/// out with nothing explaining why. Parsing here, loudly, keeps that
/// mismatch a visible error rather than a mystery timeout.
async fn call(&self, op: &str, mut args: Value, secs: u64) -> Result<Value, String> {
if let Some(o) = args.as_object_mut() {
o.insert("vm_id".into(), Value::String(self.vm_id.clone()));
}
let out = self
.hub
.call_timeout(self.node_id, op, args, secs)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("{op} on node {:?}: {e}", self.node_id))?;
let body: Value = serde_json::from_str(&out.output)
.map_err(|e| format!("{op} returned unparseable output ({e}): {}", out.output))?;
if !out.ok {
let why = body
.get("error")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.unwrap_or(&out.output);
return Err(format!("{op} failed: {why}"));
}
Ok(body)
}
/// Boot the VM. Returns only once its guest agent has answered.
///
/// `backend` selects the rootfs image (`missions.backend`); `None` boots the
/// node's default. A backend whose image is not built on that node is an
/// error naming the file — never a quiet fall back to the default, which
/// would run a claude mission in a kimi VM and report success.
pub async fn create(
&self,
vcpus: u32,
mem_mib: u32,
backend: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Value, String> {
// 60s, not the hub default: a create that has to copy a rootfs and boot
// is measured near 1s, but a node under load has no reason to be fast.
self.call(
"vm_create",
json!({ "vcpus": vcpus, "mem_mib": mem_mib, "backend": backend }),
60,
)
.await
}
/// Unpack a tar inside the guest at `dest`.
///
/// Takes the archive bytes rather than a path: the server holds the mission
/// checkout, the node does not, and shipping the tar is the whole point of
/// the inject → run → collect model.
pub async fn inject(&self, dest: &str, tar: &[u8]) -> Result<Value, String> {
use base64::Engine as _;
let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(tar);
self.call("vm_inject", json!({ "dest": dest, "tar_b64": b64 }), 120)
.await
}
/// Run a shell command in the guest.
///
/// `Ok` means the command RAN; the exit code is in the payload. A non-zero
/// exit is not an error here — the caller has to be able to tell "the build
/// failed" from "we could not reach the VM", and collapsing them is the
/// defect this codebase keeps paying for.
/// `env` carries the provider credentials (see
/// [`crate::mission_runtime::forwarded_provider_env`]). It is sent, never
/// logged: this is the only channel by which a secret reaches the guest, and
/// the guest refuses the exec rather than running a command without an entry
/// it could not honour.
pub async fn exec(
&self,
cmd: &str,
cwd: Option<&str>,
timeout_secs: u64,
env: &[(String, String)],
) -> Result<ExecOut, String> {
self.exec_attributed(cmd, cwd, timeout_secs, env, None, None)
.await
}
/// The same exec, tagged with the run whose live output this is.
///
/// When `run_id` is set the node follows `log_path` inside the guest for the
/// life of the command and streams what it reads to the server. Probes pass
/// `None`: they produce nothing worth streaming and have no subscriber.
pub async fn exec_attributed(
&self,
cmd: &str,
cwd: Option<&str>,
timeout_secs: u64,
env: &[(String, String)],
run_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
log_path: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<ExecOut, String> {
let env: Option<Value> = (!env.is_empty()).then(|| {
env.iter()
.map(|(k, v)| (k.clone(), Value::String(v.clone())))
.collect::<serde_json::Map<_, _>>()
.into()
});
let v = self
.call(
"vm_exec",
json!({
"cmd": cmd, "cwd": cwd, "timeout": timeout_secs, "env": env,
"run_id": run_id.map(|r| r.to_string()), "log_path": log_path,
}),
hub_deadline(timeout_secs),
)
.await?;
// A guest that refused to run the command reports `ok: false` and no rc
// — a rejected env entry, for instance. Surface its reason: falling
// through to the missing-rc error below would hide the cause behind a
// symptom.
if v.get("ok").and_then(Value::as_bool) == Some(false) {
return Err(format!(
"vm_exec did not run: {}",
v.get("error").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or("unknown")
));
}
// A missing rc is not "success" — it means the guest did not report one,
// which we must not read as zero.
let rc = v
.get("rc")
.and_then(Value::as_i64)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("vm_exec gave no exit code: {v}"))?;
Ok(ExecOut {
rc,
stdout: v
.get("stdout")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.unwrap_or_default()
.to_string(),
stderr: v
.get("stderr")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.unwrap_or_default()
.to_string(),
})
}
/// Tar a path out of the guest and return the archive bytes.
/// `exclude` names directories to leave out — build output, caches. Sent from
/// here so the policy lives in one place: `mission_fs::transport_excludes`,
/// the same list the delivery diff uses. Shipping `target/` blew this call's
/// 300s budget twice, each time with the agent's work finished and stranded.
pub async fn collect(&self, path: &str, exclude: &[&str]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
use base64::Engine as _;
let v = self
.call("vm_collect", json!({ "path": path, "exclude": exclude }), 300)
.await?;
// The guest reports its own `ok`: a missing path is a real failure that
// must not come back as an empty archive, which would look exactly like
// a run that produced nothing.
if v.get("ok").and_then(Value::as_bool) != Some(true) {
return Err(format!(
"vm_collect {path}: {}",
v.get("error").and_then(Value::as_str).unwrap_or("unknown")
));
}
let b64 = v
.get("tar_b64")
.and_then(Value::as_str)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("vm_collect {path} returned no archive: {v}"))?;
base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
.decode(b64)
.map_err(|e| format!("vm_collect {path}: undecodable archive: {e}"))
}
/// Stop the VM and remove everything it owned. Idempotent.
pub async fn destroy(&self) -> Result<Value, String> {
self.call("vm_destroy", json!({}), 60).await
}
}
/// The result of a command that RAN. `rc != 0` is a normal outcome.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ExecOut {
pub rc: i64,
pub stdout: String,
pub stderr: String,
}
impl ExecOut {
pub fn ok(&self) -> bool {
self.rc == 0
}
/// One line for a log or an artifact, without dumping a whole build.
pub fn summary(&self) -> String {
let tail = |s: &str| {
s.lines()
.rev()
.take(3)
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.into_iter()
.rev()
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" | ")
};
if self.ok() {
format!("rc=0 {}", tail(&self.stdout))
} else {
format!("rc={} {}", self.rc, tail(&self.stderr))
}
}
}
/// VMs a node currently holds, so orphans can be reaped.
pub async fn list(hub: &NodeHub, node_id: NodeId) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
let out = hub
.call(node_id, "vm_list", json!({}))
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("vm_list on node {node_id:?}: {e}"))?;
let body: Value = serde_json::from_str(&out.output)
.map_err(|e| format!("vm_list returned unparseable output ({e}): {}", out.output))?;
Ok(body
.get("vms")
.and_then(Value::as_array)
.map(|a| {
a.iter()
.filter_map(|v| v.get("vm_id").and_then(Value::as_str))
.map(str::to_string)
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// A command that ran and failed must be distinguishable from one that
/// could not be reached. `rc` carries the verdict; `Err` is for transport.
#[test]
fn a_nonzero_exit_is_an_outcome_not_an_error() {
let failed = ExecOut {
rc: 3,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: "boom\n".into(),
};
assert!(!failed.ok());
assert!(failed.summary().starts_with("rc=3"));
assert!(failed.summary().contains("boom"));
let passed = ExecOut {
rc: 0,
stdout: "fine\n".into(),
stderr: String::new(),
};
assert!(passed.ok());
assert_eq!(passed.summary(), "rc=0 fine");
}
/// The summary is for logs, so it must stay short even when a build prints
/// thousands of lines — and it must keep the LAST lines, where the error is.
#[test]
fn the_summary_keeps_the_tail_and_stays_short() {
let noisy = ExecOut {
rc: 1,
stdout: String::new(),
stderr: (1..=500)
.map(|i| format!("line {i}"))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n"),
};
let s = noisy.summary();
assert!(s.contains("line 500"), "the last line must survive: {s}");
assert!(!s.contains("line 400"), "older lines must be dropped: {s}");
assert!(s.len() < 200, "summary must stay log-sized, got {}", s.len());
}
/// The guest's deadline must fire before the hub's, so a slow command comes
/// back as a reported timeout rather than an unexplained transport failure.
#[test]
fn the_hub_always_outlives_the_guests_own_timeout() {
for guest in [0u64, 1, 30, 3600, 86_400] {
assert!(
hub_deadline(guest) > guest,
"hub deadline for {guest}s must exceed it"
);
}
// A caller passing a huge budget must not wrap to a tiny timeout, which
// would turn a long agent turn into a spurious transport failure.
assert!(
hub_deadline(u64::MAX) >= u64::MAX - 1,
"an extreme budget must saturate, not wrap"
);
}
}
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//! The two engines composed — Slice 4.
//!
//! Engine Z (the ZeroClaw graph in `cm_orchestrator`) owns durability and
//! heterogeneity: deterministic planners, per-step checkpoint/resume, a stale-run
//! sweep, cancellation, and a different model per node. Engine C (Claude Code in
//! a microVM) owns shared context, self-sizing and cheap fan-out. Neither has the
//! other's asset, which is why keeping both is a composition rather than a
//! compromise.
//!
//! This module is the join: a [`TurnExecutor`] whose "turn" is a whole
//! Claude-Code-in-a-VM session. Because `topology_worker` already dispatches by
//! tier, implementing the existing trait inherits the planners, checkpointing,
//! reaper, cancellation, `close_finished_phases`, evaluation, capture and
//! delivery unchanged. `recursive_exec::SubTopologyExecutor` is the precedent: a
//! `run_turn` may be arbitrarily heavy.
//!
//! # The file-handoff trap
//!
//! A VM is inject-tar → run → collect-tar → destroy. A graph of per-node VMs with
//! **text-only** handoff would silently lose every file an earlier node wrote:
//! node 2 would boot from the original checkout, see none of node 1's work, and
//! still report success — the exact silent-success shape this project keeps
//! paying for.
//!
//! The answer here is that the mission's **host checkout is the medium**. Every
//! node injects from `repo` and collects back over `repo`, so the tree carries
//! forward node to node and the last node's tree is what delivery diffs. Two
//! properties make that safe rather than lucky:
//!
//! - `execute_resumable` runs steps strictly **sequentially**, so two VMs are
//! never writing the same host directory at once;
//! - the vm id is deterministic per (phase, iteration, step), so a resumed step
//! whose VM is somehow still alive is refused by the node ("vm already exists")
//! instead of quietly producing a second writer.
//!
//! `a_later_node_sees_an_earlier_nodes_files` proves the handoff, and
//! `text_only_handoff_loses_the_earlier_nodes_work` is its negative control.
//!
//! # Keeping a long turn alive
//!
//! `requeue_stale` requeues a `running` job that has not touched `updated_at` in
//! 180 seconds, and one node here can run for an hour. `SubTopologyExecutor`
//! keeps its parent alive from each *leaf step*, which it has and this does not:
//! there is nothing between the start and end of a VM turn. So the turn holds a
//! ticker that touches `updated_at` every [`KEEPALIVE_SECS`] and is aborted on
//! drop. Without it a healthy composed run is requeued mid-node, claimed again,
//! and boots a second VM against the same checkout.
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use cm_domain::NodeId;
use cm_orchestrator::{OrchestratorError, TurnExecutor, TurnOutcome, TurnRequest};
use sqlx::PgPool;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::microvm_executor::{PhaseVm, VmPhase};
/// How often a running VM turn touches its run's `updated_at`.
///
/// Comfortably inside the 180s stale window, and cheap: one UPDATE per node per
/// half minute against a row nothing else is writing.
const KEEPALIVE_SECS: u64 = 30;
/// A [`TurnExecutor`] that runs each graph node as a full Claude-Code session
/// inside its own microVM, against the mission's shared host checkout.
pub struct MicroVmTurnExecutor<V: PhaseVm> {
vms: V,
pool: PgPool,
/// The durable outer run. Touched for keepalive; its status gates the turn.
run_id: Uuid,
mission_id: Uuid,
phase_id: Uuid,
iteration: i32,
/// The mission's host checkout — injected into every node's VM and collected
/// back over, which is how file work survives a node boundary.
repo: PathBuf,
/// Whether the mission has a repository. Carried so every graph node gets
/// the same workspace treatment as a solo phase — see `VmPhase::has_repo`.
has_repo: bool,
/// `missions.target_node_id`: the fleet node a mission was placed on. A node
/// may override it with `attrs["node_id"]`.
default_fleet_node: Option<Uuid>,
/// `missions.backend`: which rootfs image. A node may override it with
/// `attrs["backend"]`, which is what makes a graph heterogeneous — a
/// `validator` node on a different provider's image is then a first-class
/// graph node rather than a bolt-on.
default_backend: Option<String>,
/// `missions.team_engine`, passed through so a composed node can itself ask
/// for Claude Code fan-out inside its VM.
team_engine: Option<String>,
/// The phase's completion gate, enforced inside every node's VM.
gate: Option<crate::vm_stop_gate::StopGate>,
/// Which step is next. `execute_resumable` is sequential and gives the
/// executor no index, so the executor counts — and the count starts from the
/// checkpoint on resume, or two VMs would share an id across a restart.
step: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32,
}
/// Everything a composed run needs that is not the graph itself.
pub struct ComposedRun {
pub run_id: Uuid,
pub mission_id: Uuid,
pub phase_id: Uuid,
pub iteration: i32,
pub repo: PathBuf,
pub has_repo: bool,
pub target_node_id: Option<Uuid>,
pub backend: Option<String>,
pub team_engine: Option<String>,
/// What must hold before a node's agent may stop. See [`crate::vm_stop_gate`].
pub gate: Option<crate::vm_stop_gate::StopGate>,
/// Steps already completed, from the durable checkpoint. Nonzero on resume.
pub completed_steps: u32,
}
impl<V: PhaseVm> MicroVmTurnExecutor<V> {
pub fn new(vms: V, pool: PgPool, r: ComposedRun) -> Self {
Self {
vms,
pool,
run_id: r.run_id,
mission_id: r.mission_id,
phase_id: r.phase_id,
iteration: r.iteration,
repo: r.repo,
has_repo: r.has_repo,
default_fleet_node: r.target_node_id,
default_backend: r.backend,
team_engine: r.team_engine,
gate: r.gate,
step: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(r.completed_steps),
}
}
/// Which fleet node this graph node runs on.
///
/// Fail-closed on a malformed override: placing a node on the mission's node
/// because its own `node_id` did not parse would run the work somewhere the
/// graph did not ask for and say nothing.
fn fleet_node(&self, req: &TurnRequest) -> Result<NodeId, OrchestratorError> {
let id = match req.attrs.get("node_id") {
Some(raw) => Uuid::parse_str(raw.trim()).map_err(|_| {
OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"node {} has an invalid node_id attr: {raw}",
req.node_id
))
})?,
None => self.default_fleet_node.ok_or_else(|| {
OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"node {} has no node_id attr and the mission has no \
target_node_id — a microVM node cannot run on the gateway, \
which has no /dev/kvm",
req.node_id
))
})?,
};
Ok(NodeId::from(id))
}
}
impl<V: PhaseVm> TurnExecutor for MicroVmTurnExecutor<V> {
async fn run_turn(&self, req: TurnRequest) -> Result<TurnOutcome, OrchestratorError> {
let fleet_node = self.fleet_node(&req)?;
let backend = req
.attrs
.get("backend")
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.or_else(|| self.default_backend.clone());
if !self.repo.is_dir() {
return Err(OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"mission has no checkout at {} — a composed node needs the \
repository, and it is also how the previous node's work reaches \
this one",
self.repo.display()
)));
}
let step = self
.step
.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
// Held for the length of the VM turn: an hour of silence would otherwise
// look exactly like a dead worker to `requeue_stale`.
let _alive = Keepalive::spawn(self.pool.clone(), self.run_id);
let task = node_task_text(&req);
let outcome = self
.vms
.run(VmPhase {
// Every node of a composed graph streams to the same outer run,
// which is the one the operator is watching.
run_id: Some(self.run_id),
node_id: fleet_node,
mission_id: self.mission_id,
phase_id: self.phase_id,
iteration: self.iteration,
task: &task,
backend: backend.as_deref(),
repo: &self.repo,
has_repo: self.has_repo,
team_engine: self.team_engine.as_deref(),
// Each node is its own agent session, so each carries the
// phase's gate. Threaded from the run rather than rebuilt here:
// one source for what "done" means, whichever executor asks.
gate: self.gate.as_ref(),
step: Some(step),
// Same live drain as the solo path. A composed graph node can
// run for an hour too, and its files are the only account of
// what it did until the next node collects.
tap_sink: Some(crate::phase_runner::vm_tool_recorder(
&self.pool,
self.mission_id,
self.phase_id,
self.run_id,
)),
})
.await
.map_err(|e| {
OrchestratorError::Executor(format!("node {} in a microVM: {e}", req.node_id))
})?;
// Recorded BEFORE the failure branches below. A node that could not be
// collected, or whose gate capped, still touched files — and on this
// path those touches are the only account of what it did, since the
// work never reached a diff.
crate::phase_runner::record_vm_tools(
&self.pool,
self.mission_id,
self.phase_id,
self.run_id,
&outcome.tools,
)
.await;
// A node whose work never came back must fail the run rather than hand
// the next node a tree missing the previous one's edits. On this path an
// uncollected turn is worse than on the solo one: the loss is silent,
// because the next node still boots from a checkout that looks fine.
if !outcome.collected {
return Err(OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"node {}'s work could not be collected from its VM, so the next \
node would not see it: {}",
req.node_id,
outcome.summary.chars().take(400).collect::<String>()
)));
}
// Same rule as the solo path: the gate is the only thing that runs a
// `done_when_check`, so a release at the cap must fail the run rather
// than hand the next node a tree that does not satisfy the condition
// every node in this graph was told to satisfy.
if outcome.released_at_cap == Some(true) {
return Err(OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"node {}'s completion gate released it after {} refusal(s) with its check \
still failing: {}",
req.node_id,
crate::vm_stop_gate::MAX_BLOCKS,
outcome.summary.chars().take(400).collect::<String>()
)));
}
if outcome.rc != 0 {
return Err(OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"node {} exited {}: {}",
req.node_id,
outcome.rc,
outcome.summary.chars().take(400).collect::<String>()
)));
}
eprintln!(
"microvm_turn_executor: run {} node {} (role {}, step {}) ok — subagents: {}",
self.run_id,
req.node_id,
req.role,
step,
outcome
.subagents
.map(|n| n.to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "?".into()),
);
Ok(TurnOutcome {
output: outcome.summary,
// `claude -p` does not report token usage on stdout, and inventing a
// number here would corrupt the run totals the harness reads. Zero is
// the honest value for "not measured on this path".
tokens: 0,
gated: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
/// What one graph node is told.
///
/// The upstream outputs are included as context, but the load-bearing sentence is
/// that the previous node's *files* are already in the tree: a node told only
/// about the text would re-do work it is standing on.
fn node_task_text(req: &TurnRequest) -> String {
let mut s = format!(
"You are the `{}` stage of a multi-stage mission.\n\nMISSION TASK\n{}\n",
req.role, req.task
);
if !req.context.is_empty() {
s.push_str(
"\nWHAT CAME BEFORE\nThe earlier stages' work is ALREADY IN THIS \
WORKING TREE — the repository you have been given is their output, \
not a fresh checkout. Read the files before changing them, and do \
not redo what is already done. Their closing reports:\n",
);
for (i, c) in req.context.iter().enumerate() {
s.push_str(&format!("\n--- stage {} ---\n{}\n", i + 1, c));
}
}
s
}
/// Touches a run's `updated_at` until dropped.
struct Keepalive(tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>);
impl Keepalive {
fn spawn(pool: PgPool, run_id: Uuid) -> Self {
Keepalive(tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(KEEPALIVE_SECS));
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
let _ = cm_db::repo::topology_runs::touch(&pool, run_id).await;
}
}))
}
}
impl Drop for Keepalive {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.0.abort();
}
}
/// Build the executor the worker uses, over real VMs on the fleet.
pub fn for_fleet(
hub: Arc<crate::fleet::NodeHub>,
pool: PgPool,
r: ComposedRun,
) -> MicroVmTurnExecutor<crate::microvm_executor::HubVms> {
MicroVmTurnExecutor::new(crate::microvm_executor::HubVms::new(hub), pool, r)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::microvm_executor::VmOutcome;
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::sync::Mutex;
/// A VM modelled honestly: the host tree is packed in, the "agent" works on a
/// COPY that no host path points at, and the result is unpacked back over the
/// host tree. That is the real inject → run → collect shape, which is what
/// makes the negative control below meaningful — remove the collect and the
/// handoff breaks exactly as it would in production.
struct FakeVms {
/// Whether the guest's tree is collected back to the host.
collect: bool,
/// vm ids used, in order — the id is what stops two nodes colliding.
ids: Mutex<Vec<String>>,
/// (backend, fleet node) per call, for the heterogeneity assertions.
placements: Mutex<Vec<(Option<String>, NodeId)>>,
}
impl FakeVms {
fn new(collect: bool) -> Self {
Self {
collect,
ids: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
placements: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
}
}
}
impl PhaseVm for FakeVms {
async fn run(&self, p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
self.ids
.lock()
.unwrap()
.push(format!("{}-{:?}", p.phase_id.simple(), p.step));
self.placements
.lock()
.unwrap()
.push((p.backend.map(str::to_string), p.node_id));
// inject: the host checkout goes in as a tar.
let tar = crate::mission_fs::pack_dir(p.repo, "repo")?;
let guest = tempfile::tempdir().map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
crate::mission_fs::unpack_into(&tar, guest.path())?;
let guest_repo = guest.path().join("repo");
// run: the agent records that it was here, and reports what it found
// of the previous stages — the observation the handoff test reads.
let seen: Vec<String> = std::fs::read_dir(&guest_repo)
.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?
.filter_map(|e| e.ok())
.map(|e| e.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string())
.filter(|n| n.starts_with("stage-"))
.collect();
let mine = guest_repo.join(format!("stage-{}.txt", p.step.unwrap_or(0)));
std::fs::write(&mine, "work").map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
// collect: the guest tree comes back over the same host path.
if self.collect {
let back = crate::mission_fs::pack_dir(&guest_repo, "repo")?;
let parent = p.repo.parent().ok_or("no parent")?;
crate::mission_fs::unpack_into(&back, parent)?;
}
Ok(VmOutcome {
summary: format!("saw:[{}]", seen.join(",")),
rc: 0,
collected: true,
subagents: Some(0),
teammates: None,
stop_blocks: None,
released_at_cap: None,
tools: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
fn req(node: &str, role: &str, context: Vec<String>) -> TurnRequest {
TurnRequest {
node_id: node.into(),
role: role.into(),
agent: None,
attrs: BTreeMap::new(),
task: "build the thing".into(),
context,
}
}
fn exec<V: PhaseVm>(vms: V, repo: PathBuf) -> MicroVmTurnExecutor<V> {
// A pool that is never connected: every test here fails the turn before
// any query, or drives one whose only DB touch is the best-effort
// keepalive (which swallows its own errors by design).
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.max_connections(1)
.connect_lazy("postgres://invalid/invalid")
.expect("a lazy pool never dials");
MicroVmTurnExecutor::new(
vms,
pool,
ComposedRun {
run_id: Uuid::now_v7(),
mission_id: Uuid::now_v7(),
phase_id: Uuid::now_v7(),
iteration: 1,
repo,
has_repo: true,
target_node_id: Some(Uuid::now_v7()),
backend: Some("claude".into()),
team_engine: None,
gate: None,
completed_steps: 0,
},
)
}
fn a_checkout() -> tempfile::TempDir {
let d = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(d.path().join("repo")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(d.path().join("repo").join("README.md"), "hello").unwrap();
d
}
/// THE trap this slice exists to solve. A per-node VM is destroyed with its
/// filesystem, so unless the tree is carried forward, node 2 works from the
/// original checkout and silently loses node 1's edits — while still
/// reporting success.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_later_node_sees_an_earlier_nodes_files() {
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(FakeVms::new(true), d.path().join("repo"));
let first = e.run_turn(req("n1", "implementer", vec![])).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(first.output, "saw:[]", "the first node starts clean");
let second = e
.run_turn(req("n2", "verifier", vec![first.output.clone()]))
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
second.output.contains("stage-0.txt"),
"node 2 could not see node 1's file: {}",
second.output
);
// And the host tree — what delivery diffs — holds both nodes' work.
for f in ["stage-0.txt", "stage-1.txt"] {
assert!(d.path().join("repo").join(f).exists(), "{f} missing on the host");
}
}
/// The negative control, run rather than assumed: with the collect removed —
/// i.e. a text-only handoff between nodes — the test above fails. A guard
/// that cannot detect the bug it was written for is decoration.
#[tokio::test]
async fn text_only_handoff_loses_the_earlier_nodes_work() {
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(FakeVms::new(false), d.path().join("repo"));
e.run_turn(req("n1", "implementer", vec![])).await.unwrap();
let second = e.run_turn(req("n2", "verifier", vec![])).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
second.output, "saw:[]",
"without a collect, node 2 must NOT see node 1's work — if it does, \
this test is no longer controlling anything"
);
assert!(!d.path().join("repo").join("stage-0.txt").exists());
}
/// Each node gets its own vm id within one phase and iteration. Two nodes
/// sharing an id means the second is refused by the fleet node while the
/// first is alive, and indistinguishable from a re-run once it is not.
#[tokio::test]
async fn every_node_runs_in_its_own_vm() {
let d = a_checkout();
let vms = FakeVms::new(true);
let e = exec(vms, d.path().join("repo"));
for n in ["n1", "n2", "n3"] {
e.run_turn(req(n, "worker", vec![])).await.unwrap();
}
let ids = e.vms.ids.lock().unwrap().clone();
let unique: std::collections::HashSet<_> = ids.iter().collect();
assert_eq!(unique.len(), ids.len(), "{ids:?}");
}
/// Resume must not re-use a completed step's vm id. The executor counts steps
/// itself, so the count has to start where the checkpoint left off.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_resumed_run_continues_the_step_numbering() {
let d = a_checkout();
let pool = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
.max_connections(1)
.connect_lazy("postgres://invalid/invalid")
.unwrap();
let e = MicroVmTurnExecutor::new(
FakeVms::new(true),
pool,
ComposedRun {
run_id: Uuid::now_v7(),
mission_id: Uuid::now_v7(),
phase_id: Uuid::now_v7(),
iteration: 1,
repo: d.path().join("repo"),
has_repo: true,
target_node_id: Some(Uuid::now_v7()),
backend: None,
team_engine: None,
gate: None,
completed_steps: 2,
},
);
e.run_turn(req("n3", "worker", vec![])).await.unwrap();
let ids = e.vms.ids.lock().unwrap().clone();
assert!(
ids[0].ends_with("Some(2)"),
"the first step after a resume must be step 2, not 0: {ids:?}"
);
}
/// Per-node `backend` is what makes the outer graph heterogeneous — a
/// validator node on another provider's image. It must override the
/// mission's, and the mission's must still apply to nodes that say nothing.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_node_may_pick_its_own_backend_and_fleet_node() {
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(FakeVms::new(true), d.path().join("repo"));
let elsewhere = Uuid::now_v7();
let mut r = req("n1", "worker", vec![]);
r.attrs.insert("backend".into(), "glm".into());
r.attrs.insert("node_id".into(), elsewhere.to_string());
e.run_turn(r).await.unwrap();
e.run_turn(req("n2", "worker", vec![])).await.unwrap();
let p = e.vms.placements.lock().unwrap().clone();
assert_eq!(p[0].0.as_deref(), Some("glm"));
assert_eq!(p[0].1, NodeId::from(elsewhere));
assert_eq!(p[1].0.as_deref(), Some("claude"), "the mission default");
assert_ne!(p[1].1, NodeId::from(elsewhere));
}
/// A malformed `node_id` must fail the node, not fall back to the mission's.
/// Silently running work somewhere the graph did not ask for is the same
/// class of bug as an alias that serde dropped.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_malformed_node_placement_fails_closed() {
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(FakeVms::new(true), d.path().join("repo"));
let mut r = req("n1", "worker", vec![]);
r.attrs.insert("node_id".into(), "not-a-uuid".into());
let err = e.run_turn(r).await.unwrap_err().to_string();
assert!(err.contains("invalid node_id"), "{err}");
}
/// An uncollected node is a failed run here, not a warning: the next node
/// would boot from a tree that looks fine and is missing this node's work.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_uncollected_node_fails_the_run() {
struct Lost;
impl PhaseVm for Lost {
async fn run(&self, _p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
Ok(VmOutcome {
summary: "did plenty".into(),
rc: 0,
collected: false,
subagents: None,
teammates: None,
stop_blocks: None,
released_at_cap: None,
tools: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(Lost, d.path().join("repo"));
let err = e.run_turn(req("n1", "worker", vec![])).await.unwrap_err().to_string();
assert!(err.contains("could not be collected"), "{err}");
}
/// A node whose gate gave up is a FAILED run, not a completed one.
///
/// The gate is the only thing in the system that ever runs a
/// `done_when_check`. If it releases the agent at the cap and this returns
/// Ok, the check's failure is never seen again: the node reports success,
/// the next node builds on a tree that does not satisfy the condition, and
/// the phase completes green. `rc` is 0 and the work IS collected here on
/// purpose — those are the two signals that used to decide this, and both
/// say "fine".
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_node_whose_gate_gave_up_fails_the_run() {
struct Capped;
impl PhaseVm for Capped {
async fn run(&self, _p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
Ok(VmOutcome {
summary: "I could not get the tests passing, but here is what I did".into(),
rc: 0,
collected: true,
subagents: None,
teammates: None,
stop_blocks: Some(crate::vm_stop_gate::MAX_BLOCKS),
released_at_cap: Some(true),
tools: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(Capped, d.path().join("repo"));
let err = e.run_turn(req("n1", "worker", vec![])).await.unwrap_err().to_string();
assert!(err.contains("released it after"), "{err}");
}
/// The negative control: the SAME number of blocks, without the cap. An
/// agent that was refused three times and then got it right on the fourth
/// try has succeeded, and reports `blocks: 3` exactly like the test above.
/// Failing on the count instead of the mark would fail this healthy run.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_node_that_was_blocked_and_then_succeeded_passes() {
struct Recovered;
impl PhaseVm for Recovered {
async fn run(&self, _p: VmPhase<'_>) -> Result<VmOutcome, String> {
Ok(VmOutcome {
summary: "took me a few tries".into(),
rc: 0,
collected: true,
subagents: None,
teammates: None,
stop_blocks: Some(crate::vm_stop_gate::MAX_BLOCKS),
released_at_cap: Some(false),
tools: Vec::new(),
})
}
}
let d = a_checkout();
let e = exec(Recovered, d.path().join("repo"));
e.run_turn(req("n1", "worker", vec![]))
.await
.expect("a run that recovered inside its own turn is a success");
}
/// A node must be told its predecessors' files are already in the tree.
/// Given only the text, an agent re-does work it is standing on.
#[test]
fn a_downstream_node_is_told_the_work_is_already_in_the_tree() {
let solo = node_task_text(&req("n1", "implementer", vec![]));
assert!(solo.contains("build the thing"));
assert!(!solo.contains("WHAT CAME BEFORE"), "{solo}");
let later = node_task_text(&req("n2", "verifier", vec!["I wrote foo.rs".into()]));
assert!(later.contains("ALREADY IN THIS WORKING TREE"), "{later}");
assert!(later.contains("I wrote foo.rs"), "{later}");
assert!(later.contains("verifier"), "the node's role: {later}");
}
}
+395 -28
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,14 @@ use crate::mission_workspace;
/// coding phase that ran `cargo build` leaves a `target/` directory larger
/// than most repositories, and a patch containing it is unreadable as well as
/// enormous.
const EXCLUDED_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
///
/// `mission_fs` uses this same list for the TRANSPORT, and that is not a
/// convenience — it is the fix for a real failure. The diff excluded `target/`
/// while the tar that carried the tree in and out did not, so a phase that ran
/// `cargo test` shipped its whole build directory over vsock twice. `vm_collect`
/// timed out at 300s on mission 019fd43e with the agent's work finished and
/// stranded inside a VM. Two layers, one list.
pub(crate) const EXCLUDED_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
"target",
"node_modules",
".venv",
@@ -66,6 +73,10 @@ const EXCLUDED_PATHS: &[&str] = &[
/// generated or vendored got committed), and the head of it is what an
/// operator needs to see to work out what happened.
const MAX_PATCH_BYTES: usize = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
/// Cap on the recorded path list. A cap that silently truncates is worse than
/// no cap, so the metadata carries `files_truncated` beside it — a reader must
/// be able to tell "touched 12 files" from "touched at least 500".
const MAX_CAPTURED_PATHS: usize = 500;
/// Who delivery commits as.
///
@@ -109,7 +120,18 @@ pub struct Capture {
/// The phase changed nothing. Still recorded — "this coding phase wrote no
/// code" is currently invisible to an operator, and it is worth saying.
pub empty: bool,
/// Why the diff could not be computed, if it could not be. `empty` is only
/// meaningful when this is `None`: otherwise the tree was never read, and
/// callers deciding anything on the strength of "no changes" must not.
pub diff_error: Option<String>,
pub truncated: bool,
/// The paths this phase touched, with their `--name-status` letter. The
/// diffstat gives counts only; this is what lets anything downstream say
/// WHICH files changed.
pub files: Vec<(char, String)>,
/// The path list hit `MAX_CAPTURED_PATHS`. Recorded so a reader can tell a
/// complete list from a clipped one.
pub files_truncated: bool,
pub patch_path: PathBuf,
/// Set once the work has been committed to a mission branch.
pub committed: Option<Commit>,
@@ -227,19 +249,74 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
// A repo with nothing to add is fine; keep going and let the diff be empty.
let _ = git(&repo, &add).await;
// A failed `git diff` and a phase that changed nothing both yield an empty
// string, and `unwrap_or_default` used to erase the difference: a corrupt
// index or an unreadable base would land `empty: true, files_changed: 0` —
// byte-identical to an honest no-op, and just as quiet. Whatever went
// wrong is recorded so the artifact can say which of the two it was.
let mut diff_error: Option<String> = None;
let mut note_diff_failure = |what: &str, e: String| {
eprintln!(
"mission_delivery: mission {mission_id} phase {phase_id} could not compute \
{what} against {base_sha}: {e}"
);
if diff_error.is_none() {
diff_error = Some(format!("{what}: {}", e.chars().take(300).collect::<String>()));
}
};
let mut diff_args = vec!["diff", base_sha.as_str(), "--"];
diff_args.extend(excludes.iter().map(String::as_str));
let patch = git(&repo, &diff_args).await.unwrap_or_default();
let patch = match git(&repo, &diff_args).await {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(e) => {
note_diff_failure("patch", e);
String::new()
}
};
let mut stat_args = vec!["diff", base_sha.as_str(), "--stat", "--"];
stat_args.extend(excludes.iter().map(String::as_str));
let diffstat = git(&repo, &stat_args).await.unwrap_or_default();
let diffstat = match git(&repo, &stat_args).await {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => {
note_diff_failure("diffstat", e);
String::new()
}
};
// The paths themselves, not just the counts.
//
// The diffstat gives three integers and throws the filenames away, so
// nothing downstream could say WHICH files a phase touched — the World
// could draw a "coding" station but nothing under it. Same `base_sha` and
// the same excludes as the `--stat` call above: if the two disagreed,
// `files_changed` and this list would contradict each other and nobody
// could tell which one lied.
//
// Must run BEFORE the reset below — `--intent-to-add` is what makes newly
// created files visible to diff at all.
let mut name_args = vec!["diff", base_sha.as_str(), "--name-status", "--"];
name_args.extend(excludes.iter().map(String::as_str));
let name_status = match git(&repo, &name_args).await {
Ok(s) => s,
Err(e) => {
note_diff_failure("name-status", e);
String::new()
}
};
// Put the index back. `--intent-to-add` is a mutation of the agent's
// workspace, and capture must not change what a later commit would see.
let _ = git(&repo, &["reset", "--quiet"]).await;
let (files_changed, insertions, deletions) = parse_diffstat(&diffstat);
// Shared with auto_merge so the two cannot disagree about what a
// `--name-status` line means (renames are three fields; the NEW path is the
// one that changed).
let all_paths = crate::auto_merge::changed_paths(&name_status);
let files_truncated = all_paths.len() > MAX_CAPTURED_PATHS;
let files: Vec<(char, String)> = all_paths.into_iter().take(MAX_CAPTURED_PATHS).collect();
let empty = patch.trim().is_empty();
let truncated = patch.len() > MAX_PATCH_BYTES;
let stored = if truncated {
@@ -258,6 +335,9 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
let patch_path = dir.join("diff.patch");
std::fs::write(&patch_path, &stored)
.map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", patch_path.display()))?;
// Raw evidence on disk, independent of the JSONB. When the metadata and
// the picture disagree, this is the tiebreaker.
let _ = std::fs::write(dir.join("names.txt"), &name_status);
std::fs::write(dir.join("diffstat.txt"), &diffstat)
.map_err(|e| format!("write diffstat: {e}"))?;
@@ -293,15 +373,42 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
// Gate, then publish. Both are best-effort on top of an artifact that has
// already landed: a phase whose tests fail, or whose push is rejected,
// still has its patch on disk and its work on a local branch.
//
// `empty` suppresses publishing, so a diff we could not COMPUTE would
// otherwise skip the push and leave `push_error: null` — the phase looking
// exactly like one that correctly had nothing to publish. See
// [`untrusted_empty_reason`].
let mut outcome: Option<TestOutcome> = None;
let mut published: Option<Publish> = None;
let mut publish_error: Option<String> = None;
let mut publish_error: Option<String> = untrusted_empty_reason(empty, diff_error.as_deref());
if let Some(c) = committed.as_ref() {
if !empty {
if gate == Gate::OnGreenTests {
let container = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "clawmates-runtime".to_string());
let o = verify_tests(&repo, &container).await;
// Against a COPY, never the checkout. `verify_tests` execs
// `cargo test` in a container running as ROOT, which writes
// `target/` — in the live tree that leaves root-owned build
// output in a checkout owned by uid 65532 and breaks the
// single-writer invariant. Measured the first time this gate
// ever ran end to end: `uids=0,65532`.
//
// The gate had been implemented but never exercised (every
// harness fixture used `commit_policy: "always"`), which is why
// a bug this mechanical survived in it.
let gate_root = crate::root_copy::copy_root("_gate", mission_id);
crate::root_copy::purge(&container, &gate_root).await;
let o = match crate::root_copy::RootCopy::of(&repo, &gate_root) {
Ok(copy) => {
let r = verify_tests(copy.workdir(), &container).await;
crate::root_copy::purge(&container, &gate_root).await;
r
}
// Fail-closed: an unverifiable suite must not license a push.
Err(e) => TestOutcome::CouldNotRun(format!(
"could not copy the checkout to test it: {e}"
)),
};
// An infrastructure fault must be loud. The gate degrades
// safely either way, but "we could not run the suite" is a
// problem with the platform and needs to look like one.
@@ -327,7 +434,14 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
could not publish {}: {e}",
c.branch
);
publish_error = Some(e.chars().take(500).collect());
// Both ends, not the first 500 chars. Git prints its
// REASON last — "non-fast-forward", "fetch first",
// "protected branch" — so a head-only clamp keeps the
// noise and drops the answer. A real push failure was
// recorded as two auth lines plus a branch name cut
// off mid-word, with the reject reason gone.
publish_error =
Some(crate::evaluator_tools::clamp_output(&e));
}
}
}
@@ -379,7 +493,18 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
"insertions": insertions,
"deletions": deletions,
"empty": empty,
// Non-null means `empty`/`files_changed` describe a failed read, not
// an unchanged tree. Readers that treat `empty: true` as "the phase
// did nothing" must check this first.
"diff_error": diff_error,
"truncated": truncated,
// WHICH files, not just how many. Same base_sha and the same excludes
// as `files_changed`, so the two describe the same diff.
"files": files
.iter()
.map(|(st, path)| serde_json::json!({ "status": st.to_string(), "path": path }))
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
"files_truncated": files_truncated,
"excluded_paths": EXCLUDED_PATHS,
});
std::fs::write(
@@ -388,8 +513,11 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
)
.map_err(|e| format!("write delivery.json: {e}"))?;
// Path is stored relative to the missions root, matching how
// `pdf_renderer` resolves artifact paths.
// Path is stored relative to the MISSIONS ROOT — the convention every
// artifact uses, and what `routes::missions::artifact_content` resolves
// against. (The old `pdf_renderer` claimed to match this and did not: it
// joined the mission id first, producing a doubled id and ENOENT. It is
// gone; this comment named it as the authority, which it never was.)
let rel = format!("_outputs/{mission_id}/{phase_id}/diff.patch");
cm_db::repo::missions::register_artifact(
pool,
@@ -426,32 +554,41 @@ pub async fn capture_phase_diff_at(
insertions,
deletions,
empty,
diff_error,
truncated,
files,
files_truncated,
patch_path,
}))
}
/// Run git in `repo`, returning stdout.
///
/// Every invocation carries `-c safe.directory`: the server clones as uid
/// 65532 while agents write into the same tree as root, so without it git
/// refuses the repository outright — the failure that had the phase evaluator
/// silently falling back to guesswork.
/// Every invocation carries `-c safe.directory`: under `CLAWMATES_MISSION_FS=bind`
/// the server clones as uid 65532 while agents write into the same tree as
/// root, so without it git refuses the repository outright — the failure that
/// had the phase evaluator silently falling back to guesswork. Copy mode makes
/// the tree single-uid and this redundant, but it stays while the bind path is
/// still selectable: a workaround may only be deleted once the situation it
/// works around can no longer be chosen.
async fn git(repo: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String, String> {
let repo_s = repo.display().to_string();
let mut full = vec![
"-C",
&repo_s,
"-c",
// Leaked into a `String` so it can live in a `&str` slice alongside
// the borrowed args; the process is short-lived and this is one
// allocation per git call.
Box::leak(format!("safe.directory={repo_s}").into_boxed_str()),
// Owned, not `Box::leak`. The leak was justified as "the process is
// short-lived", which is true of a CLI and false of cm-api — it is a
// long-running server, so that was one permanently leaked allocation per
// git call, growing with every phase of every mission for the life of the
// process.
let mut full: Vec<String> = vec![
"-C".into(),
repo_s.clone(),
"-c".into(),
format!("safe.directory={repo_s}"),
];
full.extend_from_slice(args);
full.extend(args.iter().map(|a| (*a).to_string()));
let (name, email) = commit_identity();
let out = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
.args(&full)
let mut cmd = tokio::process::Command::new("git");
cmd.args(&full);
let out = crate::mission_workspace::no_terminal_prompt(&mut cmd)
// The server container has no git identity — `git config --global
// user.email` exits 1 — so `git commit` fails with "Author identity
// unknown" unless one is supplied. Mission `019fc450` lost its first
@@ -480,10 +617,15 @@ async fn git(repo: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String, String> {
"git {} → {}: {}",
args.first().copied().unwrap_or("?"),
out.status,
String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
.chars()
.take(300)
.collect::<String>()
// Both ends, never a head-only clamp. THIS is where the reason was
// being lost: `publish_phase_branch` returns a rejected push as
// `Ok(Publish { error })`, so the string it carries was already
// truncated here — 300 chars of auth noise, with "non-fast-forward"
// cut off — before the caller's own both-ends clamp ever saw it.
// Clamping the caller fixed the path that was already fine.
crate::mission_workspace::redact_token(&crate::evaluator_tools::clamp_output(
&String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
))
));
}
Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).into_owned())
@@ -583,6 +725,7 @@ pub async fn commit_phase_work(
String::new()
}
);
clear_stale_commit_editmsg(repo);
git(repo, &["commit", "--no-verify", "-m", &message]).await?;
}
@@ -717,7 +860,38 @@ async fn push_url_for(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, mission_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<St
// "nothing to push to" — the shape that made `commit_error` necessary.
.map_err(|e| format!("query push URL: {e}"))?
.flatten();
Ok(url.map(|u| mission_workspace::with_ambient_auth(&u)))
let Some(url) = url else { return Ok(None) };
let auth = mission_workspace::with_ambient_auth(&url);
// Fail here, not at the tty. An unauthenticated URL to OUR forge cannot
// push, and every second it survives past this point is spent producing a
// symptom that looks like something else: git asking for a username, then
// `/dev/tty: No such device or address`, then a `push_error` about auth that
// sent #55's investigation after credentials which were never the problem.
// A third-party host is left alone — ssh keys and .netrc are legitimate.
if let Some(why) = &auth.unauthenticated {
if auth.is_forge() {
return Err(format!(
"cannot authenticate the push URL for this mission — {why}. The work \
is committed locally; fix the credential and re-run delivery."
));
}
eprintln!("mission_delivery: pushing to a non-forge remote unauthenticated — {why}");
}
Ok(Some(auth.url))
}
/// Did the forge reject this push because our history diverged from the ref?
///
/// Git says this several ways depending on version and refspec, and all of them
/// mean the same thing here: the branch already exists with commits ours does not
/// contain.
fn is_non_fast_forward(err: &str) -> bool {
let e = err.to_ascii_lowercase();
e.contains("non-fast-forward")
|| e.contains("fetch first")
|| e.contains("updates were rejected")
|| (e.contains("[rejected]") && !e.contains("stale info"))
}
/// Run the gate, then push the branch if the gate allows it.
@@ -760,6 +934,54 @@ pub async fn publish_phase_branch(
error: None,
})
}
// #55: a mission whose checkout was re-cloned — a retry, a container
// teardown, disk loss — builds divergent history against its OWN
// deterministic branch, and every push it ever attempts is rejected.
// Before this, that was terminal: the work stayed on a local branch in a
// directory that gets reaped.
//
// The escape is a NEW ref, not `--force`. Forcing would overwrite
// whatever the earlier attempt pushed — which may be the only copy of
// that work — to make this attempt look tidy. Suffixing with the commit
// sha is deterministic (the same history always lands on the same ref),
// self-describing in a branch list, and cannot collide, since divergent
// history is by definition a different sha.
Err(e) if is_non_fast_forward(&e) => {
let sha = git(repo, &["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
.await
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
.unwrap_or_default();
let Some(short) = sha.get(..8) else {
eprintln!("mission_delivery: push of {target} rejected and HEAD unreadable: {e}");
return Ok(Publish {
branch: target,
pushed: false,
error: Some(e),
});
};
let alt = format!("{target}-{short}");
eprintln!(
"mission_delivery: {target} exists on the forge with history this \
checkout does not contain — pushing to {alt} instead of forcing. \
Original: {e}"
);
git(repo, &["branch", "-f", &alt, "HEAD"]).await?;
match git(repo, &["push", push_url, &format!("HEAD:refs/heads/{alt}")]).await {
Ok(_) => Ok(Publish {
branch: alt,
pushed: true,
// Not an error — the work reached the forge — but the
// redirect is a fact the operator needs, or two branches for
// one phase look like a bug rather than a rescue.
error: None,
}),
Err(e2) => Ok(Publish {
branch: alt,
pushed: false,
error: Some(format!("{e}\n\nand the diverged-history retry also failed: {e2}")),
}),
}
}
Err(e) => {
// Redacted by `git`'s error path already; the patch and the local
// branch both survive, so this is a degraded success.
@@ -878,6 +1100,34 @@ impl TestOutcome {
}
}
/// Remove a `COMMIT_EDITMSG` the agent left behind as root.
///
/// The checkout is shared between the server (uid 65532) and the agent
/// container (root). `core.sharedRepository` makes git create *objects and
/// refs* group-writable — `.git/index` lands as 0666, which is why commits
/// work at all — but it does not cover `COMMIT_EDITMSG`, which git writes
/// with the default umask. An agent that runs `git commit` itself leaves that
/// file owned by root at 0644, and the server's next commit dies with:
///
/// ```text
/// git commit → exit 128: could not open '.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG': Permission denied
/// ```
///
/// Observed on mission `019fcd0c`, which produced correct work — a reviewed,
/// tested function plus a REVIEW.md quoting a real `cargo test` summary — and
/// then delivered none of it.
///
/// Unlinking works where overwriting does not: removing a file requires write
/// permission on the *directory*, and `.git/` is owned by the server. Silent
/// on failure by design — if the file is absent or cannot be removed, the
/// commit below reports the real error rather than this speculative cleanup.
fn clear_stale_commit_editmsg(repo: &Path) {
let msg = repo.join(".git/COMMIT_EDITMSG");
if msg.exists() {
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&msg);
}
}
/// Mark a phase as impossible to capture, so it stops being selected.
///
/// A phase whose checkout has already been reaped can never be captured. It
@@ -929,10 +1179,105 @@ pub async fn record_uncapturable(
.map_err(|e| format!("register uncapturable marker: {e}"))
}
/// Why an empty patch must not be believed, if it must not be believed.
///
/// An empty patch has two causes that produce identical bytes: the tree really
/// did not change, or `git diff` failed and we have no idea what the tree
/// looks like. The first is an ordinary outcome; the second is a platform
/// fault. Returning `Some` for the second is what stops the fault from being
/// filed under the ordinary outcome — the recurring shape where a failure and
/// a legitimate negative share one representation.
fn untrusted_empty_reason(empty: bool, diff_error: Option<&str>) -> Option<String> {
match (empty, diff_error) {
(true, Some(why)) => Some(format!(
"not published: the diff could not be computed, so an empty patch \
cannot be trusted to mean an unchanged tree ({why})"
)),
_ => None,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod changed_path_capture_tests {
/// The path list and `files_changed` must describe the SAME diff.
///
/// They come from two separate git invocations — `--stat` and
/// `--name-status`. If those are ever given different revisions or
/// different exclude pathspecs, the count and the list disagree and there
/// is no way to tell which is right: both look like plausible output.
#[test]
fn both_diff_calls_use_the_same_revision_and_excludes() {
let src = include_str!("mission_delivery.rs");
let body = src
.split("let mut stat_args")
.nth(1)
.and_then(|s| s.split("let (files_changed").next())
.expect("the capture block");
assert!(
body.contains("let mut name_args = vec![\"diff\", base_sha.as_str(), \"--name-status\", \"--\"]"),
"the name-status call must use the same base_sha as --stat"
);
assert!(
body.contains("name_args.extend(excludes.iter().map(String::as_str))"),
"and the same excludes, or files_changed and the path list describe \
different diffs"
);
}
/// `--name-status` must run before the index is put back, or newly created
/// files — which `--intent-to-add` is what makes visible — vanish from the
/// list while still being counted by the stat.
#[test]
fn paths_are_read_before_the_index_reset() {
let src = include_str!("mission_delivery.rs");
let name_at = src.find("--name-status").expect("name-status call");
let reset_at = src
.find("git(&repo, &[\"reset\", \"--quiet\"])")
.expect("index reset");
assert!(
name_at < reset_at,
"the path list must be captured while --intent-to-add is still in \
effect, or created files are invisible to it"
);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Git says "your history diverged" several ways, and the one production
/// actually produced (`! [rejected] ... (fetch first)`) is not the phrase
/// anyone reaches for first. Missing a phrasing means the rescue does not
/// fire and the work stays on a local branch in a directory that gets
/// reaped — silently, since the push failure is a degraded success.
#[test]
fn every_way_git_says_diverged_is_recognised() {
for e in [
"git push → exit 1: ! [rejected] HEAD -> b (fetch first)\nhint: …",
" ! [rejected] HEAD -> b (non-fast-forward)",
"hint: Updates were rejected because the remote contains work that you \
do not have locally.",
] {
assert!(is_non_fast_forward(e), "not recognised: {e}");
}
}
/// And it must not fire on failures a new branch cannot fix. Retrying a
/// permissions or network error onto a second ref just produces a second
/// failure and a confusing branch name.
#[test]
fn other_push_failures_are_not_mistaken_for_divergence() {
for e in [
"fatal: repository 'https://forge/x.git' not found",
"remote: error: GH006: Protected branch update failed",
"fatal: could not read Username for 'https://forge': terminal prompts disabled",
" ! [rejected] (stale info)",
] {
assert!(!is_non_fast_forward(e), "wrongly recognised: {e}");
}
}
// ── The gate ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// Three recipes have declared `commit_policy` since they were written and
@@ -1031,6 +1376,28 @@ mod tests {
/// An empty stat means an empty phase, not a parse failure. This is the
/// case that must still produce an artifact.
/// The whole point: a tree that genuinely did not change stays silent, and
/// a diff that could not be computed does not get to borrow that silence.
#[test]
fn an_uncomputable_diff_is_not_an_unchanged_tree() {
assert_eq!(
untrusted_empty_reason(true, None),
None,
"a genuinely unchanged tree must not report an error"
);
let reason = untrusted_empty_reason(true, Some("patch: fatal: bad object"))
.expect("an empty patch from a FAILED diff must be reported, not accepted");
assert!(
reason.contains("bad object"),
"the reason must name what went wrong, got: {reason}"
);
assert_eq!(
untrusted_empty_reason(false, Some("diffstat: fatal: bad object")),
None,
"a non-empty patch stands on its own even if the diffstat failed"
);
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_diffstat_is_all_zeroes() {
assert_eq!(parse_diffstat(""), (0, 0, 0));
+229
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
//! Structured mission activity — the channel that replaced parsing prose.
//!
//! The operator decision behind this module: action detail comes from
//! **structured events at the source**, never from `checkpoint.log` or model
//! output. A tool name in a log line is indistinguishable from an agent
//! *discussing* a tool, and a visualization built on that distinction reads as
//! confident fact while being partly fiction.
//!
//! Everything here is best-effort. A mission must not fail because its
//! telemetry could not be written — so every write logs and swallows. That is a
//! deliberate exception to this codebase's usual rule, and it is bounded: the
//! only thing lost is detail in a picture.
use serde_json::Value;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// A phase entered `running`.
pub const PHASE_STARTED: &str = "phase.started";
/// A phase reached a terminal state. `detail.status` says which.
pub const PHASE_COMPLETED: &str = "phase.completed";
/// An agent called a tool. `target` is the tool name.
pub const TOOL_CALL: &str = "tool.call";
/// A tool touched a path. `target` is the path, repo-relative where known.
pub const FILE_TOUCH: &str = "file.touch";
/// Most events one phase may record.
///
/// A capped stream that says so beats an uncapped one that quietly becomes the
/// largest table in the database: a coding phase can call thousands of tools,
/// and every one of them would be replayed to every World subscriber. Past the
/// cap the picture is already complete — nobody reads the four-thousandth file
/// orb.
pub const PER_PHASE_CAP: i64 = 400;
/// One recorded event.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct MissionEvent {
pub mission_id: Uuid,
pub phase_id: Option<Uuid>,
pub run_id: Option<Uuid>,
pub agent_id: Option<Uuid>,
pub kind: String,
pub target: Option<String>,
pub detail: Value,
}
impl MissionEvent {
pub fn new(mission_id: Uuid, kind: &str) -> Self {
MissionEvent {
mission_id,
kind: kind.to_string(),
detail: Value::Null,
..Default::default()
}
}
pub fn phase(mut self, id: Uuid) -> Self {
self.phase_id = Some(id);
self
}
pub fn run(mut self, id: Uuid) -> Self {
self.run_id = Some(id);
self
}
pub fn agent(mut self, id: Option<Uuid>) -> Self {
self.agent_id = id;
self
}
pub fn target(mut self, t: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.target = Some(t.into());
self
}
pub fn detail(mut self, d: Value) -> Self {
self.detail = d;
self
}
}
/// Record one event, best-effort.
///
/// The per-phase cap is enforced in the INSERT itself rather than by a read
/// followed by a write: two tool taps writing concurrently would both read a
/// count below the cap and both insert, and the cap would drift by however many
/// writers there are. `INSERT … SELECT … WHERE (subquery) < cap` makes the
/// decision inside the statement.
pub async fn record(pool: &PgPool, e: MissionEvent) {
let detail = if e.detail.is_null() {
Value::Object(Default::default())
} else {
e.detail
};
let res = sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_events
(mission_id, phase_id, run_id, agent_id, kind, target, detail)
SELECT $1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7
WHERE $2::uuid IS NULL
OR (SELECT count(*) FROM mission_events WHERE phase_id = $2) < $8",
)
.bind(e.mission_id)
.bind(e.phase_id)
.bind(e.run_id)
.bind(e.agent_id)
.bind(&e.kind)
.bind(&e.target)
.bind(&detail)
.bind(PER_PHASE_CAP)
.execute(pool)
.await;
if let Err(err) = res {
eprintln!("mission_events: record {} failed: {err}", e.kind);
}
}
/// Record several events under one round trip's worth of intent.
pub async fn record_all(pool: &PgPool, events: Vec<MissionEvent>) {
for e in events {
record(pool, e).await;
}
}
/// The path a tool's **arguments** name, if any.
///
/// Reads the arguments as JSON — never the tool's prose summary. The summary is
/// a sentence written for a human; a path pulled out of it by regex would be
/// right often enough to be trusted and wrong often enough to matter.
///
/// The key names are the ones Claude Code and the ZeroClaw tools actually use.
/// An unrecognised shape returns `None`, which renders as a tool call with no
/// file — accurate, rather than a guess at which argument was a path.
pub fn tool_path(args: &Value) -> Option<String> {
const KEYS: [&str; 6] = [
"file_path",
"filePath",
"path",
"notebook_path",
"file",
"target_file",
];
let obj = args.as_object()?;
for k in KEYS {
if let Some(s) = obj.get(k).and_then(Value::as_str) {
let s = s.trim();
if !s.is_empty() {
return Some(s.to_string());
}
}
}
None
}
/// Strip the guest/host workspace prefix so a path is repo-relative.
///
/// Tool arguments are absolute inside the sandbox (`/mission/repo/src/a.rs`).
/// Left alone, every mission's file tree would nest under a `mission` → `repo`
/// pair of directory orbs that exist in no repository and mean nothing to the
/// person reading the map.
pub fn repo_relative(path: &str, roots: &[&str]) -> String {
let p = path.trim();
for root in roots {
let root = root.trim_end_matches('/');
if let Some(rest) = p.strip_prefix(root) {
let rest = rest.trim_start_matches('/');
if !rest.is_empty() {
return rest.to_string();
}
}
}
p.trim_start_matches("./").to_string()
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use serde_json::json;
/// Paths come from arguments, and only from argument keys we know.
///
/// The alternative — scanning the values for anything that looks like a
/// path — is what makes a viz confidently wrong: a `pattern` of `*.rs` or a
/// `command` of `ls src/` would both become "the agent edited a file".
#[test]
fn a_path_comes_from_a_known_argument_or_not_at_all() {
assert_eq!(
tool_path(&json!({"file_path": "/mission/repo/src/a.rs"})).as_deref(),
Some("/mission/repo/src/a.rs")
);
assert_eq!(tool_path(&json!({"path": "docs/x.md"})).as_deref(), Some("docs/x.md"));
// A shell command mentions paths and touches none we can name.
assert_eq!(tool_path(&json!({"command": "ls src/"})), None);
// A glob is a query, not a file.
assert_eq!(tool_path(&json!({"pattern": "**/*.rs"})), None);
// Blank is absence, not a file called "".
assert_eq!(tool_path(&json!({"file_path": " "})), None);
assert_eq!(tool_path(&json!("not an object")), None);
}
/// The sandbox prefix must not become two directory orbs in every mission.
#[test]
fn paths_are_made_repo_relative() {
let roots = ["/mission/repo", "/workspace"];
assert_eq!(repo_relative("/mission/repo/src/a.rs", &roots), "src/a.rs");
assert_eq!(repo_relative("/workspace/README.md", &roots), "README.md");
assert_eq!(repo_relative("./src/a.rs", &roots), "src/a.rs");
// Outside every root, it is left alone rather than mangled.
assert_eq!(repo_relative("/etc/hosts", &roots), "/etc/hosts");
// The root ITSELF is not a file, so it must not collapse to "".
assert_eq!(repo_relative("/mission/repo", &roots), "/mission/repo");
}
/// The cap must be decided inside the INSERT.
///
/// A count-then-insert is the classic version of this and it is wrong here:
/// the container tap and the microVM drain both write for the same phase,
/// and each would see a count below the cap and insert. Nothing errors —
/// the table simply grows past the bound that exists to hold it.
#[test]
fn the_cap_is_enforced_in_one_statement() {
let src = include_str!("mission_events.rs");
let body = src
.split("pub async fn record(")
.nth(1)
.and_then(|s| s.split("pub async fn").next())
.expect("record body");
assert!(
body.contains("INSERT INTO mission_events") && body.contains("SELECT count(*)"),
"the cap must be a subquery in the INSERT, not a separate read"
);
}
}
+471
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
//! Move a mission's checkout in and out of its container, instead of sharing it.
//!
//! Today the checkout lives on the host and is bind-mounted into the mission
//! container. That single directory is written by **two users** — cm-api as
//! uid 65532 and the agent as root — and every bug that pattern can produce,
//! it has produced:
//!
//! | Symptom | Fix that was needed |
//! |---|---|
//! | `.git/objects` permission denied | `core.sharedRepository=0777` |
//! | capture base overwritten each phase | advance the base after commit |
//! | `.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG` root-owned | unlink before commit |
//! | `reset --hard` deleting a prior phase | `.git/clawmates-in-use` marker |
//!
//! Four fixes, one cause. `core.sharedRepository` was never a general
//! solution — it covers objects and refs, and every *other* file git touches
//! is a fresh opportunity.
//!
//! Copy-in/copy-out removes the cause: the agent owns its filesystem
//! completely, as root, with no other writer. Nothing on the host is shared,
//! so nothing on the host can collide.
//!
//! # Cost
//!
//! Measured on gw-04 against a real 65 MB checkout of this repository:
//! **0.23s in, 0.18s out**. That was the one open risk in the plan — a
//! monorepo copied per phase — and it is not a risk at this size. Measure
//! again before assuming it holds for a repository an order of magnitude
//! larger.
//!
//! No compression: the payload crosses a local Docker socket, so gzip would
//! spend CPU to save nothing.
use std::path::Path;
use bollard::Docker;
/// Where a mission's checkout lives inside its container.
pub const CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR: &str = "/mission";
/// Pack a host directory into an uncompressed tar.
///
/// `name_in_archive` is the top-level entry, so unpacking at
/// [`CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR`] yields `/mission/<name>`. Kept separate from the
/// upload so the packing is testable without Docker.
pub fn pack_dir(root: &Path, name_in_archive: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(Vec::new());
// Follow no symlinks: a checkout can contain a link pointing outside the
// tree, and dereferencing it would pull host files into the container.
builder.follow_symlinks(false);
append_filtered(&mut builder, root, Path::new(name_in_archive))
.map_err(|e| format!("pack {}: {e}", root.display()))?;
builder
.into_inner()
.map_err(|e| format!("finish archive for {}: {e}", root.display()))
}
/// Directory names never carried across the boundary.
///
/// The same list the delivery diff uses, deliberately: see
/// [`crate::mission_delivery::EXCLUDED_PATHS`]. A build directory is not work —
/// it is regenerable output that dwarfs the source, and shipping it cost a
/// mission its results when `vm_collect` timed out with the agent's finished work
/// still inside the VM.
pub fn transport_excludes() -> &'static [&'static str] {
crate::mission_delivery::EXCLUDED_PATHS
}
/// Should this directory entry be left out of the archive?
///
/// Matched on the entry NAME at any depth, not on a path prefix: a workspace has
/// a `target/` per crate, and excluding only the root one would still ship the
/// rest.
pub fn is_excluded(name: &str) -> bool {
transport_excludes().contains(&name)
}
/// Recursive `append_dir_all` that skips [`transport_excludes`].
///
/// Hand-rolled because `tar::Builder::append_dir_all` takes no filter. Symlinks
/// are added as links rather than followed, matching `follow_symlinks(false)`.
fn append_filtered<W: std::io::Write>(
builder: &mut tar::Builder<W>,
dir: &Path,
prefix: &Path,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
builder.append_dir(prefix, dir)?;
let mut entries: Vec<_> = std::fs::read_dir(dir)?.collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
// Stable order so an archive of the same tree is byte-identical, which makes
// a size or content difference between two runs mean something.
entries.sort_by_key(|e| e.file_name());
for entry in entries {
let name = entry.file_name();
let name_str = name.to_string_lossy();
let path = entry.path();
let dest = prefix.join(&name);
let meta = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path)?;
if meta.is_dir() {
if is_excluded(&name_str) {
continue;
}
append_filtered(builder, &path, &dest)?;
} else if meta.is_symlink() {
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
header.set_metadata(&meta);
header.set_entry_type(tar::EntryType::Symlink);
header.set_size(0);
let target = std::fs::read_link(&path)?;
builder.append_link(&mut header, &dest, &target)?;
} else {
let mut f = std::fs::File::open(&path)?;
builder.append_file(&dest, &mut f)?;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Unpack a tar into a host directory.
///
/// `tar` refuses entries whose paths escape the destination, which is the
/// property that matters here: the archive comes back from a container the
/// agent controls as root, so it is untrusted input. A `../../etc` entry must
/// not be able to write outside the collection directory.
pub fn unpack_into(archive: &[u8], dest: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(dest).map_err(|e| format!("mkdir {}: {e}", dest.display()))?;
let mut ar = tar::Archive::new(archive);
ar.set_overwrite(true);
// Ownership in the archive is the container's root; re-applying it on the
// host would recreate the very uid split this module exists to remove.
ar.set_preserve_permissions(false);
ar.unpack(dest)
.map_err(|e| format!("unpack into {}: {e}", dest.display()))
}
/// Copy a host directory into a running container at [`CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR`].
pub async fn copy_in(
docker: &Docker,
container: &str,
host_dir: &Path,
name_in_archive: &str,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let archive = pack_dir(host_dir, name_in_archive)?;
let opts = bollard::query_parameters::UploadToContainerOptionsBuilder::default()
.path(CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR)
.build();
docker
.upload_to_container(container, Some(opts), bollard::body_full(archive.into()))
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("copy into {container}:{CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR}: {e}"))
}
/// Build a one-entry tar. Split out from [`put_file`] so the size-independence
/// that is the whole point can be tested without Docker.
fn single_file_archive(name: &str, contents: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, String> {
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
header
.set_path(name)
.map_err(|e| format!("tar path {name}: {e}"))?;
header.set_size(contents.len() as u64);
header.set_mode(0o600);
header.set_entry_type(tar::EntryType::Regular);
header.set_cksum();
let mut builder = tar::Builder::new(Vec::new());
builder
.append(&header, contents)
.map_err(|e| format!("tar {name}: {e}"))?;
builder
.into_inner()
.map_err(|e| format!("finish archive for {name}: {e}"))
}
/// Write one file into a container, at any size.
///
/// The obvious way to do this is `sh -c "printf … > file"`, and it works right
/// up until the payload approaches `ARG_MAX`, at which point exec fails with
/// `argument list too long`. That is a size-dependent failure in a code path
/// whose payload grows with use, which makes it a bug that ships green and
/// surfaces in production — as it did, silently unpinning every agent in
/// mission `019fcf62`. Tar has no argv limit.
///
/// The write is not atomic. Callers that need it can upload beside the target
/// and rename; the config writer does not, because the daemon reads its config
/// once at boot and is restarted afterwards.
pub async fn put_file(
docker: &Docker,
container: &str,
path: &str,
contents: &[u8],
) -> Result<(), String> {
let (dir, file) = path
.rsplit_once('/')
.ok_or_else(|| format!("{path} is not an absolute path"))?;
let dir = if dir.is_empty() { "/" } else { dir };
let archive = single_file_archive(file, contents)?;
let opts = bollard::query_parameters::UploadToContainerOptionsBuilder::default()
.path(dir)
.build();
docker
.upload_to_container(container, Some(opts), bollard::body_full(archive.into()))
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("upload {path} to {container}: {e}"))
}
/// Copy a directory back out of a container onto the host.
pub async fn copy_out(
docker: &Docker,
container: &str,
container_path: &str,
dest: &Path,
) -> Result<(), String> {
use futures::StreamExt;
let opts = bollard::query_parameters::DownloadFromContainerOptionsBuilder::default()
.path(container_path)
.build();
let mut stream = docker.download_from_container(container, Some(opts));
let mut archive = Vec::new();
while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
let bytes = chunk.map_err(|e| format!("copy out of {container}:{container_path}: {e}"))?;
archive.extend_from_slice(&bytes);
}
unpack_into(&archive, dest)
}
/// Is the copy-in/copy-out filesystem model enabled?
///
/// **Default since 2026-08-04.** It shipped opt-in, on the principle that
/// silently changing how every mission receives its code should require
/// someone to have typed it. Four production missions and a fail-closed
/// harness later (`scripts/verify-mission-delivery.sh`), the opt-in is the
/// riskier setting: the bind path is the one with four documented work-loss
/// incidents, and leaving it as the default means the untested path is what
/// runs when nobody sets the variable.
///
/// `CLAWMATES_MISSION_FS=bind` still selects the old behaviour, so a revert is
/// one line in `.env` rather than a rollback. Anything else — unset, empty,
/// misspelt — gets copy mode, because the failure mode of a typo should be the
/// safer path, not the one being retired.
pub fn copy_mode() -> bool {
!matches!(std::env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSION_FS").as_deref(), Ok("bind"))
}
/// Host directory holding a mission's checkout.
fn host_repo(mission_id: uuid::Uuid) -> std::path::PathBuf {
crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission_id)
}
/// Push the host checkout into the container before a phase runs.
///
/// A repo-less mission has no checkout to push, but it still needs
/// `/mission/repo` to EXIST inside the container: the phase prompt tells the
/// agent that is its working directory, `mission_orchestrator` pins every
/// claw's `workspace.path` to it, and `mission_outputs` copies it back out to
/// register artifacts. This used to return early instead, so none of those three
/// were true — the pin resolved to nothing, ZeroClaw fell back to each agent's
/// own sandbox, and the agents (correctly) reported they had no such directory
/// and refused to work. Creating it empty is what the microVM tier already does,
/// for the same reason: see `microvm_executor::inject` ("the guest needs the
/// workspace to exist before the agent writes into it").
///
/// Creating it host-side rather than `mkdir`-ing in the container keeps the copy
/// cycle symmetric — `sync_out` unpacks over this same path, so work written by
/// one phase survives into the next instead of being wiped by the next
/// `sync_in`.
pub async fn sync_in(container: &str, mission_id: uuid::Uuid) -> Result<(), String> {
let repo = host_repo(mission_id);
if !repo.is_dir() {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&repo)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("create empty workspace {}: {e}", repo.display()))?;
}
let docker = crate::container_exec::connect()?;
// `upload_to_container` requires the DESTINATION to exist: uploading into
// `/mission` when the container has no `/mission` fails with
// "404 Could not find the file /mission in container", which reads like a
// missing source file rather than a missing target directory. Nothing else
// creates it — not the image, not the container spec (in copy mode there is
// no `/mission` bind) — so create it here, immediately before the copy that
// depends on it.
let mkdir = [
"mkdir".to_string(),
"-p".to_string(),
CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR.to_string(),
];
if let Err(e) = crate::container_exec::exec_as_root(
&docker,
container,
None,
&mkdir,
std::time::Duration::from_secs(20),
)
.await
{
return Err(format!("create {CONTAINER_MISSION_DIR} in {container}: {e}"));
}
copy_in(&docker, container, &repo, "repo").await
}
/// Pull the agent's work back onto the host after a phase.
///
/// Unpacks over the SAME host path the checkout came from, so the host
/// directory stays a server-owned staging area with exactly one writer — and
/// `mission_delivery::capture_phase_diff_at` needs no change at all, because
/// it still finds a normal checkout exactly where it always has.
pub async fn sync_out(container: &str, mission_id: uuid::Uuid) -> Result<(), String> {
let repo = host_repo(mission_id);
if !repo.is_dir() {
return Ok(());
}
let parent = repo
.parent()
.ok_or_else(|| format!("{} has no parent", repo.display()))?;
let docker = crate::container_exec::connect()?;
copy_out(&docker, container, "/mission/repo", parent).await
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn seed(root: &Path) {
std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join("src")).unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join(".git")).unwrap();
std::fs::write(root.join("src/lib.rs"), "pub fn x() {}\n").unwrap();
std::fs::write(root.join(".git/HEAD"), "ref: refs/heads/main\n").unwrap();
}
/// A checkout must survive the round trip intact — including `.git`,
/// without which the whole delivery path (diff, commit, push) is dead.
#[test]
fn a_checkout_round_trips_with_its_git_dir() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let src = tmp.path().join("repo");
seed(&src);
let archive = pack_dir(&src, "repo").unwrap();
let dest = tmp.path().join("out");
unpack_into(&archive, &dest).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(dest.join("repo/src/lib.rs")).unwrap(),
"pub fn x() {}\n"
);
assert!(
dest.join("repo/.git/HEAD").exists(),
"the .git dir must survive or delivery has nothing to diff"
);
}
/// The archive comes back from a container the agent controls as root, so
/// it is untrusted. An entry that climbs out of the destination must not
/// be able to write to the host.
#[test]
fn an_archive_cannot_escape_the_destination() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let dest = tmp.path().join("dest");
let canary = tmp.path().join("ESCAPED");
// The path has to be written into the header bytes directly: the tar
// crate refuses to BUILD an entry containing `..`, which is itself
// reassuring but means a hostile archive cannot be produced through
// the safe API. A real attacker writes the bytes, so the test does.
let body = b"pwned\n";
let mut header = tar::Header::new_gnu();
header.set_size(body.len() as u64);
header.set_mode(0o644);
header.set_entry_type(tar::EntryType::Regular);
{
let gnu = header.as_gnu_mut().expect("gnu header");
let evil = b"../ESCAPED";
gnu.name[..evil.len()].copy_from_slice(evil);
}
header.set_cksum();
let mut archive = Vec::new();
archive.extend_from_slice(header.as_bytes());
let mut block = [0u8; 512];
block[..body.len()].copy_from_slice(body);
archive.extend_from_slice(&block);
archive.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 1024]); // end-of-archive marker
let _ = unpack_into(&archive, &dest);
assert!(
!canary.exists(),
"a ../ entry wrote outside the destination"
);
}
/// A symlink pointing at the host filesystem must be packed as a link,
/// not followed and inlined — otherwise copy-in would smuggle host files
/// into the container.
#[test]
fn symlinks_are_not_dereferenced_into_the_archive() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let src = tmp.path().join("repo");
seed(&src);
let secret = tmp.path().join("host-secret");
std::fs::write(&secret, "TOP SECRET\n").unwrap();
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(&secret, src.join("link")).unwrap();
let archive = pack_dir(&src, "repo").unwrap();
let haystack = String::from_utf8_lossy(&archive);
assert!(
!haystack.contains("TOP SECRET"),
"symlink target contents were inlined into the archive"
);
}
/// Only the exact word `bind` opts out. A typo must land on copy mode —
/// the path with a verification harness behind it — rather than silently
/// selecting the one with four documented work-loss incidents.
#[test]
fn only_the_exact_word_bind_opts_out() {
// Cannot set env vars in a test process without racing every other
// test, so this asserts the predicate the function is built from.
let opts_out = |v: &str| v == "bind";
assert!(opts_out("bind"));
for near_miss in ["Bind", "binds", "bound", "copy", "0", "false", ""] {
assert!(
!opts_out(near_miss),
"{near_miss:?} must NOT select the bind path"
);
}
}
/// The regression this exists for: a config large enough to blow `ARG_MAX`
/// via `sh -c` must round-trip untouched. 2 MB is well past the ~128 KB
/// limit that unpinned every agent in mission `019fcf62`.
#[test]
fn a_file_far_past_arg_max_round_trips() {
let big = "workspace_path = \"/mission/repo\"\n".repeat(64 * 1024);
assert!(big.len() > 2_000_000, "the fixture must exceed ARG_MAX");
let archive = single_file_archive("config.toml", big.as_bytes()).unwrap();
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
unpack_into(&archive, tmp.path()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.path().join("config.toml")).unwrap(),
big,
"a large config must survive byte-for-byte"
);
}
/// TOML holding quotes, newlines and backslashes went through a shell
/// before; nothing may depend on quoting now.
#[test]
fn shell_metacharacters_survive_the_archive() {
let nasty = "path = \"/a'b\\\"c\"\n$(rm -rf /) `id` \\\\ \n";
let archive = single_file_archive("config.toml", nasty.as_bytes()).unwrap();
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
unpack_into(&archive, tmp.path()).unwrap();
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.path().join("config.toml")).unwrap(),
nasty
);
}
#[test]
fn an_empty_directory_packs_without_error() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let src = tmp.path().join("empty");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&src).unwrap();
let archive = pack_dir(&src, "repo").unwrap();
let dest = tmp.path().join("out");
unpack_into(&archive, &dest).unwrap();
assert!(dest.join("repo").is_dir());
}
}
+414
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@
//! Reclaim the mission tree on the gateway.
//!
//! # Why this is filesystem-first
//!
//! `cleanup_sweeper` prunes ROWS. Deleting a row does not delete a directory,
//! and the reaper that was supposed to — `mission_runtime::teardown_container` —
//! only runs while a mission still exists to tear down. So a mission deleted by
//! any path that did not go through teardown left its directory behind forever,
//! and the gateway is the smallest disk in the fleet (150 GB, shared with
//! postgres and every checkout).
//!
//! The DB is therefore the PREDICATE here, never the enumerator: this walks the
//! filesystem and asks the database about what it finds. Enumerating from the
//! database is precisely how the orphans became invisible — a directory whose
//! row is gone is exactly the one a row-driven sweep cannot see.
//!
//! # Why deletion needs two attempts
//!
//! The server runs as uid 65532. Almost everything under a mission belongs to
//! 65532 now, but the per-mission ZeroClaw daemon still runs as root and leaves
//! ~26 of its own files (`.claude.json`, session jsonl). `remove_dir_all` then
//! fails with `PermissionDenied` and the directory survives — the
//! cleanup-that-cannot-clean-up shape, at a scale small enough to go unnoticed.
//! So a failed removal falls back to `root_copy::purge`, which deletes from
//! inside the runtime container as root.
//!
//! # What it will not touch
//!
//! Anything belonging to a mission that still has a row, and anything younger
//! than the grace window. A mission directory is created BEFORE its row is
//! committed in some paths, and reaping a directory out from under a launching
//! mission would be a far worse bug than the leak this fixes.
use std::path::Path;
use std::time::Duration;
use sqlx::PgPool;
/// How long a directory must have been untouched before it is considered
/// abandoned. Generously long: the cost of waiting is disk, and the cost of
/// being wrong is deleting a live mission's checkout.
const ORPHAN_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2 * 60 * 60);
/// Retention for captured outputs (`_outputs`), which are artifacts a user can
/// still open. Mirrors `TOPOLOGY_RUNS_DAYS` in `cleanup_sweeper` — the run
/// history and the files it points at should not outlive each other.
const OUTPUTS_DAYS: u64 = 90;
/// Scratch trees the mission machinery makes and is supposed to remove itself:
/// `_bench`, `_gate`, `_verify`, `_merge`. Anything older than this is debris
/// from a crashed or killed run, not work in progress — every command that
/// creates one is bounded well below it.
const SCRATCH_GRACE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(6 * 60 * 60);
/// Directories under the missions root that are NOT missions.
const RESERVED: &[&str] = &["_outputs", "_home", "_cargo", "_mirrors"];
pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool, interval: Duration) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
// Not on the first tick. A sweep racing the server's own startup — while
// `start_pending_phases` is still adopting in-flight missions — is the
// one moment its "no row for this directory" predicate is least
// trustworthy.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(120)).await;
let mut tick = tokio::time::interval(interval);
loop {
tick.tick().await;
match sweep_once(&pool).await {
Ok(r) if r.is_empty() => {}
Ok(r) => eprintln!("mission_gc: {r}"),
Err(e) => eprintln!("mission_gc: sweep failed: {e}"),
}
}
});
}
/// What one sweep reclaimed.
#[derive(Debug, Default, PartialEq)]
pub struct Reclaimed {
pub orphan_dirs: u64,
pub scratch_dirs: u64,
pub outputs: u64,
pub bytes: u64,
/// Directories we tried and failed to remove. Reported rather than swallowed
/// — a GC that cannot collect is the thing being fixed.
pub failed: u64,
/// Rows swept from `mission_events`.
pub events: u64,
}
impl Reclaimed {
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
*self == Reclaimed::default()
}
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Reclaimed {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
write!(
f,
"reclaimed {} orphan mission dir(s), {} scratch dir(s), {} output(s), \
{} mission event(s), {:.1} MiB{}",
self.orphan_dirs,
self.scratch_dirs,
self.outputs,
self.events,
self.bytes as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0),
if self.failed > 0 {
format!(" — {} COULD NOT BE REMOVED", self.failed)
} else {
String::new()
}
)
}
}
async fn sweep_once(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Reclaimed, String> {
let root = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root();
let mut out = Reclaimed::default();
reap_orphan_missions(pool, &root, &mut out).await?;
reap_scratch(&root, &mut out).await;
reap_outputs(pool, &root, &mut out).await;
reap_mission_events(pool, &mut out).await;
Ok(out)
}
/// How long a mission's structured activity is kept.
///
/// The World shows the last 24 hours of finished missions, so a week is
/// generous and still bounds a table that a single busy coding phase can add
/// hundreds of rows to. The per-phase cap bounds ONE phase; this bounds time.
const EVENT_RETENTION_DAYS: i32 = 7;
/// Sweep expired `mission_events`.
///
/// Bounded per pass rather than deleting the whole backlog in one statement: a
/// deployment that has been accumulating for months would otherwise take a long
/// lock on its first sweep after this ships. The sweep runs on a timer, so a
/// large backlog simply drains over several passes.
async fn reap_mission_events(pool: &PgPool, out: &mut Reclaimed) {
let res = sqlx::query(
"DELETE FROM mission_events
WHERE id IN (
SELECT id FROM mission_events
WHERE created_at < now() - make_interval(days => $1)
LIMIT 10000
)",
)
.bind(EVENT_RETENTION_DAYS)
.execute(pool)
.await;
match res {
Ok(r) => out.events += r.rows_affected(),
Err(e) => eprintln!("mission_gc: sweeping mission_events failed: {e}"),
}
}
/// Directories under the missions root with no mission row.
async fn reap_orphan_missions(
pool: &PgPool,
root: &Path,
out: &mut Reclaimed,
) -> Result<(), String> {
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(root) else {
// Not an error: a deployment that has never run a mission has no tree.
return Ok(());
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if !path.is_dir() {
continue;
}
let Some(name) = path.file_name().and_then(|n| n.to_str()) else {
continue;
};
if RESERVED.contains(&name) || name.starts_with('_') {
continue;
}
// Only well-formed mission ids. A directory this function does not
// recognise is one it has no business deleting.
let Ok(id) = name.parse::<uuid::Uuid>() else {
continue;
};
if !older_than(&path, ORPHAN_GRACE) {
continue;
}
// The DB as predicate, asked per directory.
let exists: Option<(uuid::Uuid,)> =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT id FROM missions WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("looking up mission {id}: {e}"))?;
if exists.is_some() {
continue;
}
let bytes = dir_size(&path);
if remove_tree(&path).await {
out.orphan_dirs += 1;
out.bytes += bytes;
} else {
out.failed += 1;
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// `_bench` / `_gate` / `_verify` / `_merge` trees older than their command
/// ceilings. These are siblings of the per-mission dirs and have leaked before.
async fn reap_scratch(root: &Path, out: &mut Reclaimed) {
const SCRATCH: &[&str] = &["_bench", "_gate", "_verify", "_merge"];
for name in SCRATCH {
let path = root.join(name);
if !path.is_dir() {
continue;
}
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&path) else {
continue;
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let p = entry.path();
if !older_than(&p, SCRATCH_GRACE) {
continue;
}
let bytes = dir_size(&p);
if remove_tree(&p).await {
out.scratch_dirs += 1;
out.bytes += bytes;
} else {
out.failed += 1;
}
}
}
}
/// Captured outputs past retention, with their artifact rows marked so nothing
/// points at a file that is gone.
async fn reap_outputs(pool: &PgPool, root: &Path, out: &mut Reclaimed) {
let outputs = root.join("_outputs");
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&outputs) else {
return;
};
let grace = Duration::from_secs(OUTPUTS_DAYS * 24 * 60 * 60);
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let p = entry.path();
if !p.is_dir() || !older_than(&p, grace) {
continue;
}
let Some(id) = p
.file_name()
.and_then(|n| n.to_str())
.and_then(|n| n.parse::<uuid::Uuid>().ok())
else {
continue;
};
let bytes = dir_size(&p);
if !remove_tree(&p).await {
out.failed += 1;
continue;
}
// The row is marked only AFTER the files are gone. The other order
// leaves a mission whose artifacts claim to be reaped while they are
// still on disk, which is a lie in the direction that costs disk.
let _ = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_artifacts SET metadata = COALESCE(metadata, '{}'::jsonb)
|| '{\"reaped\": true}'::jsonb
WHERE mission_id = $1",
)
.bind(id)
.execute(pool)
.await;
out.outputs += 1;
out.bytes += bytes;
}
}
/// Remove a tree, escalating to a root purge when our uid cannot.
///
/// The ONLY deletion path in this module. A second one is how the reap paths
/// drifted apart last time.
async fn remove_tree(path: &Path) -> bool {
match tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(path).await {
Ok(()) => true,
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => true,
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => {
let container = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "clawmates-runtime".to_string());
crate::root_copy::purge(&container, path).await;
let gone = tokio::fs::metadata(path).await.is_err();
if !gone {
eprintln!(
"mission_gc: {} survived a root purge — it will keep accumulating",
path.display()
);
}
gone
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("mission_gc: could not remove {}: {e}", path.display());
false
}
}
}
fn older_than(path: &Path, grace: Duration) -> bool {
let Ok(meta) = std::fs::metadata(path) else {
return false;
};
// mtime, not ctime: a directory whose contents changed recently is one
// something is still writing to.
let Ok(modified) = meta.modified() else {
return false;
};
modified
.elapsed()
.map(|age| age >= grace)
.unwrap_or(false)
}
/// Apparent size, best-effort. Used only for reporting, so a read error costs a
/// wrong number in a log line rather than a wrong decision.
fn dir_size(path: &Path) -> u64 {
let mut total = 0;
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(path) else {
return 0;
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let Ok(meta) = entry.metadata() else { continue };
if meta.is_dir() {
total += dir_size(&entry.path());
} else {
total += meta.len();
}
}
total
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn touch_dir(root: &Path, name: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
let p = root.join(name);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&p).unwrap();
std::fs::write(p.join("f"), b"x").unwrap();
p
}
/// The reserved siblings are never candidates.
///
/// `_outputs`, `_home` and `_cargo` live under the same root as the mission
/// directories. `_cargo` in particular is a SHARED cache every mission
/// writes to, so a sweep that treated an underscore-prefixed sibling as an
/// orphan mission would delete it out from under running work — and it would
/// look like a slow cargo build rather than a bug.
#[test]
fn siblings_of_the_mission_dirs_are_not_missions() {
for name in RESERVED {
assert!(
name.starts_with('_'),
"{name} must be underscore-prefixed so the guard catches it"
);
assert!(
name.parse::<uuid::Uuid>().is_err(),
"{name} must not parse as a mission id"
);
}
}
/// Only a well-formed mission id is ever a candidate.
///
/// The predicate is "no row exists", and a directory whose name is not an id
/// can have no row BY CONSTRUCTION — so name-parsing has to gate the lookup,
/// or every unrecognised directory looks like an orphan.
#[test]
fn a_directory_that_is_not_a_mission_id_is_never_a_candidate() {
for name in ["_outputs", "_cargo", "lost+found", "notes", "019fe8", ""] {
assert!(
name.parse::<uuid::Uuid>().is_err(),
"{name:?} must not parse as a mission id"
);
}
assert!("019fe82e-7f0d-7481-a197-698f1d400419"
.parse::<uuid::Uuid>()
.is_ok());
}
/// The grace window is real, and measured from mtime.
#[test]
fn a_fresh_directory_is_never_old_enough() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let d = touch_dir(tmp.path(), "019fe82e-7f0d-7481-a197-698f1d400419");
assert!(!older_than(&d, ORPHAN_GRACE));
// And a zero grace makes everything eligible, which is what proves the
// check is the window rather than an accident of the filesystem.
assert!(older_than(&d, Duration::from_secs(0)));
}
/// One deletion path, and it escalates.
///
/// A second removal site is how the container reap paths drifted apart and
/// leaked for a day. The escalation is the other half: the server is uid
/// 65532 and cannot delete what the per-mission daemon left as root.
#[test]
fn there_is_exactly_one_deletion_path_and_it_escalates() {
let src = include_str!("mission_gc.rs");
assert_eq!(
src.matches(concat!("remove_dir", "_all(")).count(),
1,
"exactly one removal site"
);
assert!(src.contains("root_copy::purge"), "and it must escalate");
}
}
+307 -33
View File
@@ -79,7 +79,12 @@ pub async fn on_launch(
// The mission's own runtime endpoint. Claws MUST be provisioned against
// THIS gateway, not the global one — see RuntimeProvisioner::for_gateway.
let mut mission_gateway: Option<String> = None;
if let Some(prov) = crate::mission_runtime::MissionRuntimeProvisioner::from_env() {
// Not for a microVM mission: the ZeroClaw daemon it would start is never
// spoken to, and it would sit holding a pairing code and ~3 GB of image for
// the life of the mission. Observed doing exactly that on the first real run.
if let Some(prov) = crate::mission_runtime::MissionRuntimeProvisioner::from_env()
.filter(|_| mission.runtime_kind != "microvm")
{
match prov.ensure_container(mission_id).await {
Ok(ec) => {
mission_gateway = Some(ec.endpoint.clone());
@@ -115,6 +120,76 @@ pub async fn on_launch(
);
}
// microVM PLACEMENT MUST COME BEFORE the early return below. It did not, and
// the first real microvm mission failed with "mission has no target_node_id" —
// the executor's own guard firing correctly on a mission this function had
// returned from before ever choosing a node for it.
// microVM placement. KVM is a hard predicate, not a preference: gw-04 —
// where every mission runs today — is itself a VM without nested
// virtualisation and has no /dev/kvm, so a microvm mission landing there
// cannot start. Resolve a capable node now and fail the launch if there is
// none, because the alternative is a mission that sits in 'running' having
// never had anywhere to run.
if mission.runtime_kind == "microvm" {
// Capable means BOTH: it can host a microVM, and it holds the image this
// mission's backend names. Asking only for `microvm` sent the first real
// microVM mission to a node without `rootfs-claude.ext4`.
let backend = mission.backend.as_deref();
let capable =
cm_db::repo::nodes::online_for_backend(pool, mission.workspace_id, backend)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("looking up nodes for backend {backend:?}: {e}"))?;
let how_to_fix = format!(
"needs /dev/kvm + firecracker (scripts/fc-node-setup.sh) AND the {} rootfs \
built on that node (scripts/fc-build-rootfs.sh <host> <image> {})",
backend.unwrap_or("default"),
backend.unwrap_or("<name>")
);
let how_to_fix = how_to_fix.as_str();
// CAPABILITY is checked here; CAPACITY is not, and no node is pinned.
//
// Placement moved to phase launch (`phase_runner`). A node chosen now
// would be chosen once, minutes before the first VM boots and hours
// before the last — and re-placing between phases is free, because
// mission state lives on the gateway checkout and every VM is
// inject → run → collect → destroy. Pinning early bought nothing and
// cost the ability to react to a node filling or draining mid-mission.
//
// Launching still FAILS here when no node could ever run this backend:
// that is not transient, waiting will not fix it, and the harness's
// `microvm-negctl` scenario asserts such a mission stays `draft`.
if capable.is_empty() {
return Err(format!(
"no online node can run backend {:?} — {how_to_fix}",
backend.unwrap_or("default")
));
}
eprintln!(
"mission_orchestrator: mission {mission_id} has {} node(s) able to run \
backend {:?}; placement happens per phase",
capable.len(),
backend.unwrap_or("default")
);
}
// A microVM mission materialises no team. Its phases run as one `claude -p`
// inside a VM (`microvm_executor`), so there is no claw graph to provision —
// and demanding one rejected the launch of a well-formed mission with "pick
// teams in the wizard". This is the third of three team gates on a path that
// uses no teams; the other two are in `routes::missions` (draft→running) and
// `phase_runner::launch_phase` (no matching teams → stay pending).
//
// Returning before the picks below, not filtering them, because provisioning
// claws that never run is not a cheaper version of the same thing — it is a
// runtime binding and a pairing code describing something nothing uses.
if mission.runtime_kind == "microvm" {
eprintln!(
"mission_orchestrator: mission {mission_id} is a microvm mission — no team to \
materialise; its phases execute in a VM"
);
return Ok(None);
}
// Skip team materialization if already bound.
if mission.team_id.is_some() {
eprintln!(
@@ -193,7 +268,7 @@ pub async fn on_launch(
provisioner: provisioner.as_ref(),
template: &template,
team_name: &team_name,
default_model: "claude-sonnet-5",
default_model: MINTED_CLAW_MODEL,
},
&mut provisioned_claws,
)
@@ -228,31 +303,41 @@ pub async fn on_launch(
// is a PathBuf the prop-schema won't expose — see provision_claw), so
// we patch the shared config file directly on the per-mission runtime
// container. The daemon picks it up on the same reload that surfaces
// the freshly-provisioned claws for the run. Non-fatal: without the
// pin, agents still write (to the sandbox) but the committer can't
// find the changes in /mission/repo.
if !provisioned_claws.is_empty() && mission_gateway.is_some() {
if let Some(mp) = crate::mission_runtime::MissionRuntimeProvisioner::from_env() {
match mp
.pin_agent_workspaces(mission_id, &provisioned_claws, "/mission/repo")
.await
// the freshly-provisioned claws for the run.
//
// FATAL, deliberately. This was "non-fatal: agents still write (to the
// sandbox) but the committer can't find the changes in /mission/repo" —
// which is to say, the mission runs to completion and delivers nothing.
// Mission `019fcf62` did exactly that: the pin failed with `argument list
// too long`, one line of stderr scrolled past, and phase 0 reported
// `completed` with zero files, no commit error and no push error. A launch
// that cannot bind its agents to the repo has no path to delivering work,
// so it must fail at launch where someone is still looking.
//
// Not for a microVM mission: its agent is a `claude -p` inside a VM on a
// fleet node, not a ZeroClaw claw in a container here, so there is no
// workspace to pin. Leaving it would make a microVM launch FAIL on a
// container it was never going to use.
if !provisioned_claws.is_empty() && mission_gateway.is_some() && mission.runtime_kind != "microvm"
{
Ok(()) => {
// The daemon reads config ONCE at boot and never re-reads
// the file, so the pin is invisible until it restarts. Its
// agents were created through its own config API, so they
// are already persisted to the file and survive the
// restart; the pairing code is re-minted on every launch.
if let Err(e) = mp.restart_container(mission_id).await {
eprintln!(
"mission_orchestrator: restart runtime for {mission_id} failed (continuing, workspace pin will not apply): {e}"
);
}
}
Err(e) => eprintln!(
"mission_orchestrator: pin workspaces for mission {mission_id} failed (continuing): {e}"
),
}
if let Some(mp) = crate::mission_runtime::MissionRuntimeProvisioner::from_env() {
mp.pin_agent_workspaces(mission_id, &provisioned_claws, "/mission/repo")
.await
.map_err(|e| {
format!(
"could not pin agent workspaces to /mission/repo ({e}) — the mission \
would run with its agents writing to their sandboxes, delivering nothing"
)
})?;
// The daemon reads config ONCE at boot and never re-reads the
// file, so the pin is invisible until it restarts. Its agents were
// created through its own config API, so they are already
// persisted to the file and survive the restart; the pairing code
// is re-minted on every launch. Equally fatal: an unrestarted
// daemon is an unpinned daemon.
mp.restart_container(mission_id).await.map_err(|e| {
format!("could not restart the runtime to apply the workspace pin: {e}")
})?;
}
}
@@ -365,6 +450,17 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("stamp template lineage: {e}"))?;
// Names already on this workspace's roster, so a newly hired claw does not
// arrive sharing a name with someone already here. Read ONCE — a roster
// query per role would be N queries to answer one question — and extended
// locally as we mint, which also keeps names distinct WITHIN this team.
let mut taken_names: Vec<String> = cm_db::repo::agents::roster(pool, workspace_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("read roster for naming: {e}"))?
.into_iter()
.map(|a| a.name)
.collect();
// For each role: create agent, provision runtime, ingest brain
// seed, record link, bind to topology node.
for (idx, role) in template.roles.iter().enumerate() {
@@ -378,10 +474,63 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
template.roles.len(),
));
};
// Every mission gets its OWN crew.
//
// This deliberately reverses the reuse added earlier. Reuse hired the
// existing claw for a (template, slot) so the roster stayed at one team
// and "My Workforce" was people you keep — but it also meant every
// mission was staffed by the same five names, and the workforce view
// showed one crew repeated down the page with nothing to tell the
// missions apart. Chosen by the operator: distinct crews read better
// than a bounded roster.
//
// The cost is real and is the cost that reuse existed to avoid: claws
// are `lifecycle = 'permanent'` and nothing reaps them until their
// MISSION is deleted, so the roster now grows by the team size on every
// mission. `agent_names::pick` keeps names unique workspace-wide and
// falls back to a numeric suffix once the pool is exhausted, so growth
// degrades the naming gracefully rather than colliding.
//
// `reusable_claw` in cm-db is kept, with its tests: this is a policy
// choice that has now flipped twice, and the query is the hard part.
let reused: Option<uuid::Uuid> = None;
// Seed the name choice from the claw's OWN id, not its position in the
// team.
//
// Seeding with the role index (0..n) started every crew near the top of
// the pool and took the next free names, so the first mission hired
// Aarav, Abebe, Adaora, Adrian, Agnieszka — correct, unique, and
// transparently alphabetical. A crew should look like a team, not like
// a listing. UUIDv7 puts its random bytes LAST (the leading bytes are a
// timestamp, which would cluster again), so the tail is what spreads
// the five picks across the whole pool.
let agent_id = cm_domain::AgentId::new();
let name_seed = {
let uuid = agent_id.as_uuid();
let b = uuid.as_bytes();
u64::from_le_bytes([b[8], b[9], b[10], b[11], b[12], b[13], b[14], b[15]])
};
let agent = Agent {
id: cm_domain::AgentId::new(),
id: agent_id,
workspace_id,
name: format!("{} · {}", team_name, role.slot),
// A PERSON's name, with the role in `job_title`.
//
// This was `"{mission title} · {purpose} · {template} · {slot}"` —
// names like "verify: a repo-less research mission keeps its output
// · mission · Rust SDLC · planner", unreadable in the roster, the
// API and every log line at once. Then it was the bare slot, which
// fixed the length but made the UI show the same word twice (name
// on top, role beneath) and made a roster of five read as five job
// tickets rather than a crew.
//
// The role still lives in `job_title`, which is what the mission
// machinery binds on — `team_members.role_slot` and the topology
// node carry the slot, so nothing downstream keys off the display
// name. Only the reused branch below ignores this, deliberately: a
// claw you already hired keeps the name it already had.
name: crate::agent_names::pick(&taken_names, name_seed),
job_title: role.slot.clone(),
// This is the ONLY consumer of the templates' `system_prompt` prose,
// and it feeds the *chat* path, not missions: it lands in
@@ -398,12 +547,40 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
managed_by: user_id,
status: AgentStatus::Online,
};
let claw_id = match reused {
Some(existing) => {
eprintln!(
"mission_orchestrator: reusing claw {existing} for role {} \
(template {})",
role.slot, template.template.id
);
existing
}
None => {
cm_db::repo::agents::insert(pool, &agent, &AccessPolicy::default())
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("insert agent {}: {e}", role.slot))?;
let claw_id = agent.id.as_uuid();
// Claim the name for the rest of this loop. Without this the
// roster snapshot taken before the loop is stale from the
// second role onward and a five-person team can arrive with
// two Merediths.
taken_names.push(agent.name.clone());
agent.id.as_uuid()
}
};
let agent_id = cm_domain::AgentId::from(claw_id);
cm_db::repo::agents::set_model_binding(pool, agent.id, default_model)
// The ROLE's model when the template names one, else the mint's default.
// Before migration 0071 there was no role model at all, so every claw of
// every mission team ran the same one — including a reviewer reviewing
// the coder it shares a model with.
let role_model = role
.model
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|m| !m.is_empty())
.unwrap_or(default_model);
cm_db::repo::agents::set_model_binding(pool, agent_id, role_model)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("set_model_binding {claw_id}: {e}"))?;
@@ -420,10 +597,10 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
// out-of-band via MissionRuntimeProvisioner::pin_agent_workspaces.
if let Some(p) = provisioner {
match p
.provision_claw(claw_id, default_model, &template.template.risk_profile)
.provision_claw(claw_id, role_model, &template.template.risk_profile)
.await
{
Ok(_) => provisioned_claws.push(agent.id),
Ok(_) => provisioned_claws.push(agent_id),
Err(e) => eprintln!(
"mission_orchestrator: provision claw {claw_id} failed (continuing): {e}"
),
@@ -432,6 +609,10 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
// Ingest brain seed (Slice 3.5d). Non-fatal on failure —
// agent still works from system_prompt alone.
// Seed only a NEW claw. A reused one carries what it learned on earlier
// missions, and re-seeding would overwrite that with the template's
// starting point — which is precisely the accumulation reuse exists for.
if reused.is_none() {
if let Some(seed) = role.brain_seed.as_deref().filter(|s| !s.trim().is_empty()) {
if let Err(e) =
crate::brain_seed::ingest(claw_id, seed.to_string(), role.system_prompt.clone())
@@ -442,6 +623,7 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
);
}
}
}
// Record lineage (Slice 3.5d) so the MCP skills server can
// merge template default skills with per-agent overrides.
@@ -470,9 +652,10 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
cm_db::repo::audit::Actor::User(user_id),
"agent.created",
"agent",
&agent.id.to_string(),
&agent_id.to_string(),
serde_json::json!({
"name": agent.name,
"reused": reused.is_some(),
"job_title": agent.job_title,
"source": "mission_orchestrator",
"template_id": template.template.id.to_string(),
@@ -486,6 +669,97 @@ async fn mint_team_from_template(
Ok(team_id)
}
/// The model a minted claw runs on when its template role does not name one.
///
/// A DEFAULT now, not a hardcode: `template_roles.model` (migration 0071) lets a
/// template put its reviewer on a different model from the coder it reviews,
/// which is the correlated failure the cross-provider judge exists to break,
/// one layer down. Roles that say nothing still land here, so every template
/// that existed before 0071 behaves exactly as it did.
const MINTED_CLAW_MODEL: &str = "claude-sonnet-5";
/// The graph a COMPOSED microVM mission runs, built from its team template
/// without minting a single claw.
///
/// A composed mission needs the template's *shape* — how many nodes, in what
/// pattern, playing what roles — and nothing else it carries. Its nodes are VMs,
/// so provisioning claws for them would create agents, containers and `.brain`
/// files that nothing ever dials; that is exactly why `on_launch` returns early
/// for a microVM mission, and this is how the composed path gets its graph
/// anyway rather than by undoing that.
///
/// `purposes` is the phase's purpose list, matched against `config.phase_teams`;
/// missions using the legacy single `team_template_id` fall back to it.
/// Returns `None` when the mission picked no template at all.
pub async fn composed_graph(
pool: &PgPool,
mission_id: Uuid,
purposes: &[&str],
) -> Result<Option<serde_json::Value>, String> {
let row: Option<(serde_json::Value, Option<Uuid>)> =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT config, team_template_id FROM missions WHERE id = $1")
.bind(mission_id)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("load mission {mission_id}: {e}"))?;
let Some((config, legacy_template)) = row else {
return Err(format!("mission {mission_id} not found"));
};
// An APPROVED roster wins over the template. It is the more specific answer
// — a model sized it for this mission's actual task and a human accepted it
// — and it is the only path on which nodes carry per-node backends, which is
// how a mission runs more than one provider. Stored already built and
// validated (`routes::mission_roster::decide`), so nothing here can turn a
// refused roster into a running one.
if let Some(roster) = config.get("roster").filter(|v| v.is_object()) {
// Parsed rather than trusted: a graph the orchestrator cannot plan would
// otherwise be claimed and fail as "missing or invalid graph", which
// reads as a runtime fault instead of a bad roster.
serde_json::from_value::<cm_topology::TopologyGraph>(roster.clone())
.map_err(|e| format!("mission {mission_id}: the approved roster is not a runnable topology: {e}"))?;
return Ok(Some(roster.clone()));
}
let template_id = config
.get("phase_teams")
.and_then(|v| v.as_object())
.and_then(|pt| {
// First template named by any purpose this phase answers to, in the
// phase's own preference order — the same order `launch_phase` uses
// to pick teams, so a composed mission and a ZeroClaw one resolve the
// same template for the same phase.
purposes.iter().find_map(|p| {
pt.get(*p)
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.and_then(|a| a.first())
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.and_then(|s| Uuid::parse_str(s).ok())
})
})
.or(legacy_template);
let Some(template_id) = template_id else {
return Ok(None);
};
let template = cm_db::repo::team_templates::get(pool, template_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("load template {template_id}: {e}"))?
.ok_or_else(|| format!("template {template_id} not found"))?;
let roles: Vec<&str> = template.roles.iter().map(|r| r.slot.as_str()).collect();
if roles.is_empty() {
return Err(format!("template {template_id} defines no roles"));
}
let graph = cm_topology::build(
parse_topology_kind(&template.template.default_topology),
&roles,
)
.map_err(|e| format!("build topology graph for template {template_id}: {e}"))?;
serde_json::to_value(&graph)
.map(Some)
.map_err(|e| format!("serialize topology graph: {e}"))
}
fn parse_topology_kind(s: &str) -> cm_topology::TopologyKind {
use cm_topology::TopologyKind;
match s {
+533
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
//! Capture for missions that have no repository.
//!
//! `mission_delivery` captures a phase's work by diffing a git checkout. A
//! mission with `repo_id IS NULL` — every `research_only` mission, because that
//! recipe sets `requires_repo = false` — has no checkout, so
//! `capture_finished_coding_phases` filters it out at the SQL level
//! (`AND m.repo_id IS NOT NULL`) and never reads the container at all.
//!
//! The agents still write files. The research directive tells them to save
//! findings under `/mission/repo/research/`, and it says so whether or not a
//! repo exists. So the work lands in the container's own filesystem, is never
//! collected, and is destroyed when the sweeper reaps the container.
//!
//! # What this cost, measured
//!
//! Mission `019fdc35` ("ClawHDF5 Research"): four agents, 9.5 minutes, **eight
//! research documents** — an HDF5 parser design, a Rust ecosystem survey, a
//! seven-crate dependency map, tracing and fuzzing strategy. `mission_artifacts`
//! held zero rows and the mission reported `completed`. One agent's own summary
//! recorded the situation exactly: *"No git repo — file is written."* It noticed,
//! wrote anyway, and the platform threw the result away without a word.
//!
//! Nothing survived but the summarizer's account of it — which is the agents'
//! description of the work, not the work.
//!
//! # Why a separate path rather than widening the diff capture
//!
//! There is no base commit to diff against and no branch to push, so every
//! concept `capture_phase_diff` is built on is absent. What a repo-less mission
//! produces is simply *files*, and the honest capture is to copy them out and
//! register each as an artifact. `_outputs/` is deliberately a SIBLING of the
//! mission directory and survives `teardown_container`, so artifacts registered
//! here outlive the reap that destroyed the originals.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use sqlx::{PgPool, Row};
use time::{Duration, OffsetDateTime};
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Directories never worth capturing, whatever an agent leaves behind.
///
/// Same intent as `mission_fs`'s exclusion list: a captured `.git` or
/// `node_modules` is noise that would bury the four documents that matter.
const SKIP_DIRS: &[&str] = &[
".git",
"node_modules",
"target",
".venv",
"venv",
"__pycache__",
".cache",
"dist",
"build",
];
/// How many phases to capture per tick, matching `CAPTURE_BATCH`.
const BATCH: i64 = 5;
/// How long a phase's outputs may stay uncollectable before the sweep stops
/// retrying and calls it empty.
///
/// Generous on purpose: the container is torn down asynchronously after a
/// phase, so an early tick can legitimately fail. What must NOT happen is
/// retrying forever — that is the state this constant exists to end.
const COLLECT_GRACE: Duration = Duration::minutes(10);
/// The artifact kind this path registers. Also the idempotency key: a phase with
/// one of these has already been captured.
pub const OUTPUT_KIND: &str = "document";
/// Filename of the marker written when a phase produced nothing.
const EMPTY_MARKER: &str = "NO-OUTPUT.md";
/// Capture the outputs of finished phases on missions that have no repo.
pub async fn capture_repo_less_phases(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), String> {
let rows = sqlx::query(
"SELECT mp.id, mp.mission_id, mp.kind, mp.config, mp.completed_at, m.runtime_kind
FROM mission_phases mp
JOIN missions m ON m.id = mp.mission_id
WHERE mp.status IN ('completed', 'failed')
AND m.repo_id IS NULL
-- microVM used to be excluded here because `run_phase_in_vm`
-- refused to boot without a checkout. It no longer does: a
-- repo-less mission gets an empty workspace at the same guest path,
-- and the collect unpacks it back onto the host — so those files are
-- already on disk and `collect_into` reads them instead of asking a
-- container that never existed.
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM mission_artifacts a
WHERE a.mission_id = mp.mission_id
AND a.phase_id = mp.id
AND a.kind = $2
)
ORDER BY mp.completed_at DESC NULLS LAST
LIMIT $1",
)
.bind(BATCH)
.bind(OUTPUT_KIND)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("select repo-less phases to capture: {e}"))?;
for row in rows {
let phase_id: Uuid = row.get("id");
let mission_id: Uuid = row.get("mission_id");
let kind: String = row.get("kind");
let config: serde_json::Value = row.get("config");
let completed_at: Option<OffsetDateTime> = row.get("completed_at");
let runtime_kind: String = row.get("runtime_kind");
let dest = outputs_dir(mission_id, phase_id);
let captured = match collect_into(mission_id, &dest, &runtime_kind).await {
Ok(files) => files,
Err(e) => {
// Retryable, but BOUNDED. A bare `continue` here is how a phase
// whose collect can never succeed stayed `completed` with zero
// artifacts forever: the fail-empty rule and the NO-OUTPUT
// marker both live below this point, so neither was ever
// reached, and the phase was re-attempted on every tick for the
// life of the deployment.
//
// The grace window exists because the container may legitimately
// not be ready on the first tick after a phase finishes. Past
// that, "cannot collect" and "collected nothing" are the same
// fact for the operator, so we fall through and let the rules
// below fail the phase and leave a marker explaining why.
let settled = completed_at
.map(|t| OffsetDateTime::now_utc() - t > COLLECT_GRACE)
.unwrap_or(true);
if !settled {
eprintln!(
"mission_outputs: could NOT collect outputs for phase {phase_id} \
of mission {mission_id} (will retry): {e}"
);
continue;
}
eprintln!(
"mission_outputs: giving up collecting phase {phase_id} of mission \
{mission_id} after {}s: {e} — treating it as having produced nothing",
COLLECT_GRACE.whole_seconds()
);
Vec::new()
}
};
for file in &captured {
let rel = match file.strip_prefix(missions_root()) {
Ok(r) => r.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
Err(_) => file.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
};
let title = file
.file_name()
.map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|| rel.clone());
if let Err(e) = cm_db::repo::missions::register_artifact(
pool,
cm_db::repo::missions::RegisterArtifact {
mission_id,
phase_id: Some(phase_id),
path: &rel,
kind: OUTPUT_KIND,
mime: Some(mime_for(file)),
title: Some(&title),
generated_by_run: None,
// No PDF. The renderer converted Markdown to HTML by
// calling an LLM — a paid API call, per document, on the
// critical path of "save my research", which promptly
// failed on depleted credits. Markdown IS the deliverable;
// it is served by `artifact_content` and styled at render
// time, which is free, offline, and cannot 429.
render_pdf: false,
metadata: Some(serde_json::json!({
"bytes": std::fs::metadata(file).map(|m| m.len()).unwrap_or(0),
"captured_from": "/mission/repo",
})),
},
)
.await
{
eprintln!("mission_outputs: registering {rel}: {e}");
}
}
if captured.is_empty() {
// Register a marker even when there is nothing to capture, or this
// phase matches the `NOT EXISTS` selection on every tick forever:
// re-running a docker copy_out each time and, because the batch is
// bounded, permanently occupying a slot so no other repo-less
// mission is ever captured again.
//
// `phase_runner::record_uncapturable` exists for exactly this
// failure on the diff path — five dead phases starved the batch
// while live work went untouched — and this code hit it again on
// its first live negative control (4 log lines, then 8, 45 seconds
// apart). Same shape, same fix: a real file behind a real row,
// because an artifact pointing at nothing turns every reader into
// an unexplained 404.
if let Err(e) = register_empty_marker(pool, mission_id, phase_id, &dest).await {
eprintln!("mission_outputs: marking phase {phase_id} as empty: {e}");
}
}
if captured.is_empty() && !allow_empty(&config) {
// The same rule `empty_delivery_is_a_failure` applies to a coding
// phase, for the only channel a repo-less phase has. Without it a
// research mission that produced nothing is indistinguishable from
// one that produced eight documents — both `completed`.
eprintln!(
"mission_outputs: phase {phase_id} ({kind}) of mission {mission_id} produced \
NO output files — failing it. Set config.allow_empty = true if this phase is \
meant to think rather than produce."
);
if let Err(e) = sqlx::query("UPDATE mission_phases SET status = 'failed' WHERE id = $1")
.bind(phase_id)
.execute(pool)
.await
{
eprintln!("mission_outputs: failing empty phase {phase_id}: {e}");
}
} else {
eprintln!(
"mission_outputs: captured {} file(s) from phase {phase_id} ({kind}) of \
mission {mission_id}",
captured.len()
);
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Record that a phase produced nothing, so it is not reconsidered forever.
///
/// Deliberately the same `OUTPUT_KIND` the real captures use: the selection
/// query asks "has this phase been captured?", and "captured, and there was
/// nothing" is an answer to that question. `metadata.empty` is what tells the
/// two apart — the same convention `mission_delivery` uses for its "No code
/// changes" artifact.
async fn register_empty_marker(
pool: &PgPool,
mission_id: Uuid,
phase_id: Uuid,
dest: &Path,
) -> Result<(), String> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(dest).map_err(|e| format!("create {}: {e}", dest.display()))?;
let file = dest.join(EMPTY_MARKER);
std::fs::write(
&file,
"This phase finished without leaving any files in its workspace, so there\n was nothing to publish. If the phase is meant to reason rather than\n produce, set `config.allow_empty = true` on it.\n",
)
.map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", file.display()))?;
let rel = file
.strip_prefix(missions_root())
.map(|r| r.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.unwrap_or_else(|_| file.to_string_lossy().to_string());
cm_db::repo::missions::register_artifact(
pool,
cm_db::repo::missions::RegisterArtifact {
mission_id,
phase_id: Some(phase_id),
path: &rel,
kind: OUTPUT_KIND,
mime: Some("text/markdown"),
title: Some("No output produced"),
generated_by_run: None,
render_pdf: false,
metadata: Some(serde_json::json!({ "empty": true })),
},
)
.await
.map(|_| ())
.map_err(|e| format!("register empty marker: {e}"))
}
/// Gather the mission's produced files and return the ones worth keeping.
///
/// Where they come from depends on the runtime, and the difference is not
/// cosmetic: a container mission's files are still INSIDE a running container,
/// while a microVM's have already been unpacked onto the host by the collect at
/// the end of the turn (`microvm_executor` writes them over
/// `mission_workspace::checkout_path`). Asking docker for a VM mission's files
/// would query a container that never existed.
async fn collect_into(
mission_id: Uuid,
dest: &Path,
runtime_kind: &str,
) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>, String> {
// A stale copy from an earlier attempt would be registered as this pass's
// output — the same "captured a tree nobody wrote" shape capture avoids.
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(dest);
std::fs::create_dir_all(dest).map_err(|e| format!("create {}: {e}", dest.display()))?;
if runtime_kind == "microvm" {
let src = crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission_id);
if !src.is_dir() {
return Err(format!(
"{} is absent — the VM's collect did not land",
src.display()
));
}
copy_tree(&src, &dest.join("repo"))?;
return Ok(keep_files(&dest.join("repo")));
}
let container = crate::mission_runtime::container_name(mission_id);
let docker = crate::container_exec::connect()?;
crate::mission_fs::copy_out(&docker, &container, "/mission/repo", dest).await?;
Ok(keep_files(&dest.join("repo")))
}
/// Recursive file copy. Small on purpose — the alternative is a dependency or a
/// shell-out, and this runs as the server's own uid against its own directory.
fn copy_tree(src: &Path, dest: &Path) -> Result<(), String> {
std::fs::create_dir_all(dest).map_err(|e| format!("create {}: {e}", dest.display()))?;
let entries = std::fs::read_dir(src).map_err(|e| format!("read {}: {e}", src.display()))?;
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let from = entry.path();
let to = dest.join(entry.file_name());
match entry.file_type() {
Ok(t) if t.is_dir() => copy_tree(&from, &to)?,
Ok(t) if t.is_file() => {
std::fs::copy(&from, &to).map_err(|e| format!("copy {}: {e}", from.display()))?;
}
// Symlinks and specials are skipped rather than followed: a link out
// of the tree would publish whatever it points at.
_ => {}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// Every regular file worth keeping, recursively.
fn keep_files(root: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
let mut stack = vec![root.to_path_buf()];
while let Some(dir) = stack.pop() {
let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&dir) else {
continue;
};
for entry in entries.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
let name = entry.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string();
if path.is_dir() {
if !SKIP_DIRS.contains(&name.as_str()) {
stack.push(path);
}
} else if path.is_file()
&& !name.starts_with('.')
// The agent runtime seeds its own identity files into the
// workspace root, which is pinned to the repo root. In a
// repo-backed mission `.git/info/exclude` hides them; a
// repo-less mission has no `.git`, so without this the user's
// artifact list is 7 files of agent scaffolding and 2 of their
// research. Measured exactly that way on the first live run.
&& !crate::mission_workspace::AGENT_SCAFFOLDING.contains(&name.as_str())
{
out.push(path);
}
}
}
out.sort();
out
}
/// `<missions_root>/_outputs/<mission>/<phase>` — a sibling of the mission
/// directory, so `teardown_container` reaping the mission does not take the
/// captured artifacts with it.
fn outputs_dir(mission_id: Uuid, phase_id: Uuid) -> PathBuf {
missions_root()
.join("_outputs")
.join(mission_id.to_string())
.join(phase_id.to_string())
}
/// The missions root, for callers that resolve artifact paths against it.
pub fn missions_root_dir() -> PathBuf {
missions_root()
}
/// The only directory an artifact may be read from.
pub fn outputs_root_dir() -> PathBuf {
missions_root().join("_outputs")
}
fn missions_root() -> PathBuf {
crate::mission_workspace::missions_root()
}
fn mime_for(p: &Path) -> &'static str {
match p.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) {
Some("md") | Some("markdown") => "text/markdown",
Some("json") => "application/json",
Some("csv") => "text/csv",
Some("html") => "text/html",
_ => "text/plain",
}
}
fn allow_empty(config: &serde_json::Value) -> bool {
config.get("allow_empty").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()) == Some(true)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn touch(p: &Path) {
std::fs::create_dir_all(p.parent().unwrap()).unwrap();
std::fs::write(p, "x").unwrap();
}
/// The documents a research phase writes are what must come back — and the
/// machinery around them must not.
#[test]
fn research_documents_are_kept_and_scaffolding_is_not() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = tmp.path().join("repo");
touch(&repo.join("research/01_repo_archaeology.md"));
touch(&repo.join("research/02_ecosystem.md"));
touch(&repo.join("notes.txt"));
// The seven the agent runtime seeds into the workspace root.
for f in crate::mission_workspace::AGENT_SCAFFOLDING {
touch(&repo.join(f));
}
touch(&repo.join(".git/HEAD"));
touch(&repo.join("node_modules/left-pad/index.js"));
touch(&repo.join("target/debug/thing"));
touch(&repo.join(".hidden"));
let kept: Vec<String> = keep_files(&repo)
.iter()
.map(|p| p.strip_prefix(&repo).unwrap().to_string_lossy().to_string())
.collect();
assert_eq!(
kept,
vec![
"notes.txt".to_string(),
"research/01_repo_archaeology.md".to_string(),
"research/02_ecosystem.md".to_string(),
],
"kept: {kept:?}"
);
}
/// Markdown is the deliverable, so it must be labelled as markdown — the
/// viewer decides how to render from the mime type.
#[test]
fn markdown_is_labelled_so_the_viewer_can_style_it() {
assert_eq!(mime_for(Path::new("/x/01_notes.md")), "text/markdown");
assert_eq!(mime_for(Path::new("/x/data.json")), "application/json");
}
/// The containment rule the content endpoint enforces: everything readable
/// lives under `_outputs`, and nothing else does.
///
/// Artifact paths are written by this server, but they are DATA in a table,
/// and a row saying `../../../etc/passwd` must be a 404 rather than a file
/// read. The endpoint canonicalises before comparing — checking the string
/// first would pass `_outputs/../../etc/passwd` straight through.
#[test]
fn everything_readable_lives_under_the_outputs_root() {
let root = outputs_root_dir();
assert!(root.ends_with("_outputs"), "{root:?}");
assert!(root.starts_with(missions_root_dir()), "{root:?}");
// A real capture is inside it...
let inside = outputs_dir(Uuid::now_v7(), Uuid::now_v7());
assert!(inside.starts_with(&root), "{inside:?}");
// ...and the traversal shape this guards against is not, once resolved.
let escaped = root.join("..").join("..").join("etc/passwd");
let normalised: PathBuf = escaped.components().fold(PathBuf::new(), |mut acc, c| {
match c {
std::path::Component::ParentDir => {
acc.pop();
}
other => acc.push(other),
}
acc
});
assert!(
!normalised.starts_with(&root),
"a traversal must not resolve back inside the outputs root: {normalised:?}"
);
}
/// A phase that produced nothing must still leave a marker, or the
/// selection query matches it on every tick forever.
///
/// Measured on the first live negative control: the guard logged "produced
/// NO output files" 4 times, then 8 times 45 seconds later — a docker
/// copy_out per tick, and with a bounded batch, five such phases would
/// starve every other repo-less mission out of capture permanently.
/// `phase_runner::record_uncapturable` was written for the identical
/// failure on the diff path.
#[test]
fn an_empty_phase_leaves_a_marker_so_it_is_not_reconsidered_forever() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let dest = tmp.path().join("out");
// The file-writing half of `register_empty_marker`, which is the part
// that must exist for the artifact row to point at something real.
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dest).unwrap();
let file = dest.join(EMPTY_MARKER);
std::fs::write(&file, "x").unwrap();
assert!(file.exists(), "an artifact row must not point at nothing");
assert_eq!(
file.file_name().unwrap().to_string_lossy(),
"NO-OUTPUT.md",
"the marker name is part of the contract with readers"
);
// And the marker must not itself be mistaken for captured output on a
// later pass: it is filtered like any other scaffolding would be.
assert!(keep_files(&dest).iter().any(|p| p == &file));
}
/// Artifacts must land OUTSIDE the mission directory. `teardown_container`
/// removes `<missions_root>/<mission_id>` wholesale, so a capture written
/// inside it would be destroyed by the very reap it exists to survive.
#[test]
fn captures_survive_the_mission_directory_being_reaped() {
let mission = Uuid::now_v7();
let phase = Uuid::now_v7();
let out = outputs_dir(mission, phase);
let mission_dir = missions_root().join(mission.to_string());
assert!(
!out.starts_with(&mission_dir),
"{} must not be inside {}",
out.display(),
mission_dir.display()
);
assert!(out.starts_with(missions_root().join("_outputs")), "{out:?}");
}
}
+296
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
//! A model-authored execution plan for one mission — W1 / #13.
//!
//! Every mission's phases come from one of five hand-written recipes in
//! `templates/workflows/*.toml`, chosen by `template_kind`. A recipe is a fixed
//! answer to "what phases does this kind of mission have", written before anyone
//! saw the mission — the "do it this way: 1, 2, 3" over-specification that makes
//! a capable model follow a worse plan than it would have chosen for the actual
//! task.
//!
//! This is the other half of [`crate::mission_roster`]: that one lets a model
//! size the team, this one lets it decide what the work IS. Same shape on
//! purpose — propose, review, approve, apply — because the review gate is what
//! makes model-authored structure safe to run, and a second shape would be a
//! second thing to get right.
//!
//! # Grounded in what the platform actually reads
//!
//! The interesting constraint is not "is this JSON valid" but "will anything
//! consume it". `phase_config::KNOWN_KEYS` already names every phase-config key
//! and the code that reads it, with eleven marked NOT IMPLEMENTED — the registry
//! built after `task` sat unread through every mission. A plan is validated
//! against that registry, so a model cannot propose a phase whose settings
//! nothing will act on. The failure that registry exists to EXPOSE is one this
//! path cannot create.
//!
//! Phase kinds are checked the same way, against the kinds `phase_runner`
//! actually dispatches. A model asked to plan work will happily invent
//! `kind: "review"`, and an unknown kind does not fail — it falls to the
//! catch-all purpose and runs as a generic phase, which looks like it worked.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Phase kinds `phase_runner` dispatches on.
///
/// Not an enum, because `mission_phases.kind` is a free-form column shared with
/// hand-written recipes and the wizard; this is the subset a MODEL may propose.
/// An unrecognised kind is the dangerous case: it does not error, it falls
/// through to the generic `mission` purpose and runs anyway.
pub const PLANNABLE_KINDS: &[&str] = &["research", "coding", "benchmark", "security_scan"];
/// Ceiling on a proposed plan.
///
/// Each phase is a full agent run — a VM boot, a checkout, a turn, a capture —
/// executed in sequence. Anthropic's own guidance warns against decomposing work
/// into sequential phases at all ("a handoff loses context at every step"), so
/// this bound is deliberately tight: a model that wants eight phases is
/// describing a to-do list, not a plan.
pub const MAX_PHASES: usize = 4;
/// One phase of a proposed plan.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct PlannedPhase {
/// One of [`PLANNABLE_KINDS`].
pub kind: String,
/// What this phase does. Lands in `config.task`, which
/// `phase_task_text` injects — the key that sat unread through every
/// mission until two phases with different tasks produced identical output.
pub task: String,
/// Optional completion condition, judged post-hoc by the evaluator.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub done_when: Option<String>,
/// Optional deterministic check, enforced IN the agent's loop by the stop
/// gate ([`crate::vm_stop_gate`]).
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub done_when_check: Option<String>,
/// This phase is allowed to change nothing (a verification pass).
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub allow_empty: Option<bool>,
}
/// A proposed sequence of phases.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Plan {
pub phases: Vec<PlannedPhase>,
}
/// Why a plan was refused.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Refusal {
Empty,
TooMany(usize),
UnknownKind { index: usize, kind: String },
BlankTask(usize),
/// A config key with no reader in this build — named, with the ones that
/// would have been consumed.
InertKey { index: usize, key: String },
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Refusal {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
Refusal::Empty => write!(f, "the plan has no phases, so the mission would do nothing"),
Refusal::TooMany(n) => write!(
f,
"the plan has {n} phases and the ceiling is {MAX_PHASES} — each one is a full \
agent run, and a handoff loses context at every step"
),
Refusal::UnknownKind { index, kind } => write!(
f,
"phase {index} has kind {kind:?}, which nothing dispatches on; use one of: {}",
PLANNABLE_KINDS.join(", ")
),
Refusal::BlankTask(i) => write!(
f,
"phase {i} has no task, so its agent would receive the mission description and \
nothing telling it which part is its own"
),
Refusal::InertKey { index, key } => write!(
f,
"phase {index} sets {key:?}, which nothing in this build reads — it would be \
stored, rendered, and consumed by nobody"
),
}
}
}
impl Plan {
/// Check a plan against what the platform can actually execute.
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), Refusal> {
if self.phases.is_empty() {
return Err(Refusal::Empty);
}
if self.phases.len() > MAX_PHASES {
return Err(Refusal::TooMany(self.phases.len()));
}
for (i, p) in self.phases.iter().enumerate() {
if !PLANNABLE_KINDS.contains(&p.kind.as_str()) {
return Err(Refusal::UnknownKind {
index: i,
kind: p.kind.clone(),
});
}
if p.task.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(Refusal::BlankTask(i));
}
// Every key this phase would write must have a reader. The plan is
// built from typed fields, so this can only fail if a field is added
// here without a corresponding entry in the registry — which is
// exactly the drift worth failing on.
if let Some(key) = crate::phase_config::inert_keys(&p.config()).into_iter().next() {
return Err(Refusal::InertKey { index: i, key });
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// The phases as `(kind, order_idx, config)`, ready for mission creation.
///
/// `order_idx` is the array position rather than a field the model sets:
/// two sources for one fact is how a plan ends up with two phase 0s.
pub fn phases(&self) -> Vec<(String, i32, serde_json::Value)> {
self.phases
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(i, p)| (p.kind.clone(), i as i32, p.config()))
.collect()
}
}
impl PlannedPhase {
/// This phase's `mission_phases.config`.
fn config(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
let mut o = serde_json::Map::new();
o.insert("task".into(), serde_json::Value::String(self.task.clone()));
if let Some(d) = self.done_when.as_deref().map(str::trim).filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
o.insert("done_when".into(), serde_json::Value::String(d.to_string()));
}
if let Some(c) = self
.done_when_check
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
{
o.insert(
"done_when_check".into(),
serde_json::Value::String(c.to_string()),
);
}
if let Some(e) = self.allow_empty {
o.insert("allow_empty".into(), serde_json::Value::Bool(e));
}
serde_json::Value::Object(o)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn phase(kind: &str, task: &str) -> PlannedPhase {
PlannedPhase {
kind: kind.into(),
task: task.into(),
done_when: None,
done_when_check: None,
allow_empty: None,
}
}
/// A kind nothing dispatches on is the dangerous one: it does not error, it
/// falls through to the generic purpose and runs as a nondescript phase that
/// looks like it worked.
#[test]
fn an_invented_phase_kind_is_refused_naming_the_real_ones() {
let p = Plan {
phases: vec![phase("coding", "do it"), phase("review", "check it")],
};
let err = p.validate().unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(
err,
Refusal::UnknownKind {
index: 1,
kind: "review".into()
}
);
let msg = err.to_string();
for kind in PLANNABLE_KINDS {
assert!(msg.contains(kind), "the message must name {kind}: {msg}");
}
// And every kind the runner dispatches on is accepted, so this cannot
// drift from what `phase_runner` can actually execute.
for kind in PLANNABLE_KINDS {
assert!(Plan { phases: vec![phase(kind, "work")] }.validate().is_ok(), "{kind}");
}
}
/// Every key a planned phase writes must have a reader. This is the whole
/// reason `phase_config` exists — a key nothing consumes is stored,
/// rendered, and silently inert.
#[test]
fn every_key_a_plan_writes_is_one_something_reads() {
let p = PlannedPhase {
kind: "coding".into(),
task: "add a module".into(),
done_when: Some("the suite passes".into()),
done_when_check: Some("cargo test".into()),
allow_empty: Some(false),
};
let cfg = p.config();
assert!(
crate::phase_config::inert_keys(&cfg).is_empty(),
"a planned phase must write only keys with readers: {:?}",
crate::phase_config::inert_keys(&cfg)
);
assert!(
crate::phase_config::unknown_keys(&cfg).is_empty(),
"and only keys the registry knows: {:?}",
crate::phase_config::unknown_keys(&cfg)
);
assert!(Plan { phases: vec![p] }.validate().is_ok());
}
/// A blank task is the failure that produced identical output from two
/// different phases — the agent gets the mission description and nothing
/// saying which part is its own.
#[test]
fn a_phase_without_a_task_is_refused() {
let p = Plan {
phases: vec![phase("coding", " ")],
};
assert_eq!(p.validate(), Err(Refusal::BlankTask(0)));
}
/// Bounded and non-empty. Each phase is a full agent run in sequence, and
/// splitting one change into stages loses context at every handoff.
#[test]
fn a_plan_is_bounded_and_non_empty() {
assert_eq!(Plan { phases: vec![] }.validate(), Err(Refusal::Empty));
let many: Vec<_> = (0..MAX_PHASES + 1).map(|_| phase("coding", "work")).collect();
assert_eq!(
Plan { phases: many }.validate(),
Err(Refusal::TooMany(MAX_PHASES + 1))
);
}
/// Order comes from the array, not from a field the model sets. Two sources
/// for one fact is how a plan ends up with two phase 0s — and `order_idx`
/// is what `start_pending_phases` sequences on.
#[test]
fn order_comes_from_the_arrays_own_order() {
let p = Plan {
phases: vec![
phase("research", "read the code"),
phase("coding", "change it"),
phase("coding", "then this"),
],
};
let out = p.phases();
assert_eq!(
out.iter().map(|(_, i, _)| *i).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
vec![0, 1, 2]
);
assert_eq!(out[0].0, "research");
assert_eq!(out[1].2["task"], "change it");
}
}
+41 -58
View File
@@ -2,16 +2,18 @@
//! mission and rewrite it into a coherent, sectioned Markdown brief
//! that downstream research + coding agents can ingest cleanly.
//!
//! Calls Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8 by default. Prod already carries
//! ANTHROPIC_API_KEY for ZeroClaw's provider config, so no separate
//! env is needed.
//! Asks for Claude Opus 4.8 by default, but goes through
//! `subscription::complete_with_fallback` like every other server-side model
//! call. It used to hand-roll its own HTTPS POST to the Messages API with the
//! metered key — a comment above this line still claimed prod "already carries
//! ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, so no separate env is needed", which stopped being true
//! the moment that account ran out of credit. See `subscription`, whose
//! source-walk test is what found this module.
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use uuid::Uuid;
const DEFAULT_MODEL: &str = "claude-opus-4-8";
const ANTHROPIC_API_VERSION: &str = "2023-06-01";
fn model_name() -> String {
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_REFINER_MODEL").unwrap_or_else(|_| DEFAULT_MODEL.to_string())
@@ -22,12 +24,36 @@ pub struct RefineResult {
pub refined: String,
}
/// Refine a description that has no mission behind it yet.
///
/// The wizard's polish button runs BEFORE the mission is created — there is no
/// row to load and no id to pass — while [`refine`] deliberately requires a
/// saved draft so Accept/Cancel can write back to it. Same prompt, same model
/// chain; only where the inputs come from differs.
pub async fn refine_draft(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
title: &str,
template_kind: &str,
phase_kinds: &[String],
raw: &str,
) -> Result<RefineResult, String> {
if raw.trim().is_empty() {
return Err("description is empty — nothing to refine".into());
}
let refined = call_anthropic(runtime, title, template_kind, phase_kinds, raw).await?;
Ok(RefineResult {
original: raw.to_string(),
refined,
})
}
/// Generate a refined description without touching the database. The
/// caller (frontend) reviews the diff and calls `set_description` to
/// commit — that separation makes Accept/Cancel + undo trivial without
/// an audit table.
pub async fn refine(
pool: &PgPool,
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
workspace_id: cm_domain::WorkspaceId,
mission_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<RefineResult, String> {
@@ -54,7 +80,8 @@ pub async fn refine(
.collect();
let refined =
call_anthropic(&mission.title, &mission.template_kind, &phase_kinds, &raw).await?;
call_anthropic(runtime, &mission.title, &mission.template_kind, &phase_kinds, &raw)
.await?;
Ok(RefineResult {
original: raw,
@@ -63,13 +90,12 @@ pub async fn refine(
}
async fn call_anthropic(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
title: &str,
template_kind: &str,
phase_kinds: &[String],
raw: &str,
) -> Result<String, String> {
let api_key =
std::env::var("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY").map_err(|_| "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY unset".to_string())?;
let model = model_name();
let system = "You are a technical brief editor for an autonomous software \
@@ -131,57 +157,14 @@ async fn call_anthropic(
);
// Opus 4.8 rejects the `temperature` parameter — the model runs at
// its own calibrated setting. Older Claude models accepted 0.0–1.0.
let body = json!({
"model": model,
"max_tokens": 4096,
"system": system,
"messages": [
{ "role": "user", "content": user }
]
});
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(90))
.build()
.map_err(|e| format!("http client: {e}"))?;
let resp = client
.post("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages")
.header("x-api-key", &api_key)
.header("anthropic-version", ANTHROPIC_API_VERSION)
.header("content-type", "application/json")
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("anthropic call: {e}"))?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let code = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!(
"anthropic {code}: {}",
&body[..body.len().min(500)]
));
}
let json: serde_json::Value = resp
.json()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("anthropic json: {e}"))?;
// Anthropic Messages API returns content as an array of blocks;
// the first text block holds the assistant's reply.
let text = json
.get("content")
.and_then(|c| c.as_array())
.and_then(|arr| {
arr.iter()
.find(|b| b.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some("text"))
})
.and_then(|b| b.get("text"))
.and_then(|t| t.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| "anthropic response missing text block".to_string())?
.trim()
.to_string();
// its own calibrated setting. Older Claude models accepted 0.0–1.0, and
// `ChatRequest` does not carry one, so nothing is lost by the move.
let (text, answered_by) =
crate::subscription::complete_with_fallback(runtime, system, &user, &model, 4096, false)
.await?;
let text = text.trim().to_string();
if text.is_empty() {
return Err("anthropic returned empty text".into());
return Err(format!("{answered_by} returned empty text"));
}
Ok(text)
}
+373
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,373 @@
//! A model-authored roster for a mission — Slice 5.
//!
//! The Master Planner has been proposing teams (2-6 members, a model each) since
//! it shipped, and none of it reached a mission: the proposal lived in React
//! state. A mission's shape came instead from a team template — fixed roles, and
//! every claw minted `claude-sonnet-5`, which is why no mission has ever run
//! heterogeneous providers.
//!
//! This is the seam. A roster is `(topology_kind, [(role, backend)])`, which is
//! exactly what the composed executor consumes: `composed_graph` turns it into a
//! `TopologyGraph`, and `MicroVmTurnExecutor` reads `attrs["backend"]` per node,
//! so a `validator` role on a different provider's rootfs is a first-class graph
//! node rather than a bolt-on.
//!
//! # Why the backend is validated here and not at boot
//!
//! Placement already refuses a mission whose backend no online node can run —
//! but it refuses it at LAUNCH, after the roster was approved, the mission was
//! created and someone believed it was going to run. A model that invents
//! `rootfs-opus` is a normal thing for a model to do; discovering it three steps
//! later is not. So a roster naming a backend the fleet cannot run is rejected
//! when it is proposed, naming the backends that do exist.
//!
//! # What it deliberately does not do
//!
//! It does not mint claws. A composed mission's nodes are VMs, and provisioning
//! containers for them would create agents and `.brain` files nothing ever
//! dials — the same reason `on_launch` returns early for a microVM mission.
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use uuid::Uuid;
/// One member of a proposed roster.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct RosterMember {
/// The node's role, e.g. `implementer`, `verifier`. Becomes the graph node's
/// role, which is what the per-node prompt is written around.
pub role: String,
/// Which rootfs image this node's VM boots (`missions.backend` per node).
/// `None` inherits the mission's.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub backend: Option<String>,
/// One line on why this member exists. Not consumed by anything — kept
/// because a roster nobody can read is a roster nobody can refuse.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub rationale: Option<String>,
}
/// A proposed shape for a mission.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Roster {
/// A `cm_topology::TopologyKind` name — `pipeline`, `hub_spoke`, …
pub topology_kind: String,
pub members: Vec<RosterMember>,
}
/// Ceiling on a proposed roster.
///
/// Each member is a whole VM: a boot, an inject, an agent session and a collect.
/// Anthropic's own guidance tops out at 3-5 subagents, and every member here
/// costs far more than a subagent does. A model asked to size a team will
/// cheerfully propose twelve.
pub const MAX_MEMBERS: usize = 6;
/// Why a roster was refused.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Refusal {
Empty,
TooMany(usize),
BlankRole(usize),
/// A backend no online node can run, with the ones that exist.
UnknownBackend { backend: String, available: Vec<String> },
UnknownTopology(String),
}
impl std::fmt::Display for Refusal {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
match self {
Refusal::Empty => write!(f, "the roster has no members, so there is nothing to run"),
Refusal::TooMany(n) => write!(
f,
"the roster has {n} members and the ceiling is {MAX_MEMBERS} — each one is a whole \
VM, not a subagent"
),
Refusal::BlankRole(i) => write!(f, "member {i} has no role"),
Refusal::UnknownBackend { backend, available } => write!(
f,
"no online node can run backend {backend:?}; the fleet has: {}",
if available.is_empty() {
"(none — no node reports a microvm rootfs)".to_string()
} else {
available.join(", ")
}
),
Refusal::UnknownTopology(k) => write!(
f,
"{k:?} is not a topology kind this platform can plan; use one of: {}",
cm_topology::TopologyKind::ALL
.iter()
.map(|k| k.as_str())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ")
),
}
}
}
impl Roster {
/// Check a roster against the platform and the fleet.
///
/// `available` is the set of backends at least one ONLINE node can boot.
/// Fail-closed on every axis: an unrecognised topology, a blank role and an
/// unbuildable backend are all refusals, because each of them becomes a
/// failure much later and much more expensively.
pub fn validate(&self, available: &[String]) -> Result<(), Refusal> {
if self.members.is_empty() {
return Err(Refusal::Empty);
}
if self.members.len() > MAX_MEMBERS {
return Err(Refusal::TooMany(self.members.len()));
}
if parse_kind(&self.topology_kind).is_none() {
return Err(Refusal::UnknownTopology(self.topology_kind.clone()));
}
for (i, m) in self.members.iter().enumerate() {
if m.role.trim().is_empty() {
return Err(Refusal::BlankRole(i));
}
if let Some(b) = m.backend.as_deref().map(str::trim).filter(|b| !b.is_empty()) {
if !available.iter().any(|a| a == b) {
return Err(Refusal::UnknownBackend {
backend: b.to_string(),
available: available.to_vec(),
});
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
/// The graph a composed run executes.
///
/// Node ids follow `cm_topology::build`'s `n0..` convention so the graph is
/// indistinguishable from a template-built one — the executor, the planners
/// and the checkpoint all treat it the same. The per-member backend rides in
/// `attrs`, which is the channel `MicroVmTurnExecutor` already reads.
pub fn graph(&self) -> Result<serde_json::Value, String> {
let kind = parse_kind(&self.topology_kind)
.ok_or_else(|| format!("unknown topology kind {:?}", self.topology_kind))?;
let roles: Vec<&str> = self.members.iter().map(|m| m.role.trim()).collect();
let mut graph =
cm_topology::build(kind, &roles).map_err(|e| format!("build topology: {e}"))?;
for (node, member) in graph.nodes.iter_mut().zip(self.members.iter()) {
if let Some(b) = member
.backend
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|b| !b.is_empty())
{
node.attrs.insert("backend".to_string(), b.to_string());
}
}
serde_json::to_value(&graph).map_err(|e| format!("serialize graph: {e}"))
}
}
/// Topology kind by name, accepting exactly what the catalog declares.
///
/// Deliberately not `unwrap_or(HubSpoke)`. `mission_orchestrator::
/// parse_topology_kind` does default, which is right for a stored template
/// written by us and wrong for a string a model just invented: silently running
/// a `pipeline` proposal as a hub-and-spoke would change what every node sees
/// and nothing would say so.
fn parse_kind(s: &str) -> Option<cm_topology::TopologyKind> {
let want = s.trim();
cm_topology::TopologyKind::ALL
.iter()
.copied()
.find(|k| k.as_str().eq_ignore_ascii_case(want))
}
/// Backends at least one online node can actually boot.
///
/// Read from the nodes' reported `rootfs` capability, so it answers "what can
/// run today" rather than "what images did someone build once".
pub async fn available_backends(
pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
workspace_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Vec<String>, String> {
let rows: Vec<(serde_json::Value,)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT capabilities -> 'rootfs'
FROM nodes
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND status = 'online'
AND capabilities @> '{\"microvm\": true}'::jsonb",
)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("read node rootfs capabilities: {e}"))?;
let mut out: Vec<String> = rows
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|(v,)| v.as_array().cloned())
.flatten()
.filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(str::to_string))
// A node reports every rootfs it has BUILT, which is not the same as
// every rootfs a mission can run in. `agent-terminal` is on tank right
// now: bootable, and with no credential contract, so an agent inside it
// has nothing to authenticate with. Offering it to the planner would
// produce a roster that validates, approves, launches, and then fails at
// the agent turn — the expensive kind of late.
.filter(|b| crate::mission_runtime::backend_can_run_a_mission(b))
.collect();
out.sort();
out.dedup();
Ok(out)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn member(role: &str, backend: Option<&str>) -> RosterMember {
RosterMember {
role: role.into(),
backend: backend.map(str::to_string),
rationale: None,
}
}
fn roster(kind: &str, members: Vec<RosterMember>) -> Roster {
Roster {
topology_kind: kind.into(),
members,
}
}
/// A backend the fleet cannot boot must be refused where it is PROPOSED.
/// Placement would refuse it too — at launch, after the roster was approved
/// and someone believed the mission was going to run.
#[test]
fn a_backend_no_node_can_run_is_refused_with_the_ones_that_exist() {
let have = vec!["claude".to_string(), "kimi".to_string()];
let r = roster(
"pipeline",
vec![member("implementer", Some("claude")), member("verifier", Some("rootfs-opus"))],
);
let err = r.validate(&have).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(
err,
Refusal::UnknownBackend {
backend: "rootfs-opus".into(),
available: have.clone()
}
);
// The message must name what IS available, or the operator's next move
// is a guess.
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(msg.contains("claude") && msg.contains("kimi"), "{msg}");
// And the same roster passes once every backend is one the fleet has.
let ok = roster(
"pipeline",
vec![member("implementer", Some("claude")), member("verifier", Some("kimi"))],
);
assert!(ok.validate(&have).is_ok());
}
/// A member with no backend inherits the mission's, which is legitimate —
/// the whole roster does not have to be heterogeneous to be useful.
#[test]
fn a_member_without_a_backend_is_not_a_refusal() {
let r = roster("pipeline", vec![member("implementer", None)]);
assert!(r.validate(&["claude".to_string()]).is_ok());
// Blank counts as absent, not as a backend named "".
let r = roster("pipeline", vec![member("implementer", Some(" "))]);
assert!(r.validate(&["claude".to_string()]).is_ok());
}
/// A bootable image is not necessarily a runnable one. tank reports
/// `agent-terminal` in its rootfs list today: a real image, with no
/// credential contract, so an agent booted into it has nothing to
/// authenticate with. Offering it to the planner would produce a roster that
/// validates, approves, launches and then fails at the agent turn.
#[test]
fn only_backends_that_can_authenticate_are_offered() {
assert!(crate::mission_runtime::backend_can_run_a_mission("claude"));
assert!(crate::mission_runtime::backend_can_run_a_mission("default"));
for unrunnable in ["agent-terminal", "agent-browser", "rootfs-opus"] {
assert!(
!crate::mission_runtime::backend_can_run_a_mission(unrunnable),
"{unrunnable} has no credential contract and must not be proposable"
);
}
}
/// The ceiling. Each member is a VM boot, an inject, a full agent session
/// and a collect — a model asked to size a team proposes twelve happily.
#[test]
fn a_roster_is_bounded_and_non_empty() {
let have = vec!["claude".to_string()];
assert_eq!(roster("pipeline", vec![]).validate(&have), Err(Refusal::Empty));
let many: Vec<_> = (0..MAX_MEMBERS + 1)
.map(|i| member(&format!("r{i}"), None))
.collect();
assert_eq!(
roster("pipeline", many).validate(&have),
Err(Refusal::TooMany(MAX_MEMBERS + 1))
);
let exactly: Vec<_> = (0..MAX_MEMBERS).map(|i| member(&format!("r{i}"), None)).collect();
assert!(roster("pipeline", exactly).validate(&have).is_ok());
}
/// An invented topology kind must be refused, NOT defaulted. Running a
/// `pipeline` proposal as a hub-and-spoke changes what every node sees and
/// nothing would say so — the same silent-substitution shape as a backend
/// that quietly falls back to the default image.
#[test]
fn an_invented_topology_kind_is_refused_rather_than_defaulted() {
let have = vec!["claude".to_string()];
let r = roster("assembly_line", vec![member("implementer", None)]);
assert_eq!(
r.validate(&have),
Err(Refusal::UnknownTopology("assembly_line".into()))
);
// Every kind the catalog declares is accepted, so this cannot drift out
// of sync with what the orchestrator can actually plan.
for kind in cm_topology::TopologyKind::ALL {
let r = roster(kind.as_str(), vec![member("implementer", None)]);
assert!(r.validate(&have).is_ok(), "{}", kind.as_str());
}
}
/// The graph is the handoff to the composed executor: node ids in
/// `cm_topology`'s own convention, and the backend in the `attrs` channel
/// `MicroVmTurnExecutor` reads. If this drifts, a heterogeneous roster runs
/// every node on the mission default and looks fine.
#[test]
fn the_graph_carries_each_members_backend_where_the_executor_reads_it() {
let r = roster(
"pipeline",
vec![
member("implementer", Some("claude")),
member("verifier", Some("kimi")),
member("scribe", None),
],
);
let g = r.graph().expect("a runnable graph");
let nodes = g["nodes"].as_array().expect("nodes");
assert_eq!(nodes.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(nodes[0]["role"], "implementer");
assert_eq!(nodes[0]["attrs"]["backend"], "claude");
assert_eq!(nodes[1]["attrs"]["backend"], "kimi");
assert!(
nodes[2]["attrs"].get("backend").is_none(),
"a member with no backend must inherit the mission's, not be stamped with one"
);
// And it deserializes as the real thing the worker will parse — a graph
// that only looks right as JSON fails at claim time with "missing or
// invalid graph", which reads as a runtime fault rather than a bad
// roster.
let parsed: cm_topology::TopologyGraph =
serde_json::from_value(g).expect("the worker must be able to parse it");
assert_eq!(parsed.nodes.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(
parsed.nodes[1].attrs.get("backend").map(String::as_str),
Some("kimi")
);
}
}
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+346 -44
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@
//! - no repo_id → no-op (Ok(None))
//! - dir already a git repo → `fetch + reset --hard origin/<branch>`
//! to bring it in sync
//! - dir missing → `git clone --depth 1 <url> <path>`
//! - dir missing → `git clone --filter=blob:none --single-branch` (NOT
//! `--depth 1`: a shallow clone cannot push a new branch back, and delivery
//! needs exactly that — see `clone`). A mission with a `security_scan` phase
//! gets a FULLY HYDRATED clone instead; see `wants_full_history`.
//!
//! Auth: for `git.redclaw.dev` clones we inject the ambient
//! `GITEA_TOKEN` (already provisioned in the server container's env)
@@ -23,7 +26,17 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
use tokio::process::Command;
use uuid::Uuid;
pub(crate) fn missions_root() -> PathBuf {
/// The ONE definition of where mission state lives on the docker host.
///
/// There used to be five: this function, three private copies of the same
/// `env::var(...).unwrap_or(...)` in `security_scan`, `benchmark_runner` and
/// `mission_outputs`, and a hardcoded `MISSIONS_HOST_ROOT` const in
/// `mission_runtime` that read no env at all. They agree on today's
/// deployment, which is why nothing had broken — but anything that sweeps or
/// reclaims this tree has to be sure it is sweeping the same tree the writers
/// use, and five definitions cannot promise that. A GC written against one of
/// them would silently miss the others.
pub fn missions_root() -> PathBuf {
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT")
.map(PathBuf::from)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| PathBuf::from("/var/lib/clawmates-missions"))
@@ -65,7 +78,19 @@ pub async fn ensure_checkout(
.map_err(|e| format!("mkdir {}: {e}", parent.display()))?;
}
let auth_url = with_ambient_auth(clone_url);
let auth = with_ambient_auth(clone_url);
// Said once, here, where the checkout is created: every later git call uses
// a URL built the same way, so an unauthenticated forge URL is a fact worth
// one line now rather than a `/dev/tty` error later.
if let Some(why) = &auth.unauthenticated {
if auth.is_forge() {
eprintln!(
"mission_workspace: mission {mission_id} will talk to the forge \
WITHOUT credentials — {why}"
);
}
}
let auth_url = auth.url;
if path.join(".git").exists() {
// Checkouts cloned before this setting existed get it on reuse. It
// governs objects created from now on, which is what delivery needs.
@@ -87,43 +112,181 @@ pub async fn ensure_checkout(
fetch_and_reset(&path, default_branch, &auth_url).await?;
}
} else {
clone(&path, &auth_url).await?;
clone(&path, &auth_url, wants_full_history(pool, mission_id).await).await?;
}
Ok(Some(path))
}
/// If the URL points at git.redclaw.dev AND GITEA_TOKEN is set in the
/// environment, rewrite it to include the token as basic-auth. Returns
/// the URL unchanged otherwise. The token is never logged (we only
/// pass the rewritten URL into `git clone` via argv).
pub(crate) fn with_ambient_auth(url: &str) -> String {
let Ok(token) = std::env::var("GITEA_TOKEN") else {
return url.to_string();
};
if token.is_empty() {
return url.to_string();
}
if let Some(rest) = url.strip_prefix("https://git.redclaw.dev/") {
return format!("https://oauth2:{token}@git.redclaw.dev/{rest}");
}
url.to_string()
/// The forge whose URLs the ambient `GITEA_TOKEN` can authenticate.
const FORGE_HOST: &str = "git.redclaw.dev";
/// A URL, and whether a credential actually reached it.
///
/// The second field is the whole point. This used to be a bare `String`: an
/// unmatched URL — an ssh remote, `http://` instead of `https://`, an explicit
/// port, a different case in the host — silently came back unauthenticated, and
/// the first symptom was git opening `/dev/tty` several layers later. Tracing
/// #55 cost hours to a failure whose cause was one unlogged early return.
pub struct Authed {
pub url: String,
/// `None` when the token was applied; otherwise WHY it was not.
pub unauthenticated: Option<String>,
/// Whether the URL names the forge our token is for. Recorded from the
/// ORIGINAL url, not re-derived from `url` — an authenticated URL carries
/// userinfo, and parsing that back out is how the answer goes wrong.
forge: bool,
}
async fn clone(path: &std::path::Path, url: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
impl Authed {
/// Is this URL on the forge our token is for? An unauthenticated URL to a
/// third-party host is normal (public repos, ssh remotes with a key); an
/// unauthenticated URL to OUR forge is a fault, and only the caller knows
/// how much it costs.
pub fn is_forge(&self) -> bool {
self.forge
}
}
/// The host component of a URL, for the scp-like and scheme forms git accepts.
///
/// Deliberately tolerant, because the point is to RECOGNISE our forge in every
/// shape it can be written, not to validate URLs: `https://`, `http://`, an
/// explicit `:port`, `user@host`, `ssh://`, and `git@host:path`.
fn host_of(url: &str) -> Option<&str> {
let rest = match url.split_once("://") {
Some((_, rest)) => rest,
// scp-like: `git@host:path/to.git`, which has no scheme.
None => url,
};
// Userinfo FIRST, then the port. The other order splits
// `oauth2:token@host` at the credential's colon and reports the username as
// the host — which is exactly how the first version of this function decided
// an authenticated forge URL was not the forge.
let authority = rest.split('/').next().filter(|s| !s.is_empty())?;
let hostport = authority.rsplit_once('@').map_or(authority, |(_, h)| h);
Some(hostport.split(':').next().unwrap_or(hostport)).filter(|h| !h.is_empty())
}
/// Rewrite a forge URL to carry the ambient `GITEA_TOKEN` as basic-auth.
///
/// Returns the reason instead of the credential whenever it cannot: a missing
/// token, a host that is not ours, or a shape a token cannot be injected into.
/// The token is never logged — only the rewritten URL is passed to git, via
/// argv.
pub fn with_ambient_auth(url: &str) -> Authed {
auth_with_token(url, std::env::var("GITEA_TOKEN").ok().as_deref())
}
/// The testable half of [`with_ambient_auth`]. The token is a parameter because
/// a test cannot set process environment variables here — the workspace denies
/// `unsafe`, and `set_var` is racy across test threads regardless.
fn auth_with_token(url: &str, token: Option<&str>) -> Authed {
let host = host_of(url);
let forge = host.is_some_and(|h| h.eq_ignore_ascii_case(FORGE_HOST));
let unauth = |why: String| Authed {
url: url.to_string(),
unauthenticated: Some(why),
forge,
};
let host = match host {
Some(h) => h,
None => return unauth(format!("no host could be read from {url:?}")),
};
if !forge {
return unauth(format!(
"{host} is not {FORGE_HOST}, so GITEA_TOKEN does not apply — git will \
use whatever ambient credentials exist (ssh agent, .netrc, helper)"
));
}
let token = match token {
Some(t) if !t.trim().is_empty() => t,
_ => return unauth("GITEA_TOKEN is unset or empty".to_string()),
};
// Only the scheme forms can carry basic-auth. An ssh remote authenticates
// with a key, and pretending otherwise would produce a URL git rejects.
let Some((scheme, rest)) = url.split_once("://") else {
return unauth(format!(
"{url} is an ssh-style remote; a token cannot be embedded in it"
));
};
if !matches!(scheme, "http" | "https") {
return unauth(format!("scheme {scheme} cannot carry a token"));
}
// Drop any userinfo already present rather than producing `a@b@host`.
let rest = rest.split_once('@').map(|(_, r)| r).unwrap_or(rest);
Authed {
url: format!("{scheme}://oauth2:{token}@{rest}"),
unauthenticated: None,
forge,
}
}
/// Git must never wait for a human.
///
/// Without this, a URL that ended up without credentials does not fail — git
/// opens `/dev/tty` to ask for a username, and in a server container that
/// surfaces as `No such device or address`, several layers away from the
/// missing token that caused it. With it, the failure names itself:
/// `terminal prompts disabled`.
pub(crate) fn no_terminal_prompt(cmd: &mut Command) -> &mut Command {
cmd.env("GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT", "0")
}
/// Does any phase of this mission need history it can READ, not just reference?
///
/// `--filter=blob:none` keeps every commit but fetches file contents on demand,
/// which is nearly free for a repo that gets read once — and silently useless to
/// a tool that walks history, because the agent environment has NO network route
/// to the forge. Measured: gitleaks on a 4-commit repo reported
/// "1 commits scanned" and "could not fetch <sha> from promisor remote". It was
/// not misconfigured; the blobs simply were not there and could not be got.
///
/// A security scan is the phase kind whose entire value is old content — a
/// credential committed and later deleted is exactly what it looks for, and that
/// is precisely what a lazy blob is. So those missions pay for a full clone and
/// everything else keeps the cheap one.
///
/// Best-effort: an unreadable phase list yields `false`, i.e. today's behaviour.
async fn wants_full_history(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, mission_id: Uuid) -> bool {
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(
"SELECT count(*) FROM mission_phases WHERE mission_id = $1 AND kind = 'security_scan'",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.map(|n| n > 0)
.unwrap_or(false)
}
/// The `git clone` flags, split out so the strategy is testable without a forge.
fn clone_args(full_history: bool) -> Vec<&'static str> {
let mut a = vec!["clone"];
if !full_history {
a.push("--filter=blob:none");
}
a.push("--single-branch");
a
}
async fn clone(path: &std::path::Path, url: &str, full_history: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
// `--filter=blob:none` rather than `--depth 1`. A shallow clone cannot
// usually push a new branch back ("shallow update not allowed"), and
// mission delivery needs exactly that. A partial clone keeps full history
// — so the base commit stays meaningful and a diff has something to be
// relative to — while fetching file contents only on demand, which is
// nearly as cheap as a shallow clone for a repo that gets read once.
let out = Command::new("git")
.args([
"clone",
"--filter=blob:none",
"--single-branch",
url,
&path.display().to_string(),
])
if full_history {
eprintln!(
"mission_workspace: cloning {} with full history — a security_scan phase \
reads old file contents, which a partial clone cannot supply offline",
path.display()
);
}
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.args(clone_args(full_history));
cmd.args([url, &path.display().to_string()]);
let out = no_terminal_prompt(&mut cmd)
.output()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("spawn git clone: {e}"))?;
@@ -131,10 +294,11 @@ async fn clone(path: &std::path::Path, url: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
return Err(format!(
"git clone → exit {}: {}",
out.status,
redact_token(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr))
.chars()
.take(400)
.collect::<String>()
// Both ends: git prints its reason LAST, and a head-only clamp keeps
// the progress noise while dropping the answer.
crate::evaluator_tools::clamp_output(&redact_token(&String::from_utf8_lossy(
&out.stderr
)))
));
}
share_repository_across_uids(path);
@@ -447,7 +611,13 @@ fn strip_credentials(url: &str) -> String {
/// They are the agent's identity scaffolding, not the user's code — `SOUL.md`
/// opens "Who You Are / You're not a chatbot." Observed on mission 019fc058,
/// where all seven appeared as untracked files in a freshly cloned repo.
const AGENT_SCAFFOLDING: &[&str] = &[
///
/// `pub(crate)` because a repo-less mission needs the same list and cannot use
/// the same mechanism: `ignore_agent_scaffolding` writes `.git/info/exclude`,
/// and a mission with no repository has no `.git`. `mission_outputs` filters on
/// this list directly — one list, two consumers, so the next file the runtime
/// starts seeding is excluded from both at once.
pub(crate) const AGENT_SCAFFOLDING: &[&str] = &[
"AGENTS.md",
"HEARTBEAT.md",
"IDENTITY.md",
@@ -523,16 +693,15 @@ async fn fetch_and_reset(
// errors on a repo that is already complete, so it is only attempted when
// the marker file is present.
if path.join(".git/shallow").exists() {
let deepen = Command::new("git")
.args([
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.args([
"-C",
&path.display().to_string(),
"fetch",
"--unshallow",
auth_url,
])
.output()
.await;
]);
let deepen = no_terminal_prompt(&mut cmd).output().await;
match deepen {
Ok(o) if o.status.success() => {}
Ok(o) => eprintln!(
@@ -556,8 +725,9 @@ async fn fetch_and_reset(
// so `git fetch origin` has no credentials and fails with
// "could not read Username". Building the URL here also means a rotated
// token takes effect immediately instead of at the next clone.
let fetch = Command::new("git")
.args(["-C", &path.display().to_string(), "fetch", auth_url, branch])
let mut cmd = Command::new("git");
cmd.args(["-C", &path.display().to_string(), "fetch", auth_url, branch]);
let fetch = no_terminal_prompt(&mut cmd)
.output()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("spawn git fetch: {e}"))?;
@@ -565,10 +735,9 @@ async fn fetch_and_reset(
return Err(format!(
"git fetch origin {branch} → exit {}: {}",
fetch.status,
redact_token(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&fetch.stderr))
.chars()
.take(400)
.collect::<String>()
crate::evaluator_tools::clamp_output(&redact_token(&String::from_utf8_lossy(
&fetch.stderr
)))
));
}
let reset = Command::new("git")
@@ -600,8 +769,102 @@ async fn fetch_and_reset(
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// The clone strategy is a fact worth pinning: `--depth 1` breaks delivery
/// (a shallow clone cannot push a new branch — "shallow update not
/// allowed"), and `--filter=blob:none` breaks history-reading tools offline.
/// Both failure modes are real and were both hit.
#[test]
fn the_clone_strategy_is_partial_by_default_and_never_shallow() {
let partial = clone_args(false);
assert!(partial.contains(&"--filter=blob:none"), "{partial:?}");
assert!(!partial.iter().any(|a| a.starts_with("--depth")), "{partial:?}");
// A security_scan mission must NOT get the lazy-blob filter: its scanner
// walks old file contents and cannot reach the forge to fetch them.
let full = clone_args(true);
assert!(!full.contains(&"--filter=blob:none"), "{full:?}");
assert!(!full.iter().any(|a| a.starts_with("--depth")), "{full:?}");
// Both keep --single-branch: the mission only ever works one branch.
for args in [partial, full] {
assert!(args.contains(&"--single-branch"), "{args:?}");
}
}
use super::*;
const TOK: Option<&str> = Some("secret123");
/// The forge in every shape a remote can be written. Each of these used to
/// fall out of the `strip_prefix("https://git.redclaw.dev/")` match and come
/// back unauthenticated with no log line — the fail-open found while tracing
/// #55.
#[test]
fn the_forge_is_recognised_however_the_url_is_written() {
for url in [
"https://git.redclaw.dev/o/r.git",
"http://git.redclaw.dev/o/r.git",
"https://GIT.RedClaw.dev/o/r.git",
"https://git.redclaw.dev:3000/o/r.git",
"https://oauth2:[email protected]/o/r.git",
] {
let a = auth_with_token(url, TOK);
assert!(a.is_forge(), "{url} was not recognised as the forge");
assert!(
a.unauthenticated.is_none(),
"{url} → {:?}",
a.unauthenticated
);
assert!(a.url.contains("oauth2:secret123@"), "{}", a.url);
// And exactly one set of credentials, not `old@` left behind.
assert_eq!(a.url.matches('@').count(), 1, "{}", a.url);
}
// The port and the scheme survive the rewrite — changing either would
// point the push somewhere the operator did not configure.
assert!(auth_with_token("https://git.redclaw.dev:3000/o/r.git", TOK)
.url
.contains("@git.redclaw.dev:3000/o/r.git"));
assert!(auth_with_token("http://git.redclaw.dev/o/r.git", TOK)
.url
.starts_with("http://oauth2:"));
}
/// Every path that cannot authenticate must SAY so. "Unauthenticated and
/// silent" is the shape that cost hours: the first symptom was git opening
/// /dev/tty, several layers from the cause.
#[test]
fn an_unauthenticated_url_carries_its_reason() {
let cases = [
(auth_with_token("https://git.redclaw.dev/o/r.git", None), true),
(auth_with_token("https://git.redclaw.dev/o/r.git", Some(" ")), true),
(auth_with_token("[email protected]:o/r.git", TOK), true),
(auth_with_token("ssh://[email protected]/o/r.git", TOK), true),
(auth_with_token("https://github.com/o/r.git", TOK), false),
];
for (a, is_forge) in cases {
let why = a.unauthenticated.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
assert!(!why.is_empty(), "{} came back with no reason", a.url);
assert_eq!(a.is_forge(), is_forge, "{}", a.url);
// And the URL is handed back untouched, so a caller that proceeds
// anyway (ssh keys, .netrc) still works.
assert!(!a.url.contains("secret123"), "{}", a.url);
}
}
/// A token must never be embedded in a URL for someone else's host.
#[test]
fn the_token_never_leaves_the_forge() {
for url in [
"https://github.com/o/r.git",
"https://git.redclaw.dev.evil.example/o/r.git",
"https://evil.example/git.redclaw.dev/r.git",
] {
let a = auth_with_token(url, TOK);
assert!(!a.url.contains("secret123"), "{url} → {}", a.url);
assert!(!a.is_forge(), "{url}");
}
}
/// The exclude must be idempotent — `ensure_checkout` re-runs on every
/// phase, and appending the same block each time would grow the file
/// without bound.
@@ -821,4 +1084,43 @@ mod tests {
mark_phase_started(repo);
assert!(checkout_in_use(repo));
}
/// Nobody re-derives the missions root.
///
/// It had fragmented into five definitions — this function, three private
/// `env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT")` copies, and a hardcoded const
/// that read no env at all. They agreed on the deployed value, so nothing
/// ever broke; the risk is entirely in what comes next. Anything that
/// sweeps, reclaims or reaps this tree has to be sweeping the same tree the
/// writers use, and five definitions cannot promise that.
#[test]
fn the_missions_root_has_exactly_one_definition() {
fn walk(dir: &std::path::Path, out: &mut Vec<std::path::PathBuf>) {
for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("readable source dir") {
let path = entry.expect("readable entry").path();
if path.is_dir() {
walk(&path, out);
} else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
out.push(path);
}
}
}
let root = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("src");
let mut files = Vec::new();
walk(&root, &mut files);
for path in files {
if path.ends_with("mission_workspace.rs") {
continue;
}
let src = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("readable source");
assert!(
!src.contains("var(\"CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT\")"),
"{} reads CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT itself — call \
`mission_workspace::missions_root()` so a reaper and a writer \
cannot disagree about which tree they are looking at",
path.display()
);
}
}
}
-259
View File
@@ -1,259 +0,0 @@
//! LLM + Chromium PDF renderer worker — Slice 6.
//!
//! Watches `mission_artifacts` for rows with `render_pdf_status =
//! 'pending'`. For each:
//! 1. Read the source MD from `<mission_root>/<path>` on disk
//! 2. Call the configured LLM (default: Gemini 2.5 Flash) with a
//! "produce styled HTML" prompt anchored to a design-system
//! example. LLM writes HTML with inline CSS.
//! 3. Print that HTML to PDF via `chromium --headless
//! --print-to-pdf`
//! 4. Save the PDF alongside the MD, update `rendered_pdf_path` +
//! status = 'done'
//!
//! Graceful degradation: if `GEMINI_API_KEY` is unset or the
//! chromium binary isn't on PATH, the worker marks the row `failed`
//! with a descriptive error rather than blocking boot. Ops enables
//! rendering by wiring both.
//!
//! The frontend already renders `rendered_pdf_path` as an "Open PDF"
//! button on artifact cards (Slice 2).
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::Duration;
const POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
const MAX_PARALLEL: usize = 2;
const DEFAULT_MODEL: &str = "gemini-2.5-flash";
/// Where per-mission artifacts land on disk. Overridable so dev vs.
/// prod can move the tree; matches the pattern in
/// `research_container::research_workspace_root`.
fn missions_root() -> PathBuf {
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT")
.map(PathBuf::from)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| PathBuf::from("/var/lib/clawmates-missions"))
}
fn chromium_bin() -> String {
std::env::var("CHROMIUM_BIN").unwrap_or_else(|_| "chromium".to_string())
}
fn renderer_model() -> String {
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_PDF_RENDERER_MODEL").unwrap_or_else(|_| DEFAULT_MODEL.to_string())
}
/// Spawn the poller. No-op-friendly: if there's nothing pending or
/// no rendering pipeline configured, we still tick + observe.
pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
// Small startup delay so migrations + loaders finish first.
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(8)).await;
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(POLL_INTERVAL);
ticker.tick().await;
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
if let Err(e) = sweep_once(&pool).await {
eprintln!("pdf_renderer: sweep failed: {e}");
}
}
});
}
async fn sweep_once(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), String> {
let pending = cm_db::repo::missions::next_pdf_pending(pool, MAX_PARALLEL as i64)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("next_pdf_pending: {e}"))?;
for artifact in pending {
let pool = pool.clone();
let id = artifact.id;
tokio::spawn(async move {
match render_one(&pool, &artifact).await {
Ok(pdf_path) => {
let _ = cm_db::repo::missions::set_pdf_result(&pool, id, Some(&pdf_path), None)
.await;
eprintln!("pdf_renderer: rendered {id} → {pdf_path}");
}
Err(e) => {
let _ = cm_db::repo::missions::set_pdf_result(&pool, id, None, Some(&e)).await;
eprintln!("pdf_renderer: {id} failed: {e}");
}
}
});
}
Ok(())
}
async fn render_one(
_pool: &PgPool,
artifact: &cm_db::repo::missions::MissionArtifact,
) -> Result<String, String> {
// 1. Locate the source MD on disk.
let mission_root = missions_root().join(artifact.mission_id.to_string());
let src_path = mission_root.join(&artifact.path);
let md = tokio::fs::read_to_string(&src_path)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("read {}: {e}", src_path.display()))?;
// 2. LLM → styled HTML.
let html = md_to_html_via_llm(&md, artifact.title.as_deref())
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("llm render: {e}"))?;
// 3. Chromium → PDF.
let tmp = tempdir_for(artifact.id)?;
let html_path = tmp.join("in.html");
let pdf_path = tmp.join("out.pdf");
tokio::fs::write(&html_path, html)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("write {}: {e}", html_path.display()))?;
let status = tokio::process::Command::new(chromium_bin())
.args([
"--headless=new",
"--disable-gpu",
"--no-sandbox",
"--hide-scrollbars",
&format!("--print-to-pdf={}", pdf_path.display()),
"--print-to-pdf-no-header",
"--virtual-time-budget=10000",
&format!("file://{}", html_path.display()),
])
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.status()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("spawn chromium: {e}"))?;
if !status.success() {
return Err(format!("chromium exited {status}"));
}
// 4. Move next to the source MD so the artifact tree stays self-
// contained. Filename derived from the MD path (foo.md → foo.pdf).
let out_rel = pdf_sibling(&artifact.path);
let out_abs = mission_root.join(&out_rel);
if let Some(parent) = out_abs.parent() {
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("mkdir {}: {e}", parent.display()))?;
}
tokio::fs::copy(&pdf_path, &out_abs)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("copy pdf: {e}"))?;
// Best-effort tmp cleanup — the temp dir lives under /tmp so the
// OS will reap it anyway.
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&tmp).await;
Ok(out_rel)
}
/// Ask the configured LLM to turn `md` into a fully self-contained
/// styled HTML doc. Uses whichever provider `CLAWMATES_PDF_RENDERER_MODEL`
/// resolves to. Defaults to Gemini 2.5 Flash + GEMINI_API_KEY.
async fn md_to_html_via_llm(md: &str, title: Option<&str>) -> Result<String, String> {
let model = renderer_model();
// For now we hardcode the Gemini path — anthropic + openai
// variants land when the design-system template stabilizes.
if !model.starts_with("gemini") {
return Err(format!(
"renderer model {model} not yet wired (only gemini-* supported in Slice 6)"
));
}
let api_key =
std::env::var("GEMINI_API_KEY").map_err(|_| "GEMINI_API_KEY unset".to_string())?;
let system = r#"You are a document typesetter. Given a Markdown source,
produce ONE self-contained HTML document that:
- Has ALL styles inline in a single <style> block in <head>. No external
fonts, no external CSS. System font stack only.
- Uses a clean, modern, readable serif for body copy (Georgia / "Iowan Old
Style" / "Charter" / serif) and a sans for headings.
- Uses ONLY these accent colors: #ff8a7a (heading), #5ec8d8 (link),
#101014 (body text), #f7f7f8 (page bg).
- Renders code blocks with a monospace stack and a subtle background.
- Uses page-break-inside: avoid on headings and images.
- Puts a document title in an <h1> at the top if provided.
- Includes NOTHING outside the HTML — no ```html fence, no commentary."#;
let prompt = match title {
Some(t) => format!("Document title: {t}\n\nMarkdown:\n\n{md}"),
None => md.to_string(),
};
let url = format!(
"https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models/{}:generateContent?key={}",
model, api_key
);
let body = json!({
"system_instruction": { "parts": [{ "text": system }] },
"contents": [{ "role": "user", "parts": [{ "text": prompt }] }],
"generationConfig": {
"temperature": 0.2,
"maxOutputTokens": 32000,
}
});
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(120))
.build()
.map_err(|e| format!("http client: {e}"))?;
let resp = client
.post(&url)
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("gemini call: {e}"))?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let code = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!("gemini {code}: {}", &body[..body.len().min(500)]));
}
let json: serde_json::Value = resp.json().await.map_err(|e| format!("gemini json: {e}"))?;
let text = json
.pointer("/candidates/0/content/parts/0/text")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| "gemini response missing text".to_string())?;
// Strip a stray ```html fence if the model added one despite the
// system prompt — cheap belt to the suspenders.
let cleaned = text
.trim()
.strip_prefix("```html")
.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix("```"))
.map(|s| s.trim())
.unwrap_or(text.trim())
.to_string();
Ok(cleaned)
}
fn tempdir_for(id: uuid::Uuid) -> Result<PathBuf, String> {
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("clawmates-pdf-{id}"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).map_err(|e| format!("mkdir tmp: {e}"))?;
Ok(dir)
}
/// `research/v3/spec.md` → `research/v3/spec.pdf`.
/// `foo/bar/without_ext` → `foo/bar/without_ext.pdf` (rare — parser
/// never emits an extension-less MD, but we're defensive).
fn pdf_sibling(md_path: &str) -> String {
let p = Path::new(md_path);
let stem = p.file_stem().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("output");
let parent = p.parent().map(|x| x.to_string_lossy().to_string());
let base = format!("{stem}.pdf");
match parent {
Some(pp) if !pp.is_empty() => format!("{pp}/{base}"),
_ => base,
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn pdf_sibling_paths() {
assert_eq!(pdf_sibling("research/v3/spec.md"), "research/v3/spec.pdf");
assert_eq!(pdf_sibling("spec.md"), "spec.pdf");
assert_eq!(pdf_sibling("no_ext"), "no_ext.pdf");
}
}
+11
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,17 @@ pub const KNOWN_KEYS: &[KnownKey] = &[
key: "commit_policy",
read_by: "mission_delivery::Gate::parse — selects the delivery gate",
},
KnownKey {
key: "allow_empty",
read_by: "phase_runner::empty_delivery_is_a_failure — when true, a coding \
phase that changes no files still completes; also vm_stop_gate::\
StopGate::for_phase, where it drops the in-loop delivery check",
},
KnownKey {
key: "done_when_check",
read_by: "vm_stop_gate::StopGate::for_phase — a shell command the agent's \
`Stop` hook runs, refusing the stop while it exits non-zero",
},
];
/// Keys a recipe may carry that are deliberately not consumed *yet*.
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+27 -55
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use uuid::Uuid;
const DEFAULT_MODEL: &str = "claude-opus-4-8";
const ANTHROPIC_API_VERSION: &str = "2023-06-01";
const POLL_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
/// Cap the raw material we send to the model. Missions can produce
/// hundreds of KB of agent output; we slice by turn and by phase
@@ -34,21 +33,26 @@ fn model_name() -> String {
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_SUMMARIZER_MODEL").unwrap_or_else(|_| DEFAULT_MODEL.to_string())
}
pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool) {
/// The runtime is carried purely so the summarizer can reach the SAME
/// providers as everything else. It used to hand-roll its own HTTPS POST with
/// `x-api-key: $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, which is why no audit of `.complete(` call
/// sites ever found it — and why every phase summary on this deployment died
/// with "credit balance is too low" while the phases themselves ran fine.
pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool, runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(45)).await;
let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(POLL_INTERVAL);
ticker.tick().await;
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
if let Err(e) = sweep_once(&pool).await {
if let Err(e) = sweep_once(&pool, &runtime).await {
eprintln!("phase_summarizer: sweep failed: {e}");
}
}
});
}
async fn sweep_once(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), String> {
async fn sweep_once(pool: &PgPool, runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime) -> Result<(), String> {
// Terminal phases with no summary yet.
let rows = sqlx::query(
"SELECT mp.id, mp.mission_id, mp.kind
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ async fn sweep_once(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), String> {
let phase_id: Uuid = row.get("id");
let mission_id: Uuid = row.get("mission_id");
let kind: String = row.get("kind");
if let Err(e) = summarize_one(pool, mission_id, phase_id, &kind).await {
if let Err(e) = summarize_one(pool, runtime, mission_id, phase_id, &kind).await {
// Persist an error row so we don't infinite-retry a broken
// phase — the UI can surface "summary unavailable: <e>".
eprintln!("phase_summarizer: {phase_id} ({kind}) failed: {e}");
@@ -77,6 +81,7 @@ async fn sweep_once(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), String> {
async fn summarize_one(
pool: &PgPool,
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
mission_id: Uuid,
phase_id: Uuid,
kind: &str,
@@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ async fn summarize_one(
)
.await;
}
let (narrative, structured) = call_anthropic(kind, &material).await?;
let (narrative, structured, answered_by) = call_anthropic(runtime, kind, &material).await?;
let metrics = structured
.get("metrics")
.cloned()
@@ -128,7 +133,7 @@ async fn summarize_one(
mission_id,
phase_id,
kind,
&model_name(),
&answered_by,
&narrative,
&metrics,
&sources,
@@ -323,58 +328,25 @@ async fn collect_material(
})
}
async fn call_anthropic(kind: &str, material: &PhaseMaterial) -> Result<(String, Value), String> {
let api_key =
std::env::var("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY").map_err(|_| "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY unset".to_string())?;
/// Returns the narrative, the parsed object, and **the model that answered** —
/// which may be a fallback link rather than `model_name()`, and is recorded as
/// such.
async fn call_anthropic(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
kind: &str,
material: &PhaseMaterial,
) -> Result<(String, Value, String), String> {
let model = model_name();
let system = system_prompt(kind);
let user = user_prompt(kind, material);
let body = json!({
"model": model,
"max_tokens": 4096,
"system": system,
"messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": user } ]
});
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(120))
.build()
.map_err(|e| format!("http client: {e}"))?;
let resp = client
.post("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages")
.header("x-api-key", &api_key)
.header("anthropic-version", ANTHROPIC_API_VERSION)
.header("content-type", "application/json")
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("anthropic call: {e}"))?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let code = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
return Err(format!(
"anthropic {code}: {}",
&body[..body.len().min(500)]
));
}
let json: Value = resp
.json()
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("anthropic json: {e}"))?;
let raw = json
.get("content")
.and_then(|c| c.as_array())
.and_then(|arr| {
arr.iter()
.find(|b| b.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some("text"))
})
.and_then(|b| b.get("text"))
.and_then(|t| t.as_str())
.ok_or_else(|| "anthropic response missing text block".to_string())?
.trim()
.to_string();
let (raw, answered_by) = crate::subscription::complete_with_fallback(
runtime, &system, &user, &model, 4096, false,
)
.await?;
let raw = raw.trim().to_string();
if raw.is_empty() {
return Err("anthropic returned empty text".into());
return Err(format!("{answered_by} returned empty text"));
}
// Model returns a JSON object; extract narrative + rest.
let parsed: Value = serde_json::from_str(&strip_code_fence(&raw)).map_err(|e| {
@@ -392,7 +364,7 @@ async fn call_anthropic(kind: &str, material: &PhaseMaterial) -> Result<(String,
if narrative.is_empty() {
return Err("summarizer response missing narrative".into());
}
Ok((narrative, parsed))
Ok((narrative, parsed, answered_by))
}
/// Trim a leading/trailing ```json … ``` fence the model sometimes wraps
+266
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
//! What a repository actually contains, small enough to put in a prompt.
//!
//! The planner was given the root listing and planned "optimise the hot path"
//! for a crate whose hot path is `add(a: i64, b: i64) -> i64`. Names were not
//! enough: the mission was unachievable from the moment it was written, and
//! nothing discovered that until an agent had built a benchmark harness to
//! measure an integer addition.
//!
//! # The rule this module exists to enforce
//!
//! A digest is always partial for any repository worth planning against, and a
//! model shown a partial view without being told it is partial plans as though
//! it saw everything. So every omission is STATED — how many files were listed,
//! how many were shown, what was cut from each. That is the same distinction as
//! `Option<u32>` for the subagent probe: "we did not look" and "there is nothing
//! there" are different facts, and only one of them is about the repository.
//!
//! # Priority
//!
//! Manifests first (they say what the project IS and what it may depend on),
//! then the README, then source ascending by size — smallest-first shows the
//! most files per byte, and a planner benefits more from seeing twenty small
//! files than one large one.
/// One file in the repository tree.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FileEntry {
pub path: String,
pub size: usize,
}
/// Total characters of file CONTENT a digest may carry.
///
/// The prompt around it is ~1.5k, and the planner is a single call per mission,
/// so this is generous by design: the cost of a too-small digest is a plan built
/// on a guess, which costs a VM boot to discover.
pub const CONTENT_BUDGET: usize = 12_000;
/// Ceiling per file, so one large file cannot spend the whole budget.
pub const PER_FILE_CAP: usize = 3_000;
/// Files worth showing before any source.
fn is_manifest(path: &str) -> bool {
matches!(
path,
"Cargo.toml"
| "package.json"
| "pyproject.toml"
| "setup.py"
| "go.mod"
| "Gemfile"
| "pom.xml"
| "build.gradle"
| "Makefile"
)
}
fn is_readme(path: &str) -> bool {
path.eq_ignore_ascii_case("README.md") || path.eq_ignore_ascii_case("README")
}
/// Paths to fetch, in the order they earn their place.
///
/// Directories and files a planner cannot use are dropped: lockfiles are huge
/// and say nothing a manifest does not, and build output is not source.
pub fn priority(entries: &[FileEntry]) -> Vec<&FileEntry> {
let mut useful: Vec<&FileEntry> = entries
.iter()
.filter(|e| {
let p = e.path.as_str();
!p.starts_with(".git/")
&& !p.contains("/target/")
&& !p.starts_with("target/")
&& !p.contains("node_modules/")
&& p != "Cargo.lock"
&& p != "package-lock.json"
&& p != "poetry.lock"
&& e.size > 0
})
.collect();
useful.sort_by_key(|e| {
let rank = if is_manifest(&e.path) {
0
} else if is_readme(&e.path) {
1
} else {
2
};
(rank, e.size, e.path.clone())
});
useful
}
/// Render the digest a planner sees.
///
/// `contents` is `(path, text)` for the files that were actually fetched, in
/// priority order. Anything not fetched is still LISTED, so the model knows the
/// file exists even when it cannot read it.
pub fn render(entries: &[FileEntry], contents: &[(String, String)]) -> String {
if entries.is_empty() {
return "(the repository is empty, or its tree could not be read)".to_string();
}
let mut out = String::new();
out.push_str(&format!("FILES ({} total):\n", entries.len()));
// The whole tree by name is cheap and is what stops "does X exist" guessing.
// Capped anyway: a 10k-file monorepo listing is not a prompt.
const MAX_LISTED: usize = 300;
for e in entries.iter().take(MAX_LISTED) {
out.push_str(&format!(" {} ({} bytes)\n", e.path, e.size));
}
if entries.len() > MAX_LISTED {
out.push_str(&format!(
" … and {} more files NOT listed\n",
entries.len() - MAX_LISTED
));
}
if contents.is_empty() {
out.push_str("\n(no file contents could be read — plan from the names alone, and say so if that is not enough)\n");
return out;
}
out.push_str(&format!(
"\nCONTENTS ({} of {} files shown; anything not shown you have NOT seen):\n",
contents.len(),
entries.len()
));
for (path, text) in contents {
out.push_str(&format!("\n--- {path} ---\n{text}\n"));
}
out
}
/// Take file texts up to the budget, truncating each at [`PER_FILE_CAP`].
///
/// Truncation is marked in the text itself rather than silently cutting: a model
/// that can see it is reading a fragment asks differently than one that believes
/// it read the file.
pub fn fit(fetched: Vec<(String, String)>) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
let mut spent = 0usize;
for (path, text) in fetched {
if spent >= CONTENT_BUDGET {
break;
}
let room = (CONTENT_BUDGET - spent).min(PER_FILE_CAP);
let text = if text.len() <= room {
text
} else {
let end = (0..=room)
.rev()
.find(|i| text.is_char_boundary(*i))
.unwrap_or(0);
format!(
"{}\n… [truncated: {} of {} bytes shown]",
&text[..end],
end,
text.len()
)
};
spent += text.len();
out.push((path, text));
}
out
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn f(path: &str, size: usize) -> FileEntry {
FileEntry {
path: path.into(),
size,
}
}
/// Manifests first, then the README, then source smallest-first. A planner
/// learns more from twenty small files than from one large one.
#[test]
fn the_files_that_say_what_this_is_come_first() {
let entries = vec![
f("src/big.rs", 9000),
f("README.md", 400),
f("src/lib.rs", 120),
f("Cargo.toml", 200),
];
let order: Vec<&str> = priority(&entries).iter().map(|e| e.path.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(order, vec!["Cargo.toml", "README.md", "src/lib.rs", "src/big.rs"]);
}
/// Lockfiles and build output are dropped: enormous, and they say nothing a
/// manifest does not.
#[test]
fn noise_is_not_offered_to_the_planner() {
let entries = vec![
f("Cargo.lock", 50_000),
f("target/debug/thing", 900_000),
f("node_modules/x/index.js", 400),
f(".git/config", 100),
f("src/lib.rs", 100),
f("empty.rs", 0),
];
let kept: Vec<&str> = priority(&entries).iter().map(|e| e.path.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(kept, vec!["src/lib.rs"]);
}
/// THE rule. A partial view presented as complete is planned against as
/// though it were complete — which is how "optimise the hot path" gets
/// written for a crate that adds two integers.
#[test]
fn every_omission_is_stated() {
let entries: Vec<FileEntry> = (0..400).map(|i| f(&format!("src/f{i}.rs"), 100)).collect();
let shown = vec![("src/f0.rs".to_string(), "fn a() {}".to_string())];
let out = render(&entries, &shown);
assert!(out.contains("FILES (400 total)"), "{out}");
assert!(out.contains("and 100 more files NOT listed"), "{out}");
assert!(out.contains("1 of 400 files shown"), "{out}");
assert!(
out.contains("you have NOT seen"),
"the model must be told the view is partial: {out}"
);
}
/// A file cut short says so, in the text the model reads.
#[test]
fn a_truncated_file_says_it_was_truncated() {
let big = "x".repeat(PER_FILE_CAP * 2);
let out = fit(vec![("src/big.rs".into(), big.clone())]);
assert_eq!(out.len(), 1);
assert!(out[0].1.contains("truncated"), "{}", &out[0].1[..80]);
assert!(out[0].1.len() < big.len());
// And the marker names both numbers, so "how much did I miss" is
// answerable rather than guessable.
assert!(out[0].1.contains(&big.len().to_string()));
}
/// The budget is a total, not per file: one large file must not starve the
/// rest, and the whole digest must stay promptable.
#[test]
fn the_budget_bounds_the_whole_digest() {
let files: Vec<(String, String)> = (0..20)
.map(|i| (format!("src/f{i}.rs"), "y".repeat(PER_FILE_CAP)))
.collect();
let out = fit(files);
let total: usize = out.iter().map(|(_, t)| t.len()).sum();
assert!(total <= CONTENT_BUDGET, "digest was {total} bytes");
assert!(!out.is_empty(), "and it still shows something");
assert!(out.len() < 20, "not everything fits, by construction");
}
/// An empty or unreadable tree is stated as such — never rendered as a
/// repository that happens to contain nothing.
#[test]
fn an_unreadable_tree_is_not_an_empty_repository() {
let out = render(&[], &[]);
assert!(out.contains("could not be read"), "{out}");
// A tree we CAN read but no contents we could fetch is a different
// fact, and says so.
let out = render(&[f("src/lib.rs", 100)], &[]);
assert!(out.contains("src/lib.rs"), "{out}");
assert!(out.contains("no file contents could be read"), "{out}");
}
}
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
//! A throwaway copy of a mission checkout, for commands that run as ROOT.
//!
//! Three places in this codebase run a real command against a mission's tree —
//! the judge's verification (`evaluator_tools::Sandbox`), the benchmark runner,
//! and the `on_green_tests` delivery gate. All three enter a container running as
//! root with the missions root bind-mounted, and all three run something that
//! writes `target/`. All three now go through here; the judge was the last to
//! move, having carried its own copy of this logic since before it existed.
//!
//! Run against the live checkout, that breaks the single-writer invariant: the
//! tree is owned by uid 65532 and now contains root-owned build output, so the
//! next phase's `cargo` hits permission-denied on a directory it cannot write.
//! The harness's uid probe reports it as `uids=0,65532`.
//!
//! # The cleanup half, which is the part that keeps being got wrong
//!
//! The copy inherits the same problem: its `target/` is root-owned, so the
//! server process (uid 65532) **cannot delete it**. A `Drop` calling
//! `std::fs::remove_dir_all` fails, and because that error is discarded the tree
//! survives forever — measured at 1.2 MB per benchmark run and 16 MB of stranded
//! judge sandboxes before this existed.
//!
//! So removal goes back through the container, as root, where the files were
//! written. `Drop` remains only as a fallback for the paths where nothing has
//! run as root yet, and does not pretend to be more.
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
/// Where throwaway copies live: siblings of the per-mission directories, like
/// `_outputs` and `_verify`, so reaping a mission cannot race a running command.
pub fn copy_root(kind: &str, mission_id: uuid::Uuid) -> PathBuf {
crate::mission_workspace::missions_root()
.join(kind)
.join(mission_id.to_string())
}
/// Delete a copy from inside the container that wrote it.
///
/// Best-effort and loud: a housekeeping failure must not cost a real verdict or
/// a real benchmark, but it must not be silent either — silence is how the leaks
/// this module exists for went unnoticed for a day.
pub async fn purge(container: &str, root: &Path) {
let Ok(docker) = crate::container_exec::connect() else {
return;
};
let argv = vec![
"rm".to_string(),
"-rf".to_string(),
root.display().to_string(),
];
// Explicitly root: this exists to delete files an EARLIER root-run exec
// created, which uid 65532 cannot touch. Everything else now runs as 65532
// (see `container_exec`), so this is cleaning up history, not policy.
if let Err(e) = crate::container_exec::exec_as_root(
&docker,
container,
Some("/"),
&argv,
std::time::Duration::from_secs(120),
)
.await
{
eprintln!(
"root_copy: could not remove {} from {container}: {e}",
root.display()
);
}
}
/// A copy of a checkout, removed when it goes out of scope.
pub struct RootCopy {
root: PathBuf,
workdir: PathBuf,
}
impl RootCopy {
/// Copy `source` into `root`, returning a handle whose `workdir` is the tree
/// to run in.
///
/// Packed through `mission_fs::pack_dir`, so the copy carries exactly what a
/// delivered diff carries — no `target/`, no `node_modules/`. One exclusion
/// list, four consumers.
pub fn of(source: &Path, root: &Path) -> Result<RootCopy, String> {
let archive = crate::mission_fs::pack_dir(source, "repo")
.map_err(|e| format!("pack {} for a root-run command: {e}", source.display()))?;
crate::mission_fs::unpack_into(&archive, root)
.map_err(|e| format!("unpack copy into {}: {e}", root.display()))?;
let workdir = root.join("repo");
if !workdir.is_dir() {
return Err(format!("copy missing at {}", workdir.display()));
}
Ok(RootCopy {
root: root.to_path_buf(),
workdir,
})
}
pub fn workdir(&self) -> &Path {
&self.workdir
}
/// Take the working directory and give up automatic cleanup.
///
/// For a caller whose copy outlives this handle — `evaluator_tools::Sandbox`
/// hands the path to a judge that has not run yet, so letting `Drop` fire on
/// return would delete the tree out from under it. That caller becomes
/// responsible for calling [`purge`], which is the only thing that can
/// remove root-owned build output anyway.
///
/// Spelled as a method rather than `mem::forget` at the call site, so the
/// transfer of responsibility is visible in the type rather than implied by
/// a leak.
pub fn into_workdir(self) -> PathBuf {
let workdir = self.workdir.clone();
std::mem::forget(self);
workdir
}
}
impl Drop for RootCopy {
/// Fallback only. This CANNOT remove root-owned build output — see
/// [`purge`], which is what actually clears a copy something has run in.
fn drop(&mut self) {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&self.root);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// A copy must be a SIBLING of the per-mission directory, never inside it:
/// `teardown_container` removes `<missions_root>/<mission_id>` wholesale and
/// would take a running command's tree with it.
#[test]
fn copies_live_beside_the_mission_directory_not_inside_it() {
let mission = uuid::Uuid::now_v7();
let mission_dir = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root().join(mission.to_string());
for kind in ["_bench", "_gate", "_verify"] {
let root = copy_root(kind, mission);
assert!(!root.starts_with(&mission_dir), "{root:?}");
assert!(
root.starts_with(crate::mission_workspace::missions_root().join(kind)),
"{root:?}"
);
}
}
/// The copy is not the checkout. Stated as a test because the whole defect
/// class is "ran the real command against the real tree".
#[test]
fn a_copy_is_never_the_checkout() {
let mission = uuid::Uuid::now_v7();
let live = crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission);
for kind in ["_bench", "_gate", "_verify"] {
assert_ne!(copy_root(kind, mission).join("repo"), live);
}
}
}
+88 -5
View File
@@ -26,6 +26,19 @@ pub(crate) async fn workspace_agent(
Ok(agent)
}
/// As [`workspace_agent`], but sees soft-deleted agents too. PURGE ONLY.
pub(crate) async fn workspace_agent_any(
state: &AppState,
user: &cm_auth::AuthedUser,
agent_id: AgentId,
) -> Result<Agent, ApiError> {
let agent = cm_db::repo::agents::get_any(&state.pool, agent_id).await?;
if agent.workspace_id != user.workspace_id {
return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
}
Ok(agent)
}
/// `GET /api/claws/{id}/runtime-config` — the claw's model + §15 sandbox facts
/// (for the claw card / anatomy view's model badge).
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -577,7 +590,11 @@ pub async fn enhance_brain(
let user_prompt = format!(
"BRAIN: {reference}\n\n=== SYSTEM PROMPT ===\n{sp}\n\n=== AGENTS.md ===\n{agent_md}\n\n=== PERSONA ===\n{persona}\n\n=== SKILLS ===\n{skills}"
);
let raw = match runtime.complete(ENHANCE_SYSTEM, &user_prompt, "claude-opus-4-8", 16000, true).await {
let raw = match crate::subscription::complete_or(
&runtime, ENHANCE_SYSTEM, &user_prompt, "claude-opus-4-8", 16000, true,
)
.await
{
Ok(t) => t,
Err(e) => { yield sse(json!({"stage":"error","pct":100,"label":format!("Opus error: {e}")})); return; }
};
@@ -656,8 +673,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn enhance_and_publish(
let user_prompt = format!(
"ROLE CONTEXT: {role_context}\n\nBRAIN: {reference}\n\n=== SYSTEM PROMPT ===\n{sp}\n\n=== AGENTS.md ===\n{agent_md}\n\n=== PERSONA ===\n{persona}\n\n=== SKILLS ===\n{skills}"
);
let raw = runtime
.complete(ENHANCE_SYSTEM, &user_prompt, "claude-opus-4-8", 16000, true)
let raw = crate::subscription::complete_or(
runtime,
ENHANCE_SYSTEM,
&user_prompt,
"claude-opus-4-8",
16000,
true,
)
.await?;
let v = extract_json(&raw).ok_or_else(|| "unparseable enhance output".to_string())?;
let enh = v.get("enhanced").cloned().unwrap_or(Value::Null);
@@ -1127,7 +1150,7 @@ pub async fn patch(
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct SetModelRequest {
/// Model selector (claude / glm / glm-5.2 / kimi / gemini / groq /
/// Model selector (claude / glm / glm-5.2 / kimi / groq /
/// specific model id like `claude-sonnet-5`). Resolved through the
/// same RuntimeProvisioner::provider_alias_for that team creation
/// uses, so shorthand + fully-qualified ids both work.
@@ -1279,7 +1302,12 @@ pub async fn batch_delete(
let mut done = 0usize;
for id in agent_ids {
let base = 100 * done / total;
let agent = match workspace_agent(&state, &user, id).await {
// `workspace_agent_any`, not `workspace_agent`: a purge has to be
// able to see the rows it exists to remove. The soft-delete path
// correctly hides them from every read, which also hid them from
// the only route that could reap them — four soft-deleted agents
// from June were unreachable from the application entirely.
let agent = match workspace_agent_any(&state, &user, id).await {
Ok(a) => a,
Err(_) => { yield sse(json!({"stage":"skip","pct":base,"label":format!("{id}: not found or no access")})); done += 1; continue; }
};
@@ -1379,3 +1407,58 @@ pub async fn settings_full(
"managed_by_name": manager.display_name,
})))
}
/// `GET /api/claws/lifecycle` — the agent census.
///
/// Answers "who is working, who is finished, and who is bound to nothing" in
/// one place, which previously required reading the database by hand.
pub async fn lifecycle_census(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
) -> Result<axum::Json<serde_json::Value>, ApiError> {
let rows = crate::agent_lifecycle::census(&state.pool, user.workspace_id.as_uuid())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("claws::lifecycle_census: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
let mut counts = std::collections::BTreeMap::<&str, usize>::new();
for c in &rows {
*counts.entry(c.state.as_str()).or_default() += 1;
}
Ok(axum::Json(serde_json::json!({
"counts": counts,
"agents": rows.iter().map(|c| serde_json::json!({
"id": c.id,
"name": c.name,
"state": c.state.as_str(),
"reapable": c.state.reapable(),
"finished_hours_ago": c.finished_hours_ago,
})).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
})))
}
/// `POST /api/claws/lifecycle/sweep` — run the reap now.
///
/// The sweeper is hourly; this exists so an operator does not have to wait an
/// hour to see the effect of a decision they already made.
pub async fn lifecycle_sweep(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(_user): Authed,
) -> Result<axum::Json<serde_json::Value>, ApiError> {
let swept = crate::agent_lifecycle::sweep(
&state.pool,
&state.runtime,
crate::agent_lifecycle::COMPLETED_GRACE_HOURS,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("claws::lifecycle_sweep: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
Ok(axum::Json(serde_json::json!({
"reaped": swept.reaped,
"failed": swept.failed,
"kept_in_grace": swept.kept_in_grace,
})))
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ pub async fn propose_for_agent(
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(agent_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, ApiError> {
let id = crate::level_up::propose_agent(&state.pool, user.workspace_id, user.user_id, agent_id)
let id = crate::level_up::propose_agent(&state.pool, &state.runtime, user.workspace_id, user.user_id, agent_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("level_up: propose_agent {agent_id} failed: {e}");
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ pub async fn propose_for_team(
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(team_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, ApiError> {
let id = crate::level_up::propose_team(&state.pool, user.workspace_id, user.user_id, team_id)
let id = crate::level_up::propose_team(&state.pool, &state.runtime, user.workspace_id, user.user_id, team_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("level_up: propose_team {team_id} failed: {e}");
+359
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
//! `/api/missions/{id}/plan-proposals` — let a model author the phases.
//!
//! W1 / #13, and the sibling of [`crate::routes::mission_roster`]: that one has
//! a model size the team, this one has it decide what the work is. Same three
//! verbs and the same rule — propose and decide are separate, because only the
//! second one changes a mission.
//!
//! The model is handed two lists it may not depart from: the phase kinds
//! `phase_runner` dispatches on, and the config keys `phase_config` says have
//! readers. Both are enforced again on the way in, so a plan cannot describe
//! work this platform will accept and then not do.
use axum::extract::{Path, State};
use axum::Json;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::mission_plan::{Plan, MAX_PHASES, PLANNABLE_KINDS};
use crate::{ApiError, AppState, Authed};
const PLANNER_MODEL: &str = "claude-opus-4-8";
/// What the repository actually contains, for the planner's prompt.
///
/// Names were not enough. Given the root listing alone, the planner wrote
/// "optimise the hot path" for a crate whose hot path is
/// `add(a: i64, b: i64) -> i64` — a mission that was unachievable from the
/// moment it was written, and that nothing discovered until an agent had built a
/// benchmark harness to measure an integer addition.
///
/// Read from the FORGE, not a checkout: at proposal time the mission is still a
/// draft and `ensure_checkout` has not run, so there is nothing on disk. Every
/// failure degrades to a STATED absence — a planner told "the listing could not
/// be read" can hedge; one told nothing assumes.
async fn repo_digest(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, mission_id: uuid::Uuid) -> String {
let row: Option<(Option<String>, Option<String>, Option<String>)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT r.owner, r.name, r.default_branch
FROM missions m JOIN repos r ON r.id = m.repo_id
WHERE m.id = $1",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await
.ok()
.flatten();
let Some((Some(owner), Some(name), branch)) = row else {
return "(this mission has no repository)".to_string();
};
let branch = branch.unwrap_or_else(|| "main".to_string());
let token = std::env::var("GITEA_TOKEN").unwrap_or_default();
let Ok(client) = reqwest::Client::builder()
.timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(20))
.build()
else {
return "(the repository could not be read)".to_string();
};
let auth = |r: reqwest::RequestBuilder| {
if token.trim().is_empty() {
r
} else {
r.header("Authorization", format!("token {token}"))
}
};
// The whole tree in one call, so "does this repo have benches/" is a fact
// rather than an inference from the root.
let tree_url = format!(
"https://git.redclaw.dev/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/git/trees/{branch}?recursive=true&per_page=1000"
);
let tree: serde_json::Value = match auth(client.get(&tree_url)).send().await {
Ok(r) if r.status().is_success() => r.json().await.unwrap_or_default(),
_ => return "(the repository tree could not be read)".to_string(),
};
let entries: Vec<crate::repo_digest::FileEntry> = tree
.get("tree")
.and_then(|t| t.as_array())
.map(|items| {
items
.iter()
.filter(|e| e.get("type").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("blob"))
.filter_map(|e| {
Some(crate::repo_digest::FileEntry {
path: e.get("path")?.as_str()?.to_string(),
size: e.get("size").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0) as usize,
})
})
.collect()
})
.unwrap_or_default();
// Fetch in priority order until the budget is spent. Requested serially and
// capped: this runs inside one API request, and a repo with 500 useful files
// must not turn a proposal into 500 round trips.
let mut fetched: Vec<(String, String)> = Vec::new();
let mut spent = 0usize;
for e in crate::repo_digest::priority(&entries).into_iter().take(40) {
if spent >= crate::repo_digest::CONTENT_BUDGET {
break;
}
let raw = format!(
"https://git.redclaw.dev/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{name}/raw/{}?ref={branch}",
e.path
);
if let Ok(r) = auth(client.get(&raw)).send().await {
if r.status().is_success() {
if let Ok(text) = r.text().await {
spent += text.len().min(crate::repo_digest::PER_FILE_CAP);
fetched.push((e.path.clone(), text));
}
}
}
}
crate::repo_digest::render(&entries, &crate::repo_digest::fit(fetched))
}
const PLAN_SYSTEM: &str = "You decide what ONE software mission actually does — its phases, in order. \
Each phase is a full agent run against the same repository checkout: the next phase sees the tree the \
previous one left. They run SEQUENTIALLY, so phases are expensive and a handoff loses context at every \
step.\n\n\
Propose the FEWEST phases that genuinely need to be separate. ONE phase is usually the right answer, and \
is always the right answer for a self-contained change: splitting one change into plan → implement → \
test is a documented anti-pattern, not thoroughness — a single agent doing all three in one pass keeps \
the context that makes the later steps good. A second phase earns its place only when it depends on \
something the first phase could not have known when it started.\n\n\
Every phase needs a `task`: the specific instruction for THAT phase, not a restatement of the mission. \
An agent receives the mission description plus its own task, so a vague task means an agent guessing \
which part of the mission is its share.\n\n\
`done_when` is judged afterwards by a separate model reading the repository, so write it as something \
observable in the tree — a file that exists, a suite that passes — never as an intention. \
`done_when_check` is a SHELL COMMAND that must exit 0; it is enforced while the agent still works, so \
prefer it when the condition is mechanical. Set `allow_empty` true only for a phase whose job is to \
verify rather than to change files.\n\n\
ALWAYS respond with STRICT JSON ONLY, no prose and no markdown: \
{\"phases\":[{\"kind\":\"coding\",\"task\":\"...\",\"done_when\":null|\"...\",\
\"done_when_check\":null|\"...\",\"allow_empty\":null|true|false}]}";
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct PlanProposalResponse {
pub id: Uuid,
pub plan: Value,
pub author_model: String,
pub status: String,
}
/// `POST /api/missions/{id}/plan-proposals` — ask the model for a phase plan.
pub async fn suggest(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<PlanProposalResponse>, ApiError> {
let ws = user.workspace_id;
let mission = cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, ws.as_uuid())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
let prompt = format!(
"MISSION: {}\n\nDESCRIPTION:\n{}\n\n=== THE REPOSITORY ===\n{}\n=== END REPOSITORY \
===\n\nPlan for the repository as it ACTUALLY IS, not as the description implies it \
might be. If the work needs something absent — a benchmark harness, a test suite, a \
config file — the phase that needs it must CREATE it, and its task must say so. If the \
description asks for something this code cannot support (optimising a function with \
nothing to optimise, testing a module that does not exist), say so in the task text and \
plan the phase that would establish the truth, rather than a phase that must fail.\n\n\
NOTE: a mission agent has NO package-registry access — it cannot add dependencies. A \
phase needing tooling must build it from the standard library or from what is already \
vendored here.\n\nPHASE KINDS YOU MAY USE (nothing else runs): {}\nCEILING: \
{MAX_PHASES} phases.\n\nPropose the plan now (JSON only).",
mission.title,
mission.description.as_deref().unwrap_or("(none)"),
repo_digest(&state.pool, id).await,
PLANNABLE_KINDS.join(", "),
);
// The stored `author_model` is whichever link of the fallback chain
// actually answered — see `subscription::complete_with_fallback`.
let (raw, author_model) = crate::subscription::complete_with_fallback(
&state.runtime,
PLAN_SYSTEM,
&prompt,
PLANNER_MODEL,
2000,
false,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: plan proposal failed: {e}");
crate::subscription::as_api_error(&e)
})?;
let parsed: Value = crate::routes::claws::extract_json(&raw).ok_or_else(|| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: planner returned no JSON: {raw}");
ApiError::BadRequest
})?;
let plan: Plan = serde_json::from_value(parsed.clone()).map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: planner JSON is not a plan ({e}): {parsed}");
ApiError::BadRequest
})?;
// Validated BEFORE storing, so a stored proposal is always one that could be
// approved — the failure belongs to the model, not to whoever clicks
// approve later.
if let Err(why) = plan.validate() {
eprintln!("mission {id}: planner proposed an unrunnable plan: {why}");
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let pid = Uuid::now_v7();
let stored = serde_json::to_value(&plan).map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::insert(
&state.pool,
pid,
id,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
&stored,
&author_model,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: could not store plan proposal: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
eprintln!(
"mission_plan: mission {id} — {author_model} proposed {} phase(s): {}",
plan.phases.len(),
plan.phases
.iter()
.map(|p| p.kind.as_str())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(" → ")
);
Ok(Json(PlanProposalResponse {
id: pid,
plan: stored,
author_model,
status: "proposed".into(),
}))
}
/// `GET /api/missions/{id}/plan-proposals`
pub async fn list(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<Vec<cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::MissionPlanProposal>>, ApiError> {
let rows = cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::list(
&state.pool,
id,
user.workspace_id.as_uuid().to_owned(),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
Ok(Json(rows))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct DecideRequest {
pub status: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub note: Option<String>,
}
/// `POST /api/missions/{id}/plan-proposals/{pid}/decide`
///
/// Approving REPLACES the mission's phases. Draft-only: re-planning a mission
/// whose phases have started would discard work that already ran, and the phase
/// rows are what every downstream sweep keys off.
pub async fn decide(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path((id, pid)): Path<(Uuid, Uuid)>,
Json(body): Json<DecideRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
let ws = user.workspace_id;
let proposal = cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::get(&state.pool, pid, ws.as_uuid().to_owned())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
if proposal.mission_id != id {
return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
}
if body.status == "rejected" {
let decided = cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::decide(
&state.pool,
pid,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
"rejected",
body.note.as_deref(),
Some(user.user_id.as_uuid().to_owned()),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
return Ok(Json(json!({ "status": "rejected", "decided": decided })));
}
if body.status != "approved" {
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let mission = cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, ws.as_uuid())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
if mission.status != "draft" {
eprintln!("mission {id}: plan approval refused — mission is {}", mission.status);
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let plan: Plan = serde_json::from_value(proposal.plan.clone()).map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: stored plan {pid} does not parse ({e})");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
// Re-validated at approval. The stored plan passed once, but `PLANNABLE_KINDS`
// and the config registry are properties of the BUILD — a proposal made
// before a deploy could name a kind this build no longer dispatches.
if let Err(why) = plan.validate() {
eprintln!("mission {id}: plan {pid} is no longer runnable: {why}");
let _ = cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::decide(
&state.pool,
pid,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
"rejected",
Some(&why.to_string()),
Some(user.user_id.as_uuid().to_owned()),
)
.await;
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let phases = plan.phases();
let claimed = cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals::approve_and_apply(
&state.pool,
pid,
id,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
&phases,
body.note.as_deref(),
Some(user.user_id.as_uuid().to_owned()),
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: could not apply plan {pid}: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
if !claimed {
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
eprintln!(
"mission_plan: mission {id} now runs a {}-phase model-authored plan from proposal {pid}",
phases.len()
);
Ok(Json(json!({
"status": "approved",
"phases": phases.iter().map(|(k, i, _)| json!({"kind": k, "order_idx": i})).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
})))
}
+321
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
//! `/api/missions/{id}/team-proposals` — let a model size the mission's team.
//!
//! Slice 5. The planner has been proposing rosters into React state for months;
//! this is where one reaches a mission. Three verbs, and the split between them
//! is the point:
//!
//! - **suggest** asks the model and PERSISTS the answer. It changes nothing
//! about the mission.
//! - **approve** writes the roster onto the mission, where the composed executor
//! reads it.
//! - **reject** records that a human said no, which is the only evidence we ever
//! collect about what the planner gets wrong.
//!
//! A proposal is never applied on arrival. A model sizing a team is a suggestion
//! about how many VMs to boot, and this codebase has an explicit rule about
//! model output that costs money: it is evidence for a decision, not the
//! decision.
use axum::extract::{Path, State};
use axum::Json;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::mission_roster::{available_backends, Roster};
use crate::{ApiError, AppState, Authed};
/// The model that sizes a mission's team.
///
/// The same one the Master Planner uses. Sizing a team is the kind of judgement
/// the planner's own system prompt calls for — and it is a once-per-mission call,
/// so the cost argument that keeps missions on cheaper models does not apply.
const PLANNER_MODEL: &str = "claude-opus-4-8";
const ROSTER_SYSTEM: &str = "You size the team for ONE software mission that runs inside Firecracker \
microVMs. Each member you propose is a WHOLE VM — a boot, a repository injected as a tar, a full \
Claude Code session, and a collect — running one after another, each one receiving the working tree the \
previous member left behind. That is expensive and it is serial, so propose the FEWEST members that \
genuinely divide the work. One member is a perfectly good answer and is usually the right one for a \
small change; Anthropic measure multi-agent work at 3-10x the tokens with wall-clock often LONGER, and \
the benefit is thoroughness rather than speed.\n\n\
Members run SEQUENTIALLY and share the repository, so do NOT propose members that would edit the same \
file, and do NOT split one change into stages (plan → implement → test) — a handoff loses context at \
every step and one careful pass beats an assembly line. The shape that DOES earn its cost is an \
implementer followed by an independent verifier that only checks.\n\n\
Give each member a `backend` ONLY when running it on a different provider's image is the point — an \
independent verifier on another provider breaks the correlated failure where the model that wrote the \
code also grades it. Omit `backend` to inherit the mission's.\n\n\
ALWAYS respond with STRICT JSON ONLY, no prose and no markdown: \
{\"topology_kind\":\"pipeline\",\"members\":[{\"role\":\"...\",\"backend\":null|\"...\",\
\"rationale\":\"one line\"}]}";
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
pub struct ProposalResponse {
pub id: Uuid,
pub roster: Value,
pub author_model: String,
pub status: String,
}
/// `POST /api/missions/{id}/team-proposals` — ask the model for a roster.
pub async fn suggest(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<ProposalResponse>, ApiError> {
let ws = user.workspace_id;
let mission = cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, ws.as_uuid())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
// The backends the FLEET can boot today, handed to the model as the menu.
// Without it the model invents plausible image names and the roster is
// refused after it was written, which reads as our bug rather than as a
// model guessing.
let available = available_backends(&state.pool, ws.as_uuid().to_owned())
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: could not read fleet backends: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
let phases: Vec<(String, Option<String>)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT kind, config->>'task' FROM mission_phases WHERE mission_id = $1 ORDER BY order_idx",
)
.bind(id)
.fetch_all(&state.pool)
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
let phase_text = phases
.iter()
.map(|(kind, task)| format!("- {kind}: {}", task.as_deref().unwrap_or("(no task text)")))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("\n");
let prompt = format!(
"MISSION: {}\n\nDESCRIPTION:\n{}\n\nPHASES:\n{}\n\nBACKENDS THIS FLEET CAN BOOT (use only \
these, or omit `backend`): {}\n\nPropose the roster now (JSON only).",
mission.title,
mission.description.as_deref().unwrap_or("(none)"),
if phase_text.is_empty() {
"(none declared)".to_string()
} else {
phase_text
},
if available.is_empty() {
"(none — omit backend on every member)".to_string()
} else {
available.join(", ")
},
);
// On the SUBSCRIPTION, like every mission VM — not the metered API key.
// `Runtime::complete` with a bare model name resolves to the default
// provider, which is the pay-as-you-go key; this planner died with
// "credit balance is too low" while missions on the same box ran fine.
// `author_model` is what ANSWERED, not what was asked for. When opus is
// capped the chain steps down to haiku and then to GLM, and a plan drafted
// by the third link but filed as an opus plan is a silent quality change.
let (raw, author_model) = crate::subscription::complete_with_fallback(
&state.runtime,
ROSTER_SYSTEM,
&prompt,
PLANNER_MODEL,
2000,
false,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: roster proposal failed: {e}");
// A rate-limited subscription is a 503 the operator can act on, not
// a 500 that reads as "this server is broken".
crate::subscription::as_api_error(&e)
})?;
// A model that answered with prose around its JSON has still answered; a
// model that answered with nothing usable has not, and that is a refusal
// rather than an empty roster.
let parsed: Value = crate::routes::claws::extract_json(&raw).ok_or_else(|| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: planner returned no JSON: {raw}");
ApiError::BadRequest
})?;
let roster: Roster = serde_json::from_value(parsed.clone()).map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: planner JSON is not a roster ({e}): {parsed}");
ApiError::BadRequest
})?;
// Validated BEFORE it is stored, so a stored proposal is always one that
// could be approved. Storing an invalid roster would mean the failure
// surfaces at approval time, pointing at the human rather than the model.
if let Err(why) = roster.validate(&available) {
eprintln!("mission {id}: planner proposed an unusable roster: {why}");
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let pid = Uuid::now_v7();
let stored = serde_json::to_value(&roster).map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::insert(
&state.pool,
pid,
id,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
&stored,
&author_model,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: could not store proposal: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
eprintln!(
"mission_roster: mission {id} — {} proposed {} member(s): {}",
author_model,
roster.members.len(),
roster
.members
.iter()
.map(|m| format!("{}{}", m.role, m.backend.as_deref().map(|b| format!("@{b}")).unwrap_or_default()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ")
);
Ok(Json(ProposalResponse {
id: pid,
roster: stored,
author_model,
status: "proposed".into(),
}))
}
/// `GET /api/missions/{id}/team-proposals`
pub async fn list(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<Vec<cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::MissionTeamProposal>>, ApiError> {
let rows =
cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::list(&state.pool, id, user.workspace_id.as_uuid().to_owned())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
Ok(Json(rows))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct DecideRequest {
/// `approved` or `rejected`.
pub status: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub note: Option<String>,
}
/// `POST /api/missions/{id}/team-proposals/{pid}/decide` — accept or refuse.
///
/// Approving writes `config.roster` on the mission and switches it to the
/// composed engine, because a roster is a graph of VMs and that is the engine
/// that runs one. Draft-only: re-shaping a mission that is already running would
/// change what its next phase does with no record of the swap on the phase that
/// already ran.
pub async fn decide(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path((id, pid)): Path<(Uuid, Uuid)>,
Json(body): Json<DecideRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
let ws = user.workspace_id;
let proposal = cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::get(&state.pool, pid, ws.as_uuid().to_owned())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
if proposal.mission_id != id {
return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
}
if body.status == "rejected" {
let decided = cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::decide(
&state.pool,
pid,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
"rejected",
body.note.as_deref(),
Some(user.user_id.as_uuid().to_owned()),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
return Ok(Json(json!({ "status": "rejected", "decided": decided })));
}
if body.status != "approved" {
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let mission = cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, ws.as_uuid())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
if mission.status != "draft" {
eprintln!("mission {id}: roster approval refused — mission is {}", mission.status);
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let roster: Roster = serde_json::from_value(proposal.roster.clone()).map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: stored proposal {pid} is not a roster ({e})");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
// Re-validated at approval, against the fleet as it is NOW. A node can go
// offline between proposing and approving, and the cheapest place to find
// that out is still here rather than at VM boot.
let available = available_backends(&state.pool, ws.as_uuid().to_owned())
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
if let Err(why) = roster.validate(&available) {
eprintln!("mission {id}: roster {pid} is no longer applicable: {why}");
let _ = cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::decide(
&state.pool,
pid,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
"rejected",
Some(&why.to_string()),
Some(user.user_id.as_uuid().to_owned()),
)
.await;
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let graph = roster.graph().map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: approved roster does not build a graph: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
// Claiming the proposal and writing the mission are ONE transaction. Doing
// them as two statements left the first real approval in production marked
// `approved` with nothing written to the mission — and the partial unique
// index then makes that permanent, since no other proposal for that mission
// can ever be approved.
let claimed = cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals::approve_and_apply(
&state.pool,
pid,
id,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
&graph,
body.note.as_deref(),
Some(user.user_id.as_uuid().to_owned()),
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: could not apply roster {pid}: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
if !claimed {
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
eprintln!(
"mission_roster: mission {id} now runs a {}-node composed graph from proposal {pid}",
roster.members.len()
);
Ok(Json(json!({
"status": "approved",
"team_engine": "composed",
"nodes": roster.members.len(),
"graph": graph,
})))
}
+658 -9
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,16 @@ pub struct CreateMissionRequest {
/// Defaults to "zeroclaw". "local_herdr" requires target_node_id.
pub runtime_kind: Option<String>,
pub target_node_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// Which per-CLI rootfs a `microvm` mission boots (`missions.backend`), e.g.
/// "claude". NULL boots the node's default image.
pub backend: Option<String>,
/// Model that independently validates this mission's phase verdicts, e.g.
/// `glm:glm-4.7`. Omit to use the deployment default; send `""` to opt out of
/// independent validation and judge with the house model.
pub validator_model: Option<String>,
/// Team engine: `"claude_code"` asks the mission's agent to form a team.
/// Omit for solo, which is the default and much cheaper.
pub team_engine: Option<String>,
}
fn default_schedule() -> Value {
@@ -260,6 +270,12 @@ pub async fn create(
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
}
// microvm needs no target here: placement resolves a KVM-capable node at
// launch and fails the launch when there is none, so an explicit target is
// a request rather than a requirement. Rejecting the value outright — as
// this did until B4.5 — made `runtime_kind='microvm'` unreachable through
// the only interface that creates missions.
"microvm" => {}
_ => return Err(ApiError::BadRequest),
}
@@ -275,6 +291,9 @@ pub async fn create(
config: body.config,
runtime_kind: Some(runtime_kind),
target_node_id: body.target_node_id,
backend: body.backend.as_deref(),
validator_model: body.validator_model.as_deref(),
team_engine: body.team_engine.as_deref(),
phases: phases_for_create(
crate::workflow_registry::get(body.template_kind.trim()),
body.phases,
@@ -308,6 +327,303 @@ pub async fn get(
}))
}
/// GET /api/missions/{id}/artifacts/{artifact_id}/content — the artifact's text.
///
/// The frontend had no way to READ an artifact: it listed paths and offered a
/// PDF preview, and the PDF never rendered. Markdown is the deliverable now, so
/// something has to serve it.
///
/// Two containment rules, both enforced rather than assumed:
///
/// - the artifact row must belong to a mission in the caller's workspace, so
/// an artifact id from another tenant is a 404, not a file read;
/// - the resolved path must stay inside `<missions_root>/_outputs`. Artifact
/// paths are written by this server, but a stored `../../etc/passwd` would
/// otherwise be read and returned. Canonicalise, then check the prefix —
/// checking the string before resolving `..` is the classic hole.
///
/// Text only, and capped: these are markdown documents, and streaming an
/// arbitrary captured file into a JSON body is not what this is for.
/// Turn a stored artifact path into an absolute one, refusing anything outside
/// `_outputs`.
///
/// Shared by the read and download routes deliberately: two copies of a
/// containment check is two chances for one of them to be the lenient one, and
/// the lenient one is a path-traversal read of the gateway's filesystem.
fn resolve_artifact_path(stored: &str) -> Result<std::path::PathBuf, ApiError> {
let root = crate::mission_outputs::outputs_root_dir();
let abs = crate::mission_outputs::missions_root_dir().join(stored);
// `canonicalize` on BOTH sides, so a symlink out of the tree resolves to
// its target before the comparison rather than after.
let resolved = std::fs::canonicalize(&abs).map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound)?;
let root = std::fs::canonicalize(&root).map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound)?;
if !resolved.starts_with(&root) {
eprintln!(
"missions: refused artifact {} — outside {}",
resolved.display(),
root.display()
);
return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
}
Ok(resolved)
}
/// `GET /api/missions/{id}/artifacts/{artifact_id}/download` — the file itself.
///
/// Separate from `artifact_content` because that route cannot serve the two
/// cases a download exists for: it caps at 2 MiB and reads as UTF-8, so a large
/// or binary artifact is unreachable by any means today. This one streams the
/// bytes with a filename attached and no ceiling.
pub async fn artifact_download(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path((id, artifact_id)): Path<(Uuid, Uuid)>,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, ApiError> {
use axum::response::IntoResponse;
cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, user.workspace_id.as_uuid())
.await?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
let artifacts = cm_db::repo::missions::artifacts_for(&state.pool, id).await?;
let artifact = artifacts
.into_iter()
.find(|a| a.id == artifact_id)
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
let resolved = resolve_artifact_path(&artifact.path)?;
let bytes = tokio::fs::read(&resolved)
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound)?;
// The basename, never the stored path: `_outputs/<mission>/<phase>/repo/x.md`
// as a filename would arrive as a browser-mangled string, and the path is
// internal layout the user has no reason to see.
let name = resolved
.file_name()
.and_then(|n| n.to_str())
.filter(|n| !n.is_empty())
.unwrap_or("artifact");
// Quoted and stripped of quotes/newlines: a filename is attacker-influenced
// input (an agent chose it) and this header is parsed by every browser.
let safe: String = name
.chars()
.filter(|c| *c != '"' && *c != '\\' && !c.is_control())
.collect();
Ok((
[
(
axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
artifact
.mime
.unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".into()),
),
(
axum::http::header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION,
format!("attachment; filename=\"{safe}\""),
),
],
bytes,
)
.into_response())
}
pub async fn artifact_content(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path((id, artifact_id)): Path<(Uuid, Uuid)>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, ApiError> {
/// Beyond this, a document is not something a reader wants inline.
const MAX_BYTES: u64 = 2 * 1024 * 1024;
// Scoped to the caller's workspace by loading the mission first.
cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, user.workspace_id.as_uuid())
.await?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
let artifacts = cm_db::repo::missions::artifacts_for(&state.pool, id).await?;
let artifact = artifacts
.into_iter()
.find(|a| a.id == artifact_id)
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
let resolved = resolve_artifact_path(&artifact.path)?;
let meta = std::fs::metadata(&resolved).map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound)?;
if meta.len() > MAX_BYTES {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"path": artifact.path,
"mime": artifact.mime,
"truncated": true,
"content": "",
"bytes": meta.len(),
})));
}
let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&resolved).map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound)?;
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"path": artifact.path,
"mime": artifact.mime,
"title": artifact.title,
"truncated": false,
"content": content,
"bytes": meta.len(),
})))
}
/// POST /api/missions/{id}/merge — merge this mission's branch into the base.
///
/// The operator's button. `MergePolicy::Never` — the default for anything that
/// touches code — means "do not merge on your own", deferring to a human; this
/// endpoint is that human saying yes. So the additive-only test does not apply
/// here, and deliberately so.
///
/// It works in a FRESH CLONE under `_merge/<mission>`, never the mission
/// checkout: that directory is reaped on a timer after a mission ends, so a
/// merge that used it would succeed right after a run and fail inexplicably an
/// hour later. The clone is made by the server process, so nothing here runs as
/// root and the ordinary cleanup works — unlike the copies in `root_copy`.
pub async fn merge_branch(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, ApiError> {
let mission = cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, user.workspace_id.as_uuid())
.await?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
let repo_id = mission.repo_id.ok_or(ApiError::BadRequest)?;
let repo = cm_db::repo::repos::get(&state.pool, repo_id, user.workspace_id)
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::NotFound)?;
let clone_url = repo.clone_url.as_deref().ok_or(ApiError::BadRequest)?;
let base = repo.default_branch.as_deref().unwrap_or("main");
// The branch is whatever delivery actually pushed — read from the artifact
// it recorded, not reconstructed from the mission id. A phase that never
// pushed has no branch, and that must be a refusal rather than a guess.
let artifacts = cm_db::repo::missions::artifacts_for(&state.pool, id).await?;
let delivered = artifacts.iter().rev().find_map(|a| {
let m = a.metadata.as_object()?;
let branch = m.get("branch")?.as_str()?.to_string();
(m.get("pushed").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()) == Some(true)).then_some(branch)
});
let Some(branch) = delivered else {
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"merged": false,
"reason": "this mission has no pushed branch to merge",
})));
};
let auth = crate::mission_workspace::with_ambient_auth(clone_url);
let workdir = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root()
.join("_merge")
.join(id.to_string());
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&workdir).await;
if let Some(parent) = workdir.parent() {
let _ = tokio::fs::create_dir_all(parent).await;
}
let clone = tokio::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["clone", "--quiet", &auth.url])
.arg(&workdir)
.env("GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT", "0")
.output()
.await
.map_err(|_| ApiError::Internal)?;
if !clone.status.success() {
eprintln!(
"missions::merge_branch: clone for {id} failed: {}",
String::from_utf8_lossy(&clone.stderr)
.chars()
.take(300)
.collect::<String>()
);
return Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"merged": false,
"reason": "could not clone the repository to merge",
})));
}
let container = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "clawmates-runtime".to_string());
let outcome = async {
let merged =
crate::auto_merge::merge_on_operator_approval(&workdir, &auth.url, &branch, base)
.await?;
if !merged.merged {
return Ok(merged);
}
// Run the project's own tests against the MERGED tree, before it is
// published. Verifying first rather than reverting after is the
// difference between "main was never broken" and "main was broken until
// someone noticed".
//
// The merge is already committed locally at this point; refusing here
// simply never pushes it, and the branch is still there to retry.
match crate::mission_delivery::verify_tests(&workdir, &container).await {
crate::mission_delivery::TestOutcome::Passed => {}
crate::mission_delivery::TestOutcome::NoSuite => {
eprintln!(
"missions::merge_branch: {branch} has no discoverable test suite — publishing unverified"
);
}
crate::mission_delivery::TestOutcome::Failed(code) => {
return Ok(crate::auto_merge::MergeOutcome {
merged: false,
reason: format!(
"the merged tree FAILS the project's tests (exit {code}) — not published. The branch is unchanged; fix it and merge again."
),
});
}
// Fail closed. A suite that could not run has not passed, and
// publishing on "we could not check" is how a green main stops
// meaning anything.
crate::mission_delivery::TestOutcome::CouldNotRun(why) => {
return Ok(crate::auto_merge::MergeOutcome {
merged: false,
reason: format!("could not run the tests on the merged tree ({why}) — not published"),
});
}
}
crate::auto_merge::push_merged(&workdir, &auth.url, base).await?;
Ok::<_, String>(crate::auto_merge::MergeOutcome {
merged: true,
reason: format!("tests pass on the merged tree; published to {base}"),
})
}
.await;
// Purge through the container: `verify_tests` runs `cargo test` as ROOT, so
// the workdir now holds a root-owned `target/` the server (uid 65532) cannot
// delete. Same defect as the bench and judge copies.
crate::root_copy::purge(&container, &workdir).await;
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(&workdir).await;
match outcome {
Ok(o) => {
eprintln!(
"missions::merge_branch: mission {id} branch {branch} -> {base}: {}",
o.reason
);
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"merged": o.merged,
"reason": o.reason,
"branch": branch,
"base": base,
})))
}
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("missions::merge_branch: mission {id} failed: {e}");
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"merged": false,
"reason": format!("merge failed: {e}"),
"branch": branch,
"base": base,
})))
}
}
}
/// POST /api/missions/{id}/benchmark — run the benchmark harness
/// against a phase. Slot='baseline' records iteration 0's
/// before_metrics; slot='after' with iteration=N records the
@@ -367,6 +683,61 @@ pub struct RefineResponse {
pub refined: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct RefineDraftRequest {
#[serde(default)]
pub title: String,
pub description: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub template_kind: Option<String>,
}
/// `POST /api/missions/refine-draft` — polish a description with no mission
/// behind it yet.
///
/// The wizard's polish button fires while the user is still typing, before
/// anything is created. `refine` deliberately requires a saved draft so its
/// Accept can write back; this one has nothing to write back to and returns the
/// text for the caller to put in the box.
///
/// The phase list comes from the workflow recipe rather than the caller, for
/// the same reason `phases_for_create` prefers it: the recipe is the
/// authoritative composition, and a client that guessed would have the model
/// write acceptance criteria for phases the mission will not run.
pub async fn refine_draft(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(_user): Authed,
Json(req): Json<RefineDraftRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<RefineResponse>, ApiError> {
let phase_kinds: Vec<String> = req
.template_kind
.as_deref()
.and_then(crate::workflow_registry::get)
.map(|r| r.phases.iter().map(|p| p.kind.clone()).collect())
.unwrap_or_default();
let result = crate::mission_refiner::refine_draft(
&state.runtime,
req.title.trim(),
req.template_kind.as_deref().unwrap_or("custom"),
&phase_kinds,
&req.description,
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("refine-draft failed: {e}");
if e.contains("empty") {
ApiError::BadRequest
} else {
crate::subscription::as_api_error(&e)
}
})?;
Ok(Json(RefineResponse {
original: result.original,
refined: result.refined,
}))
}
/// POST /api/missions/{id}/refine — generate a coherent, sectioned
/// Markdown rewrite of the current description WITHOUT persisting.
/// Frontend renders a before/after diff; user hits Accept (PATCH
@@ -376,7 +747,7 @@ pub async fn refine(
Authed(user): Authed,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<Json<RefineResponse>, ApiError> {
let result = crate::mission_refiner::refine(&state.pool, user.workspace_id, id)
let result = crate::mission_refiner::refine(&state.pool, &state.runtime, user.workspace_id, id)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("mission {id}: refine failed: {e}");
@@ -529,7 +900,41 @@ async fn reap_mission_resources(state: &AppState, mission_id: Uuid) {
// all DB rows. Shared with the batch-delete reaper so this path cannot
// drift back into skipping the container teardown.
let provisioner = crate::runtime_provision::RuntimeProvisioner::from_env();
// Counted, not assumed. The summary below used to report `claw_ids.len()`,
// which is how many claws were FOUND — including every one skipped as still
// employed and every one whose purge failed. So "reaped 4 claw(s)" was
// printed by a delete that purged none, which is exactly the log you would
// read while wondering why the agents are still there.
let mut purged = 0usize;
let mut kept = 0usize;
let mut failed = 0usize;
for cid in &claw_ids {
// Only claws this mission is the LAST holder of.
//
// Claws are reused across missions now (see
// `agent_template_link::reusable_claw`), so a mission's team can contain
// staff that other missions still employ. Purging those would delete a
// user's workforce as a side effect of tidying up one mission — and it
// would look like the roster quietly shrinking, not like an error.
let shared: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT count(*)
FROM team_members tm
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.team_id = tm.team_id
WHERE tm.claw_id = $1 AND mt.mission_id <> $2",
)
.bind(cid)
.bind(mission_id)
.fetch_one(&state.pool)
.await
.unwrap_or(0);
if shared > 0 {
eprintln!(
"missions::delete: keeping claw {cid} — {shared} other mission(s) still employ it"
);
kept += 1;
continue;
}
let report = crate::routes::claws::purge_agent(
&state.pool,
&state.runtime,
@@ -537,10 +942,14 @@ async fn reap_mission_resources(state: &AppState, mission_id: Uuid) {
cm_domain::AgentId::from(*cid),
)
.await;
if let Err(e) = report.counts {
match report.counts {
Ok(_) => purged += 1,
Err(e) => {
failed += 1;
eprintln!("missions::delete: hard_purge claw {cid} failed (continuing): {e}");
}
}
}
// 3. Delete the (permanent-lifecycle) teams — no mission FK cascades them.
// team_members cascades from teams.
@@ -575,10 +984,14 @@ async fn reap_mission_resources(state: &AppState, mission_id: Uuid) {
}
}
// Say what actually happened. `failed > 0` means the mission row is about to
// be deleted while its claws survive with nothing left pointing at them —
// the orphan case, and the only way to notice it after the fact.
eprintln!(
"missions::delete: reaped {} claw(s), {} team(s) for mission {mission_id}",
claw_ids.len(),
team_ids.len()
"missions::delete: mission {mission_id}: {purged} claw(s) purged, {kept} kept (still \
employed), {failed} FAILED, {} team(s) deleted, {} claw(s) considered",
team_ids.len(),
claw_ids.len()
);
}
@@ -682,9 +1095,16 @@ pub async fn retry_phase(
let mission = cm_db::repo::missions::get(&state.pool, id, user.workspace_id.as_uuid())
.await?
.ok_or(ApiError::NotFound)?;
if mission.status != "running" {
// `failed` is retryable, and has to be: a failed phase now closes its
// mission (its later phases are marked unreachable so the mission can
// finish at all), so refusing anything but `running` would mean the one
// outcome you would actually want to retry is the one you cannot.
// `completed` and `cancelled` stay refused — reopening those is a different
// decision than re-running a phase that failed.
if mission.status != "running" && mission.status != "failed" {
return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
}
let mut tx = state.pool.begin().await?;
let r = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_phases
SET status = 'pending', started_at = NULL, completed_at = NULL
@@ -693,12 +1113,41 @@ pub async fn retry_phase(
)
.bind(phase_id)
.bind(id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
if r.rows_affected() == 0 {
tx.rollback().await?;
return Err(ApiError::NotFound);
}
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({ "reset": true })))
// Reopen the phases this one's failure had made unreachable. Without this a
// retry runs the failed phase and then stops, because everything after it
// is terminal-by-skip — the mission would close again the moment this phase
// finished, having done only part of the work.
let reopened = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_phases mp
SET status = 'pending', started_at = NULL, completed_at = NULL
WHERE mp.mission_id = $1
AND mp.status = 'skipped'
AND mp.order_idx > (SELECT order_idx FROM mission_phases WHERE id = $2)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(phase_id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?
.rows_affected();
// And put the mission back to running, or nothing sweeps the phase: every
// launcher and closer keys off `missions.status = 'running'`.
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE missions SET status = 'running', completed_at = NULL, updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1 AND status = 'failed'",
)
.bind(id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(Json(
serde_json::json!({ "reset": true, "reopened_phases": reopened }),
))
}
/// GET /api/missions/{id}/phases/{phase_id}/summary — the completion
@@ -844,7 +1293,16 @@ pub async fn set_status(
.any(|v| v.as_array().map(|a| !a.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false))
})
.unwrap_or(false);
if prior.team_id.is_none() && prior.team_template_id.is_none() && !has_phase_teams {
// A microVM mission materialises no team — `microvm_executor` runs the
// agent CLI directly in the VM — so requiring one would reject the launch
// of a perfectly well-formed mission, and satisfying it would provision
// claws that never run.
let needs_team = prior.runtime_kind != "microvm";
if needs_team
&& prior.team_id.is_none()
&& prior.team_template_id.is_none()
&& !has_phase_teams
{
eprintln!(
"mission {id}: launch rejected — no team_id, no team_template_id, no config.phase_teams"
);
@@ -1243,3 +1701,194 @@ mod tests {
assert!(outputs_of(Some(&serde_json::json!({}))).is_empty());
}
}
/// GET /api/workforce — the roster grouped by the mission each claw works on.
///
/// The sidebar used to flatten `orgs → companies → teams → agents`, which
/// rendered a claw once per TEAM it belongs to. Since claws are reused across
/// missions, a crew of five that had run five missions appeared as twenty-five
/// rows of the same five people — the roster looked like it was multiplying.
///
/// Grouping by mission makes that repetition mean something: the same person
/// legitimately appears under each mission they staffed. `agents` is deduped
/// per mission, and claws belonging to no mission come back under `unassigned`
/// so a hand-created claw cannot fall out of the UI entirely.
pub async fn workforce(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
use sqlx::Row;
let ws = user.workspace_id.as_uuid();
// One query, not one-per-mission: the sidebar renders on every navigation.
let rows = sqlx::query(
"SELECT m.id::text AS mission_id,
m.title AS mission_title,
m.status AS mission_status,
m.template_kind AS template_kind,
m.created_at AS created_at,
a.id::text AS agent_id,
a.name AS agent_name,
a.job_title AS job_title,
a.accent AS accent,
a.status AS agent_status,
tm.role AS role_slot
FROM missions m
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.mission_id = m.id
JOIN team_members tm ON tm.team_id = mt.team_id
JOIN agents a ON a.id = tm.claw_id
WHERE m.workspace_id = $1
AND a.deleted_at IS NULL
ORDER BY m.created_at DESC, tm.role ASC",
)
.bind(ws)
.fetch_all(&state.pool)
.await?;
let mut missions: Vec<Value> = Vec::new();
let mut seen_mission: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for r in rows {
let mid: String = r.get("mission_id");
let idx = match seen_mission.get(&mid) {
Some(i) => *i,
None => {
missions.push(serde_json::json!({
"mission_id": mid,
"title": r.get::<String, _>("mission_title"),
"status": r.get::<String, _>("mission_status"),
// Drives the World's palette: what the mission is FOR
// should be visible before any label is read.
"templateKind": r.get::<String, _>("template_kind"),
"agents": Vec::<Value>::new(),
}));
seen_mission.insert(r.get::<String, _>("mission_id"), missions.len() - 1);
missions.len() - 1
}
};
let agent = serde_json::json!({
"id": r.get::<String, _>("agent_id"),
"name": r.get::<String, _>("agent_name"),
"job_title": r.get::<String, _>("job_title"),
"role_slot": r.get::<String, _>("role_slot"),
"accent": r.get::<String, _>("accent"),
"status": r.get::<String, _>("agent_status"),
});
// A claw bound to two NODES of the same mission is still one colleague.
let list = missions[idx]["agents"]
.as_array_mut()
.expect("agents array");
let id = agent["id"].clone();
if !list.iter().any(|a| a["id"] == id) {
list.push(agent);
}
}
// Claws on no mission at all — hand-created, or whose missions were
// deleted. Without this they would simply vanish from the sidebar.
let loose = sqlx::query(
"SELECT a.id::text AS agent_id, a.name, a.job_title, a.accent, a.status
FROM agents a
WHERE a.workspace_id = $1
AND a.deleted_at IS NULL
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM team_members tm
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.team_id = tm.team_id
JOIN missions m ON m.id = mt.mission_id
WHERE tm.claw_id = a.id AND m.workspace_id = $1)
ORDER BY a.name ASC",
)
.bind(ws)
.fetch_all(&state.pool)
.await?;
let unassigned: Vec<Value> = loose
.into_iter()
.map(|r| {
serde_json::json!({
"id": r.get::<String, _>("agent_id"),
"name": r.get::<String, _>("name"),
"job_title": r.get::<String, _>("job_title"),
"role_slot": Value::Null,
"accent": r.get::<String, _>("accent"),
"status": r.get::<String, _>("status"),
})
})
.collect();
Ok(Json(serde_json::json!({
"missions": missions,
"unassigned": unassigned,
})))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod reap_tests {
/// A mission's teardown must ask whether anyone else still employs a claw.
///
/// Claws are reused across missions now, so a mission's team can contain
/// staff other missions still hold. The old code purged every claw in the
/// team unconditionally, which under reuse deletes a user's workforce as a
/// side effect of tidying one mission — and it presents as the roster
/// quietly shrinking rather than as an error.
#[test]
fn mission_teardown_checks_for_other_employers_before_purging() {
let src = include_str!("missions.rs");
let reaper = src
.split("async fn reap_mission_resources")
.nth(1)
.expect("the reaper exists");
// Scoped to the reaper, so the check cannot be satisfied by some other
// function elsewhere in the file that happens to mention mission_teams.
assert!(
reaper.contains("mt.mission_id <> $2"),
"the purge must exclude claws held by another mission"
);
let purge_at = reaper.find("purge_agent").expect("it still purges");
let guard_at = reaper.find("mt.mission_id <> $2").expect("guard present");
assert!(
guard_at < purge_at,
"the guard has to run BEFORE the purge, or it is decoration"
);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod artifact_tests {
/// A filename reaches `Content-Disposition` after an AGENT chose it.
///
/// The value is attacker-influenced and parsed by every browser, so the
/// quote and control characters that would end the header early — or inject
/// a second one — are removed rather than escaped.
#[test]
fn a_downloaded_filename_cannot_break_out_of_its_header() {
let clean = |name: &str| -> String {
name.chars()
.filter(|c| *c != '"' && *c != '\\' && !c.is_control())
.collect()
};
assert_eq!(clean("findings.md"), "findings.md");
assert_eq!(clean("re\"port.md"), "report.md");
assert_eq!(clean("a\r\nX-Evil: 1.md"), "aX-Evil: 1.md");
assert_eq!(clean("back\\slash.md"), "backslash.md");
}
/// Both artifact routes resolve through ONE containment check.
///
/// Two copies is two chances for one of them to be the lenient one, and the
/// lenient one is an arbitrary read of the gateway's filesystem.
#[test]
fn one_containment_check_serves_both_routes() {
let src = include_str!("missions.rs");
assert_eq!(
src.matches(concat!("fn resolve_", "artifact_path")).count(),
1,
"one resolver"
);
assert_eq!(
src.matches(concat!("resolve_", "artifact_path(&artifact.path)"))
.count(),
2,
"and both routes must go through it"
);
}
}
+2
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ pub mod health;
pub mod identity;
pub mod level_up;
pub mod library;
pub mod mission_plan;
pub mod mission_roster;
pub mod missions;
pub mod nodes;
pub mod oauth;
+112
View File
@@ -402,3 +402,115 @@ async fn bridge_terminal(hub: Arc<NodeHub>, node_id: NodeId, socket: WebSocket)
}
hub.terminal_close(node_id, sid).await;
}
/// `GET /api/fleet/capacity` — what the SCHEDULER sees, verbatim.
///
/// Pulled forward from the observability phase because the capacity harness
/// scenario needs it: a test that recomputed the slot arithmetic in bash would
/// drift from `vm_placement` and then agree with itself while the scheduler did
/// something else. This returns `vm_placement::survey` unmodified, so the fleet
/// page, the harness and the placer cannot disagree.
///
/// `backend` narrows to the nodes that can boot one image (`?backend=claude`),
/// matching what `choose` does for a phase.
pub async fn capacity(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
Query(q): Query<CapacityQuery>,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
let ws = user.workspace_id.as_uuid().to_owned();
let (fit, unfit) =
crate::vm_placement::survey(
&state.pool,
&state.node_hub,
ws,
&crate::vm_placement::required_backends(q.backend.as_deref(), None),
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("fleet capacity survey failed: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
let ranked = crate::vm_placement::rank(fit);
Ok(Json(json!({
// Total free slots across the fleet. A burst larger than this MUST
// queue rather than overcommit — that is the whole feature.
"slots": ranked.iter().map(|n| n.slots).sum::<i64>(),
"nodes": ranked.iter().map(|n| json!({
"id": n.node_id,
"name": n.name,
"slots": n.slots,
"committedVms": n.committed_vms,
"headroom": n.headroom,
"memTotalMib": n.mem_total_mib,
"usedEffMib": n.used_eff_mib,
"diskFreeGib": n.disk_free_gib,
})).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
// Never folded into the above. "Full" and "unreadable" send an
// operator to different places, so they stay separate here too.
"unfit": unfit.iter().map(|(id, name, why)| json!({
"id": id,
"name": name,
"reason": why.reason(),
})).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct CapacityQuery {
pub backend: Option<String>,
}
/// `GET /api/fleet/backends` — the microVM backends a mission may actually use.
///
/// The SAME `available_backends` the roster planner is handed, not a second
/// list. The two rules it applies are both load-bearing and neither is obvious
/// from a node's capabilities alone: a backend must be built on an online node,
/// and it must have a credential contract. `agent-terminal` satisfies the first
/// and not the second — bootable, with nothing for the agent inside to
/// authenticate with — so offering it would produce a mission that validates,
/// launches, and fails at the agent turn, which is the expensive kind of late.
///
/// Exists because the UI had no backend selector at all: every mission created
/// from the dashboard ran on `claude`, so `local-ornith`, `glm` and `kimi` were
/// reachable only by calling the API directly.
pub async fn backends(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Authed(user): Authed,
) -> Result<Json<Value>, ApiError> {
let ws = user.workspace_id.as_uuid().to_owned();
let mut list = crate::mission_roster::available_backends(&state.pool, ws)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
eprintln!("fleet backends: {e}");
ApiError::Internal
})?;
// `default` is the generic `rootfs.ext4` and `claude` is the named one, and
// `microvm_credential_for` gives them the SAME contract — so a picker
// offering both shows two options with one meaning, and whichever the user
// picks they get the same thing. Collapse to the named one where it exists.
if list.iter().any(|b| b == "claude") {
list.retain(|b| b != "default");
}
Ok(Json(json!({
"backends": list.iter().map(|b| json!({
"id": b,
"label": backend_label(b),
})).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
})))
}
/// A name a person can choose between. The ids are deployment vocabulary
/// (`local-ornith`, `canary-claude`); a picker showing those alone asks the user
/// to know which company each one bills.
fn backend_label(id: &str) -> String {
match id {
"claude" => "Claude (Anthropic subscription)".into(),
"default" => "Claude (generic image)".into(),
"canary-claude" => "Claude — candidate CLI (canary)".into(),
"glm" => "GLM 4.7 (z.ai)".into(),
"kimi" => "Kimi (Moonshot)".into(),
"local-ornith" => "Ornith 9B — this fleet's own GPU".into(),
other => other.to_string(),
}
}
+5 -2
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ research tools. Grant write only to members that actually produce code or commit
- glm-4.7 — strong general reasoning (Z.ai); best cost/quality default for most workers.\n\
- glm-5.2 — GLM Opus-class for the hardest reasoning roles; higher cost.\n\
- kimi — excellent for code-heavy roles.\n\
- gemini — Gemini 2.5 Flash: very fast; classification, summarization, high-volume tasks.\n\
- groq — fastest/cheapest; simple sequential high-throughput steps.\n\
AGENT TOOLS each agent can use at runtime: web.search (find sources), browser.goto (fetch a URL), \
files.write (build a markdown vault in the shared drive), chat.send (delegate to teammates), \
@@ -133,7 +132,11 @@ pub async fn planner_chat(
};
let user_prompt = format!("{hierarchy}{topology_lock}\n\n=== CONVERSATION ===\n{convo}\n\nRespond now (JSON only).");
let system = planner_system_for(&body.mode);
let raw = match runtime.complete(&system, &user_prompt, "claude-opus-4-8", 8000, true).await {
let raw = match crate::subscription::complete_or(
&runtime, &system, &user_prompt, "claude-opus-4-8", 8000, true,
)
.await
{
Ok(t) => t,
Err(e) => { yield sse(json!({"stage":"error","label":format!("Opus error: {e}")})); return; }
};
+19 -2
View File
@@ -430,13 +430,30 @@ async fn sync_gitea(
Some(owner) => format!("{api_base}/orgs/{owner}/repos?limit={per_page}&page={page}"),
None => format!("{api_base}/repos/search?limit={per_page}&page={page}"),
};
let (status, body) = broker
let (mut status, mut body) = broker
.fetch_authorized(secret_ref, &url)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("broker fetch: {e}"))?;
// A Gitea owner is either an ORG or a USER, and they live on different
// endpoints. Scoping a connection to a personal namespace — `osobh`,
// where clawmates itself lives — 404s on /orgs and reported "not found
// or PAT lacks access", which points at permissions when the account is
// simply not an org. Retry as a user before giving up.
if status == 404 {
if let Some(owner) = conn.owner.as_deref() {
let user_url =
format!("{api_base}/users/{owner}/repos?limit={per_page}&page={page}");
let (s2, b2) = broker
.fetch_authorized(secret_ref, &user_url)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("broker fetch: {e}"))?;
status = s2;
body = b2;
}
}
if status == 404 && conn.owner.is_some() {
return Err(format!(
"org '{}' not found or PAT lacks access",
"'{}' matched neither an org nor a user, or the PAT lacks access",
conn.owner.as_deref().unwrap_or("")
));
}
+5 -1
View File
@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@ pub async fn leaderboard(
COUNT(u.id)::BIGINT AS "runs!"
FROM agents a
LEFT JOIN usage_events u ON u.agent_id = a.id
WHERE a.workspace_id = $1
-- deleted_at: a soft-deleted agent is gone everywhere else, so
-- listing it here made deletion look like a no-op — the operator
-- deletes it, the board still shows it, and deleting again does
-- nothing because the row is already marked.
WHERE a.workspace_id = $1 AND a.deleted_at IS NULL
GROUP BY a.id, a.name, a.accent
ORDER BY "credits!" DESC, "tokens!" DESC, a.name"#,
user.workspace_id.as_uuid(),
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ use crate::{ApiError, AppState, Authed};
pub struct TeamMemberInput {
pub role: String,
pub name: String,
/// Model selector: claude | glm | glm-5.2 | kimi | gemini | groq.
/// Model selector: claude | glm | glm-5.2 | kimi | groq.
#[serde(default)]
pub model: String,
#[serde(default)]
+22
View File
@@ -309,6 +309,10 @@ pub async fn run_events_sse(
.map(|n| n + 1)
.unwrap_or(0);
// Bytes of `checkpoint.log` already sent. The step cursor above counts
// RECORDS; this counts BYTES, because a log grows continuously rather than
// in discrete entries. Two sources, two cursors.
let mut log_sent: usize = 0;
let stream = async_stream::stream! {
loop {
match cm_db::repo::topology_runs::status(&pool, id, ws).await {
@@ -327,6 +331,24 @@ pub async fn run_events_sse(
sent += 1;
}
}
// Live stdout/stderr from a microVM turn, appended by the
// node over the fleet WebSocket (`Uplink::VmOut`). Emitted
// as `step` so the existing reader renders it with no
// frontend change — it already reads `data.text`.
if let Some(log) = st
.checkpoint
.as_ref()
.and_then(|c| c.get("log"))
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
{
if log.len() > log_sent {
let fresh = &log[log_sent..];
log_sent = log.len();
yield Ok::<Event, Infallible>(Event::default().event("step").data(
serde_json::json!({ "kind": "output", "text": fresh }).to_string(),
));
}
}
if matches!(st.status.as_str(), "completed" | "failed" | "cancelled") {
let done = serde_json::json!({
"status": st.status,
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+76 -2
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
//! from serving — it should stop us believing a scan that scanned nothing.
use crate::container_exec;
use bollard::Docker;
use std::time::Duration;
const PROBE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(20);
@@ -36,6 +37,11 @@ struct Dependency {
}
const DEPENDENCIES: &[Dependency] = &[
Dependency {
argv: &["zeroclaw", "--version"],
needed_for: "driving every container-tier turn; the version is also how \
a runtime image that silently rolled back is noticed",
},
Dependency {
argv: &["cargo", "--version"],
needed_for: "the on_green_tests gate for Rust repos; without it every \
@@ -113,9 +119,67 @@ pub async fn probe(container: &str) -> Result<Vec<ToolStatus>, String> {
};
out.push(status);
}
out.push(probe_mission_uid_can_write(&docker, container).await);
Ok(out)
}
/// Can uid 65532 actually work in the missions tree?
///
/// `container_exec` now runs every mission exec as 65532 rather than root, so
/// that no phase leaves behind files the cleanup (which runs as 65532) cannot
/// delete. That only holds while the image gives 65532 a writable `HOME` and
/// `CARGO_HOME` — and in the deployed image its default `HOME`
/// (`/zeroclaw-data`) and `/usr/local/cargo` are BOTH root-owned, which is why
/// `container_exec::mission_env` redirects them into the missions root.
///
/// If a future image moves that mount or tightens its permissions, every cargo
/// invocation starts failing for a reason no error message would connect to a
/// uid. So it is probed at boot, alongside the tools, and reported the same way.
async fn probe_mission_uid_can_write(docker: &Docker, container: &str) -> ToolStatus {
let root = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root();
let probe = root.join("_probe-uid");
// Through `exec`, not `exec_as_root`: the point is to exercise the exact
// policy real mission work gets, including the env it is given.
let argv: Vec<String> = [
"sh",
"-c",
&format!(
"set -e; mkdir -p \"$HOME\" \"$CARGO_HOME\" {p}; : > {p}/w; rm -rf {p}; echo \"uid=$(id -u) HOME=$HOME CARGO_HOME=$CARGO_HOME\"",
p = probe.display()
),
]
.iter()
.map(|s| s.to_string())
.collect();
let detail = match container_exec::exec(
docker,
container,
Some(&root.display().to_string()),
&argv,
PROBE_TIMEOUT,
)
.await
{
Ok(r) if r.success() => {
return ToolStatus {
program: "mission-uid".to_string(),
present: true,
detail: r.combined().trim().chars().take(120).collect(),
needed_for: "every mission exec, so no phase leaves root-owned files",
}
}
Ok(r) => r.combined().trim().chars().take(160).collect(),
Err(e) => e.chars().take(160).collect(),
};
ToolStatus {
program: "mission-uid".to_string(),
present: false,
detail,
needed_for: "every mission exec, so no phase leaves root-owned files",
}
}
/// Probe at startup and write the result to stderr.
///
/// Spawned rather than awaited so a slow or absent Docker socket cannot delay
@@ -134,10 +198,20 @@ pub fn report_at_boot() {
let missing: Vec<&ToolStatus> = tools.iter().filter(|t| !t.present).collect();
if missing.is_empty() {
let names: Vec<&str> = tools.iter().map(|t| t.program.as_str()).collect();
// The VERSIONS, not just the names. A tag that quietly
// points at an older build passes a presence check
// perfectly: gw-04's default tag was two zeroclaw releases
// behind while every probe said "present", and the only way
// anyone found out was running the binary by hand.
let detail: Vec<String> = tools
.iter()
.map(|t| format!("{}={}", t.program, t.detail))
.collect();
eprintln!(
"runtime_preflight: `{container}` has all {} expected tools ({})",
"runtime_preflight: `{container}` has all {} expected tools ({}) — {}",
tools.len(),
names.join(", ")
names.join(", "),
detail.join("; ")
);
return;
}
+54 -17
View File
@@ -18,22 +18,46 @@ pub fn claw_alias(claw_id: Uuid) -> String {
format!("claw_{}", claw_id.simple())
}
/// The claw behind a runtime alias, or `None` if it is not one of ours.
///
/// The inverse of [`claw_alias`], and it lives beside it so the two cannot
/// drift — a changed prefix breaks the round-trip test rather than quietly
/// returning `None` for every agent and dropping their attribution.
///
/// `None` is the honest answer for `scout` and the other configured aliases
/// that are not claws: they have no row in `agents` to point at.
pub fn claw_from_alias(alias: &str) -> Option<Uuid> {
Uuid::parse_str(alias.trim().strip_prefix("claw_")?).ok()
}
/// Map a claw's chosen model to a configured provider alias.
///
/// Claude models resolve to `claude_cli.default`, which spawns the real
/// `claude` binary against the Max subscription rather than posting to the
/// raw API with Claude Code identity headers. The API-key path still exists
/// and the judge uses it deliberately (see below), but agent work — which is
/// ~99% of the tokens — belongs on the subscription and on the supported
/// client.
/// raw API with Claude Code identity headers. Agent work — ~99% of the
/// tokens — belongs on the subscription and on the supported client.
///
/// The judge stays on `anthropic.judge`/API key on purpose: if the
/// subscription throttles, missions degrade but verification keeps working.
/// Putting both on one credential would mean a single limit blinds the
/// verifier at exactly the moment there is most to verify.
/// **The API-key path is gone.** `anthropic.default` and `anthropic.judge`
/// were retired from the runtime config on 2026-08-10: both held `sk-ant-api`
/// keys on an account whose balance is zero, which the real code path reports
/// as `400 … "Your credit balance is too low"`. Every agent that named them
/// was repointed onto a live credential.
///
/// Non-Claude families are unchanged: `groq.default`, `gemini.default`, and
/// the GLM/Kimi substitution below.
/// The independence argument that put the judge there still holds — a
/// verifier sharing one credential with the implementer goes blind at exactly
/// the moment there is most to verify — but it is now served by a different
/// FAMILY rather than a different key: the validator runs on
/// `CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL` (`glm:glm-4.7` on gw-04) while agents run on
/// the subscription, and `cross_provider_judge` refuses a validator in the
/// implementer's own family. `claude_cli.default` also carries
/// `fallback = ["claude_cli.kimi", "claude_cli.glm"]`, so a throttle degrades
/// across credentials instead of stopping.
///
/// Non-Claude families are unchanged: `groq.default` and the GLM/Kimi
/// substitution below. Gemini was removed entirely — a `gemini*` model now
/// falls through to the unrecognised branch, which LOGS and defaults to
/// `claude_cli.default` rather than silently routing to a provider we no
/// longer configure.
pub fn provider_alias_for(model: &str) -> &'static str {
let m = model.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
// Prefix families first (covers claude-sonnet-5, claude-opus-4-8,
@@ -43,9 +67,6 @@ pub fn provider_alias_for(model: &str) -> &'static str {
if m.starts_with("claude") {
return "claude_cli.default";
}
if m.starts_with("gemini") {
return "gemini.default";
}
return "groq.default";
}
match m.as_str() {
@@ -88,7 +109,6 @@ pub fn provider_alias_for(model: &str) -> &'static str {
pub fn is_exact_provider_match(model: &str) -> bool {
let m = model.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
m.starts_with("claude")
|| m.starts_with("gemini")
|| m.starts_with("llama")
|| m.starts_with("groq")
}
@@ -363,7 +383,6 @@ mod tests {
}
for m in [
"claude-sonnet-5",
"gemini-2.5-flash",
"groq-llama",
"llama3",
] {
@@ -402,8 +421,11 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn provider_alias_mapping() {
assert_eq!(provider_alias_for("gemini"), "gemini.default");
assert_eq!(provider_alias_for("gemini-2.0-flash"), "gemini.default");
// Gemini is gone: no provider row, so it must land on the logged
// default rather than a family alias that resolves to nothing.
assert_eq!(provider_alias_for("gemini"), "claude_cli.default");
assert_eq!(provider_alias_for("gemini-2.0-flash"), "claude_cli.default");
assert!(!is_exact_provider_match("gemini-2.5-flash"));
// glm/kimi families fall back to Claude until their own provider
// tables are configured in the runtime template.
assert_eq!(provider_alias_for("GLM-4.7"), "claude_cli.default");
@@ -425,4 +447,19 @@ mod tests {
let id = Uuid::nil();
assert_eq!(claw_alias(id), "claw_00000000000000000000000000000000");
}
/// The alias must round-trip, and must NOT invent a claw for one of the
/// configured non-claw aliases.
///
/// The failure this guards is silent both ways: a broken round-trip drops
/// every tool call's agent attribution (files appear, nobody moves), and a
/// too-eager parse would attribute work to a claw id that matches no row.
#[test]
fn an_alias_round_trips_to_its_claw_and_nothing_else_does() {
let id = Uuid::from_u128(0x0198_2f11_7ac0_7d51_9c3e_44a1_09b2_5e77);
assert_eq!(claw_from_alias(&claw_alias(id)), Some(id));
assert_eq!(claw_from_alias("scout"), None);
assert_eq!(claw_from_alias("claude_cli.default"), None);
assert_eq!(claw_from_alias("claw_not-a-uuid"), None);
}
}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -314,9 +314,7 @@ async fn exec_target(pool: &PgPool, mission_id: Uuid) -> Result<(String, PathBuf
}
let container = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "clawmates-runtime".to_string());
let root = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "/var/lib/clawmates-missions".to_string());
let workdir = PathBuf::from(root)
let workdir = crate::mission_workspace::missions_root()
.join(mission_id.to_string())
.join("repo");
Ok((container, workdir))
+678
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
//! The Anthropic provider backed by the SUBSCRIPTION token, not the metered key.
//!
//! Two Anthropic credentials reach this server and they bill differently:
//!
//! - `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` (`sk-ant-api…`) — metered, pay-as-you-go, and the thing
//! that runs out. Every mission VM already avoids it: `mission_runtime` sends
//! only the subscription token into a guest, deliberately.
//! - `ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN` / `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` (`sk-ant-oat…`) — the
//! Claude Code subscription, which is what the CLI inside every VM runs on.
//!
//! Server-side model calls that went through `Runtime::complete` with a bare
//! model name resolved to the DEFAULT provider — the metered key. So the roster
//! planner died with
//! `400 … "Your credit balance is too low to access the Anthropic API"` while
//! every mission on the same machine kept running fine on the subscription.
//! The harness reported it honestly as FAIL-NORUN rather than a passing scenario,
//! which is the only reason it was visible at all.
//!
//! This is the one place that turns the subscription token into a provider.
//! `evaluator::subscription_judge` had its own copy; there is now one.
/// The subscription-backed provider, or `None` when no usable token is present.
///
/// Checks the `sk-ant-oat` prefix rather than trusting the variable name: an
/// `sk-ant-api` key pasted into the OAuth slot would authenticate and then bill
/// the metered account, which is the failure this module exists to prevent —
/// silently, and with the same error weeks later.
pub fn provider() -> Option<cm_llm::AnthropicProvider> {
for var in ["ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN", "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN"] {
let Ok(token) = std::env::var(var) else {
continue;
};
let token = token.trim();
if token.is_empty() {
continue;
}
if !is_subscription_token(token) {
eprintln!(
"subscription: {var} is set but is not a Claude Code setup token \
(expected sk-ant-oat…) — ignoring it rather than billing the \
metered key by accident"
);
continue;
}
return Some(cm_llm::AnthropicProvider::new(token.to_string()));
}
None
}
/// Whether a token is a Claude Code subscription token rather than an API key.
pub fn is_subscription_token(token: &str) -> bool {
token.trim().starts_with("sk-ant-oat")
}
/// One completion on the subscription, mirroring `Runtime::complete`'s contract
/// so a caller can swap between them without reshaping its call.
///
/// Falls back to the caller's runtime when no subscription token exists, so a
/// deployment without one behaves exactly as it did before.
pub async fn complete_or(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
system: &str,
user: &str,
model: &str,
max_tokens: u32,
// Carried explicitly rather than defaulted. The Master Planner and the claw
// enhancer both pass `true`, and a helper that quietly dropped it would take
// web search away from two features while every test still passed.
web_search: bool,
) -> Result<String, String> {
// A `name:model` spec is an operator's explicit provider choice — the swarm
// worker model is literally configured that way (`kimi:kimi-k2.6`), and
// `Runtime::resolve_provider` honours it. Forcing that onto Anthropic would
// silently run someone's chosen model on the wrong provider, which is the
// same class of bug as this module exists to fix, only pointed the other
// way. Only a BARE name is ambiguous, and a bare name is what resolves to
// the default provider — the metered key.
if !is_bare_model_name(model) || provider().is_none() {
return runtime
.complete(system, user, model, max_tokens, web_search)
.await;
}
let provider = provider().expect("checked just above");
complete_with(&provider, system, user, model, max_tokens, web_search).await
}
/// Whether a model string names a model without naming a provider.
pub fn is_bare_model_name(model: &str) -> bool {
!model.contains(':')
}
/// How long to wait before each retry. Four attempts, ~30s of patience total.
///
/// The subscription has no credit wall, but it does have a rate limit, and a
/// roster proposal is a single one-shot call: a 429 that a browser would shrug
/// off used to fail the whole "propose a team" button. Measured on this
/// deployment — moving the roster onto the subscription turned
/// `400 credit balance too low` into `429 rate_limit_error`, i.e. a wall that
/// clears on its own became the failure mode, so waiting is the right answer.
const BACKOFF_SECS: &[u64] = &[2, 8, 20];
/// Whether an error is worth waiting out rather than reporting.
///
/// Deliberately narrow. A 400 (bad request), 401 (wrong token) or 404 (unknown
/// model) will never succeed on a retry, and retrying them turns a legible
/// error into a 30-second hang followed by the same error.
fn is_transient(e: &cm_llm::LlmError) -> bool {
use cm_llm::LlmError;
match e {
// The transport never reached Anthropic — a dropped connection or a
// DNS blip, not a rejected request.
LlmError::Transport(_) => true,
LlmError::Api(detail) => {
// `anthropic.rs` formats these as `"{status}: {body}"`.
detail.starts_with("429")
|| detail.starts_with("500")
|| detail.starts_with("502")
|| detail.starts_with("503")
|| detail.starts_with("529")
|| detail.contains("rate_limit")
|| detail.contains("overloaded")
}
LlmError::Scenario(_) | LlmError::Wire(_) => false,
}
}
/// Models to try, in order, when the requested one is rate limited.
///
/// The order is capability first, then independence:
///
/// opus -> sonnet -> haiku one account, three tiers. A throttle usually
/// hits a tier, so stepping down often clears it.
/// -> kimi -> glm two separately funded accounts. Now an
/// Anthropic outage, not just a throttle, is
/// survivable.
/// -> local our own GPU. Nothing left to be down.
///
/// Every model id here was probed on this deployment 2026-08-09 and answered
/// 200: the four Anthropic tiers on the subscription, `kimi-k2.7-code` on
/// api.kimi.com/coding, `glm-4.7` on z.ai, and `ornith-fleet:9b` on the fleet.
/// Configured is not the same as working — see `preflight`, which re-checks
/// them at boot, because a link nobody exercises is discovered broken during
/// the outage it existed for.
///
/// The last link runs on our OWN hardware. Every other entry — and every other
/// link above it — depends on somebody else's account staying funded and
/// unthrottled; `local:` depends on a GPU in the next room. It is last because
/// it is the weakest model, and present because a chain whose every link is
/// external is not a fallback chain, it is one outage in a trench coat.
///
/// Note the model half contains a colon (`ornith-fleet:9b`), which is why
/// `resolve_provider` splits on the FIRST one only.
///
/// Override with `CLAWMATES_MODEL_FALLBACK` (comma-separated). An empty value
/// disables fallback and restores plain "503 and wait".
const DEFAULT_FALLBACK: &str = "claude-sonnet-4-6,claude-haiku-4-5-20251001,\
kimi:kimi-k2.7-code,glm:glm-4.7,local:ornith-fleet:9b";
/// The chain to walk after `requested`, with `requested` itself removed so a
/// capped model is never retried as its own fallback.
pub fn fallback_chain(requested: &str) -> Vec<String> {
let raw =
std::env::var("CLAWMATES_MODEL_FALLBACK").unwrap_or_else(|_| DEFAULT_FALLBACK.to_string());
raw.split(',')
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|m| !m.is_empty() && *m != requested.trim())
.map(str::to_string)
.collect()
}
/// Whether a failure means "this model has no capacity right now" as opposed
/// to "this request was wrong".
///
/// The distinction is the whole safety of the chain: walking it on a malformed
/// prompt would ask three models the same bad question and report the third
/// one's confusion, while walking it on a rate limit is exactly the point.
pub fn is_capacity_failure(err: &str) -> bool {
err.contains("rate_limit") || err.contains("429") || err.contains("credit balance")
}
/// One completion, stepping down `fallback_chain` when a model has no capacity.
///
/// Returns the text **and the model that actually produced it**. Callers must
/// persist that second value: a plan drafted by the third link in the chain and
/// filed as an opus plan is a silent quality change, which is the failure shape
/// this project keeps paying for. Every hop is logged.
pub async fn complete_with_fallback(
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
system: &str,
user: &str,
model: &str,
max_tokens: u32,
web_search: bool,
) -> Result<(String, String), String> {
let mut last = match complete_or(runtime, system, user, model, max_tokens, web_search).await {
Ok(text) => return Ok((text, model.to_string())),
Err(e) if is_capacity_failure(&e) => e,
// A real error. Do not launder it through two more models.
Err(e) => return Err(e),
};
for next in fallback_chain(model) {
eprintln!("model fallback: {model} has no capacity ({last}) — trying {next}");
match complete_or(runtime, system, user, &next, max_tokens, web_search).await {
Ok(text) => {
eprintln!("model fallback: {next} answered in place of {model}");
return Ok((text, next));
}
Err(e) if is_capacity_failure(&e) => last = e,
Err(e) => return Err(format!("fallback {next}: {e}")),
}
}
Err(last)
}
/// What a probe of one link found.
///
/// `Throttled` is deliberately NOT a failure. A 429 means the spec resolved, the
/// credential authenticated, and the provider simply had no capacity this
/// second — which is the exact condition the chain exists to route around. A
/// report that painted it red would train an operator to ignore the red.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum LinkStatus {
Answered,
Throttled(String),
/// Never came back. Its own state because it is the one that used to make
/// the whole report vanish: with no timeout, a single hung provider meant
/// silence from the tool built to prevent silence.
TimedOut,
/// The spec named a provider the registry does not have, so
/// `resolve_provider` silently fell back to the DEFAULT provider. The link
/// would "work" while running on entirely the wrong model.
Unregistered,
Broken(String),
}
impl LinkStatus {
pub fn usable(&self) -> bool {
matches!(self, LinkStatus::Answered | LinkStatus::Throttled(_))
}
fn label(&self) -> String {
match self {
LinkStatus::Answered => "ok".into(),
LinkStatus::Throttled(_) => "throttled (configured, no capacity now)".into(),
LinkStatus::TimedOut => {
format!("TIMED OUT after {}s — treat as down", PROBE_TIMEOUT.as_secs())
}
LinkStatus::Unregistered => "UNREGISTERED — resolves to the DEFAULT provider".into(),
LinkStatus::Broken(e) => format!("BROKEN: {}", e.chars().take(120).collect::<String>()),
}
}
}
/// Probe every link of the chain, head model included.
///
/// Eight tokens each, through the SAME path a real call takes, so it proves
/// resolution and reachability rather than that a string is present in a config
/// file. The distinction matters here more than usual: `resolve_provider` falls
/// back to the default provider for an unknown provider name, so a typo in
/// `kimi:` does not error — it quietly runs on Anthropic, and the chain reads
/// as five providers while being one.
/// Per-link ceiling. Generous on purpose: `complete_or` spends up to 30s in its
/// own backoff before giving up, so anything under that would report a merely
/// throttled link as hung.
const PROBE_TIMEOUT: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);
pub async fn preflight(runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime, head: &str) -> Vec<(String, LinkStatus)> {
let mut out = Vec::new();
for spec in std::iter::once(head.to_string()).chain(fallback_chain(head)) {
// A qualified spec whose provider is missing resolves to the default —
// detected the same way `cross_provider_judge` does it, by asking what
// the model half came back as.
if spec.contains(':') {
// Unrouted specs come back WHOLE; routed ones come back as the part
// after the FIRST colon. Testing "does it still contain a colon"
// reads the same and is wrong: `local:ornith-fleet:9b` resolves
// correctly to model `ornith-fleet:9b`, which does. This probe
// reported a provider the server had just registered as
// UNREGISTERED on its first live run, which is how the same latent
// bug was found in `evaluator::cross_provider_judge`.
let (_, resolved) = runtime.resolve_provider(&spec);
if resolved == spec {
out.push((spec.clone(), LinkStatus::Unregistered));
continue;
}
}
// A non-empty system prompt. Kimi rejects an empty one outright —
// `400 the message at position 0 with role 'system' must not be empty` —
// so an empty probe reported a healthy provider as BROKEN on the first
// live run. The probe must look like the traffic it stands in for.
// NOT awaited here — the timeout has to wrap the FUTURE. Awaiting first
// and wrapping the result compiles, reads correctly, and bounds nothing.
let probe = complete_or(
runtime,
"You are a reachability probe.",
"Reply with exactly: OK",
&spec,
8,
false,
);
let status = match tokio::time::timeout(PROBE_TIMEOUT, probe).await {
Err(_) => LinkStatus::TimedOut,
Ok(Ok(_)) => LinkStatus::Answered,
Ok(Err(e)) if is_capacity_failure(&e) => LinkStatus::Throttled(e),
Ok(Err(e)) => LinkStatus::Broken(e),
};
// Emitted as it resolves, not collected and printed at the end. A later
// link that hangs must not be able to hide the ones already checked.
eprintln!("fallback chain: {spec:<32} {}", status.label());
out.push((spec, status));
}
out
}
/// Probe the chain at boot and write the result to stderr.
///
/// Spawned rather than awaited, like `runtime_preflight`: this is diagnostic and
/// must never delay the server coming up. Loud when a link is unusable, because
/// the whole point of a chain is that nobody looks at it until the day it has to
/// work.
pub fn report_at_boot(runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let head = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_PREFLIGHT_HEAD")
.unwrap_or_else(|_| "claude-opus-4-8".to_string());
let links = preflight(&runtime, &head).await;
let bad: Vec<_> = links.iter().filter(|(_, s)| !s.usable()).collect();
eprintln!(
"fallback chain ({} link(s), {} usable):",
links.len(),
links.len() - bad.len()
);
for (spec, status) in &links {
eprintln!(" {spec:<32} {}", status.label());
}
if !bad.is_empty() {
eprintln!(
"fallback chain: WARNING — {} link(s) are NOT usable. The chain is \
shorter than it reads, and the shortfall only shows up during the \
outage it exists for.",
bad.len()
);
}
});
}
/// Turn a `complete_or` failure into the right API error.
///
/// A rate limit that outlived the backoff is not a bug in this server, and
/// reporting it as one costs an operator a trip through the logs to find out
/// the answer was "wait". Measured: a bare 16-token probe with the same token
/// returned 429 with `x-should-retry: true` — Anthropic itself says try again.
pub fn as_api_error(err: &str) -> crate::error::ApiError {
if err.contains("rate_limit") || err.contains("429") {
return crate::error::ApiError::Unavailable(
"the Claude Code subscription is rate limited right now — this \
clears on its own; try again shortly"
.into(),
);
}
crate::error::ApiError::Internal
}
/// Stream one request and collect its text, waiting out transient failures.
async fn complete_with(
provider: &cm_llm::AnthropicProvider,
system: &str,
user: &str,
model: &str,
max_tokens: u32,
web_search: bool,
) -> Result<String, String> {
let mut attempt = 0usize;
loop {
match attempt_once(provider, system, user, model, max_tokens, web_search).await {
Ok(text) => return Ok(text),
Err((stage, e)) => {
let Some(delay) = BACKOFF_SECS.get(attempt).copied().filter(|_| is_transient(&e))
else {
return Err(format!("subscription {stage}: {e}"));
};
eprintln!(
"subscription {stage}: {e} — retrying in {delay}s \
(attempt {} of {})",
attempt + 2,
BACKOFF_SECS.len() + 1
);
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(delay)).await;
attempt += 1;
}
}
}
}
/// One attempt. The collected text is discarded on failure, so a retry never
/// concatenates a partial answer onto a whole one.
async fn attempt_once(
provider: &cm_llm::AnthropicProvider,
system: &str,
user: &str,
model: &str,
max_tokens: u32,
web_search: bool,
) -> Result<String, (&'static str, cm_llm::LlmError)> {
use cm_llm::{ChatMessage, ChatRequest, ChatRole, ContentPart, LlmEvent, LlmProvider};
use futures::StreamExt as _;
let request = ChatRequest {
system: system.to_string(),
model: model.to_string(),
messages: vec![ChatMessage {
role: ChatRole::User,
parts: vec![ContentPart::text(user)],
}],
tools: vec![],
max_tokens,
web_search,
};
let mut stream = provider.stream(request).await.map_err(|e| ("call", e))?;
let mut text = String::new();
while let Some(event) = stream.next().await {
match event {
Ok(LlmEvent::TextDelta(t)) => text.push_str(&t),
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => return Err(("stream", e)),
}
}
Ok(text)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Every server-side model call that should be on the subscription IS.
///
/// `validator_preflight` is the deliberate exception: it probes whatever
/// spec an operator configured (today `glm:glm-4.7`), and forcing it onto
/// Anthropic would make it prove the wrong thing — it exists to answer "is
/// the configured validator reachable".
/// The first version of this test grepped for the literal
/// `runtime.complete(` and passed while FOUR more call sites — the phase
/// planner, both swarm calls, and a second enhance path — still billed the
/// metered key. They were spelled `state.runtime` or wrapped across lines,
/// so the receiver name was never the thing to look for. Match the METHOD.
#[test]
fn no_server_side_call_silently_uses_the_metered_key() {
let sources = [
("routes/mission_roster.rs", include_str!("routes/mission_roster.rs")),
("routes/mission_plan.rs", include_str!("routes/mission_plan.rs")),
("routes/planner.rs", include_str!("routes/planner.rs")),
("routes/claws.rs", include_str!("routes/claws.rs")),
("swarm.rs", include_str!("swarm.rs")),
];
for (name, src) in sources {
assert!(
!src.contains(".complete("),
"{name} calls Runtime::complete directly — a bare model name there \
resolves to the DEFAULT provider, which is the metered API key. \
Use `subscription::complete_or`, which passes a `name:model` \
spec through untouched."
);
}
// And the exception stays an exception, on purpose.
assert!(
include_str!("validator_preflight.rs").contains("runtime.complete("),
"validator_preflight must keep probing the CONFIGURED spec"
);
}
/// Only errors that can clear on their own are waited out.
///
/// The negative half is the point: a 400 or a 401 retried three times is a
/// 30-second hang ending in the identical message, which reads as a stall
/// rather than a bad request — the failure mode this project keeps hitting.
#[test]
fn a_wall_that_clears_is_waited_out_and_one_that_does_not_is_not() {
use cm_llm::LlmError;
let api = |s: &str| LlmError::Api(s.to_string());
assert!(is_transient(&api(
"429 Too Many Requests: {\"type\":\"rate_limit_error\"}"
)));
assert!(is_transient(&api("529: overloaded_error")));
assert!(is_transient(&api("503 Service Unavailable")));
assert!(is_transient(&LlmError::Transport("connection reset".into())));
// The exact error that started this: it never clears by waiting, it
// clears by moving to the other credential — which is now done.
assert!(!is_transient(&api(
"400 Bad Request: Your credit balance is too low"
)));
assert!(!is_transient(&api("401 Unauthorized: invalid x-api-key")));
assert!(!is_transient(&api("404 Not Found: model not found")));
assert!(!is_transient(&LlmError::Wire("bad json".into())));
}
/// Nobody hand-rolls their own Anthropic HTTP call.
///
/// `phase_summarizer` did — its own `reqwest` POST to `api.anthropic.com`
/// with `x-api-key: $ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`. No audit of `.complete(` call
/// sites could ever have found it, and it was the last thing on this
/// deployment still billing an account with no credit: every phase summary
/// died with "credit balance is too low" while the phases themselves ran.
/// A call site is only routable if it goes through a provider, so walk the
/// whole crate rather than a hand-listed set of files.
#[test]
fn no_module_talks_to_anthropic_behind_the_providers_back() {
fn walk(dir: &std::path::Path, out: &mut Vec<std::path::PathBuf>) {
for entry in std::fs::read_dir(dir).expect("readable source dir") {
let path = entry.expect("readable entry").path();
if path.is_dir() {
walk(&path, out);
} else if path.extension().is_some_and(|e| e == "rs") {
out.push(path);
}
}
}
let root = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("src");
let mut files = Vec::new();
walk(&root, &mut files);
assert!(files.len() > 20, "source walk found suspiciously few files");
for path in files {
// This module names the host in prose; it is the one that may.
if path.ends_with("subscription.rs") {
continue;
}
let src = std::fs::read_to_string(&path).expect("readable source");
for needle in ["api.anthropic.com", "\"x-api-key\""] {
assert!(
!src.contains(needle),
"{} contains {needle} — build the request through cm_llm and \
route it via `subscription::complete_or`, so credential \
choice and the capacity fallback live in ONE place",
path.display()
);
}
}
}
/// A model name may contain a colon, and "unregistered" must not mean that.
///
/// `resolve_provider` returns the spec unchanged when it does not recognise
/// the provider and the part after the FIRST colon when it does. The obvious
/// test — "does the model half still contain a colon" — reads the same and
/// is wrong the moment a model id has one. `ornith-fleet:9b` has one, and
/// the live preflight reported a provider the server had just registered as
/// UNREGISTERED. The identical bug was in `cross_provider_judge`, where it
/// would have refused a perfectly good independent judge.
#[test]
fn a_colon_in_the_model_name_is_not_a_missing_provider() {
// What `resolve_provider` returns in each case.
fn routed(spec: &str) -> &str {
spec.split_once(':').map(|(_, m)| m).unwrap_or(spec)
}
for spec in ["local:ornith-fleet:9b", "glm:glm-4.7", "kimi:kimi-k2.7-code"] {
assert_ne!(routed(spec), spec, "{spec} routed must not equal the whole spec");
}
// An unrecognised provider comes back WHOLE — the only true signal.
assert_eq!(routed("nosuch"), "nosuch");
// And the case that made the naive colon test look correct for so long.
assert!(routed("local:ornith-fleet:9b").contains(':'));
}
/// A throttled link is usable; an unregistered one is not.
///
/// The second is the dangerous one and the reason `preflight` checks
/// resolution separately from reachability. `resolve_provider` falls back to
/// the DEFAULT provider when it does not recognise a provider name, so a
/// typo in `kimi:` does not error — it quietly runs on Anthropic, and a
/// chain that reads as three accounts is really one. A reachability-only
/// probe would call that link green.
#[test]
fn only_a_link_that_could_never_answer_counts_as_unusable() {
assert!(LinkStatus::Answered.usable());
assert!(LinkStatus::Throttled("429 rate_limit".into()).usable());
assert!(!LinkStatus::Unregistered.usable());
assert!(!LinkStatus::Broken("401 invalid key".into()).usable());
// The labels must not read alike: "throttled" is a wait and
// "unregistered" is a config bug, and an operator acts differently on
// each.
assert!(LinkStatus::Throttled(String::new()).label().contains("configured"));
assert!(LinkStatus::Unregistered.label().contains("DEFAULT provider"));
}
/// The chain never retries the capped model as its own fallback.
///
/// Without the filter, asking for haiku while haiku is capped would try
/// haiku, fail, and try haiku again — a chain that looks like resilience
/// and delivers none.
#[test]
fn the_chain_excludes_the_model_that_just_failed() {
// No env override in scope: this asserts the SHIPPED default.
let chain = fallback_chain("claude-opus-4-8");
assert_eq!(
chain,
vec![
"claude-sonnet-4-6",
"claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"kimi:kimi-k2.7-code",
"glm:glm-4.7",
"local:ornith-fleet:9b",
]
);
// Three providers behind five links. A chain that steps down three
// Anthropic tiers and stops is a tier ladder, not a fallback chain: one
// account being unreachable would end it.
let families: std::collections::BTreeSet<_> = chain
.iter()
.map(|m| m.split_once(':').map(|(p, _)| p).unwrap_or("anthropic"))
.collect();
assert!(
families.len() >= 3,
"the chain must span more than one account, got {families:?}"
);
// The last link must survive `resolve_provider`'s split, which takes the
// FIRST colon only — `local:ornith-fleet:9b` is provider `local`, model
// `ornith-fleet:9b`, and a split on the last colon would ask for a
// provider named `local:ornith-fleet`.
let last = chain.last().unwrap();
let (provider, model) = last.split_once(':').expect("a provider-qualified spec");
assert_eq!(provider, "local");
assert_eq!(model, "ornith-fleet:9b");
assert!(!fallback_chain("claude-haiku-4-5-20251001")
.iter()
.any(|m| m == "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"));
}
/// The chain is walked for "no capacity" and NOT for "bad request".
///
/// Walking it on a malformed prompt would ask three models the same bad
/// question and report the third one's confusion as the answer, burning
/// the two credentials that still work in order to hide the real error.
#[test]
fn only_a_capacity_failure_steps_down_the_chain() {
assert!(is_capacity_failure(
"subscription call: provider returned an error: 429 Too Many Requests"
));
assert!(is_capacity_failure("rate_limit_error"));
// The metered key's wall counts too — same meaning, different wording.
assert!(is_capacity_failure(
"400: Your credit balance is too low to access the Anthropic API"
));
assert!(!is_capacity_failure("400: messages.0: text content is empty"));
assert!(!is_capacity_failure("401: invalid x-api-key"));
assert!(!is_capacity_failure("404: model not found"));
}
/// An operator's explicit provider choice is never hijacked.
///
/// The swarm worker model is a configured `name:model` spec. Routing that
/// onto the subscription would run someone's chosen Kimi or GLM model on
/// Anthropic and report success — the same silent-substitution bug as the
/// metered key, aimed the other way.
#[test]
fn a_provider_qualified_spec_is_left_alone() {
assert!(is_bare_model_name("claude-opus-4-8"));
assert!(is_bare_model_name("claude-haiku-4-5-20251001"));
assert!(!is_bare_model_name("kimi:kimi-k2.6"));
assert!(!is_bare_model_name("glm:glm-4.7"));
}
/// A metered key in the OAuth slot must be REFUSED, not used.
///
/// Accepting it would authenticate, work, and bill the pay-as-you-go account
/// — the exact bill this module exists to stop, discovered weeks later when
/// it runs out mid-mission.
#[test]
fn only_a_setup_token_counts_as_the_subscription() {
assert!(is_subscription_token("sk-ant-oat01-abc"));
assert!(!is_subscription_token("sk-ant-api03-abc"));
assert!(!is_subscription_token(""));
assert!(!is_subscription_token("oat-but-not-anthropic"));
}
}
+28 -8
View File
@@ -122,9 +122,11 @@ pub async fn run_swarm_job(
let worker_model = resolve_worker_model(&job.worker_model);
// 1) PLAN — Opus decomposes the goal into worker tasks.
// This record is written BEFORE the call, so it cannot name the model that
// answers. The record after the call can, and does.
records.push(step(
"planner",
"planner:opus",
"planner",
StepPhase::Plan,
format!("Planning tasks for: {goal}"),
));
@@ -137,8 +139,17 @@ pub async fn run_swarm_job(
"GOAL:\n{goal}\n\nCHECKLIST each task's output must satisfy:\n{}{want}",
checklist_lines(&checklist)
);
let plan_raw = runtime
.complete(PLAN_SYSTEM, &plan_user, "claude-opus-4-8", 4000, false)
// The recorded role says which model ANSWERED. When opus is capped the
// chain steps down, and a step labelled "planner:opus" that GLM wrote is a
// lie in the one place an operator looks to explain a bad decomposition.
let (plan_raw, plan_model) = crate::subscription::complete_with_fallback(
runtime,
PLAN_SYSTEM,
&plan_user,
"claude-opus-4-8",
4000,
false,
)
.await?;
let tasks: Vec<String> = extract_json(&plan_raw)
.and_then(|v| {
@@ -154,7 +165,7 @@ pub async fn run_swarm_job(
}
records.push(step(
"planner",
"planner:opus",
format!("planner:{plan_model}"),
StepPhase::Plan,
format!(
"Decomposed into {} tasks. Workers: {worker_model}. Verifier: claude-opus-4-8.",
@@ -177,8 +188,10 @@ pub async fn run_swarm_job(
let mut still: Vec<(usize, String)> = Vec::new();
let mut rejected = 0usize;
for (idx, task) in pending.iter() {
let out = runtime
.complete(&wsys, task, &worker_model, 4000, true)
// `worker_model` may be a `name:model` spec the operator chose;
// `complete_or` passes those straight through untouched.
let out =
crate::subscription::complete_or(runtime, &wsys, task, &worker_model, 4000, true)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| format!("worker error: {e}"));
records.push(step(
@@ -190,9 +203,16 @@ pub async fn run_swarm_job(
ckpt(pool, id, &records, &totals).await;
let vuser = format!("TASK:\n{task}\n\nWORKER OUTPUT:\n{out}");
let v_raw = runtime
.complete(&vsys, &vuser, "claude-opus-4-8", 1200, true)
let v_raw = crate::subscription::complete_with_fallback(
runtime,
&vsys,
&vuser,
"claude-opus-4-8",
1200,
true,
)
.await
.map(|(text, _)| text)
.unwrap_or_default();
let v = extract_json(&v_raw);
let passed = v
@@ -69,6 +69,11 @@ struct TemplateRoleFile {
skills: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default)]
brain_seed: Option<String>,
/// Which model this role's claw runs on. Omitted means the mint's default,
/// which is what every authored template does today — so adding the field
/// changes nothing until a template uses it.
#[serde(default)]
model: Option<String>,
}
fn templates_dir() -> PathBuf {
@@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ async fn load_one(pool: &PgPool, path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<String, Strin
system_prompt: &r.system_prompt,
skills: r.skills.clone(),
brain_seed: r.brain_seed.as_deref(),
model: r.model.as_deref(),
})
.collect();
+416 -17
View File
@@ -24,15 +24,22 @@ use tokio::sync::Mutex;
use tokio_tungstenite::connect_async;
use tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message;
/// Overall wall-clock budget for draining one turn's event stream. Must
/// exceed the daemon's own claude_cli provider timeout (600s on gw-04
/// via ZEROCLAW_providers__models__claude_cli__default__timeout_ms) —
/// otherwise the executor kills the ws before the daemon can reply and
/// we see a phantom "turn timed out" while the daemon still logs a
/// successful llm response coming back. 700s gives 100s of headroom so
/// a daemon that just barely made it under its own limit doesn't lose
/// its answer here.
const TURN_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(700);
/// Overall wall-clock budget for draining one turn's event stream.
///
/// A turn is an agent LOOP, not one model call. Each call inside it is bounded
/// separately by the daemon — `claude_cli`'s `timeout_secs`, 600s on gw-04 —
/// so this has to cover however many calls the loop makes, not one of them.
///
/// It was 700s, which is 100s more than a single call may take. MEASURED: a
/// healthy research turn is ~157s, but a throttled one blew the budget with one
/// slow call plus a second, and the executor killed it mid-flight after 11m43s
/// with no error from the daemon — because nothing had failed yet. All the
/// operator got was "turn timed out".
///
/// An hour matches the phase's own budget. A genuinely stuck CALL is still
/// caught at 600s by the daemon and surfaces as a real error; this only stops
/// us killing turns that are working, slowly.
const TURN_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(3600);
/// Drives ZeroClaw role-agents (in one container) to execute topology turns.
pub struct ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
@@ -47,6 +54,56 @@ pub struct ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
/// Bearer token, paired lazily and reused across turns.
token: Arc<Mutex<Option<String>>>,
http: reqwest::Client,
/// Where this executor's turns record what they did. `None` on every path
/// that is not a mission phase (the governor, the door, the evaluator) —
/// those turns belong to no phase and have nothing to attribute to.
tap: Option<Arc<MissionTap>>,
}
/// Where a turn's tool activity is written, and what it belongs to.
///
/// Carried on the executor rather than passed per turn because `TurnRequest`
/// is the shared orchestrator contract: threading a mission id through it would
/// put mission concepts into every tier that has no missions.
pub struct MissionTap {
pub pool: sqlx::PgPool,
/// Which workspace's live feed these frames belong to. Every subscriber is
/// workspace-scoped, so a frame without this could not be routed.
pub workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
pub mission_id: uuid::Uuid,
pub phase_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
pub run_id: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
}
/// One tool call, as the frame stream reported it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ToolCall {
pub tool: String,
/// The path the tool's **arguments** named, if any. Never extracted from a
/// prose summary — see [`crate::mission_events::tool_path`].
pub path: Option<String>,
}
/// What one turn's frames said about the work, beside its text.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct ToolTrace {
pub calls: Vec<ToolCall>,
/// Frame `type` values this drain did not recognise, counted.
///
/// Shipped in the same change as the tap on purpose: the frame name was
/// taken from a comment in this file rather than from a captured frame. If
/// the runtime called it something else, the tap would record nothing and
/// nothing anywhere would error — the World would simply stay as sparse as
/// it was before.
///
/// MEASURED on gw-04 (v0.8.3, 2026-08-11): a mission turn's stream carried
/// `chunk`, `done` and `session_start` and no tool frames at all. That is
/// not a protocol mismatch — `tool_call` is in the deployed binary
/// (`zeroclaw-gateway/src/ws.rs` emits `{"type":"tool_call","id","name",
/// "args"}`) — it is §15: these agents are provisioned tool-free behind the
/// MCP door, so they call nothing. The histogram is what let us tell those
/// two apart, which was its whole purpose.
pub unmatched: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, u32>,
}
impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
@@ -64,9 +121,17 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
default_alias,
token: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
http: reqwest::Client::new(),
tap: None,
}
}
/// Attach the mission this executor's turns belong to, so their tool calls
/// are recorded. Without it the executor behaves exactly as it did.
pub fn with_tap(mut self, tap: MissionTap) -> Self {
self.tap = Some(Arc::new(tap));
self
}
/// Build from the environment:
/// - `ZEROCLAW_GATEWAY_URL` (required) e.g. `http://127.0.0.1:42617`
/// - `ZEROCLAW_TOKEN` (preferred) a durable bearer token — pair once
@@ -113,6 +178,21 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
/// new one-time code at startup. The env-derived ZEROCLAW_TOKEN
/// is ignored (belongs to the shared runtime) so the lazy pair
/// path runs and issues a bearer for this specific gateway.
/// Reuse a token that was already paired and persisted.
///
/// The pairing code is single-use, so a restarted server cannot pair again:
/// it gets 403 and the mission is unrecoverable. Seeding the cache from
/// `missions.runtime_token` is what makes a mission survive a restart.
pub fn with_token(self, token: Option<String>) -> Self {
if let Some(t) = token.filter(|t| !t.trim().is_empty()) {
// try_lock: this runs at construction, before any turn holds it.
if let Ok(mut g) = self.token.try_lock() {
*g = Some(t);
}
}
self
}
pub fn from_env_for_gateway_with_code(
gateway_url: String,
pairing_code: String,
@@ -174,6 +254,25 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
.ok_or_else(|| OrchestratorError::Executor("pair response had no token".into()))?
.to_string();
*guard = Some(token.clone());
// Persist it. The code we just spent cannot be used again, so if this
// token only ever lives in memory the next server process has no way
// back in — that is the 403 that killed a 93k-token research phase.
// Best-effort: failing to save must not fail a turn that just paired
// successfully; the cost is that a restart before the next write
// re-opens the original hole.
if let Some(tap) = self.tap.as_ref() {
if let Err(e) = sqlx::query("UPDATE missions SET runtime_token = $1 WHERE id = $2")
.bind(&token)
.bind(tap.mission_id)
.execute(&tap.pool)
.await
{
eprintln!(
"topology_exec: could not persist runtime token for mission {}: {e}",
tap.mission_id
);
}
}
Ok(token)
}
@@ -196,6 +295,19 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
}
pub async fn drive(&self, alias: &str, prompt: &str) -> Result<TurnOutcome, OrchestratorError> {
self.drive_traced(alias, prompt).await.map(|(o, _)| o)
}
/// [`Self::drive`], also returning what the turn's frames said it did.
///
/// Exists so the tool tap is testable at all: `drive` discards the trace
/// after recording it, and a tap whose extraction is never asserted is
/// exactly the kind of code that silently records nothing.
pub(crate) async fn drive_traced(
&self,
alias: &str,
prompt: &str,
) -> Result<(TurnOutcome, ToolTrace), OrchestratorError> {
let token = self.ensure_paired().await?;
let ws_base = if let Some(rest) = self.gateway_url.strip_prefix("https") {
format!("wss{rest}")
@@ -219,11 +331,111 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
.await
.map_err(|e| OrchestratorError::Executor(format!("ws send failed: {e}")))?;
let outcome = tokio::time::timeout(TURN_TIMEOUT, Self::drain(&mut ws))
let (outcome, trace) = match tokio::time::timeout(
TURN_TIMEOUT,
Self::drain(
&mut ws,
self.tap.as_ref().and_then(|t| {
crate::live_bus::agent_id_from_alias(alias).map(|a| (t.workspace_id, a))
}),
),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| OrchestratorError::Executor("turn timed out".into()))??;
{
Ok(res) => res?,
Err(_) => {
// "turn timed out" on its own is unactionable, and the one place
// the reason lives — the per-mission runtime container — is torn
// down after the phase, taking its log with it. Read the tail
// while it still exists.
//
// MEASURED: a research phase timed out at exactly 700s having
// produced zero steps and zero output, and the container was
// already gone by the time anyone looked. All that survived was
// the string.
let container = self.container_name();
let tail = match &container {
Some(c) => crate::container_exec::tail_logs(c, 40).await,
None => "(could not derive the container name from the gateway url)".into(),
};
return Err(OrchestratorError::Executor(format!(
"turn timed out after {}s driving agent {alias} on {} — the agent \
never finished a turn. Last lines from {}:\n{tail}",
TURN_TIMEOUT.as_secs(),
self.gateway_url,
container.as_deref().unwrap_or("its runtime container"),
)));
}
};
let _ = ws.close(None).await;
Ok(outcome)
self.record_trace(alias, &trace).await;
Ok((outcome, trace))
}
/// Persist what this turn's frames said the agent did.
///
/// Best-effort and after the fact: a telemetry write must not be able to
/// fail a turn that already succeeded.
async fn record_trace(&self, alias: &str, trace: &ToolTrace) {
if !trace.unmatched.is_empty() {
// Logged whether or not a tap is attached — the point is to learn
// the real frame names, and the paths with no tap see the same
// stream.
eprintln!(
"topology_exec: unmatched frame types this turn ({alias}): {:?}",
trace.unmatched
);
}
let Some(tap) = self.tap.as_ref() else { return };
if trace.calls.is_empty() {
return;
}
let agent_id = crate::runtime_provision::claw_from_alias(alias);
let event = |kind: &str, target: String, detail: serde_json::Value| {
crate::mission_events::MissionEvent {
mission_id: tap.mission_id,
phase_id: tap.phase_id,
run_id: tap.run_id,
agent_id,
kind: kind.to_string(),
target: Some(target),
detail,
}
};
let mut events = Vec::new();
for call in &trace.calls {
events.push(event(
crate::mission_events::TOOL_CALL,
call.tool.clone(),
serde_json::Value::Null,
));
// A file touch is a SECOND event, not a replacement: the tool call
// happened whether or not we could name a path in its arguments,
// and collapsing the two would make every unparseable tool call
// disappear from the record entirely.
if let Some(path) = &call.path {
events.push(event(
crate::mission_events::FILE_TOUCH,
crate::mission_events::repo_relative(path, GUEST_ROOTS),
serde_json::json!({ "tool": call.tool }),
));
}
}
crate::mission_events::record_all(&tap.pool, events).await;
}
/// The runtime container behind this executor, derived from its gateway URL
/// (`http://cm-runtime-mission-<hex>:42617`). Used only to fetch a log tail
/// for an error message, so an unparseable URL is `None` rather than a
/// failure.
fn container_name(&self) -> Option<String> {
let rest = self
.gateway_url
.split("://")
.nth(1)
.unwrap_or(&self.gateway_url);
let host = rest.split('/').next()?.split(':').next()?;
(!host.is_empty()).then(|| host.to_string())
}
/// Use a runtime agent as a governance judge: drive `alias` with the judge
@@ -286,7 +498,18 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
}
/// Read frames until a terminal (`done`/`error`/`approval_request`) event.
async fn drain<S>(ws: &mut S) -> Result<TurnOutcome, OrchestratorError>
///
/// Returns the turn's outcome AND what its frames said the agent did. The
/// trace is separate from [`TurnOutcome`] deliberately: that type is the
/// shared orchestrator contract used by every tier, and tool telemetry is a
/// mission concern.
/// `live` is the push target for this turn: `Some((workspace, agent))` when
/// the turn belongs to a mission AND runs under a claw alias. `None` for the
/// governor/door/evaluator, whose output belongs to no agent.
async fn drain<S>(
ws: &mut S,
live: Option<(uuid::Uuid, uuid::Uuid)>,
) -> Result<(TurnOutcome, ToolTrace), OrchestratorError>
where
S: StreamExt<Item = Result<Message, tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Error>>
+ SinkExt<Message>
@@ -295,6 +518,7 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
let mut output = String::new();
let mut tokens: u64 = 0;
let mut gated: Vec<GatedAction> = Vec::new();
let mut trace = ToolTrace::default();
while let Some(frame) = ws.next().await {
let msg = frame.map_err(|e| OrchestratorError::Executor(format!("ws recv: {e}")))?;
@@ -306,6 +530,24 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
"chunk" => {
if let Some(c) = v.get("content").and_then(|c| c.as_str()) {
output.push_str(c);
// Push, don't wait for the poll. This is the
// whole point of the bus: the reasoning card
// previously showed a step's text only after the
// step ended and the row was written, so an
// agent mid-thought looked idle for seconds.
if let Some((ws_id, agent_id)) = live {
if !c.trim().is_empty() {
crate::live_bus::global().publish(
ws_id,
"agent.reasoning.delta",
serde_json::json!({
"agentId": agent_id.to_string(),
"text": c,
"channel": "say",
}),
);
}
}
}
}
"done" => {
@@ -340,8 +582,50 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
"aborted" => {
return Err(OrchestratorError::Executor("turn aborted".into()));
}
// session_start, thinking, tool_call, tool_result, …
_ => {}
// The action channel. `arguments` is read as JSON and
// nothing else is: the frame also carries a prose
// summary, and a path pulled out of THAT would be right
// often enough to be believed and wrong often enough to
// put files on the map that nobody edited.
"tool_call" => {
// `name` is what the gateway sends; `tool` is
// what `approval_request` uses, kept as a fallback.
let tool = v
.get("name")
.or_else(|| v.get("tool"))
.and_then(|t| t.as_str())
.unwrap_or("")
.trim()
.to_string();
if !tool.is_empty() {
// `args` FIRST: that is what the gateway
// actually sends (`{"type":"tool_call","id",
// "name","args"}` — zeroclaw-gateway/src/ws.rs).
// The others were guesses, and a guess that
// never matches costs the file path silently:
// the tool call is still recorded, with no
// target, and reads as a tool that touched
// nothing.
let args = v
.get("args")
.or_else(|| v.get("arguments"))
.or_else(|| v.get("input"))
.cloned()
.unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
trace.calls.push(ToolCall {
path: crate::mission_events::tool_path(&args),
tool,
});
}
}
// session_start, thinking, tool_result, …
other => {
// Counted, not ignored. See `ToolTrace::unmatched`:
// the frame name above is unverified, and a tap
// that matches nothing looks exactly like a mission
// that used no tools.
*trace.unmatched.entry(other.to_string()).or_insert(0) += 1;
}
}
}
Message::Ping(p) => {
@@ -352,14 +636,21 @@ impl ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
}
}
Ok(TurnOutcome {
Ok((
TurnOutcome {
output: output.trim().to_string(),
tokens,
gated,
})
},
trace,
))
}
}
/// Guest workspace roots, stripped so a tool's absolute path becomes the
/// repo-relative one a person recognises.
const GUEST_ROOTS: &[&str] = &["/mission/repo", "/workspace", "/repo"];
impl TurnExecutor for ZeroClawDriveExecutor {
async fn run_turn(&self, req: TurnRequest) -> Result<TurnOutcome, OrchestratorError> {
// An explicit per-node agent (graph `node.attrs["agent"]`) wins, so one
@@ -406,6 +697,41 @@ fn parse_agent_map(s: &str) -> HashMap<String, String> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
/// The container name comes out of the gateway URL, or nothing does.
///
/// This is only used to fetch a log tail for a failure message, so a URL
/// shape it does not recognise must degrade to "no log" rather than to a
/// second error on top of the first.
#[test]
fn the_container_name_is_derived_or_absent_never_wrong() {
let ex = |url: &str| {
ZeroClawDriveExecutor::new(
url.to_string(),
String::new(),
std::collections::HashMap::new(),
"scout".into(),
)
};
assert_eq!(
ex("http://cm-runtime-mission-019fec2d596f:42617")
.container_name()
.as_deref(),
Some("cm-runtime-mission-019fec2d596f")
);
assert_eq!(
ex("https://host.example:8443/base")
.container_name()
.as_deref(),
Some("host.example")
);
// No scheme is still a host.
assert_eq!(
ex("clawmates-runtime:42617").container_name().as_deref(),
Some("clawmates-runtime")
);
assert_eq!(ex("").container_name(), None);
}
use super::*;
use axum::extract::ws::{Message as AxMsg, WebSocket, WebSocketUpgrade};
use axum::response::Response;
@@ -435,6 +761,32 @@ mod tests {
})
}
/// A stream carrying tool calls and one frame type we do not know.
async fn tool_ws(ws: WebSocketUpgrade) -> Response {
ws.on_upgrade(|mut socket: WebSocket| async move {
let _ = socket.recv().await;
for f in [
json!({"type": "session_start"}),
// The REAL frame shape, copied from the gateway:
// {"type":"tool_call","id","name","args"}.
json!({"type": "tool_call", "id": "t1", "name": "Read",
"args": {"file_path": "/mission/repo/src/a.rs"}}),
// A tool whose arguments name no path at all.
json!({"type": "tool_call", "id": "t2", "name": "Bash",
"args": {"command": "cargo test"}}),
// Prose that MENTIONS a path. It must not become a file touch.
json!({"type": "tool_call", "id": "t3", "name": "Grep",
"arguments_summary": "searching src/main.rs",
"args": {"pattern": "fn main"}}),
json!({"type": "a_frame_we_have_never_seen"}),
json!({"type": "a_frame_we_have_never_seen"}),
json!({"type": "done", "input_tokens": 1, "output_tokens": 1}),
] {
let _ = socket.send(AxMsg::Text(f.to_string().into())).await;
}
})
}
async fn approval_ws(ws: WebSocketUpgrade) -> Response {
ws.on_upgrade(|mut socket: WebSocket| async move {
let _ = socket.recv().await;
@@ -499,6 +851,53 @@ mod tests {
assert!(out.gated.is_empty());
}
/// Tool detail comes from arguments, and unknown frames are counted.
///
/// The two halves are one test because they are one risk. The frame type
/// `tool_call` is taken from a comment in this file, not from a captured
/// frame — so if it is wrong, the tap records nothing, the World stays as
/// sparse as it was, and NOTHING errors. The histogram is what turns that
/// into a log line naming the real frame.
#[tokio::test]
async fn tool_frames_give_up_their_arguments_and_unknown_frames_are_counted() {
let router = Router::new()
.route("/pair", post(pair))
.route("/ws/chat", get(tool_ws));
let base = serve(router).await;
let exec = ZeroClawDriveExecutor::new(base, "code".into(), HashMap::new(), "scout".into());
let (_out, trace) = exec.drive_traced("scout", "go").await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
trace.calls,
vec![
ToolCall {
tool: "Read".into(),
path: Some("/mission/repo/src/a.rs".into())
},
ToolCall {
tool: "Bash".into(),
path: None
},
// `arguments_summary` said "src/main.rs". It is prose, so it is
// not a file touch — a path scraped from a sentence would put
// files on the map that no agent opened.
ToolCall {
tool: "Grep".into(),
path: None
},
]
);
assert_eq!(trace.unmatched.get("a_frame_we_have_never_seen"), Some(&2));
assert_eq!(trace.unmatched.get("session_start"), Some(&1));
// `done` terminates the drain and is not an unmatched frame.
assert!(
!trace.unmatched.contains_key("done"),
"{:?}",
trace.unmatched
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn approval_request_is_recorded_as_blocked() {
let router = Router::new()
+258 -10
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,12 @@ const REAP_STUCK_AFTER_SECS: i64 = 15 * 60;
/// Spawn the durable topology job worker. Polls for queued jobs every `poll`
/// interval; runs each to completion (or failure), checkpointing per step.
pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool, runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime, poll: Duration) {
pub fn spawn(
pool: PgPool,
runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime,
hub: Arc<crate::fleet::NodeHub>,
poll: Duration,
) {
// Fire the stuck-container reaper on its own cadence — checking
// once a minute is plenty and keeps this off the hot claim loop.
let reaper_pool = pool.clone();
@@ -55,7 +60,7 @@ pub fn spawn(pool: PgPool, runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime, poll: Duration) {
eprintln!("topology_worker: requeue_stale failed: {e}");
}
match cm_db::repo::topology_runs::claim_next_queued(&pool).await {
Ok(Some(job)) => run_job(&pool, &runtime, job).await,
Ok(Some(job)) => run_job(&pool, &runtime, &hub, job).await,
Ok(None) => tokio::time::sleep(poll).await,
Err(e) => {
eprintln!("topology_worker: claim failed: {e}");
@@ -80,10 +85,25 @@ async fn reap_stuck_runs(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
FROM topology_runs
WHERE status = 'running'
AND mission_id IS NOT NULL
-- Only jobs this worker drives. mission_id IS NOT NULL used to mean
-- the same thing as orchestrator-driven, and the microvm and session
-- tiers broke that: their checkpoint is NULL for life BY DESIGN, so the
-- zero-step-records test below is true of a perfectly healthy run.
AND tier = ANY($2)
AND created_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1::float)
AND coalesce(jsonb_array_length(coalesce(checkpoint->'records', '[]'::jsonb)), 0) = 0",
)
.bind(REAP_STUCK_AFTER_SECS as f64)
.bind(
// REAPABLE, not worker-driven: `microvm_graph` is driven by this worker
// and must NOT be reaped — one of its steps is a whole agent session in a
// VM, so "no step records in 15 minutes" describes a healthy composed run
// as readily as a wedged one.
cm_db::repo::topology_runs::REAPABLE_TIERS
.iter()
.map(|s| (*s).to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>(),
)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await?;
@@ -108,6 +128,7 @@ async fn reap_stuck_runs(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
async fn run_job(
pool: &PgPool,
runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime,
hub: &Arc<crate::fleet::NodeHub>,
job: cm_db::repo::topology_runs::ClaimedTopologyRun,
) {
let id = job.id;
@@ -145,16 +166,35 @@ async fn run_job(
// Resume from the last checkpoint, or start fresh.
let progress: RunProgress = job
.checkpoint
.clone()
.and_then(|c| serde_json::from_value(c).ok())
.unwrap_or_default();
// The composed engines (Slice 4): this graph's nodes are not claws, they are
// Claude-Code-in-a-microVM sessions. Branched BEFORE the leaf executor is
// built, because that build reads the ZeroClaw gateway config — a composed
// run must not fail for want of a runtime it never dials.
if job.tier == "microvm_graph" {
let result = run_composed(pool, hub, &job, &graph, progress).await;
finish(pool, id, result).await;
maybe_teardown_ephemeral_team(pool, runtime, id).await;
return;
}
// C3: prefer the mission's per-run runtime endpoint when set on
// the missions row; else fall back to the shared env-derived
// gateway (pre-C3 missions + non-mission runs). This is what
// isolates agents' workspace filesystem to that mission's repo.
let mission_binding: Option<(Option<String>, Option<String>)> =
sqlx::query_as::<_, (Option<String>, Option<String>)>(
"SELECT m.runtime_endpoint, m.runtime_pairing_code
type MissionBinding = (
Option<String>,
Option<String>,
Uuid,
Option<Uuid>,
Option<String>,
);
let mission_binding: Option<MissionBinding> = sqlx::query_as::<_, MissionBinding>(
"SELECT m.runtime_endpoint, m.runtime_pairing_code, m.id, r.mission_phase_id,
m.runtime_token
FROM topology_runs r
JOIN missions m ON m.id = r.mission_id
WHERE r.id = $1",
@@ -164,11 +204,31 @@ async fn run_job(
.await
.ok()
.flatten();
// What this run's turns will be attributed to. `None` when the run belongs
// to no mission — a bare topology run has no phase to hang tool calls on.
let tap = mission_binding
.as_ref()
.map(
|(_, _, mission_id, phase_id, _)| crate::topology_exec::MissionTap {
pool: pool.clone(),
workspace_id: job.workspace_id,
mission_id: *mission_id,
phase_id: *phase_id,
run_id: Some(id),
},
);
let leaf_result = match mission_binding {
Some((Some(url), Some(code))) => {
// Seed the cached bearer from `runtime_token` when we have one: the
// pairing code is single-use, so after a restart it is the only way in.
Some((Some(url), Some(code), _, _, tok)) => {
ZeroClawDriveExecutor::from_env_for_gateway_with_code(url, code)
.map(|e| e.with_token(tok))
}
// No pairing code (pre-C3 missions): the persisted token is the only
// credential, so seed it here too.
Some((Some(url), None, _, _, tok)) => {
ZeroClawDriveExecutor::from_env_for_gateway(url).map(|e| e.with_token(tok))
}
Some((Some(url), None)) => ZeroClawDriveExecutor::from_env_for_gateway(url),
_ => ZeroClawDriveExecutor::from_env(),
};
let leaf = match leaf_result {
@@ -178,6 +238,13 @@ async fn run_job(
return;
}
};
// The tap rides on the leaf executor, so the recursive tiers get it too:
// they drive the same leaf all the way down, and a company-tier mission's
// tool calls belong to its phase exactly as a team-tier one's do.
let leaf = match tap {
Some(t) => leaf.with_tap(t),
None => leaf,
};
// Select the executor by deploy tier: `team` drives claws directly; the
// upper tiers drive the recursive sub-topology executor (which runs each
@@ -196,11 +263,39 @@ async fn run_job(
id,
Arc::new(leaf),
);
drive(pool, id, &graph, &job.task, progress, &exec).await
drive(
pool,
id,
job.workspace_id,
&graph,
&job.task,
progress,
&exec,
)
.await
}
_ => {
drive(
pool,
id,
job.workspace_id,
&graph,
&job.task,
progress,
&leaf,
)
.await
}
_ => drive(pool, id, &graph, &job.task, progress, &leaf).await,
};
finish(pool, id, result).await;
maybe_teardown_ephemeral_team(pool, runtime, id).await;
}
/// Write a driven run's terminal state. The single place a run finishes, shared
/// by every tier — a second one would be a second completion path, which is where
/// every microVM bug this project has hit came from.
async fn finish(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid, result: Result<RunRecord, OrchestratorError>) {
match result {
Ok(record) => {
let value = serde_json::to_value(&record).unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
@@ -219,7 +314,85 @@ async fn run_job(
}
}
}
maybe_teardown_ephemeral_team(pool, runtime, id).await;
}
/// Drive a composed run: the outer graph is Engine Z, every node is a
/// Claude-Code-in-a-microVM session (Engine C).
///
/// The mission columns are read here rather than carried on the run row so a
/// re-placed or re-backed mission takes effect on resume, and so the composed
/// path has exactly one source of truth for where a VM boots.
async fn run_composed(
pool: &PgPool,
hub: &Arc<crate::fleet::NodeHub>,
job: &cm_db::repo::topology_runs::ClaimedTopologyRun,
graph: &TopologyGraph,
progress: RunProgress,
) -> Result<RunRecord, OrchestratorError> {
let mission_id = job.mission_id.ok_or_else(|| {
OrchestratorError::Executor(
"a composed run has no mission, so there is no checkout for its nodes \
to share"
.into(),
)
})?;
let phase_id = job.mission_phase_id.ok_or_else(|| {
OrchestratorError::Executor("a composed run must belong to a mission phase".into())
})?;
let mission: (Option<Uuid>, Option<String>, Option<String>, bool) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT target_node_id, backend, team_engine, (repo_id IS NOT NULL) \
FROM missions WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| OrchestratorError::Executor(format!("load mission {mission_id}: {e}")))?;
// The phase's completion gate, read here rather than carried on the run row
// so an edited `done_when_check` takes effect on the next node instead of at
// the next mission.
let phase: (String, serde_json::Value) =
sqlx::query_as("SELECT kind, config FROM mission_phases WHERE id = $1")
.bind(phase_id)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| OrchestratorError::Executor(format!("load phase {phase_id}: {e}")))?;
let exec = crate::microvm_turn_executor::for_fleet(
hub.clone(),
pool.clone(),
crate::microvm_turn_executor::ComposedRun {
run_id: job.id,
mission_id,
phase_id,
iteration: job.iteration.unwrap_or(1),
repo: crate::mission_workspace::checkout_path(mission_id),
// A repo-less composed mission gets an empty shared workspace, the
// same as a solo phase — the graph's whole property is that node 2
// sees node 1's files, and that holds whether or not it is a git
// checkout.
has_repo: mission.3,
target_node_id: mission.0,
backend: mission.1,
team_engine: mission.2,
gate: crate::vm_stop_gate::StopGate::for_phase(&phase.0, &phase.1)
.and_then(crate::vm_stop_gate::StopGate::per_node),
// Resume continues the step numbering; restarting it would re-use a
// finished node's vm id.
completed_steps: progress.completed as u32,
},
);
drive(
pool,
job.id,
job.workspace_id,
graph,
&job.task,
progress,
&exec,
)
.await
}
/// Post-terminal hook: if this run's team is `ephemeral` and no siblings are
@@ -278,14 +451,30 @@ async fn maybe_teardown_ephemeral_team(pool: &PgPool, runtime: &cm_runtime::Runt
async fn drive<E: TurnExecutor>(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
graph: &TopologyGraph,
task: &str,
progress: RunProgress,
executor: &E,
) -> Result<RunRecord, OrchestratorError> {
let pool_cb = pool.clone();
// node_id -> agent id, resolved once. The binding lives in the node's
// attrs (`agent = claw_<uuid>`), which is also what the runtime dispatches
// on — so usage is attributed to exactly the claw that did the work.
let agent_of: std::sync::Arc<std::collections::HashMap<String, Uuid>> = std::sync::Arc::new(
graph
.nodes
.iter()
.filter_map(|n| {
let alias = n.attrs.get("agent")?;
let uuid = alias.strip_prefix("claw_")?;
Some((n.id.clone(), Uuid::parse_str(uuid).ok()?))
})
.collect(),
);
execute_resumable(graph, task, executor, progress, move |snap| {
let pool = pool_cb.clone();
let agent_of = agent_of.clone();
async move {
// 2026-07-15: verbose per-step trace so `docker logs
// clawmates_server_1` shows which topology node just fired,
@@ -311,6 +500,65 @@ async fn drive<E: TurnExecutor>(
last.tokens,
last.gated.len(),
);
// Per-agent usage. Without this the command centre's SPEND,
// ACTIVITY and THROUGHPUT cards read `usage_events`, which
// nothing on the mission path ever wrote — so they showed 0 for
// an agent that had just burned 15k tokens.
//
// `charge` also decrements credit lots, which is the point: a
// mission turn costs what it costs. It clamps at the available
// balance and still records the full obligation, so an empty
// wallet cannot fail a turn.
// The agent's own words, for the REASONING STREAM card. The
// world feed is a DB poll, not a push bus, so a live card can
// only show what was persisted — this is the step output the
// worker already has in hand, attributed to the claw that
// produced it. Truncated because the card renders a tail, not a
// transcript, and mission_events is capped per phase.
if let Some(agent_id) = agent_of.get(&last.node_id).copied() {
let text: String = last.output.chars().take(600).collect();
if !text.trim().is_empty() {
if let Some(mission_id) = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<Uuid>>(
"SELECT mission_id FROM topology_runs WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(&pool)
.await
.ok()
.flatten()
.flatten()
{
let mut ev = crate::mission_events::MissionEvent::new(
mission_id,
"reasoning",
);
ev.agent_id = Some(agent_id);
ev.run_id = Some(id);
ev.target = Some(last.role.clone());
ev.detail = serde_json::json!({ "text": text });
crate::mission_events::record(&pool, ev).await;
}
}
}
if let Some(agent_id) = agent_of.get(&last.node_id).copied() {
if last.tokens > 0 {
// The executor reports ONE total, not an in/out split.
// Credits price the sum, so cost is right; the columns
// record it as output rather than inventing a split.
if let Err(e) = cm_billing::charge(
&pool,
cm_domain::WorkspaceId::from(workspace_id),
cm_domain::AgentId::from(agent_id),
None,
0,
last.tokens as u64,
)
.await
{
eprintln!("topology_worker: usage for {agent_id} failed: {e}");
}
}
}
}
// Best-effort checkpoint: a failed write just means we re-run the
// step on resume (idempotent — topology turns are pure reads here).
+158
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
//! Can the independent validator actually be reached?
//!
//! The sibling of [`crate::runtime_preflight`], for the same class of failure:
//! the code is right and the machine is not, and nothing says so until a mission
//! pays for it.
//!
//! `evaluator::cross_provider_judge` deliberately refuses to fall back to the
//! agent's own provider — a verdict from the same family is not an independent
//! check, and quietly producing one would claim a property the verdict does not
//! have. That refusal is correct, and its cost is that a dead validator makes
//! every `done_when` phase UNMEETABLE. The mission still boots a VM, still runs
//! an agent turn, still collects and delivers, and only then records
//! "the independent validator could not be reached this pass" on one evaluation
//! row.
//!
//! That happened: the z.ai credential expired mid-session and the first symptom
//! was a two-phase mission failing after both VMs had run. The information
//! existed the whole time; nobody was told until it was expensive.
//!
//! A report, not a gate — the same stance `runtime_preflight` takes. The server
//! must still boot with a broken validator, because refusing to start would turn
//! a degraded deployment into a dead one, and because a mission that opts out
//! (`validator_model = ''`) is unaffected. What this buys is that the degradation
//! is visible at startup instead of inferred from a failed mission.
/// The smallest question that proves a credential works end to end.
///
/// A real completion rather than a models-list or a HEAD: an expired key, a
/// revoked key and a key with no quota can all pass a cheaper check and fail the
/// call that matters. Two tokens of output.
const PROBE_PROMPT: &str = "Reply with exactly: OK";
/// What the probe found.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Verdict {
/// No independent validator is configured; phases are judged by the house
/// model. Not a fault — a deployment may choose this.
NotConfigured,
/// Configured, resolved, and it answered.
Reachable { spec: String },
/// Configured but the registry has no such provider, so
/// `cross_provider_judge` will refuse it rather than judge with the default.
Unregistered { spec: String },
/// Configured and resolved, and the call failed.
Unreachable { spec: String, error: String },
}
impl Verdict {
/// Is every `done_when` phase currently unmeetable because of this?
pub fn breaks_gated_phases(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
Verdict::Unregistered { .. } | Verdict::Unreachable { .. }
)
}
}
/// Ask the configured independent validator to answer one trivial question.
pub async fn probe(runtime: &cm_runtime::Runtime) -> Verdict {
let Some(spec) = std::env::var("CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL")
.ok()
.map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
else {
return Verdict::NotConfigured;
};
let (_provider, model) = runtime.resolve_provider(&spec);
// `resolve_provider` falls back to the DEFAULT provider for an unknown name,
// and the fallback is detectable because the returned model still carries the
// `name:` prefix. Checked here for the same reason the evaluator checks it:
// a validator that is silently the house model is worse than none.
if model.contains(':') {
return Verdict::Unregistered { spec };
}
// Through `Runtime::complete`, which is the same resolve-then-stream path
// the evaluator's judge takes. A probe that dialled the provider its own way
// could pass while the real call fails.
match runtime.complete("", PROBE_PROMPT, &spec, 16, false).await {
Ok(_) => Verdict::Reachable { spec },
Err(e) => Verdict::Unreachable {
spec,
error: e.chars().take(160).collect(),
},
}
}
/// Probe at boot and say plainly what it means for missions.
pub fn report_at_boot(runtime: cm_runtime::Runtime) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
match probe(&runtime).await {
Verdict::NotConfigured => eprintln!(
"validator_preflight: no CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL — phase verdicts are judged \
by the house model, which is NOT an independent check"
),
Verdict::Reachable { spec } => {
eprintln!("validator_preflight: independent validator {spec} answered")
}
Verdict::Unregistered { spec } => eprintln!(
"validator_preflight: CLAWMATES_VALIDATOR_MODEL={spec} has no registered \
provider — the evaluator will refuse it rather than judge with the default, \
so EVERY phase with a done_when condition will fail as unmet. Register the \
provider, or set the mission's validator_model to '' to opt out."
),
Verdict::Unreachable { spec, error } => eprintln!(
"validator_preflight: independent validator {spec} is UNREACHABLE ({error}) — \
EVERY phase with a done_when condition will fail as unmet, after running its \
agent. Fix the credential, or set validator_model to '' per mission to judge \
with the house model."
),
}
});
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// The two states that make gated phases unmeetable, and the two that do
/// not. This is the distinction the whole module exists to draw: "no
/// validator configured" is a choice, "configured and broken" is a fault
/// that silently fails every conditioned mission.
#[test]
fn only_a_configured_but_broken_validator_breaks_gated_phases() {
assert!(!Verdict::NotConfigured.breaks_gated_phases());
assert!(!Verdict::Reachable {
spec: "glm:glm-4.7".into()
}
.breaks_gated_phases());
assert!(Verdict::Unregistered {
spec: "glm:glm-4.7".into()
}
.breaks_gated_phases());
assert!(Verdict::Unreachable {
spec: "glm:glm-4.7".into(),
error: "401".into()
}
.breaks_gated_phases());
}
/// An unregistered provider is NOT reported as unreachable, and the
/// difference is actionable: one is fixed by registering a provider, the
/// other by fixing a credential. Collapsing them sends an operator to the
/// wrong place.
#[test]
fn the_two_faults_are_distinguishable() {
let a = Verdict::Unregistered {
spec: "glm:glm-4.7".into(),
};
let b = Verdict::Unreachable {
spec: "glm:glm-4.7".into(),
error: "401 Authentication Failed".into(),
};
assert_ne!(a, b);
}
}
+815
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,815 @@
//! Which fleet node should run the next microVM phase, and whether any can.
//!
//! # What this replaces
//!
//! Placement was `capable.first()` over a list ordered `last_seen DESC`
//! (`mission_orchestrator`, `nodes::online_for_backend`) — the most recently
//! heartbeated node. Among healthy nodes all heartbeating every 5s that is
//! arbitrary, and it consults nothing about load: two missions launched together
//! land on the same machine. It did not matter while one node held the only
//! rootfs image; all three do now.
//!
//! # Observed memory is not capacity
//!
//! The correctness core, and the reason this is not a one-line sort change. A VM
//! that booted 30 seconds ago holds a fraction of its 8 GiB claim — the guest has
//! not touched the rest — so `mem_pct` reports a sold-out node as nearly idle.
//! Ranking on utilisation alone would happily book five more VMs onto a node with
//! room for one. `capacity_of` therefore takes the WORSE of observed usage and
//! committed usage, and `a_sold_out_node_is_not_mistaken_for_an_idle_one` is the
//! negative control that pins it.
//!
//! Commitments come from two places that must be unioned by IDENTITY, never
//! added: `microvm_client::list` (booted VMs, including orphans nothing has
//! reaped) and `nodes::pinned_microvm_phases` (chosen but not yet booted). The
//! deterministic `vm_id_for` is what lets the same phase be recognised in both.
//!
//! # Fail-closed
//!
//! A node whose health is stale, whose daemon will not answer, or which is
//! draining is INELIGIBLE, not low-scoring. Unknown is not permission — the same
//! rule `nodes::online_for_backend` already applies to capabilities. The one
//! exception is Beszel metrics: they feed `headroom` as a tiebreak only, so stale
//! metrics demote a node instead of excluding it.
use cm_db::repo::node_metrics::EvalRow;
use cm_domain::NodeId;
/// Memory a phase VM claims. Re-exported from the executor so there is ONE number
/// — a scheduler and a launcher that disagree about VM size is a fleet that
/// overcommits by exactly their difference.
pub(crate) use crate::microvm_executor::MEM_MIB as MEM_PER_VM_MIB;
/// Held back for the host: the daemon, the OS, page cache, and the margin that
/// keeps a node out of swap. A node in swap makes every VM on it slow, so this is
/// cheaper than the alternative.
const HOST_RESERVE_MIB: i64 = 4096;
/// The floor we refuse to believe a host's own footprint is below. Without it, a
/// node reporting less used memory than its VMs have claimed would compute a
/// negative baseline and inflate its free memory.
const HOST_BASELINE_FLOOR_MIB: i64 = 2048;
/// Disk a VM may consume: an 8 GiB sparse rootfs plus room for the collected tar.
const DISK_PER_VM_GIB: i64 = 12;
/// Never let VM disk drive a node below this. `_outputs` and images live on the
/// same filesystem on some nodes.
const DISK_RESERVE_GIB: i64 = 20;
/// Health older than this and the node is ineligible. Deliberately close to the
/// 20s at which `fleet::spawn_node_sweeper` marks a node offline: the window in
/// which a node is "online with unreadable memory" should be narrow.
pub const MAX_HEALTH_AGE_SECS: f64 = 30.0;
/// Beszel metrics older than this rank as zero headroom. Only a tiebreak.
const MAX_METRICS_AGE_SECS: f64 = 60.0;
/// A node that can take at least one more phase VM.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub struct NodeCapacity {
pub node_id: NodeId,
pub name: String,
/// How many MORE 8 GiB VMs fit.
pub slots: i64,
pub headroom: f64,
pub committed_vms: i64,
pub mem_total_mib: i64,
pub used_eff_mib: i64,
pub disk_free_gib: i64,
}
/// Why a node cannot take this phase. Each renders a distinct, actionable line —
/// "at capacity" and "we could not read it" send an operator to different places.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum Unfit {
Draining,
NotConnected,
NoRecentHealth { age_secs: Option<f64> },
CapacityUnknown { err: String },
AtCapacity { committed: i64, used_eff_mib: i64, mem_total_mib: i64 },
NoDisk { free_gib: i64 },
}
impl Unfit {
pub fn reason(&self) -> String {
match self {
Unfit::Draining => "draining".into(),
Unfit::NotConnected => "daemon not connected".into(),
Unfit::NoRecentHealth { age_secs } => match age_secs {
Some(a) => format!("health {a:.0}s stale (max {MAX_HEALTH_AGE_SECS:.0}s)"),
None => "never reported health".into(),
},
Unfit::CapacityUnknown { err } => format!("could not read running VMs: {err}"),
Unfit::AtCapacity { committed, used_eff_mib, mem_total_mib } => format!(
"at capacity: {committed} VM(s), {used_eff_mib}/{mem_total_mib} MiB committed"
),
Unfit::NoDisk { free_gib } => format!("only {free_gib} GiB free"),
}
}
}
/// Why placement produced no node. Distinguished because the operator response
/// differs: wait, fix a daemon, or build an image.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum PlacementError {
/// No node has the image / KVM at all. Not a capacity problem.
NoCapableNode { backend: String, how_to_fix: String },
/// Every capable node is full. Transient — the caller should queue.
FleetAtCapacity { report: String },
/// We could not READ capacity. Must never be reported as "full".
FleetUnreadable { report: String },
}
impl PlacementError {
/// Whether the caller should wait and retry rather than fail the work.
pub fn is_transient(&self) -> bool {
matches!(
self,
PlacementError::FleetAtCapacity { .. } | PlacementError::FleetUnreadable { .. }
)
}
pub fn message(&self) -> String {
match self {
PlacementError::NoCapableNode { backend, how_to_fix } => {
format!("no online node can run backend {backend:?} — {how_to_fix}")
}
PlacementError::FleetAtCapacity { report } => format!(
"fleet at capacity — a phase VM runs up to 60 min; this phase waits for a slot.\n{report}"
),
PlacementError::FleetUnreadable { report } => format!(
"cannot read node capacity — this is NOT a full fleet; check the node daemons.\n{report}"
),
}
}
}
/// What the host itself costs, excluding its phase VMs.
///
/// With nothing committed the answer is simply what the node reports. With VMs
/// committed it cannot be measured, only remembered or inferred — and inference
/// is where this went wrong: subtracting the VMs' FULL 8 GiB claim from
/// observed usage assumes they have already consumed it. A VM booted seconds
/// ago holds about an eighth of that, so the subtraction goes negative, hits
/// the floor, and hands back memory the host is really using.
///
/// Measured on morpheus (31757 MiB total, 4314 MiB idle, 2 slots) with 2 VMs
/// committed and young: the inferred baseline collapsed to the 2048 floor,
/// freeing 2266 MiB — exactly enough to admit a 3rd VM to a 2-slot node. The
/// `capacity` harness scenario caught it on its first full run.
///
/// So prefer the remembered idle reading, and take the LARGER of it and the
/// inference: a host that has genuinely started doing non-VM work must not be
/// under-charged just because it was once idle at a lower number.
fn host_baseline(mem_used_mib: i64, committed_vms: i64, baseline_mib: Option<i64>) -> i64 {
if committed_vms <= 0 {
// Directly observable, and the only moment it is.
return mem_used_mib.max(HOST_BASELINE_FLOOR_MIB);
}
let inferred = mem_used_mib - committed_vms * MEM_PER_VM_MIB as i64;
inferred
.max(baseline_mib.unwrap_or(0))
.max(HOST_BASELINE_FLOOR_MIB)
}
/// The whole capacity decision for one node, as pure arithmetic.
///
/// Separated from every I/O concern so the numbers can be tested against measured
/// fleet values without a database, a hub, or a VM.
pub fn capacity_of(
node_id: NodeId,
name: &str,
mem_total_mib: i64,
mem_used_mib: i64,
disk_free_gib: i64,
committed_vms: i64,
// What this node used the last time it was seen with nothing committed.
// `None` before it has ever been observed idle.
baseline_mib: Option<i64>,
headroom: f64,
) -> Result<NodeCapacity, Unfit> {
let host_baseline = host_baseline(mem_used_mib, committed_vms, baseline_mib);
let committed_use = committed_vms * MEM_PER_VM_MIB as i64 + host_baseline;
// The worse of the two views. Observed alone under-counts a freshly booted
// VM; committed alone under-counts a host doing real work outside its VMs.
let used_eff = mem_used_mib.max(committed_use);
let free = mem_total_mib - used_eff - HOST_RESERVE_MIB;
let slots = if free <= 0 { 0 } else { free / MEM_PER_VM_MIB as i64 };
if disk_free_gib - DISK_PER_VM_GIB < DISK_RESERVE_GIB {
return Err(Unfit::NoDisk { free_gib: disk_free_gib });
}
if slots < 1 {
return Err(Unfit::AtCapacity {
committed: committed_vms,
used_eff_mib: used_eff,
mem_total_mib,
});
}
Ok(NodeCapacity {
node_id,
name: name.to_string(),
slots,
headroom,
committed_vms,
mem_total_mib,
used_eff_mib: used_eff,
disk_free_gib,
})
}
/// Admission inputs drawn from an `EvalRow`, or why the node is ineligible.
///
/// Fail-closed on stale or absent health: a node whose memory we cannot read is
/// one whose capacity we would be guessing at.
pub fn from_eval(
row: &EvalRow,
name: &str,
committed_vms: i64,
) -> Result<NodeCapacity, Unfit> {
if row.status == "draining" {
return Err(Unfit::Draining);
}
let fresh = row
.health_age_secs
.is_some_and(|a| a <= MAX_HEALTH_AGE_SECS);
let (Some(total), Some(used)) = (row.mem_total_bytes, row.mem_used_bytes) else {
return Err(Unfit::NoRecentHealth { age_secs: row.health_age_secs });
};
if !fresh || total <= 0 {
return Err(Unfit::NoRecentHealth { age_secs: row.health_age_secs });
}
const MIB: i64 = 1024 * 1024;
const GIB: i64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
capacity_of(
row.node_id,
name,
total / MIB,
used / MIB,
row.disk_free_bytes.unwrap_or(0) / GIB,
committed_vms,
row.mem_baseline_mib,
row.headroom_fresh(MAX_METRICS_AGE_SECS),
)
}
/// Rank admissible nodes: most free slots first, then live headroom, then id.
///
/// Slots before headroom SPREADS load rather than stacking it — two missions
/// launched together go to different machines. Headroom breaks ties with
/// real-time load, which is where a node mid-`cargo build` loses to an idle peer.
/// Node id last so the same fleet state always yields the same answer; the old
/// `last_seen DESC` made placement unreproducible between two identical runs.
pub fn rank(mut fit: Vec<NodeCapacity>) -> Vec<NodeCapacity> {
fit.sort_by(|a, b| {
b.slots
.cmp(&a.slots)
.then(
b.headroom
.partial_cmp(&a.headroom)
.unwrap_or(std::cmp::Ordering::Equal),
)
.then(a.node_id.as_uuid().cmp(&b.node_id.as_uuid()))
});
fit
}
/// One line per node, for logs and for the message an operator reads.
pub fn report(fit: &[NodeCapacity], unfit: &[(NodeId, String, Unfit)]) -> String {
let mut out = Vec::new();
for f in fit {
out.push(format!(
" {}: {} slot(s) free, {} VM(s) committed, {}/{} MiB, headroom {:.0}",
f.name, f.slots, f.committed_vms, f.used_eff_mib, f.mem_total_mib, f.headroom
));
}
for (_, name, why) in unfit {
out.push(format!(" {name}: UNFIT — {}", why.reason()));
}
if out.is_empty() {
out.push(" (no capable nodes)".into());
}
out.join("\n")
}
/// Count a node's commitments, unioning booted VMs with pinned-not-yet-booted
/// phases BY IDENTITY.
///
/// A composed graph's step VMs (`...-s0`, `-s1`) each count: each is a real
/// Firecracker process holding 8 GiB. A pinned phase counts only while no live VM
/// carries its id — otherwise the same claim would be counted twice and the fleet
/// would shrink by the number of phases currently starting.
pub fn commitments(live_vm_ids: &[String], pinned_keys: &[String]) -> i64 {
let live = live_vm_ids.len() as i64;
let unbooted = pinned_keys
.iter()
.filter(|k| !live_vm_ids.iter().any(|v| v.starts_with(k.as_str())))
.count() as i64;
live + unbooted
}
/// Every backend a phase needs on ONE node: the mission's, plus each backend
/// named by a node of its composed graph.
///
/// The roster stores them as `config.roster.nodes[].attrs.backend`, and they are
/// the reason this function exists. A 2-member roster with
/// `verifier@canary-claude` was placed on a node holding `claude` and not
/// `canary-claude`; the graph's first node ran, the second died with
/// `no rootfs for backend "canary-claude" on this node`, and the mission
/// delivered half its work and failed. Placement had asked only about the
/// mission's own backend, which was true and insufficient.
pub fn required_backends(mission_backend: Option<&str>, roster: Option<&serde_json::Value>) -> Vec<String> {
let mut out = vec![cm_db::repo::nodes::backend_key(mission_backend).to_string()];
if let Some(nodes) = roster.and_then(|r| r.get("nodes")).and_then(|n| n.as_array()) {
for n in nodes {
if let Some(b) = n
.get("attrs")
.and_then(|a| a.get("backend"))
.and_then(|b| b.as_str())
.filter(|b| !b.trim().is_empty())
{
out.push(b.to_string());
}
}
}
out.sort();
out.dedup();
out
}
/// Survey every capable node: which can take a phase VM, and why the rest cannot.
///
/// `vm_list` is asked of each candidate in parallel with a short deadline. A node
/// that will not answer is `CapacityUnknown` and therefore ineligible — we cannot
/// count what we cannot see, and guessing zero is how a node gets double-booked.
pub async fn survey(
pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
hub: &crate::fleet::NodeHub,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
// EVERY backend the work needs, not just the mission's. A composed graph
// runs on ONE node and its nodes may each name their own — the roster's
// whole purpose is an independent verifier on another provider — so the
// node has to hold all of their rootfs images.
backends: &[String],
) -> Result<(Vec<NodeCapacity>, Vec<(NodeId, String, Unfit)>), String> {
let candidates = cm_db::repo::nodes::online_for_backends(pool, workspace_id, backends)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("looking up nodes for backends {backends:?}: {e}"))?;
if candidates.is_empty() {
return Ok((Vec::new(), Vec::new()));
}
let evals = cm_db::repo::node_metrics::eval_all(pool)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("reading node metrics: {e}"))?;
let pinned = cm_db::repo::nodes::pinned_microvm_phases(pool, workspace_id)
.await
.map_err(|e| format!("reading pinned phases: {e}"))?;
let names = node_names(pool, workspace_id).await;
let mut fit = Vec::new();
let mut unfit = Vec::new();
for node in candidates {
let row = evals.iter().find(|e| e.node_id == node);
let name = names
.get(&node.as_uuid())
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(|| node.as_uuid().to_string()[..8].to_string());
// Not connected: nothing can be asked of it, and nothing can run on it.
if !hub.is_connected(node) {
unfit.push((node, name, Unfit::NotConnected));
continue;
}
let Some(row) = row else {
unfit.push((node, name, Unfit::NoRecentHealth { age_secs: None }));
continue;
};
// Commitments: booted VMs unioned with phases pinned here but not yet
// booted, by the deterministic id both sides agree on.
let live = match crate::microvm_client::list(hub, node).await {
Ok(v) => v,
Err(e) => {
unfit.push((node, name, Unfit::CapacityUnknown { err: e }));
continue;
}
};
let keys: Vec<String> = pinned
.iter()
.filter(|(n, _, _)| *n == node)
.map(|(_, phase, iter)| crate::microvm_executor::vm_id_for(*phase, *iter, None))
.collect();
let committed = commitments(&live, &keys);
// An idle node is the ONLY time its own footprint is measurable rather
// than inferred, so take the reading whenever we get one. Cheap: an
// UPDATE per idle node per survey, and it is what stops a young VM's
// unconsumed memory from being handed out a second time.
if committed == 0 {
if let Some(used) = row.mem_used_bytes.filter(|_| {
row.health_age_secs
.is_some_and(|a| a <= MAX_HEALTH_AGE_SECS)
}) {
let mib = used / (1024 * 1024);
if row.mem_baseline_mib != Some(mib) {
let _ = cm_db::repo::nodes::set_mem_baseline(pool, node, mib).await;
}
}
}
match from_eval(row, &name, committed) {
Ok(c) => fit.push(c),
Err(why) => unfit.push((node, name, why)),
}
}
Ok((rank(fit), unfit))
}
/// Node names for readable reports. A capacity report naming two machines
/// "New node" is a report nobody can act on.
async fn node_names(
pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
) -> std::collections::HashMap<uuid::Uuid, String> {
sqlx::query_as::<_, (uuid::Uuid, String)>(
"SELECT id, name FROM nodes WHERE workspace_id = $1",
)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await
.unwrap_or_default()
.into_iter()
.collect()
}
/// Choose a node for a phase, honouring an explicit target as a REQUEST.
///
/// `want` is honoured only if that node is genuinely admissible — the same
/// "a request, not a guarantee" rule the orchestrator already applied to
/// capability, now extended to capacity and draining.
pub async fn choose(
pool: &sqlx::PgPool,
hub: &crate::fleet::NodeHub,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
backends: &[String],
want: Option<uuid::Uuid>,
) -> Result<NodeId, PlacementError> {
let named = backends.join(", ");
let how_to_fix = format!(
"needs /dev/kvm + firecracker (scripts/fc-node-setup.sh) AND the {named} rootfs \
built on ONE node (scripts/fc-build-rootfs.sh <host> <image> <name>) — a \
composed graph runs on a single node, so that node needs every image its \
nodes ask for"
);
let (fit, unfit) = survey(pool, hub, workspace_id, backends).await.map_err(|e| {
PlacementError::FleetUnreadable { report: format!(" survey failed: {e}") }
})?;
if fit.is_empty() && unfit.is_empty() {
return Err(PlacementError::NoCapableNode {
backend: named,
how_to_fix,
});
}
let report = report(&fit, &unfit);
// `want` is ADVISORY, always. The only caller passes `missions.target_node_id`,
// which is simply where the PREVIOUS phase ran — not an operator's choice.
// Treating it as a requirement had two consequences, both wrong:
//
// - a previous node that had since filled up (or gone unreadable) failed
// the phase outright: `TargetUnfit` is not transient, so it never
// reached the queue. Note this was NOT the drain case — a draining node
// is already excluded by `online_for_backend`'s `status = 'online'`, so
// it never reaches `unfit` at all and the pin simply falls through.
// `drain-midmission` passes either way; the path it does not cover is
// "phase 1's node is now full", which is the one that used to fail.
// - and while the node stayed fit, every later phase went back to it
// regardless of ranking — accidental mission-to-node affinity, which
// this module's own header says must not exist.
//
// Mission state lives on the gateway (inject -> run -> collect -> destroy),
// so re-placing costs nothing. Prefer the pin when it still fits; say out
// loud why it did not when it does not, and rank as usual.
if let Some(want) = want {
if let Some(c) = fit.iter().find(|c| c.node_id.as_uuid() == want) {
return Ok(c.node_id);
}
if let Some((_, name, why)) = unfit.iter().find(|(n, _, _)| n.as_uuid() == want) {
eprintln!(
"vm_placement: the previous phase's node {name} is {} — re-placing this phase",
why.reason()
);
}
}
if let Some(best) = fit.into_iter().next() {
return Ok(best.node_id);
}
// Nothing fit. Distinguish "full" from "blind": an operator sent to look for
// a load problem that is really a dead daemon wastes the outage.
let blind = unfit.iter().all(|(_, _, w)| {
matches!(w, Unfit::CapacityUnknown { .. } | Unfit::NotConnected | Unfit::NoRecentHealth { .. })
});
Err(if blind {
PlacementError::FleetUnreadable { report }
} else {
PlacementError::FleetAtCapacity { report }
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn nid(n: u128) -> NodeId {
NodeId::from(uuid::Uuid::from_u128(n))
}
/// THE test. Measured on tank: 60 GiB total, and five VMs booted moments ago
/// showing only ~12 GiB used because the guests have not touched their claim.
///
/// Observed-usage-only arithmetic says (61440-12000-4096)/8192 = 5 more VMs.
/// The node has room for ONE. Booking those five is a node in swap, and every
/// VM on it slows down together.
/// A node whose VMs have not yet consumed their claim must not hand the
/// difference out again.
///
/// This is the bug the `capacity` harness scenario found on its first full
/// run — "morpheus peaked at 3 concurrent VM(s) with only 2 slot(s)" — and
/// the numbers here are that node's real ones. Idle it reports 4314 MiB of
/// 31757 and the survey correctly gives it 2 slots. Two VMs later, each
/// holding roughly 1 GiB of its 8 GiB, observed usage is ~6314 MiB;
/// inferring the baseline as 6314 - 16384 goes negative, clamps to the
/// 2048 floor, and invents 2266 MiB — exactly one more VM than exists.
/// A previous node that is no longer usable re-places the next phase; it
/// does not fail it.
///
/// `choose` treated `missions.target_node_id` — which is only ever "where
/// the last phase ran" — as a hard requirement, so a pinned node that had
/// since FILLED UP produced `TargetUnfit`, which is not transient, and the
/// phase failed instead of queueing or moving. It also gave every later
/// phase silent affinity back to the first node.
///
/// The drain case is not this one and never was: `online_for_backend`
/// filters on `status = 'online'`, so a draining node is not a candidate
/// and the pin falls through to ranking. `drain-midmission` passes on both
/// the old and new code, which is why the capacity half needs this test.
/// A composed graph's per-node backends are part of what placement needs.
///
/// The full harness found this: a 2-member roster with
/// `verifier@canary-claude` was placed on a node holding `claude` and not
/// `canary-claude`. The first graph node ran, the second died with
/// `no rootfs for backend "canary-claude" on this node`, and the mission
/// delivered half its work and failed. Placement had asked only about the
/// mission's own backend — true, and insufficient.
#[test]
fn a_composed_graph_needs_every_backend_its_nodes_name() {
let roster = serde_json::json!({
"kind": "pipeline",
"nodes": [
{"id": "n0", "role": "implementer"},
{"id": "n1", "role": "verifier", "attrs": {"backend": "canary-claude"}},
],
});
assert_eq!(
required_backends(Some("claude"), Some(&roster)),
vec!["canary-claude".to_string(), "claude".to_string()],
"both images have to be on the ONE node the graph runs on"
);
// A solo mission is unchanged — this must not make ordinary placement
// stricter than it was.
assert_eq!(required_backends(Some("claude"), None), vec!["claude"]);
assert_eq!(required_backends(None, None), vec!["default"]);
// A node with no explicit backend inherits the mission's, so it adds
// nothing. Deduped, or a 5-node graph would ask for `claude` five times
// and the containment query would still be right but the error message
// would be nonsense.
let inherit = serde_json::json!({"nodes": [
{"id": "n0", "role": "a"},
{"id": "n1", "role": "b", "attrs": {}},
{"id": "n2", "role": "c", "attrs": {"backend": ""}},
]});
assert_eq!(required_backends(Some("claude"), Some(&inherit)), vec!["claude"]);
}
#[test]
fn an_unfit_previous_node_is_re_placed_not_refused() {
let drained = uuid::Uuid::from_u128(1);
let healthy = capacity_of(nid(2), "tank", 61440, 6144, 800, 0, None, 90.0).unwrap();
// Stand in for `choose`'s decision: the pin is consulted, then dropped.
let fit = vec![healthy.clone()];
let picked = fit
.iter()
.find(|c| c.node_id.as_uuid() == drained)
.or_else(|| fit.first())
.expect("a fit node exists");
assert_eq!(
picked.node_id,
nid(2),
"with the pinned node absent from `fit`, ranking must still yield a node"
);
// And the error that used to be produced here no longer exists, so it
// cannot be reintroduced as a non-transient failure by accident.
for e in [
PlacementError::FleetAtCapacity { report: String::new() },
PlacementError::FleetUnreadable { report: String::new() },
] {
assert!(e.is_transient(), "both no-node outcomes must QUEUE, not fail");
}
}
#[test]
fn a_young_vms_unconsumed_memory_is_not_handed_out_twice() {
// Idle: the reading that gets remembered, and the slot count it implies.
let idle = capacity_of(nid(3), "morpheus", 31757, 4314, 312, 0, None, 90.0)
.expect("an idle morpheus fits VMs");
assert_eq!(idle.slots, 2, "idle capacity is the number we are defending");
// Two committed, both young. WITHOUT the remembered baseline this
// returned 1 slot and admitted a third VM.
let inferred = capacity_of(nid(3), "morpheus", 31757, 6314, 312, 2, None, 90.0);
assert!(
inferred.is_ok(),
"the old inference is preserved as the no-baseline fallback"
);
// WITH it, the node is correctly full.
let remembered = capacity_of(nid(3), "morpheus", 31757, 6314, 312, 2, Some(4314), 90.0);
assert!(
matches!(remembered, Err(Unfit::AtCapacity { committed: 2, .. })),
"a 2-slot node with 2 VMs committed is FULL, got {remembered:?}"
);
}
/// A host that starts doing real work outside its VMs is charged for it.
///
/// The remembered baseline is a floor, not a substitute. If it replaced the
/// inference outright, a node that was idle at 4 GiB and is now running a
/// 20 GiB build would still be scored as if it were idle — the same
/// over-commit, arrived at from the opposite direction.
#[test]
fn a_remembered_baseline_never_under_charges_a_busy_host() {
// 1 VM committed and consumed (8192), plus 20 GiB of non-VM work.
let used = 8192 + 20480;
let c = capacity_of(nid(3), "busy", 61440, used, 800, 1, Some(4096), 90.0)
.expect("still has room");
// Inference says 20480; the stale 4096 baseline must not win.
assert_eq!(c.used_eff_mib, used, "observed usage is charged in full");
}
#[test]
fn a_sold_out_node_is_not_mistaken_for_an_idle_one() {
let observed_only =
capacity_of(nid(1), "tank", 61440, 12000, 800, 0, None, 50.0).expect("fits");
assert_eq!(
observed_only.slots, 5,
"this is what utilisation alone claims — the bug being fixed"
);
let with_commitments =
capacity_of(nid(1), "tank", 61440, 12000, 800, 5, None, 50.0).expect("fits");
assert_eq!(
with_commitments.slots, 1,
"five 8 GiB claims are already spoken for, whatever the guests have touched"
);
}
/// The measured idle fleet. Numbers from `free`/`df` on the real machines, so
/// a future change to the constants has to face what it does to real nodes.
#[test]
fn the_measured_fleet_gets_the_slots_it_actually_has() {
// tank: 60 GiB, ~6 GiB used at idle.
let tank = capacity_of(nid(1), "tank", 61440, 6144, 869, 0, None, 90.0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(tank.slots, 6);
// architect: 60 GiB, ~7 GiB used.
let arch = capacity_of(nid(2), "architect", 61440, 7168, 388, 0, None, 90.0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(arch.slots, 6);
// morpheus: 31 GiB — deliberately the conservative 2, not 3. Three VMs
// would leave under 2 GiB for the host, which is where the OOM killer
// lives, and an OOM-killed VM looks like an agent that gave up.
let morph = capacity_of(nid(3), "morpheus", 31744, 5120, 312, 0, None, 90.0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(morph.slots, 2);
}
/// Spread, don't stack; then real load; then determinism.
#[test]
fn ranking_prefers_free_slots_then_headroom_then_a_stable_order() {
let a = capacity_of(nid(1), "a", 61440, 6144, 800, 0, None, 40.0).unwrap(); // 6 slots
let b = capacity_of(nid(2), "b", 61440, 6144, 800, 3, None, 90.0).unwrap(); // 3 slots
assert_eq!(rank(vec![b.clone(), a.clone()])[0].name, "a", "more slots wins");
// Equal slots → the node under less real load.
let busy = capacity_of(nid(3), "busy", 61440, 6144, 800, 0, None, 10.0).unwrap();
let idle = capacity_of(nid(4), "idle", 61440, 6144, 800, 0, None, 95.0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(rank(vec![busy.clone(), idle.clone()])[0].name, "idle");
// Equal on both → same answer twice. `last_seen DESC` could not promise this.
let x = capacity_of(nid(9), "x", 61440, 6144, 800, 0, None, 50.0).unwrap();
let y = capacity_of(nid(8), "y", 61440, 6144, 800, 0, None, 50.0).unwrap();
assert_eq!(rank(vec![x.clone(), y.clone()])[0].name, "y");
assert_eq!(rank(vec![y, x])[0].name, "y");
}
/// A booted VM and its pinned phase row are ONE claim, not two.
#[test]
fn commitments_union_by_identity_rather_than_adding() {
let live = vec!["m-abc123def456-0".to_string(), "m-abc123def456-0-s2".to_string()];
// Same phase as the live VMs: already counted.
assert_eq!(commitments(&live, &["m-abc123def456-0".to_string()]), 2);
// A different phase, pinned but not yet booted: a real additional claim.
assert_eq!(
commitments(&live, &["m-999888777666-0".to_string()]),
3,
"a phase chosen seconds ago holds 8 GiB no node can report yet"
);
assert_eq!(commitments(&[], &["m-1-0".into(), "m-2-0".into()]), 2);
}
/// Disk is a hard gate, and it is checked BEFORE capacity so the message
/// names the real problem.
#[test]
fn a_node_short_of_disk_is_refused_even_with_memory_to_spare() {
let e = capacity_of(nid(1), "tank", 61440, 6144, 25, 0, None, 90.0).unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(e, Unfit::NoDisk { free_gib: 25 }), "{e:?}");
assert!(e.reason().contains("25 GiB"));
}
/// Stale metrics may cost a tie; they may never win one, and they may never
/// exclude a node — that is health's job.
#[test]
fn stale_beszel_metrics_demote_but_do_not_exclude() {
let mut row = row_for(nid(1), 61440 * MIB_T, 6144 * MIB_T, 800 * GIB_T);
row.metrics_age_secs = Some(3600.0);
row.health_age_secs = Some(3.0);
row.cpu_pct = Some(5.0);
let fit = from_eval(&row, "tank", 0).expect("still eligible");
assert_eq!(fit.headroom, 95.0, "fresh health carries the headroom");
row.health_age_secs = Some(3600.0);
assert!(
matches!(from_eval(&row, "tank", 0), Err(Unfit::NoRecentHealth { .. })),
"stale HEALTH is exclusion, because memory is then a guess"
);
}
/// The two failures an operator must never confuse.
#[test]
fn unreadable_capacity_never_reads_as_a_full_fleet() {
let full = PlacementError::FleetAtCapacity { report: " tank: 0 slots".into() };
let blind = PlacementError::FleetUnreadable { report: " tank: UNFIT".into() };
assert!(full.message().contains("at capacity"));
assert!(blind.message().contains("cannot read"));
assert!(
!blind.message().contains("at capacity"),
"sends an operator hunting a load problem that does not exist"
);
assert!(full.is_transient() && blind.is_transient());
let missing = PlacementError::NoCapableNode {
backend: "claude".into(),
how_to_fix: "build the image".into(),
};
assert!(!missing.is_transient(), "a missing image will not fix itself by waiting");
}
const MIB_T: i64 = 1024 * 1024;
const GIB_T: i64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
fn row_for(node_id: NodeId, total: i64, used: i64, disk_free: i64) -> EvalRow {
EvalRow {
node_id,
workspace_id: cm_domain::WorkspaceId::from(uuid::Uuid::from_u128(1)),
status: "online".into(),
cpu_pct: None,
mem_pct: None,
disk_pct: None,
gpu_pct: None,
temp_max: None,
load1: None,
mem_total_bytes: Some(total),
mem_used_bytes: Some(used),
disk_free_bytes: Some(disk_free),
mem_baseline_mib: None,
health_age_secs: Some(3.0),
metrics_age_secs: Some(3.0),
}
}
/// A draining node is ineligible, not merely unattractive. The microVM path
/// never checked this before: a mission pinned before a drain kept feeding
/// VMs to a node an operator had cordoned.
#[test]
fn a_draining_node_is_ineligible() {
let mut row = row_for(nid(1), 61440 * MIB_T, 6144 * MIB_T, 800 * GIB_T);
row.status = "draining".into();
assert_eq!(from_eval(&row, "tank", 0), Err(Unfit::Draining));
}
}
+516
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@@ -0,0 +1,516 @@
//! The completion gate, moved into the agent's own loop.
//!
//! Every check this platform has on a phase runs **after** the agent has
//! finished: the evaluator judges `done_when`, capture notices that a coding
//! phase delivered nothing, and either verdict costs a whole new VM — a fresh
//! boot, a fresh inject, and an agent starting again with none of the context
//! that got it that far. Meanwhile the documented failure of a long-running
//! agent is that it *stops too early*.
//!
//! Claude Code's `Stop` hook is the seam. **Exit code 2 blocks the stop and
//! feeds stderr back to the model as the reason.** Measured, not read off docs —
//! an agent told "say hello and do nothing else", whose `Stop` hook exited 2
//! saying `evidence.txt` was missing, created `evidence.txt` and then stopped.
//!
//! # What it may and may not check
//!
//! Deliberately mechanical: whether the repository changed, and whether a
//! command the phase author wrote exits 0. NOT the `done_when` verdict — that is
//! an LLM judgement made host-side by a *different provider* on purpose
//! ([[evaluator-verification]]), and re-implementing it inside the VM would put
//! the agent's own environment in charge of grading the agent, which is the
//! correlated failure the independent judge exists to break.
//!
//! # The cap is load-bearing
//!
//! A gate with no ceiling turns a stuck agent into a wedged one: it would be
//! blocked, retry, be blocked again, and burn the hour-long turn budget instead
//! of failing in a way the operator can see. After [`MAX_BLOCKS`] the gate lets
//! the agent stop, records that it did, and leaves the verdict to the existing
//! post-hoc path — which still runs, unchanged.
//!
//! # Which hooks exist here
//!
//! `TaskCompleted` / `TeammateIdle` were the plan's chosen seam. Measured under
//! `claude -p`: they never fire, because no team forms in print mode at all.
//! `Stop`, `SubagentStop`, `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, `UserPromptSubmit` and
//! `SessionStart` do.
/// How many times the gate may refuse a stop before it gives up and lets the
/// agent finish. Three is enough for "you wrote nothing" → "you wrote something"
/// → "your check passes" without ever approaching the turn budget.
pub const MAX_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
/// The file the gate writes when it gives up and lets the agent stop with its
/// condition still failing.
///
/// A separate file rather than a line in the log, because the log is not
/// parseable for this: a block reason embeds the check's own output, and an
/// output line beginning `cap:` would read as a cap release that never happened.
///
/// It exists because the block COUNT cannot answer the question. Three blocks
/// followed by a stop that finally passed, and three blocks followed by a
/// release at the cap, both report `blocks: 3` — and they are opposite outcomes.
/// Without this, the second one completed the phase green.
pub const CAPPED_FILE: &str = "capped";
/// Where the gate lives in the guest.
///
/// Under `/root`, never under the repository. Anything written into
/// `/mission/repo` is collected and diffed, so a gate script placed there would
/// arrive in the user's delivered patch as if an agent had authored it.
pub const GATE_DIR: &str = "/root/gate";
/// What must hold before this phase's agent is allowed to stop.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct StopGate {
/// The phase must leave the repository changed. Set for coding phases that
/// have not declared `allow_empty` — the same rule
/// `empty_delivery_is_a_failure` applies post-hoc, applied while the agent
/// can still do something about it.
pub require_changes: bool,
/// `config.done_when_check`: a shell command, run in the repo, that must
/// exit 0. The deterministic half of a completion condition — a command,
/// not a judgement.
pub check: Option<String>,
}
impl StopGate {
/// The gate for a phase, or `None` when there is nothing to enforce.
///
/// `None` matters: installing a hook that can never block would still cost a
/// process per stop and would put a `--settings` flag on the command line
/// for no reason.
pub fn for_phase(kind: &str, config: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<StopGate> {
let allow_empty = config.get("allow_empty").and_then(|v| v.as_bool()) == Some(true);
let check = config
.get("done_when_check")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.map(str::to_string);
let require_changes = kind == "coding" && !allow_empty;
if !require_changes && check.is_none() {
return None;
}
Some(StopGate {
require_changes,
check,
})
}
/// The same gate, for ONE NODE of a composed run.
///
/// `require_changes` is a property of the phase, not of every node in it: a
/// graph whose second node reviews or verifies is *supposed* to leave the
/// tree alone, and a per-node gate would refuse its stop three times for
/// doing exactly its job. Dropping it loses nothing, because
/// `empty_delivery_is_a_failure` applies the same rule post-hoc to what the
/// phase as a whole delivered.
///
/// That "post-hoc" claim used to be written as covering the `check` too. It
/// did not: nothing outside this hook has ever re-run `done_when_check`, so
/// a release at [`MAX_BLOCKS`] completed the phase green with the check
/// still failing. [`CAPPED_FILE`] is what closes that.
///
/// A declared `check` DOES apply per node: it is a command the phase author
/// wrote, and every stage of the work should satisfy it.
pub fn per_node(self) -> Option<StopGate> {
self.check.map(|check| StopGate {
require_changes: false,
check: Some(check),
})
}
/// The hook script, as POSIX `sh`.
///
/// `repo` and `dir` are parameters rather than the constants above so a test
/// can run this script — the real one, not a paraphrase — against a real git
/// repository in a temp directory.
pub fn script(&self, repo: &str, dir: &str) -> String {
let mut s = String::from("#!/bin/sh\n# ClawMates stop gate. Exit 2 refuses the stop.\n");
s.push_str(&format!("REPO={}\nGATE={}\nMAX={MAX_BLOCKS}\n", q(repo), q(dir)));
s.push_str("N=$(cat \"$GATE/blocks\" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)\nreason=''\n");
if self.require_changes {
// Two questions, because either alone is answerable "no" by a
// perfectly good phase: an agent that committed its work leaves a
// clean tree, and an agent that did not commit leaves HEAD where it
// was. Only both together mean nothing happened.
s.push_str(
"BASE=$(cat \"$REPO/.git/clawmates-base\" 2>/dev/null || echo '')\n\
DIRTY=$(git -C \"$REPO\" status --porcelain 2>/dev/null | head -c 400)\n\
HEAD=$(git -C \"$REPO\" rev-parse HEAD 2>/dev/null || echo '')\n\
if [ -z \"$DIRTY\" ] && [ -n \"$BASE\" ] && [ \"$HEAD\" = \"$BASE\" ]; then\n\
\x20 reason='This phase has changed nothing: the working tree is clean and \
HEAD is still the commit you started from. Do the work the task describes \
and leave it in the tree. If the task genuinely requires no code change, \
say so explicitly in your final message.'\n\
fi\n",
);
}
if let Some(check) = &self.check {
s.push_str(&format!(
"if [ -z \"$reason\" ]; then\n\
\x20 out=$(cd \"$REPO\" && sh -c {} 2>&1); rc=$?\n\
\x20 if [ \"$rc\" -ne 0 ]; then\n\
\x20 reason=\"This phase's completion check exited $rc, so the work is not \
done yet. The check is: {}\n\nIts output:\n$(printf '%s' \"$out\" | tail -c 1500)\"\n\
\x20 fi\n\
fi\n",
q(check),
// Inside a double-quoted assignment, so the command text itself
// must not carry a `\"` or a `$` that the shell would expand.
check.replace('\\', "\\\\").replace('"', "'").replace('$', "\\$"),
));
}
s.push_str(
"if [ -z \"$reason\" ]; then echo pass >> \"$GATE/log\"; exit 0; fi\n\
if [ \"$N\" -ge \"$MAX\" ]; then\n\
\x20 echo \"cap: $reason\" >> \"$GATE/log\"\n\
\x20 echo 1 > \"$GATE/capped\"\n\
\x20 exit 0\n\
fi\n\
N=$((N+1)); echo \"$N\" > \"$GATE/blocks\"\n\
echo \"block $N: $reason\" >> \"$GATE/log\"\n\
printf '%s\\n' \"$reason\" >&2\n\
exit 2\n",
);
s
}
/// One shell command that writes the gate SCRIPT into the guest.
///
/// It deliberately does NOT write `settings.json`. It used to, and it wrote
/// the whole document — so the moment a second feature needed a hook, the
/// later writer would silently erase this one. The composed document is
/// built in exactly one place: [`crate::vm_tool_tap::guest_settings`].
///
/// Written by `printf` through an exec rather than injected as part of the
/// tar: the tar lands in `/mission/repo`, which is exactly where this must
/// not be.
pub fn install_command(&self, repo: &str, dir: &str) -> String {
format!(
"mkdir -p {d} && rm -f {d}/blocks {d}/log {d}/capped \
&& printf '%s' {script} > {d}/stop-gate.sh \
&& chmod +x {d}/stop-gate.sh",
d = dir,
script = q(&self.script(repo, dir)),
)
}
}
/// Single-quote for `sh`. Same rule as `microvm_executor::shell_quote`, kept
/// local so this module has no dependency on the executor it is used by.
fn q(s: &str) -> String {
format!("'{}'", s.replace('\'', r"'\''"))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use serde_json::json;
use std::path::Path;
use std::process::Command;
fn sh(script: &str, dir: &Path) -> std::process::Output {
let path = dir.join("stop-gate.sh");
std::fs::write(&path, script).unwrap();
Command::new("sh").arg(&path).output().expect("run the gate")
}
/// A git repo with one commit and the clone-point marker the real checkout
/// carries (`mission_workspace::record_base_commit` writes it).
fn repo_with_base(root: &Path) -> std::path::PathBuf {
let repo = root.join("repo");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo).unwrap();
let git = |args: &[&str]| {
let o = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&repo)
.args(args)
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(o.status.success(), "git {args:?}: {:?}", o);
};
git(&["init", "--quiet"]);
git(&["config", "user.email", "t@t"]);
git(&["config", "user.name", "T"]);
std::fs::write(repo.join("README.md"), "base\n").unwrap();
git(&["add", "."]);
git(&["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "base"]);
let head = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&repo)
.args(["rev-parse", "HEAD"])
.output()
.unwrap();
std::fs::write(
repo.join(".git/clawmates-base"),
String::from_utf8_lossy(&head.stdout).trim(),
)
.unwrap();
repo
}
/// The failure this exists for: an agent that stops having written nothing.
/// Post-hoc that costs a whole new VM; here it costs one sentence.
#[test]
fn an_agent_that_changed_nothing_is_not_allowed_to_stop() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: true,
check: None,
};
let script = gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &tmp.path().display().to_string());
let out = sh(&script, tmp.path());
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(2), "the stop must be refused");
let why = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
assert!(why.contains("changed nothing"), "{why}");
// Uncommitted work counts — the usual case, since the agent is told to
// leave its work in the tree rather than commit it.
std::fs::write(repo.join("new.rs"), "fn done() {}\n").unwrap();
let out = sh(&script, tmp.path());
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0), "{:?}", out);
}
/// The gate gives up after [`MAX_BLOCKS`] and lets the agent stop — and it
/// must LEAVE A MARK when it does. Nothing outside this hook ever runs a
/// `done_when_check`, so a silent release completed the phase green with its
/// condition still failing.
///
/// The two files say different things and both are needed: `blocks` reaches
/// 3 in this test AND in a run where the agent got it right on the fourth
/// try, so the count alone cannot tell success from surrender.
#[test]
fn a_gate_that_gives_up_records_that_it_gave_up() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let dir = tmp.path().display().to_string();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: false,
check: Some("exit 1".into()),
};
let script = gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &dir);
for n in 1..=MAX_BLOCKS {
let out = sh(&script, tmp.path());
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(2), "block {n} must refuse the stop");
assert!(
!tmp.path().join(CAPPED_FILE).exists(),
"the cap mark must not appear while the gate is still blocking"
);
}
// One more stop: the gate is out of blocks and must let the agent go.
let out = sh(&script, tmp.path());
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0), "at the cap the stop is allowed");
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.path().join(CAPPED_FILE))
.unwrap()
.trim(),
"1",
"the release must be recorded, or nothing downstream can see it"
);
}
/// The negative control for the mark: a gate whose check PASSES releases the
/// agent too, and that release must not be recorded as a surrender. Without
/// this, "always write the file" would pass the test above and fail every
/// healthy phase in production.
#[test]
fn a_gate_that_is_satisfied_leaves_no_cap_mark() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: false,
check: Some("true".into()),
};
let script = gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &tmp.path().display().to_string());
let out = sh(&script, tmp.path());
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0));
assert!(
!tmp.path().join(CAPPED_FILE).exists(),
"a satisfied gate must not look like one that gave up"
);
}
/// And committed work counts too. An agent that committed leaves a CLEAN
/// tree, so a gate that only looked at `git status` would refuse the stop of
/// a phase that had done everything asked of it.
#[test]
fn work_the_agent_committed_satisfies_the_gate() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
std::fs::write(repo.join("new.rs"), "fn done() {}\n").unwrap();
for args in [vec!["add", "."], vec!["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "work"]] {
Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&repo)
.args(&args)
.output()
.unwrap();
}
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: true,
check: None,
};
let out = sh(
&gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &tmp.path().display().to_string()),
tmp.path(),
);
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0), "{:?}", out);
}
/// The cap. Without it a stuck agent is blocked, retries, is blocked again,
/// and spends the whole hour-long turn budget instead of failing where an
/// operator can see it.
#[test]
fn the_gate_gives_up_after_the_cap_and_says_so() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: true,
check: None,
};
let script = gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &tmp.path().display().to_string());
for i in 1..=MAX_BLOCKS {
assert_eq!(
sh(&script, tmp.path()).status.code(),
Some(2),
"block {i} of {MAX_BLOCKS}"
);
}
assert_eq!(
sh(&script, tmp.path()).status.code(),
Some(0),
"past the cap the agent must be allowed to stop"
);
let log = std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.path().join("log")).unwrap();
assert!(log.contains("cap:"), "giving up is recorded: {log}");
assert_eq!(
std::fs::read_to_string(tmp.path().join("blocks"))
.unwrap()
.trim(),
MAX_BLOCKS.to_string(),
"and the count is exact, so the host can report it"
);
}
/// A phase-declared check runs in the repo, and its OUTPUT comes back — a
/// gate that said only "the check failed" would send the agent guessing.
#[test]
fn a_declared_check_must_pass_and_its_output_is_the_feedback() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: false,
check: Some("test -f wanted.txt || { echo 'wanted.txt is missing'; exit 3; }".into()),
};
let script = gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &tmp.path().display().to_string());
let out = sh(&script, tmp.path());
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(2));
let why = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
assert!(why.contains("exited 3"), "{why}");
assert!(why.contains("wanted.txt is missing"), "{why}");
std::fs::write(repo.join("wanted.txt"), "here\n").unwrap();
assert_eq!(sh(&script, tmp.path()).status.code(), Some(0));
}
/// A check with quotes, `$` and apostrophes is ordinary. It travels through
/// `sh -c` inside a script that itself travels through `sh -c` to reach the
/// guest, and a quoting bug at either layer would run something else.
#[test]
fn a_check_with_shell_metacharacters_survives_both_layers() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let repo = repo_with_base(tmp.path());
std::fs::write(repo.join("it's here.txt"), "x\n").unwrap();
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: false,
check: Some("test -f \"it's here.txt\" && echo $HOME > /dev/null".into()),
};
let out = sh(
&gate.script(&repo.display().to_string(), &tmp.path().display().to_string()),
tmp.path(),
);
assert_eq!(out.status.code(), Some(0), "{:?}", out);
// And the install command it is embedded in is still one shell argument.
let install = gate.install_command("/mission/repo", GATE_DIR);
assert!(install.contains("stop-gate.sh"), "{install}");
}
/// Nothing the gate writes may land under the repository: `/mission/repo` is
/// collected and diffed, so a file there arrives in the user's patch as if
/// an agent had written it.
#[test]
fn the_gate_never_writes_into_the_delivered_tree() {
let gate = StopGate {
require_changes: true,
check: Some("cargo test".into()),
};
assert!(GATE_DIR.starts_with("/root/"), "{GATE_DIR}");
let install = gate.install_command("/mission/repo", GATE_DIR);
for write in ["> /mission/repo", "/mission/repo/stop", "/mission/repo/.claude"] {
assert!(!install.contains(write), "{install}");
}
assert_eq!(
crate::vm_tool_tap::guest_settings(Some(GATE_DIR), None)["hooks"]["Stop"][0]["hooks"]
[0]["command"],
json!("/root/gate/stop-gate.sh")
);
}
/// A composed run's nodes must not each be held to "this phase changed
/// something". The graph's verifier node changes nothing BY DESIGN, and a
/// per-node gate would refuse its stop until the cap — three wasted agent
/// turns for doing its job correctly.
#[test]
fn a_composed_node_is_not_held_to_the_whole_phases_delivery() {
let phase = StopGate::for_phase("coding", &json!({})).unwrap();
assert!(phase.require_changes);
assert!(
phase.per_node().is_none(),
"with nothing but the delivery rule, a node has no gate at all"
);
let with_check =
StopGate::for_phase("coding", &json!({ "done_when_check": "cargo test" })).unwrap();
let node = with_check.per_node().expect("the declared check still applies");
assert!(!node.require_changes);
assert_eq!(node.check.as_deref(), Some("cargo test"));
}
/// A gate with nothing to enforce must not be installed at all — a hook that
/// can never block still costs a process per stop and a flag on the command
/// line.
#[test]
fn a_phase_with_nothing_to_enforce_gets_no_gate() {
let none = json!({});
assert!(StopGate::for_phase("research", &none).is_none());
assert!(StopGate::for_phase("coding", &json!({ "allow_empty": true })).is_none());
let coding = StopGate::for_phase("coding", &none).expect("a coding phase must deliver");
assert!(coding.require_changes);
assert!(coding.check.is_none());
// A declared check applies to any kind, including one that is allowed to
// change nothing — a verification phase's whole job is that check.
let verify = StopGate::for_phase(
"research",
&json!({ "allow_empty": true, "done_when_check": " ./verify.sh " }),
)
.expect("a declared check is a gate on its own");
assert!(!verify.require_changes);
assert_eq!(verify.check.as_deref(), Some("./verify.sh"));
}
}
+331
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
//! What the agent did inside a microVM, taken from Claude Code's own hooks.
//!
//! The microVM tier had no action channel at all: a phase ran, a diff came
//! back, and everything between was invisible. The seam is the same one
//! [`crate::vm_stop_gate`] proved works in this image — `PostToolUse` fires
//! under `claude -p`, measured, not read off documentation.
//!
//! # The observer must not become a participant
//!
//! The hook `exit 0`s unconditionally. A `PostToolUse` hook that exits non-zero
//! feeds its stderr back to the model, so a tap with a bug would start
//! *instructing* the agent it exists to watch — and the resulting transcript
//! would look like a model that lost the plot rather than a broken hook.
//!
//! # Never inside the repository
//!
//! Everything lives under `/root`. `/mission/repo` is collected and diffed, so
//! a tap file written there would arrive in the user's delivered patch as
//! though an agent had authored it — the same rule, and the same reason, as the
//! stop gate's [`crate::vm_stop_gate::GATE_DIR`].
use serde_json::{json, Value};
/// Where the tap writes in the guest. Under `/root`, never the repo.
pub const TAP_DIR: &str = "/root/tap";
/// The file the hook appends to, one JSON object per line.
pub const TAP_FILE: &str = "/root/tap/tools.jsonl";
/// The single settings document the guest agent runs with.
///
/// One path, because there is only ever one writer — see [`guest_settings`].
pub const SETTINGS_PATH: &str = "/root/guest-settings.json";
/// Read the tap out of the guest, before collection destroys the VM.
///
/// `|| true` so a phase whose agent called no tools — or where the hook never
/// fired — reads as empty rather than as a failed probe. The difference between
/// those two is the histogram in the log, not an error here.
pub const DRAIN_PROBE: &str = "cat /root/tap/tools.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true";
/// Read the tap from line `from` onward, so a repeated drain returns only what
/// is new.
///
/// A cursor rather than a re-read: the live drain runs every few seconds
/// against a file the agent is still appending to, and re-sending the whole
/// file each pass would record every tool call once per poll — a phase would
/// finish with its early files weighted by how long it ran.
///
/// `tail -n +N` is 1-based on the FIRST line to print, so `from` is a line
/// count already consumed and the probe asks for `from + 1`.
pub fn drain_from(from: usize) -> String {
format!("tail -n +{} {TAP_FILE} 2>/dev/null || true", from + 1)
}
/// How far a drain advanced the cursor — the number of LINES it consumed.
///
/// Counts every line, including blank ones, and that is the whole point. The
/// hook appends the event and then a newline of its own, so the tap is
/// `{json}\n\n{json}\n\n…` and `parse` skips the blanks. Advancing the cursor
/// by the number of PARSED events instead would leave it short by one line per
/// event, and `tail -n +N` would hand back events already recorded — every one
/// of them written again on the next poll, with nothing anywhere reporting it.
pub fn consumed_lines(raw: &str) -> usize {
raw.lines().count()
}
/// One observed tool call.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Observed {
pub tool: String,
/// The path the tool's **input** named, if any. From JSON, never prose.
pub path: Option<String>,
}
/// The hook script. Copies stdin verbatim to the tap file and gets out of the
/// way.
///
/// The parsing happens host-side, on purpose: a `jq` or `sed` pipeline in the
/// guest would need the tool's JSON schema baked into a shell script, inside an
/// image we do not rebuild for a parser change, with no way to tell a parse
/// failure from a quiet turn.
pub fn hook_script(dir: &str) -> String {
format!(
"#!/bin/sh\n\
# The tool tap. See cm-api/src/vm_tool_tap.rs.\n\
mkdir -p {dir} 2>/dev/null\n\
# `cat` of stdin, appended whole. One JSON object per line, because\n\
# Claude Code hands the hook one event per invocation.\n\
cat >> {dir}/tools.jsonl 2>/dev/null\n\
printf '\\n' >> {dir}/tools.jsonl 2>/dev/null\n\
# ALWAYS zero. A non-zero PostToolUse hook talks back to the model.\n\
exit 0\n"
)
}
/// The settings document for the guest, carrying **every** hook at once.
///
/// This function exists because the alternative — each feature writing its own
/// `settings.json` — is a silent clobber. The stop gate wrote the whole
/// document; a tap that did the same would erase the gate, and a coding phase
/// would then complete having written nothing, which is the exact failure the
/// gate exists to catch. One writer, one document, one test that both hooks
/// survive it.
///
/// `None` for either half means that hook is simply absent.
pub fn guest_settings(gate_dir: Option<&str>, tap_dir: Option<&str>) -> Value {
let mut hooks = serde_json::Map::new();
if let Some(dir) = gate_dir {
hooks.insert(
"Stop".into(),
json!([{ "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": format!("{dir}/stop-gate.sh") }] }]),
);
}
if let Some(dir) = tap_dir {
hooks.insert(
"PostToolUse".into(),
json!([{ "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": format!("{dir}/tap.sh") }] }]),
);
}
json!({ "hooks": Value::Object(hooks) })
}
/// One shell command that installs the tap.
///
/// Written by `printf` through an exec rather than injected with the workspace
/// tar: the tar lands in `/mission/repo`, which is exactly where this must not.
pub fn install_command(dir: &str) -> String {
format!(
"mkdir -p {dir} && rm -f {dir}/tools.jsonl \
&& printf '%s' {script} > {dir}/tap.sh && chmod +x {dir}/tap.sh",
dir = dir,
script = q(&hook_script(dir)),
)
}
/// Write the composed settings document.
pub fn settings_command(path: &str, settings: &Value) -> String {
format!("printf '%s' {} > {path}", q(&settings.to_string()))
}
/// Parse a drained tap.
///
/// Tolerant by construction: the file is appended to by a shell hook in a VM
/// that may be killed mid-write, so a truncated last line is expected and is
/// skipped rather than failing the whole drain. Losing the last tool call of a
/// phase costs one orb; losing all of them because of it would cost the tier.
pub fn parse(raw: &str) -> Vec<Observed> {
raw.lines()
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|l| !l.is_empty())
.filter_map(|line| {
let v: Value = serde_json::from_str(line).ok()?;
// Only tool events. The same hook file would carry others if the
// settings ever install one, and a `hook_event_name` we do not
// recognise must not be read as a tool named "".
let tool = v
.get("tool_name")
.or_else(|| v.get("toolName"))
.and_then(Value::as_str)?
.trim()
.to_string();
if tool.is_empty() {
return None;
}
let input = v
.get("tool_input")
.or_else(|| v.get("toolInput"))
.cloned()
.unwrap_or(Value::Null);
Some(Observed {
path: crate::mission_events::tool_path(&input),
tool,
})
})
.collect()
}
/// Single-quote for `sh`. Local copy, same rule as the stop gate's — these two
/// modules deliberately share no code, so neither can break the other.
fn q(s: &str) -> String {
format!("'{}'", s.replace('\'', r"'\''"))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// The gate and the tap must BOTH survive one settings document.
///
/// This is the whole reason `guest_settings` exists. Two writers each
/// producing a whole `settings.json` is not a merge conflict — the second
/// simply wins, no error, and the loser's hook never runs. When the loser is
/// the stop gate, a coding phase completes having written nothing: the exact
/// failure the gate was built to catch.
#[test]
fn both_hooks_survive_one_settings_document() {
let s = guest_settings(Some("/root/gate"), Some(TAP_DIR));
let hooks = s.get("hooks").expect("hooks");
assert_eq!(
hooks["Stop"][0]["hooks"][0]["command"],
json!("/root/gate/stop-gate.sh"),
"the stop gate must survive the tap being installed"
);
assert_eq!(
hooks["PostToolUse"][0]["hooks"][0]["command"],
json!("/root/tap/tap.sh")
);
}
/// Either half absent leaves the other exactly as it was.
#[test]
fn one_hook_alone_is_a_valid_document() {
let gate_only = guest_settings(Some("/root/gate"), None);
assert!(gate_only["hooks"].get("Stop").is_some());
assert!(gate_only["hooks"].get("PostToolUse").is_none());
let tap_only = guest_settings(None, Some(TAP_DIR));
assert!(tap_only["hooks"].get("Stop").is_none());
assert!(tap_only["hooks"].get("PostToolUse").is_some());
}
/// The observer must never talk back to the model.
#[test]
fn the_hook_always_exits_zero() {
let s = hook_script(TAP_DIR);
assert!(s.contains("exit 0"));
// No conditional exits at all: a `PostToolUse` hook that exits non-zero
// feeds stderr back to the agent, so the tap would become an instruction.
assert!(!s.contains("exit 1") && !s.contains("exit 2"), "{s}");
}
/// Nothing the tap writes may land in the delivered tree.
#[test]
fn the_tap_never_writes_into_the_repository() {
assert!(TAP_DIR.starts_with("/root/"));
assert!(TAP_FILE.starts_with("/root/"));
assert!(SETTINGS_PATH.starts_with("/root/"));
let cmd = install_command(TAP_DIR);
assert!(!cmd.contains("/mission/repo"), "{cmd}");
assert!(!hook_script(TAP_DIR).contains("/mission/repo"));
}
/// A real `PostToolUse` payload gives up its tool and its path — and a
/// truncated final line does not take the rest of the phase with it.
#[test]
fn a_drained_tap_parses_and_tolerates_a_torn_last_line() {
let raw = concat!(
r#"{"hook_event_name":"PostToolUse","tool_name":"Edit","#,
r#""tool_input":{"file_path":"/mission/repo/src/a.rs"}}"#,
"\n",
r#"{"hook_event_name":"PostToolUse","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"ls"}}"#,
"\n",
"\n",
// The VM was destroyed mid-write.
r#"{"hook_event_name":"PostToolUse","tool_name":"Wri"#,
);
assert_eq!(
parse(raw),
vec![
Observed { tool: "Edit".into(), path: Some("/mission/repo/src/a.rs".into()) },
Observed { tool: "Bash".into(), path: None },
]
);
}
/// Exactly one place in the tree writes the guest settings document.
///
/// The unit test above proves `guest_settings` composes correctly; it says
/// nothing about whether anyone bypasses it. A second `> …settings.json`
/// anywhere is the silent clobber itself, and it would pass every other
/// test in this file.
#[test]
fn nothing_else_writes_the_guest_settings() {
for (name, src) in [
("vm_stop_gate.rs", include_str!("vm_stop_gate.rs")),
("microvm_executor.rs", include_str!("microvm_executor.rs")),
] {
assert!(
!src.contains("> {d}/settings.json") && !src.contains("settings.json\","),
"{name} writes a settings document of its own; compose it through \
vm_tool_tap::guest_settings instead"
);
}
// And the one legitimate writer is this module's own helper.
let exec = include_str!("microvm_executor.rs");
assert_eq!(
exec.matches("vm_tool_tap::settings_command").count(),
1,
"the settings document must be written exactly once per turn"
);
}
/// The cursor must not re-read what it already returned.
///
/// Off by one here is not a crash, it is a double-count: `tail -n +1` and
/// `tail -n +2` both return output, and the wrong one quietly records every
/// early tool call once per poll.
#[test]
fn the_drain_cursor_asks_for_what_it_has_not_seen() {
assert!(drain_from(0).contains("tail -n +1 "));
assert!(drain_from(3).contains("tail -n +4 "));
assert!(drain_from(0).contains(TAP_FILE));
}
/// The cursor counts LINES, not events.
///
/// The hook writes the event and then a newline of its own, so a two-event
/// tap is four lines. Advancing by parsed-event count would leave the
/// cursor two lines short, `tail` would return both events again, and the
/// live drain would re-record everything it had already recorded — growing
/// worse the longer the turn ran, and silent throughout.
#[test]
fn the_cursor_counts_lines_not_events() {
let raw = concat!(
r#"{"tool_name":"Edit","tool_input":{"file_path":"a.rs"}}"#,
"\n\n",
r#"{"tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"ls"}}"#,
"\n\n",
);
assert_eq!(parse(raw).len(), 2, "two events");
assert_eq!(consumed_lines(raw), 4, "…written across four lines");
}
/// An event that is not a tool call is not a tool named "".
#[test]
fn a_non_tool_event_is_skipped() {
assert!(parse(r#"{"hook_event_name":"SessionStart","session_id":"x"}"#).is_empty());
assert!(parse(r#"{"tool_name":" ","tool_input":{}}"#).is_empty());
}
}
+143
View File
@@ -564,6 +564,109 @@ async fn a_failed_gate_publishes_to_a_wip_branch() {
);
}
/// #55: a mission whose checkout was re-cloned builds divergent history against
/// its OWN deterministic branch, and git rejects every push it will ever make.
/// That was terminal — the work stayed on a local branch in a directory that
/// gets reaped — and it is reachable from a retry, a container teardown, or disk
/// loss, not just from someone deleting a checkout by hand.
#[tokio::test]
async fn diverged_history_lands_on_a_new_branch_instead_of_being_lost() {
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let remote = tmp.path().join("remote.git");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&remote).unwrap();
Command::new("git")
.args(["init", "--bare", "--quiet"])
.arg(&remote)
.output()
.unwrap();
let branch = "clawmates/mission-test-dddddddd";
let url = remote.to_str().unwrap();
// The first attempt: a checkout that pushed its work and then vanished.
let first = seed_repo(tmp.path(), Uuid::now_v7());
std::fs::write(first.join("first.rs"), "fn first() {}\n").unwrap();
git(&first, &["add", "."]);
git(&first, &["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "first pass"]);
git(&first, &["checkout", "-B", branch]);
let one = mission_delivery::publish_phase_branch(
&first,
url,
branch,
mission_delivery::Gate::Always,
None,
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(one.pushed, "setup push failed: {:?}", one.error);
let claimed = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&remote)
.args(["rev-parse", branch])
.output()
.unwrap();
let claimed = String::from_utf8_lossy(&claimed.stdout).trim().to_string();
// The retry: a fresh clone of the same mission, so unrelated history under
// the same deterministic branch name.
let second = seed_repo(tmp.path(), Uuid::now_v7());
std::fs::write(second.join("second.rs"), "fn second() {}\n").unwrap();
git(&second, &["add", "."]);
git(&second, &["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "retry"]);
git(&second, &["checkout", "-B", branch]);
let out = mission_delivery::publish_phase_branch(
&second,
url,
branch,
mission_delivery::Gate::Always,
None,
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert!(
out.pushed,
"the retry's work never reached the forge: {:?}",
out.error
);
assert!(
out.branch.starts_with(branch) && out.branch != branch,
"it must land on a NEW ref, not the contested one: {}",
out.branch
);
let refs = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&remote)
.args(["for-each-ref", "--format=%(refname:short)"])
.output()
.unwrap();
let refs = String::from_utf8_lossy(&refs.stdout);
assert!(refs.contains(&out.branch), "refs: {refs}");
// NEVER force: the first attempt's ref still points where it did. Losing it
// to make this push look tidy would trade one lost copy of the work for
// another.
let still = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&remote)
.args(["rev-parse", branch])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(
String::from_utf8_lossy(&still.stdout).trim(),
claimed,
"the earlier attempt's branch was overwritten"
);
let show = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(&remote)
.args(["show", &format!("{}:second.rs", out.branch)])
.output()
.unwrap();
assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&show.stdout).contains("fn second()"));
}
/// An unreachable remote is a degraded success, not a failure: the patch and
/// the local branch both still exist.
#[tokio::test]
@@ -876,3 +979,43 @@ async fn an_unrunnable_suite_is_distinguishable_from_no_suite() {
"the two must be distinguishable — this is the whole point"
);
}
/// A COMMIT_EDITMSG left by the agent must not block delivery.
///
/// From mission 019fcd0c: the agent ran `git commit` itself, leaving
/// `.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG` owned by root at 0644, and the server's commit died
/// with "Permission denied". The mission produced correct work — a reviewed,
/// tested function — and delivered none of it.
///
/// A test process cannot own a file as another uid, so this asserts the
/// mechanism: whatever COMMIT_EDITMSG was there before, a delivery commit
/// still succeeds and the file is the one git just wrote.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_stale_commit_editmsg_does_not_block_delivery() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let mission = Uuid::now_v7();
let repo = seed_repo(tmp.path(), mission);
let (_, phase) = seed_mission_phase(&pool, mission).await;
// Stand in for the agent's leftover: content that must not survive.
let msg = repo.join(".git/COMMIT_EDITMSG");
std::fs::write(&msg, "LEFTOVER FROM THE AGENT\n").unwrap();
std::fs::write(repo.join("WORK.md"), "work\n").unwrap();
let cap = capture(&pool, tmp.path(), mission, phase)
.await
.unwrap()
.unwrap();
let commit = cap
.committed
.expect("delivery must commit despite a stale COMMIT_EDITMSG");
assert!(!commit.sha.is_empty());
let body = std::fs::read_to_string(&msg).unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
!body.contains("LEFTOVER FROM THE AGENT"),
"the stale message survived: {body:?}"
);
}
+116
View File
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ async fn seed_test_template(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> Uuid {
system_prompt: "Plan the feature. Break it into INT-XX items.",
skills: vec!["decompose-int-items".into()],
brain_seed: Some("# Planner\nBreak features into INT items."),
model: None,
},
team_templates::UpsertBuiltinRole {
slot: "coder",
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ async fn seed_test_template(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> Uuid {
system_prompt: "Implement one INT item at a time.",
skills: vec!["write-rust-current-edition".into()],
brain_seed: Some("# Coder\nOne INT per commit."),
model: None,
},
team_templates::UpsertBuiltinRole {
slot: "reviewer",
@@ -83,6 +85,9 @@ async fn seed_test_template(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> Uuid {
system_prompt: "Review each commit before merge.",
skills: vec!["code-review-checklist".into()],
brain_seed: None,
// The point of migration 0071: a reviewer that does NOT
// share a model with the coder it reviews.
model: Some("glm-4.7"),
},
],
},
@@ -258,3 +263,114 @@ async fn on_launch_no_template_hard_fails() {
.unwrap();
assert!(team_id.is_none());
}
/// Slice 5: an APPROVED roster outranks the team template.
///
/// The template gives every composed mission the same five roles on the same
/// image. A roster is the model's answer for THIS mission, and it is the only
/// path that carries a per-node backend — which is how a mission runs more than
/// one provider at all. If the template won, a heterogeneous roster would be
/// accepted, stored, and then silently ignored at launch.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_approved_roster_outranks_the_template() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = seed_workspace(&pool).await;
let template_id = seed_test_template(&pool).await;
let mission = seed_mission(&pool, ws, template_id, "roster beats template").await;
// With no roster, the shape comes from the template — the behaviour every
// composed mission had before this slice.
let from_template = mission_orchestrator::composed_graph(&pool, mission, &["mission"])
.await
.expect("template graph")
.expect("the template supplies a shape");
let template_nodes = from_template["nodes"].as_array().unwrap().len();
assert!(template_nodes >= 1);
assert!(
from_template["nodes"][0]["attrs"].get("backend").is_none(),
"a template cannot express a per-node backend — that is the gap the roster fills"
);
// Approve a roster the way the route does: the built graph under
// `config.roster`.
let roster = cm_api::mission_roster::Roster {
topology_kind: "pipeline".into(),
members: vec![
cm_api::mission_roster::RosterMember {
role: "implementer".into(),
backend: Some("claude".into()),
rationale: None,
},
cm_api::mission_roster::RosterMember {
role: "verifier".into(),
backend: Some("kimi".into()),
rationale: None,
},
],
};
let graph = roster.graph().expect("a runnable graph");
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE missions SET config = jsonb_set(config, '{roster}', $2::jsonb, true) WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(mission)
.bind(&graph)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
let chosen = mission_orchestrator::composed_graph(&pool, mission, &["mission"])
.await
.expect("roster graph")
.expect("the roster supplies a shape");
let nodes = chosen["nodes"].as_array().unwrap();
assert_eq!(nodes.len(), 2, "the roster's two nodes, not the template's");
assert_eq!(nodes[0]["role"], "implementer");
assert_eq!(nodes[0]["attrs"]["backend"], "claude");
assert_eq!(nodes[1]["attrs"]["backend"], "kimi");
}
/// Migration 0071: a template role may name its own model, and the claw minted
/// for it must actually run on that model.
///
/// Before this, `mint_team_from_template` bound EVERY role to one literal — so a
/// template whose whole point is an independent reviewer minted a reviewer
/// sharing a model with the coder it reviews. That is the correlated failure the
/// cross-provider judge exists to break, reintroduced one layer down.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_template_role_may_run_on_its_own_model() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = seed_workspace(&pool).await;
let user = seed_owner(&pool, ws).await;
let template_id = seed_test_template(&pool).await;
let mission = seed_mission(&pool, ws, template_id, "per-role models").await;
mission_orchestrator::on_launch(&pool, ws, user, mission, None)
.await
.expect("launch");
let rows: Vec<(String, Option<String>)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT job_title, model_binding FROM agents
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
ORDER BY job_title",
)
.bind(ws.as_uuid())
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
let by_role: std::collections::HashMap<_, _> = rows.into_iter().collect();
assert_eq!(
by_role.get("reviewer").and_then(|m| m.clone()).as_deref(),
Some("glm-4.7"),
"the reviewer must run the model its role names: {by_role:?}"
);
// And a role that names none still gets the mint's default, so every
// template written before 0071 behaves exactly as it did.
for silent in ["planner", "coder"] {
assert_eq!(
by_role.get(silent).and_then(|m| m.clone()).as_deref(),
Some("claude-sonnet-5"),
"{silent} named no model and must take the default"
);
}
}
+3
View File
@@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ async fn evaluations_are_unique_per_iteration_and_upsert() {
model: "runtime:coordinator".into(),
error: None,
checks: Vec::new(),
independent: false,
};
cm_api::evaluator::record(&pool, mission, phase, 0, &first)
.await
@@ -296,6 +297,7 @@ async fn evaluations_are_unique_per_iteration_and_upsert() {
exit_code: Some(0),
evidence: "exit status: 0".into(),
}],
independent: false,
};
cm_api::evaluator::record(&pool, mission, phase, 0, &second)
.await
@@ -353,6 +355,7 @@ async fn latest_returns_the_most_recent_iteration() {
model: "m".into(),
error: None,
checks: Vec::new(),
independent: false,
},
)
.await
+5 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ pub async fn charge(
pool: &PgPool,
workspace_id: WorkspaceId,
agent_id: AgentId,
run_id: Uuid,
// Optional: `usage_events.run_id` references `agent_runs`, and a topology
// turn has no row there — its id lives in `topology_runs`. Passing that id
// was a foreign-key violation, so mission usage went unrecorded. NULL is
// the honest value for a charge that is not an agent_run.
run_id: Option<Uuid>,
input_tokens: u64,
output_tokens: u64,
) -> Result<i64, BillingError> {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ async fn charges_span_lots_oldest_first_and_record_usage() {
.unwrap();
// 2500 tokens → 3 credits: drains the first lot (2) then one more.
let deducted = charge(&pool, ws.id, agent.id, run_id, 1500, 1000)
let deducted = charge(&pool, ws.id, agent.id, Some(run_id), 1500, 1000)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(deducted, 3);
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ async fn an_empty_workspace_records_usage_but_clamps_at_zero() {
.unwrap();
// Owes 5, only 1 available: deducts 1, balance hits zero, never negative.
let deducted = charge(&pool, ws.id, agent.id, run_id, 4000, 500)
let deducted = charge(&pool, ws.id, agent.id, Some(run_id), 4000, 500)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(deducted, 1);
@@ -113,3 +113,51 @@ pub async fn agents_for_template(
})
.collect())
}
/// A claw already in this workspace that can take this template role again.
///
/// The workforce is meant to be KEPT: a mission that needs a `coder` should
/// hire the one that already exists rather than mint a sixth. Without this,
/// every zeroclaw mission added a whole team to the roster permanently — they
/// are minted `lifecycle = 'permanent'` and nothing reaps them until the
/// mission itself is deleted — while each member was used exactly once.
///
/// A claw currently on a RUNNING mission is not offered. Two missions driving
/// the same ZeroClaw agent and the same `.brain` at once is a data race with a
/// model on the other end of it; minting a second claw is much cheaper than
/// reasoning about that.
///
/// Oldest first, so reuse concentrates on the same few claws and their brains
/// actually accumulate, instead of spreading thinly across a growing pool.
pub async fn reusable_claw(
pool: &PgPool,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
template_id: uuid::Uuid,
role_slot: &str,
) -> Result<Option<uuid::Uuid>, DbError> {
let row: Option<(uuid::Uuid,)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT a.id
FROM agents a
JOIN agent_template_link l ON l.agent_id = a.id
WHERE a.workspace_id = $1
AND a.deleted_at IS NULL
AND l.template_id = $2
AND l.role_slot = $3
AND NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1
FROM team_members tm
JOIN mission_teams mt ON mt.team_id = tm.team_id
JOIN missions m ON m.id = mt.mission_id
WHERE tm.claw_id = a.id
AND m.status = 'running'
)
ORDER BY a.created_at
LIMIT 1",
)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(template_id)
.bind(role_slot)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(|(id,)| id))
}
+47 -1
View File
@@ -64,6 +64,52 @@ pub async fn insert(pool: &PgPool, agent: &Agent, policy: &AccessPolicy) -> Resu
Ok(())
}
/// Fetch an agent even if it has been soft-deleted.
///
/// For the PURGE path only. `get` hides soft-deleted rows, which is right for
/// every read — but it also meant the hard purge could not see the rows it
/// exists to remove: a soft-deleted agent was unreachable from every route and
/// accumulated forever with no way out of the application. Four of them dated
/// from June before anyone noticed, because the UI correctly never showed them.
pub async fn get_any(pool: &PgPool, agent_id: AgentId) -> Result<Agent, DbError> {
// `sqlx::query_as` rather than the checked macro: this is the same columns
// as `get` minus one predicate, and adding a second compile-time query for
// that would mean regenerating the offline cache on every machine that
// builds this.
let row: Option<(
uuid::Uuid,
uuid::Uuid,
String,
String,
String,
String,
String,
String,
uuid::Uuid,
String,
)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id, workspace_id, name, job_title, system_prompt, avatar,
accent, wallpaper, managed_by, status
FROM agents WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(agent_id.as_uuid())
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await?;
let row = row.ok_or(DbError::NotFound)?;
Ok(Agent {
id: AgentId::from(row.0),
workspace_id: WorkspaceId::from(row.1),
name: row.2,
job_title: row.3,
system_prompt: row.4,
avatar: row.5,
accent: row.6,
wallpaper: row.7,
managed_by: UserId::from(row.8),
status: row.9.parse().expect("status CHECK constraint"),
})
}
pub async fn get(pool: &PgPool, agent_id: AgentId) -> Result<Agent, DbError> {
let row = sqlx::query!(
"SELECT id, workspace_id, name, job_title, system_prompt, avatar,
@@ -87,7 +133,7 @@ pub async fn get(pool: &PgPool, agent_id: AgentId) -> Result<Agent, DbError> {
})
}
/// Persist the model a claw was deployed with (e.g. "claude", "gemini",
/// Persist the model a claw was deployed with (e.g. "claude", "glm",
/// "glm-5.2") — the runtime config is otherwise the only record of it.
pub async fn set_model_binding(
pool: &PgPool,
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
//! Model-authored mission PLANS — the phase list — and whether a human
//! accepted them.
//!
//! See `migrations/0070_mission_plan_proposals.sql` for why a proposal is
//! persisted rather than applied on arrival.
use crate::DbError;
use serde_json::Value;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
pub struct MissionPlanProposal {
pub id: Uuid,
pub mission_id: Uuid,
pub plan: Value,
pub author_model: String,
pub status: String,
pub note: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub created_at: OffsetDateTime,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option")]
pub decided_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
}
pub async fn insert(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
mission_id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
plan: &Value,
author_model: &str,
) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_plan_proposals
(id, mission_id, workspace_id, plan, author_model)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(plan)
.bind(author_model)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Every proposal for a mission, newest first. Rejected ones are included on
/// purpose: what a human turned down is the only record of what the planner
/// gets wrong.
pub async fn list(
pool: &PgPool,
mission_id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Vec<MissionPlanProposal>, DbError> {
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, Uuid, Value, String, String, Option<String>, OffsetDateTime, Option<OffsetDateTime>)>(
"SELECT id, mission_id, plan, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at
FROM mission_plan_proposals
WHERE mission_id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2
ORDER BY created_at DESC",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(
|(id, mission_id, plan, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at)| {
MissionPlanProposal {
id,
mission_id,
plan,
author_model,
status,
note,
created_at,
decided_at,
}
},
)
.collect())
}
pub async fn get(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<MissionPlanProposal>, DbError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, Uuid, Value, String, String, Option<String>, OffsetDateTime, Option<OffsetDateTime>)>(
"SELECT id, mission_id, plan, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at
FROM mission_plan_proposals
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(
|(id, mission_id, plan, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at)| {
MissionPlanProposal {
id,
mission_id,
plan,
author_model,
status,
note,
created_at,
decided_at,
}
},
))
}
/// Approve a plan AND write its phases onto the mission, atomically.
///
/// One transaction, for the reason `mission_team_proposals::approve_and_apply`
/// documents: a two-statement version left a proposal marked `approved` against
/// a mission that never received it, and the partial unique index then makes
/// that state permanent.
///
/// The mission's existing phases are REPLACED. A plan is an answer to "what is
/// this mission", not an addition to the recipe's answer — merging the two would
/// produce a phase list neither the model nor the recipe author intended. Only a
/// draft mission is eligible (checked by the caller), so nothing in flight is
/// discarded.
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub async fn approve_and_apply(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
mission_id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
phases: &[(String, i32, Value)],
note: Option<&str>,
decided_by: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<bool, DbError> {
let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
let claimed = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_plan_proposals
SET status = 'approved', note = $3, decided_at = now(), decided_by = $4
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 AND status = 'proposed'",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(note)
.bind(decided_by)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?
.rows_affected();
if claimed != 1 {
tx.rollback().await?;
return Ok(false);
}
// Scoped by workspace on the mission, so a proposal cannot rewrite the
// phases of a mission in another workspace even if its own row were forged.
let owned: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT count(*) FROM missions WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await?;
if owned != 1 {
tx.rollback().await?;
return Err(DbError::NotFound);
}
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM mission_phases WHERE mission_id = $1")
.bind(mission_id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
for (kind, order_idx, config) in phases {
// `done_when` is PROMOTED out of the config into its column, exactly as
// `missions::create` does. The evaluator sweep filters on the column in
// SQL on every tick — a plan whose condition stayed in the JSONB blob
// would be stored, rendered, and never judged, which is the same shape
// as the unread `task` this whole registry exists because of.
let done_when = config
.get("done_when")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(str::trim)
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_phases
(id, mission_id, kind, order_idx, status, config, done_when, max_iterations)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'pending', $5, $6, 1)",
)
.bind(Uuid::now_v7())
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(kind)
.bind(order_idx)
.bind(config)
.bind(done_when)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
}
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Record a decision. Only a `proposed` row may be decided, so approving twice
/// — a double-click, a retried request — cannot re-apply a roster to a mission
/// that has since moved on. Returns whether this call was the one that decided.
pub async fn decide(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
status: &str,
note: Option<&str>,
decided_by: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<bool, DbError> {
let done = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_plan_proposals
SET status = $3, note = $4, decided_at = now(), decided_by = $5
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 AND status = 'proposed'",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(status)
.bind(note)
.bind(decided_by)
.execute(pool)
.await?
.rows_affected();
Ok(done == 1)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
//! Model-authored mission rosters, and whether a human accepted them.
//!
//! See `migrations/0070_mission_team_proposals.sql` for why a proposal is
//! persisted rather than applied on arrival.
use crate::DbError;
use serde_json::Value;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use time::OffsetDateTime;
use uuid::Uuid;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize)]
pub struct MissionTeamProposal {
pub id: Uuid,
pub mission_id: Uuid,
pub roster: Value,
pub author_model: String,
pub status: String,
pub note: Option<String>,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339")]
pub created_at: OffsetDateTime,
#[serde(with = "time::serde::rfc3339::option")]
pub decided_at: Option<OffsetDateTime>,
}
pub async fn insert(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
mission_id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
roster: &Value,
author_model: &str,
) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_team_proposals
(id, mission_id, workspace_id, roster, author_model)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(roster)
.bind(author_model)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Every proposal for a mission, newest first. Rejected ones are included on
/// purpose: what a human turned down is the only record of what the planner
/// gets wrong.
pub async fn list(
pool: &PgPool,
mission_id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Vec<MissionTeamProposal>, DbError> {
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, Uuid, Value, String, String, Option<String>, OffsetDateTime, Option<OffsetDateTime>)>(
"SELECT id, mission_id, roster, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at
FROM mission_team_proposals
WHERE mission_id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2
ORDER BY created_at DESC",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(
|(id, mission_id, roster, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at)| {
MissionTeamProposal {
id,
mission_id,
roster,
author_model,
status,
note,
created_at,
decided_at,
}
},
)
.collect())
}
pub async fn get(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<MissionTeamProposal>, DbError> {
let row = sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, Uuid, Value, String, String, Option<String>, OffsetDateTime, Option<OffsetDateTime>)>(
"SELECT id, mission_id, roster, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at
FROM mission_team_proposals
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(
|(id, mission_id, roster, author_model, status, note, created_at, decided_at)| {
MissionTeamProposal {
id,
mission_id,
roster,
author_model,
status,
note,
created_at,
decided_at,
}
},
))
}
/// Approve a proposal AND apply it to its mission, atomically.
///
/// One transaction, because the two halves are one decision. The first version
/// claimed the proposal and then wrote the mission in two statements, and
/// production found the hole on the first real approval: the write failed, the
/// claim stood, and the mission was left with no roster while its proposal said
/// `approved` — a state the partial unique index then makes permanent, since no
/// second proposal for that mission can ever be approved.
///
/// Returns false when the proposal was already decided (a double-clicked
/// approve), in which case nothing is written.
pub async fn approve_and_apply(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
mission_id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
graph: &Value,
note: Option<&str>,
decided_by: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<bool, DbError> {
let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
let claimed = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_team_proposals
SET status = 'approved', note = $3, decided_at = now(), decided_by = $4
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 AND status = 'proposed'",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(note)
.bind(decided_by)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?
.rows_affected();
if claimed != 1 {
tx.rollback().await?;
return Ok(false);
}
// `jsonb_set` REFUSES a scalar, and a mission created without a `config`
// stores jsonb `null` — a scalar. `coalesce` does not help: it guards SQL
// NULL, and this is a JSON null, which is a perfectly good non-NULL value of
// the wrong shape. Production hit this on the first real approval with
// "cannot set path in scalar".
let applied = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE missions
SET config = jsonb_set(
CASE WHEN jsonb_typeof(config) = 'object' THEN config ELSE '{}'::jsonb END,
'{roster}', $3::jsonb, true),
team_engine = 'composed',
updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(graph)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?
.rows_affected();
if applied != 1 {
tx.rollback().await?;
return Err(DbError::NotFound);
}
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(true)
}
/// Record a decision. Only a `proposed` row may be decided, so approving twice
/// — a double-click, a retried request — cannot re-apply a roster to a mission
/// that has since moved on. Returns whether this call was the one that decided.
pub async fn decide(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
workspace_id: Uuid,
status: &str,
note: Option<&str>,
decided_by: Option<Uuid>,
) -> Result<bool, DbError> {
let done = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_team_proposals
SET status = $3, note = $4, decided_at = now(), decided_by = $5
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 AND status = 'proposed'",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(status)
.bind(note)
.bind(decided_by)
.execute(pool)
.await?
.rows_affected();
Ok(done == 1)
}
+33 -5
View File
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ pub struct Mission {
pub runtime_kind: String,
/// FK → nodes(id); only relevant when runtime_kind = 'local_herdr'
pub target_node_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// Which per-CLI rootfs a `microvm` mission boots. NULL = the node's default
/// image. Read by placement (a node must HOLD this image) and by the executor
/// (it is passed to `vm_create`).
pub backend: Option<String>,
/// Per-mission ZeroClaw runtime container name (C3 workspace isolation).
/// Null until `mission_runtime::ensure_container` provisions it.
pub runtime_container_name: Option<String>,
@@ -129,6 +133,15 @@ pub struct NewMission<'a> {
/// Defaults to 'zeroclaw' when None.
pub runtime_kind: Option<&'a str>,
pub target_node_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// Which per-CLI image a `microvm` mission boots. NULL = the node's default
/// rootfs. Deliberately unconstrained in the schema: which images exist is a
/// property of the NODES, not of the database.
pub backend: Option<&'a str>,
/// Independent validator for this mission's verdicts. `None` = deployment
/// default; `Some("")` = explicitly none. See migration 0068.
pub validator_model: Option<&'a str>,
/// `"claude_code"` to ask for an agent team; `None` = solo. See 0069.
pub team_engine: Option<&'a str>,
pub phases: Vec<NewMissionPhase>,
}
@@ -157,9 +170,9 @@ pub async fn insert(pool: &PgPool, m: NewMission<'_>) -> Result<Uuid, DbError> {
"INSERT INTO missions
(id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, team_id,
team_template_id, repo_id, schedule, status, description, config,
runtime_kind, target_node_id)
runtime_kind, target_node_id, backend, validator_model, team_engine)
VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7,$8,'draft',$9,$10,
COALESCE($11,'zeroclaw'),$12)",
COALESCE($11,'zeroclaw'),$12,$13,$14,$15)",
)
.bind(mission_id)
.bind(m.workspace_id)
@@ -173,6 +186,9 @@ pub async fn insert(pool: &PgPool, m: NewMission<'_>) -> Result<Uuid, DbError> {
.bind(&m.config)
.bind(m.runtime_kind)
.bind(m.target_node_id)
.bind(m.backend)
.bind(m.validator_model)
.bind(m.team_engine)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
@@ -224,7 +240,7 @@ pub async fn get(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid, workspace_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<M
let row = sqlx::query(
"SELECT id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, team_id,
team_template_id, repo_id, schedule, status,
description, config, runtime_kind, target_node_id,
description, config, runtime_kind, target_node_id, backend,
runtime_container_name, runtime_endpoint, runtime_pairing_code,
created_at, updated_at, completed_at
FROM missions WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
@@ -247,6 +263,7 @@ pub async fn get(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid, workspace_id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<M
config: r.get("config"),
runtime_kind: r.get("runtime_kind"),
target_node_id: r.get("target_node_id"),
backend: r.get("backend"),
runtime_container_name: r.get("runtime_container_name"),
runtime_endpoint: r.get("runtime_endpoint"),
runtime_pairing_code: r.get("runtime_pairing_code"),
@@ -266,7 +283,7 @@ pub async fn list_by_workspace(
let rows = sqlx::query(
"SELECT id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, team_id,
team_template_id, repo_id, schedule, status,
description, config, runtime_kind, target_node_id,
description, config, runtime_kind, target_node_id, backend,
runtime_container_name, runtime_endpoint, runtime_pairing_code,
created_at, updated_at, completed_at
FROM missions WHERE workspace_id = $1
@@ -292,6 +309,7 @@ pub async fn list_by_workspace(
config: r.get("config"),
runtime_kind: r.get("runtime_kind"),
target_node_id: r.get("target_node_id"),
backend: r.get("backend"),
runtime_container_name: r.get("runtime_container_name"),
runtime_endpoint: r.get("runtime_endpoint"),
runtime_pairing_code: r.get("runtime_pairing_code"),
@@ -358,7 +376,7 @@ pub async fn set_runtime_binding(
endpoint: Option<&str>,
pairing_code: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query(
let r = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE missions
SET runtime_container_name = $3,
runtime_endpoint = $4,
@@ -373,6 +391,16 @@ pub async fn set_runtime_binding(
.bind(pairing_code)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
// A `WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2` that matches nothing is not an
// error to sqlx — it updates zero rows and returns Ok. That made a
// mismatched workspace indistinguishable from a successful bind, and the
// binding is what the sweeper uses to find a mission's container: a silent
// no-op here leaks a container with no record that anything went wrong.
// Callers log this rather than aborting, which is the point — it becomes
// visible instead of invisible.
if r.rows_affected() == 0 {
return Err(DbError::NotFound);
}
Ok(())
}
+2
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ pub mod fleet_beszel;
pub mod fleet_tailscale;
pub mod level_up;
pub mod messages;
pub mod mission_plan_proposals;
pub mod mission_team_proposals;
pub mod missions;
pub mod node_metrics;
pub mod node_rules;
+45 -1
View File
@@ -71,6 +71,22 @@ pub struct EvalRow {
pub gpu_pct: Option<f64>,
pub temp_max: Option<f64>,
pub load1: Option<f64>,
/// Absolute memory, for CAPACITY rather than utilisation. `mem_pct` cannot
/// answer "does another 8 GiB VM fit" — a node at 20% of 31 GiB and one at
/// 20% of 60 GiB report the same percentage and hold a different number of
/// VMs. From the 5s heartbeat, which is the only source with absolutes.
pub mem_total_bytes: Option<i64>,
pub mem_used_bytes: Option<i64>,
pub disk_free_bytes: Option<i64>,
/// Memory in use with no phase VMs committed, remembered from the last time
/// this node was observed idle. `None` until then, which makes placement
/// fall back to inferring it — the behaviour that over-committed morpheus.
pub mem_baseline_mib: Option<i64>,
/// Age of each source. Placement is fail-closed on stale health (a node whose
/// RAM we cannot read is one we are guessing at), and demotes rather than
/// excludes on stale Beszel metrics, which only ever break ties.
pub health_age_secs: Option<f64>,
pub metrics_age_secs: Option<f64>,
}
impl EvalRow {
@@ -91,6 +107,22 @@ impl EvalRow {
let used = self.cpu_pct.unwrap_or(0.0).max(self.mem_pct.unwrap_or(0.0));
100.0 - used
}
/// [`headroom`] when at least one source is recent, otherwise the WORST
/// possible score.
///
/// Used only as a placement TIEBREAK, never as an admission gate: stale
/// metrics may cost a node a tie, they may never win one. Admission is
/// decided by absolute memory from the heartbeat, which has its own
/// freshness check.
pub fn headroom_fresh(&self, max_age_secs: f64) -> f64 {
let fresh = |a: Option<f64>| a.is_some_and(|x| x <= max_age_secs);
if fresh(self.health_age_secs) || fresh(self.metrics_age_secs) {
self.headroom()
} else {
0.0
}
}
}
/// Every node's current metric scalars (merged Beszel + heartbeat health).
@@ -101,7 +133,13 @@ pub async fn eval_all(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Vec<EvalRow>, DbError> {
COALESCE(m.mem_pct, CASE WHEN h.mem_total > 0 THEN h.mem_used::float8 / h.mem_total * 100 END) AS mem_pct,
COALESCE(m.disk_pct, CASE WHEN h.disk_total > 0 THEN (h.disk_total - h.disk_free)::float8 / h.disk_total * 100 END) AS disk_pct,
m.gpu_pct, m.temp_max,
COALESCE(m.load1, h.load1) AS load1
COALESCE(m.load1, h.load1) AS load1,
h.mem_total AS mem_total_bytes,
h.mem_used AS mem_used_bytes,
h.disk_free AS disk_free_bytes,
n.mem_baseline_mib,
EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now() - h.captured_at)::float8 AS health_age_secs,
EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now() - m.updated_at)::float8 AS metrics_age_secs
FROM nodes n
LEFT JOIN node_health h ON h.node_id = n.id
LEFT JOIN node_metrics m ON m.node_id = n.id",
@@ -120,6 +158,12 @@ pub async fn eval_all(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Vec<EvalRow>, DbError> {
gpu_pct: r.get("gpu_pct"),
temp_max: r.get("temp_max"),
load1: r.get("load1"),
mem_total_bytes: r.get("mem_total_bytes"),
mem_used_bytes: r.get("mem_used_bytes"),
disk_free_bytes: r.get("disk_free_bytes"),
mem_baseline_mib: r.get("mem_baseline_mib"),
health_age_secs: r.get("health_age_secs"),
metrics_age_secs: r.get("metrics_age_secs"),
})
.collect())
}
+201
View File
@@ -178,6 +178,170 @@ pub async fn set_status(pool: &PgPool, id: NodeId, status: &str) -> Result<(), D
Ok(())
}
/// Record what a node reports it can host, for placement predicates.
///
/// Replaces rather than merges: the node sends its complete view on every
/// report, so a capability it has *stopped* having (firecracker uninstalled,
/// `/dev/kvm` gone after a reboot into a non-virt kernel) must disappear here
/// too. Merging would let a stale `true` survive forever.
pub async fn set_capabilities(
pool: &PgPool,
id: NodeId,
capabilities: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE nodes SET capabilities = $2 WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id.as_uuid())
.bind(capabilities)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Online nodes that report every one of `required` as `true`.
///
/// The predicate side of placement. Nothing is assumed: a node that has never
/// reported has `capabilities = '{}'`, which fails every requirement — an
/// unqueried node and an incapable node are treated identically, because
/// scheduling work onto a node whose abilities are unknown is how you get a
/// mission that cannot start and does not say why.
pub async fn online_with_capabilities(
pool: &PgPool,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
required: &[&str],
) -> Result<Vec<NodeId>, DbError> {
let needed: serde_json::Value = required
.iter()
.map(|k| ((*k).to_string(), serde_json::Value::Bool(true)))
.collect::<serde_json::Map<_, _>>()
.into();
let rows: Vec<(uuid::Uuid,)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id FROM nodes
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND status = 'online' AND capabilities @> $2
ORDER BY last_seen DESC NULLS LAST",
)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(&needed)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows.into_iter().map(|(id,)| NodeId::from(id)).collect())
}
/// Online nodes that can host a microVM **and** hold the image `backend` names.
///
/// KVM alone is the wrong predicate. The first real microVM mission was placed
/// on a node reporting `microvm: true` that did not have `rootfs-claude.ext4`;
/// it failed by name rather than booting the wrong image, but whether a mission
/// ran came down to which capable node was listed first.
///
/// `backend = None` means the node's default image, which reports itself as
/// `"default"` — so the requirement is never vacuous. A node running an older
/// daemon has no `rootfs` key at all and matches nothing, which is the same
/// treatment an unqueried node gets for every other capability: unknown is not
/// permission.
///
/// Capability only — this says a node COULD run the backend, not that it has room.
/// Capacity is `cm_api::vm_placement`'s job.
/// microVM phases already pinned to a node but whose VM may not exist yet.
///
/// The other half of "how much is this node committed to". `vm_list` reports
/// BOOTED VMs; between `phase_runner` choosing a node and the guest answering,
/// there is a window of seconds in which a phase is a real 8 GiB claim that no
/// node can report. Two missions launched together both survey a node as empty
/// and both land on it.
///
/// Returns (node, phase_id, iteration) so the caller can build the same
/// deterministic vm id the executor uses and union the two sets by identity
/// rather than adding them — a phase whose VM HAS booted must count once, not
/// twice.
pub async fn pinned_microvm_phases(
pool: &PgPool,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
) -> Result<Vec<(NodeId, uuid::Uuid, i32)>, DbError> {
let rows: Vec<(uuid::Uuid, uuid::Uuid, i32)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT m.target_node_id, p.id, p.iteration
FROM mission_phases p
JOIN missions m ON m.id = p.mission_id
WHERE m.workspace_id = $1
AND m.runtime_kind = 'microvm'
AND m.status = 'running'
AND m.target_node_id IS NOT NULL
-- `pending` counts: it is about to become a VM. `completed`/`failed`
-- do not: their VM is destroyed on every exit path of
-- `run_phase_in_vm`, so counting them would shrink the fleet by the
-- number of missions it has ever run.
AND p.status IN ('pending', 'running')",
)
.bind(workspace_id)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows
.into_iter()
.map(|(n, p, i)| (NodeId::from(n), p, i))
.collect())
}
pub async fn online_for_backend(
pool: &PgPool,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
backend: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Vec<NodeId>, DbError> {
online_for_backends(pool, workspace_id, &[backend_key(backend).to_string()]).await
}
/// Nodes that can run EVERY one of these backends.
///
/// A composed mission runs its whole graph on one node, and the graph's nodes
/// may each name their own backend — an independent verifier on another
/// provider is the entire point of the roster. Asking only for the mission's
/// backend placed such a mission on a node with `claude` and no
/// `canary-claude`, and the run died at the second graph node with
/// `no rootfs for backend "canary-claude" on this node`. The full harness
/// caught it; nothing before it had a reason to.
pub async fn online_for_backends(
pool: &PgPool,
workspace_id: uuid::Uuid,
backends: &[String],
) -> Result<Vec<NodeId>, DbError> {
// `@>` on the array asks "does this node's list contain ALL of these" —
// containment, not intersection, which is exactly the question here and the
// whole reason the node reports an array rather than a count.
let rows: Vec<(uuid::Uuid,)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT id FROM nodes
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND status = 'online'
AND capabilities @> '{\"microvm\": true}'::jsonb
AND capabilities -> 'rootfs' @> $2::jsonb
-- Deterministic, NOT `last_seen DESC`. Ranking now happens in
-- `cm_api::vm_placement`, against real capacity. Ordering by last_seen
-- and taking `.first()` was the placement algorithm until now: among
-- healthy nodes all heartbeating every 5s, that is arbitrary — it sent
-- concurrent missions to whichever node's packet landed most recently,
-- with no regard for what was already running there.
ORDER BY id",
)
.bind(workspace_id)
.bind(serde_json::Value::Array(
backends
.iter()
.map(|b| serde_json::Value::String(b.clone()))
.collect(),
))
.fetch_all(pool)
.await?;
Ok(rows.into_iter().map(|(id,)| NodeId::from(id)).collect())
}
/// The name a backend reports itself as in a node's `rootfs` list.
///
/// Must agree with `clawmates-node::microvm::rootfs_for`, which resolves the same
/// three spellings to the default image. If these two drift, placement promises
/// an image the booter cannot find — or refuses one it has.
pub fn backend_key(backend: Option<&str>) -> &str {
match backend {
None | Some("") | Some("default") => "default",
Some(b) => b,
}
}
/// Mark online nodes whose last heartbeat is older than `secs` as offline.
pub async fn mark_stale_offline(pool: &PgPool, secs: i64) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query(
@@ -242,3 +406,40 @@ fn map_node(r: sqlx::postgres::PgRow) -> NodeRow {
temp_max: r.get("m_temp_max"),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// The three spellings that mean "the node's default image" must all resolve
/// to the name the node actually advertises for it. A mismatch here makes
/// placement reject every node for an ordinary mission with no backend set.
#[test]
fn the_default_backend_has_one_name() {
for spelling in [None, Some(""), Some("default")] {
assert_eq!(backend_key(spelling), "default", "{spelling:?}");
}
}
/// And a named backend is passed through verbatim — it is matched against the
/// node's list, which is built from the filenames on its disk.
#[test]
fn a_named_backend_is_not_rewritten() {
assert_eq!(backend_key(Some("claude")), "claude");
assert_eq!(backend_key(Some("agent-terminal")), "agent-terminal");
}
}
/// Remember a node's idle memory footprint.
///
/// Only ever called with a reading taken while the node had ZERO phase VMs
/// committed — that is the one moment the number is honestly observable.
/// Writing it at any other time would record the VMs as part of the host.
pub async fn set_mem_baseline(pool: &PgPool, node_id: NodeId, mib: i64) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE nodes SET mem_baseline_mib = $2 WHERE id = $1")
.bind(node_id.as_uuid())
.bind(mib)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
+15 -4
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,12 @@ pub struct TemplateRole {
pub system_prompt: String,
pub skills: Vec<String>,
pub brain_seed: Option<String>,
/// Which model this role's claw runs on. `None` takes the mint's default —
/// which is what every role did unconditionally before migration 0071, and
/// why a template could not put its reviewer on a different model from the
/// coder it reviews.
#[serde(default)]
pub model: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
@@ -60,6 +66,8 @@ pub struct UpsertBuiltinRole<'a> {
pub system_prompt: &'a str,
pub skills: Vec<String>,
pub brain_seed: Option<&'a str>,
/// Optional per-role model. `None` leaves the mint's default in place.
pub model: Option<&'a str>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
@@ -138,13 +146,14 @@ pub async fn upsert_builtin(pool: &PgPool, b: UpsertBuiltin<'_>) -> Result<Uuid,
for r in &b.roles {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO template_roles
(template_id, slot, order_idx, system_prompt, skills, brain_seed)
VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6)
(template_id, slot, order_idx, system_prompt, skills, brain_seed, model)
VALUES ($1,$2,$3,$4,$5,$6,$7)
ON CONFLICT (template_id, slot) DO UPDATE SET
order_idx = EXCLUDED.order_idx,
system_prompt = EXCLUDED.system_prompt,
skills = EXCLUDED.skills,
brain_seed = EXCLUDED.brain_seed",
brain_seed = EXCLUDED.brain_seed,
model = EXCLUDED.model",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(r.slot)
@@ -152,6 +161,7 @@ pub async fn upsert_builtin(pool: &PgPool, b: UpsertBuiltin<'_>) -> Result<Uuid,
.bind(r.system_prompt)
.bind(&r.skills)
.bind(r.brain_seed)
.bind(r.model)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
}
@@ -226,7 +236,7 @@ pub async fn get(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<TeamTemplateDetail>,
return Ok(None);
};
let role_rows = sqlx::query(
"SELECT template_id, slot, order_idx, system_prompt, skills, brain_seed
"SELECT template_id, slot, order_idx, system_prompt, skills, brain_seed, model
FROM template_roles WHERE template_id = $1
ORDER BY order_idx ASC",
)
@@ -242,6 +252,7 @@ pub async fn get(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<TeamTemplateDetail>,
system_prompt: r.get("system_prompt"),
skills: r.get("skills"),
brain_seed: r.get("brain_seed"),
model: r.get("model"),
})
.collect();
Ok(Some(TeamTemplateDetail { template: t, roles }))
+111 -17
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,15 @@ pub struct ClaimedTopologyRun {
/// Deploy tier: `team` drives claws directly; `company`/`org` drive the
/// recursive sub-topology executor.
pub tier: String,
/// The mission this run belongs to, when it belongs to one. The composed
/// (`microvm_graph`) tier needs it: its nodes share the mission's checkout,
/// and that shared tree is how file work survives a node boundary.
pub mission_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// The mission phase, for the same reason — the phase and pass identify the
/// VMs a composed run may boot.
pub mission_phase_id: Option<Uuid>,
/// Which pass of the phase produced this run.
pub iteration: Option<i32>,
}
/// Lifecycle status + progress for a durable run (status endpoint).
@@ -203,51 +212,129 @@ pub async fn check_ephemeral_teardown(
}))
}
/// Tiers the topology worker drives, and therefore the only ones it may claim,
/// requeue or reap.
///
/// **A load-bearing allowlist, not tidiness.** Both sweepers were written when
/// every `running` row was a `cm_orchestrator` job that checkpointed after each
/// step. `tier='microvm'` and `tier='session'` broke that assumption: they are
/// inserted directly as `running` by `phase_runner`, driven by a `tokio::spawn`
/// that owns them start to finish, and they never write `updated_at` or
/// `checkpoint` while in flight.
///
/// Measured cost of the omission: `requeue_stale` flipped an in-flight microVM run
/// to `queued` at 180s, `claim_next_queued` handed it to the worker, and the worker
/// failed it with "missing or invalid graph" — a microvm run's graph is a
/// placeholder `TopologyGraph` cannot parse. Mission 019fd43e died at 210 seconds
/// with its agent still working and its VM orphaned. Every microVM mission that
/// appeared to work did so only by finishing inside three minutes.
///
/// An allowlist rather than a denylist on purpose: the next self-driven tier is
/// then safe by default, instead of exposed until someone remembers this file.
pub const WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS: &[&str] = &[
"team",
"company",
"org",
"swarm",
"compare",
// The composed engines: a ZeroClaw graph whose every node is a
// Claude-Code-in-a-microVM session. Worker-driven BY DESIGN — the outer
// graph's durability (checkpoint, resume, cancellation) is the entire reason
// the tier exists, and it comes from being claimed like any other job. It
// survives `requeue_stale` because the executor touches `updated_at` from a
// ticker for the whole length of a VM turn, not only between steps.
"microvm_graph",
];
/// Tiers the stuck-run reaper may fail.
///
/// A subset of [`WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS`], and the difference matters. The reaper
/// asks "has this run journaled a step within 15 minutes of being CREATED?",
/// which assumes a step is short. A `microvm_graph` node is a whole agent session
/// in a VM with an hour's budget, so a healthy composed run can legitimately
/// journal nothing for far longer than the reaper's patience — it would kill the
/// run and orphan a live VM, which is #54 wearing a different tier.
///
/// Losing the reaper for that tier costs little: a composed run that genuinely
/// wedges stops touching `updated_at` and `requeue_stale` recovers it at 180s,
/// which is the mechanism the reaper was a backstop for in the first place.
pub const REAPABLE_TIERS: &[&str] = &["team", "company", "org", "swarm", "compare"];
/// The allowlist as owned strings, for binding as `text[]`.
fn worker_driven() -> Vec<String> {
WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.iter().map(|s| (*s).to_string()).collect()
}
/// Atomically claim the oldest queued job, flipping it to `running`. Uses
/// `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` so multiple workers never claim the same job.
/// Returns `None` when the queue is empty.
pub async fn claim_next_queued(pool: &PgPool) -> Result<Option<ClaimedTopologyRun>, DbError> {
let row = sqlx::query!(
use sqlx::Row as _;
// A runtime query rather than `query!` so the tier allowlist can be bound
// without regenerating the offline metadata on a machine with no database.
let row = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE topology_runs
SET status = 'running', started_at = COALESCE(started_at, now()), updated_at = now()
WHERE id = (
SELECT id FROM topology_runs
WHERE status = 'queued'
-- Defence in depth. Even if a self-driven row somehow reaches
-- `queued`, the worker must not adopt a job it cannot execute:
-- doing so is what turned a live microVM run into a
-- missing-or-invalid-graph failure.
AND tier = ANY($1)
ORDER BY created_at
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED
LIMIT 1
)
RETURNING id, workspace_id, task, graph, checkpoint, last_event_id, tier",
RETURNING id, workspace_id, task, graph, checkpoint, last_event_id, tier,
mission_id, mission_phase_id, iteration",
)
.bind(worker_driven())
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await?;
Ok(row.map(|r| ClaimedTopologyRun {
id: r.id,
workspace_id: r.workspace_id,
task: r.task,
graph: r.graph,
checkpoint: r.checkpoint,
last_event_id: r.last_event_id,
tier: r.tier,
id: r.get("id"),
workspace_id: r.get("workspace_id"),
task: r.get("task"),
graph: r.get("graph"),
checkpoint: r.get("checkpoint"),
last_event_id: r.get("last_event_id"),
tier: r.get("tier"),
mission_id: r.get("mission_id"),
mission_phase_id: r.get("mission_phase_id"),
iteration: r.get("iteration"),
}))
}
/// Persist mid-run progress: the completed-step checkpoint + journal offset.
/// Touches `updated_at` so the stale-run sweeper treats the job as alive.
///
/// MERGES rather than replaces. This is not cosmetic: a second writer appends
/// live agent output under `checkpoint.log` (see `fleet.rs`, `Uplink::VmOut`),
/// and a composed run checkpoints after EVERY graph node. With `SET checkpoint =
/// $2` each node's progress silently wiped the log written during it, so a
/// composed mission finished with a full `records` array and no output at all —
/// while a solo mission, which has no second writer, streamed fine. The keys are
/// disjoint, so the progress object still wins for everything it owns.
pub async fn checkpoint(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
checkpoint: &Value,
last_event_id: i64,
) -> Result<(), DbError> {
sqlx::query!(
// `query` rather than `query!`: the macro verifies against a cached schema
// that would need regenerating for this SQL, and the bind types here are
// unambiguous.
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE topology_runs
SET checkpoint = $2, last_event_id = $3, updated_at = now()
SET checkpoint = COALESCE(checkpoint, '{}'::jsonb) || $2,
last_event_id = $3, updated_at = now()
WHERE id = $1",
id,
checkpoint,
last_event_id,
)
.bind(id)
.bind(checkpoint)
.bind(last_event_id)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
@@ -325,12 +412,19 @@ pub async fn current_status(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<String>, D
/// touch within `older_than_secs`). The next claim resumes them from checkpoint.
/// Returns how many were requeued.
pub async fn requeue_stale(pool: &PgPool, older_than_secs: f64) -> Result<u64, DbError> {
let result = sqlx::query!(
let result = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE topology_runs
SET status = 'queued', updated_at = now()
WHERE status = 'running' AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)",
older_than_secs,
WHERE status = 'running'
AND updated_at < now() - make_interval(secs => $1)
-- Only jobs the WORKER drives. A self-driven run (microvm, session) is
-- owned by its own task for its whole life and never touches
-- `updated_at`, so without this every one of them looked stale after
-- three minutes and was requeued out from under a live VM.
AND tier = ANY($2)",
)
.bind(older_than_secs)
.bind(worker_driven())
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(result.rows_affected())
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
//! Approving a plan rewrites a mission's phases — atomically, and with
//! `done_when` promoted into the column the evaluator actually reads.
use cm_db::repo::mission_plan_proposals as plans;
use cm_domain::WorkspaceId;
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use uuid::Uuid;
async fn workspace(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> WorkspaceId {
let ws = cm_domain::Workspace {
id: WorkspaceId::new(),
name: "Plan".into(),
plan: "team".into(),
};
cm_db::repo::workspaces::insert(pool, &ws).await.expect("workspace");
ws.id
}
/// A mission with the recipe-derived phases a plan is meant to replace.
async fn mission_with_phases(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, ws: WorkspaceId) -> Uuid {
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO missions (id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, status, schedule, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'plan test', 'research_and_code', 'draft', '{}'::jsonb, 'null'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(ws.as_uuid())
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("insert mission");
for (kind, idx) in [("research", 0), ("coding", 1)] {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_phases (id, mission_id, kind, order_idx, status, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, 'pending', '{}'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(Uuid::now_v7())
.bind(id)
.bind(kind)
.bind(idx)
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("insert phase");
}
id
}
fn a_plan() -> Value {
json!({"phases": [{"kind": "coding", "task": "do the thing", "done_when": "FILE.md exists"}]})
}
fn phases() -> Vec<(String, i32, Value)> {
vec![(
"coding".to_string(),
0,
json!({"task": "do the thing", "done_when": "FILE.md exists"}),
)]
}
/// The plan REPLACES the recipe's phases — a plan is an answer to "what is this
/// mission", not an addition to one.
#[tokio::test]
async fn an_approved_plan_replaces_the_missions_phases() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission_with_phases(&pool, ws).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
plans::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &a_plan(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
assert!(plans::approve_and_apply(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &phases(), None, None)
.await
.expect("apply"));
let rows: Vec<(String, i32, Option<String>, i32)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT kind, order_idx, done_when, max_iterations FROM mission_phases
WHERE mission_id = $1 ORDER BY order_idx",
)
.bind(m)
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(rows.len(), 1, "the two recipe phases must be gone: {rows:?}");
assert_eq!(rows[0].0, "coding");
assert_eq!(rows[0].1, 0);
// THE assertion. `done_when` lives in a COLUMN because the evaluator sweep
// filters on it in SQL every tick; a plan whose condition stayed in the
// JSONB blob would be stored, rendered, and never judged.
assert_eq!(
rows[0].2.as_deref(),
Some("FILE.md exists"),
"done_when must be promoted out of the config, or nothing ever judges it"
);
assert_eq!(rows[0].3, 1);
}
/// Claim and apply are one decision. A proposal marked `approved` against a
/// mission whose phases were never rewritten is permanent — the partial unique
/// index blocks every later approval.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_failed_apply_leaves_the_proposal_undecided() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission_with_phases(&pool, ws).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
plans::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &a_plan(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
// Another workspace's id: the mission-ownership check inside the
// transaction must fail and undo the claim.
let other = workspace(&pool).await;
let err = plans::approve_and_apply(&pool, id, m, other.as_uuid().to_owned(), &phases(), None, None).await;
assert!(err.is_ok() || err.is_err());
let rows = plans::list(&pool, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("list");
assert_eq!(
rows[0].status, "proposed",
"the claim must be rolled back, or this proposal is stuck approved forever"
);
// And the mission's original phases are untouched.
let n: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT count(*) FROM mission_phases WHERE mission_id = $1")
.bind(m)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(n, 2, "a failed apply must not have deleted the existing phases");
}
/// At most one approved plan per mission: two would be two answers to "what is
/// this mission", and the phase table holds one.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_mission_cannot_have_two_approved_plans() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission_with_phases(&pool, ws).await;
let (a, b) = (Uuid::now_v7(), Uuid::now_v7());
for id in [a, b] {
plans::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &a_plan(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
}
assert!(plans::approve_and_apply(&pool, a, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &phases(), None, None)
.await
.expect("approve a"));
let second = plans::approve_and_apply(&pool, b, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &phases(), None, None).await;
assert!(second.is_err(), "a second approved plan was allowed: {second:?}");
}
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
//! A mission may have many proposals and at most one approved roster.
//!
//! Both properties are enforced in SQL rather than in the handler, and both
//! matter for the same reason: the composed executor reads ONE field for what
//! shape a mission is, so a second approval would silently win by being written
//! last.
use cm_db::repo::mission_team_proposals as proposals;
use cm_domain::WorkspaceId;
use serde_json::json;
use uuid::Uuid;
async fn workspace(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> WorkspaceId {
let ws = cm_domain::Workspace {
id: WorkspaceId::new(),
name: "Roster".into(),
plan: "team".into(),
};
cm_db::repo::workspaces::insert(pool, &ws).await.expect("workspace");
ws.id
}
/// A mission row to hang proposals off — `mission_id` is a real FK.
async fn mission(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, ws: WorkspaceId) -> Uuid {
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO missions (id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, status, schedule, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'roster test', 'research_and_code', 'draft', '{}'::jsonb, '{}'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(ws.as_uuid())
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("insert mission");
id
}
fn roster() -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"topology_kind": "pipeline",
"members": [
{"role": "implementer"},
{"role": "verifier", "backend": "kimi"}
]
})
}
/// The whole point of persisting: a proposal is a record, not a click. It
/// arrives `proposed`, applied to nothing.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_proposal_arrives_undecided_and_is_listed() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission(&pool, ws).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
proposals::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &roster(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
let rows = proposals::list(&pool, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("list");
assert_eq!(rows.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(rows[0].status, "proposed");
assert_eq!(rows[0].author_model, "claude-opus-4-8");
assert!(rows[0].decided_at.is_none());
assert_eq!(rows[0].roster["members"][1]["backend"], "kimi");
}
/// Deciding twice must not decide twice. A double-clicked approve, or a retried
/// request, would otherwise re-apply a roster to a mission that has moved on.
#[tokio::test]
async fn only_the_first_decision_counts() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission(&pool, ws).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
proposals::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &roster(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
let first = proposals::decide(&pool, id, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), "approved", None, None)
.await
.expect("decide");
assert!(first, "the first approval must claim the proposal");
let second = proposals::decide(&pool, id, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), "rejected", None, None)
.await
.expect("decide");
assert!(!second, "a decided proposal must not be re-decided");
let rows = proposals::list(&pool, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("list");
assert_eq!(rows[0].status, "approved", "and the first decision stands");
assert!(rows[0].decided_at.is_some());
}
/// At most one approved roster per mission, enforced by a partial unique index.
/// Two approved proposals are two answers to "what shape is this mission".
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_mission_cannot_have_two_approved_rosters() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission(&pool, ws).await;
let a = Uuid::now_v7();
let b = Uuid::now_v7();
for id in [a, b] {
proposals::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &roster(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
}
assert!(proposals::decide(&pool, a, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), "approved", None, None)
.await
.expect("approve a"));
// The second approval must be REFUSED by the database, not merely lose a
// race in the handler.
let second = proposals::decide(&pool, b, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), "approved", None, None).await;
assert!(second.is_err(), "a second approved roster was allowed: {second:?}");
// Rejecting it is still fine — the constraint is on approvals only, and the
// ones a human turned down are the record of what the planner gets wrong.
assert!(proposals::decide(&pool, b, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), "rejected", Some("too many VMs"), None)
.await
.expect("reject b"));
let rows = proposals::list(&pool, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("list");
assert_eq!(rows.len(), 2, "a rejected proposal is kept, not deleted");
assert!(rows.iter().any(|r| r.status == "rejected" && r.note.as_deref() == Some("too many VMs")));
}
/// Another workspace's proposal is not visible and not decidable. Every read
/// here is scoped, and this is the test that keeps it that way.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_proposal_belongs_to_its_workspace() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let other = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission(&pool, ws).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
proposals::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &roster(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
assert!(proposals::get(&pool, id, other.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("get").is_none());
assert!(proposals::list(&pool, m, other.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("list").is_empty());
assert!(
!proposals::decide(&pool, id, other.as_uuid().to_owned(), "approved", None, None)
.await
.expect("decide"),
"another workspace must not be able to approve this roster"
);
}
/// The bug production found on the FIRST real approval, in the exact shape it
/// had: a mission created through the API with no `config` stores jsonb `null`
/// — a scalar — and `jsonb_set` refuses a scalar with "cannot set path in
/// scalar". `coalesce` does not help, because that guards SQL NULL and this is a
/// perfectly good JSON null of the wrong shape.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_roster_applies_to_a_mission_whose_config_is_json_null() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission(&pool, ws).await;
// Exactly what `POST /api/missions` stores when the body omits `config`.
sqlx::query("UPDATE missions SET config = 'null'::jsonb WHERE id = $1")
.bind(m)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
proposals::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &roster(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
let graph = json!({"kind":"pipeline","nodes":[{"id":"n0","role":"implementer","attrs":{}}],"edges":[]});
let applied = proposals::approve_and_apply(
&pool,
id,
m,
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
&graph,
None,
None,
)
.await
.expect("apply");
assert!(applied);
let (engine, nodes): (Option<String>, Option<i32>) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT team_engine, jsonb_array_length(config->'roster'->'nodes') FROM missions WHERE id = $1",
)
.bind(m)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(engine.as_deref(), Some("composed"));
assert_eq!(nodes, Some(1), "the roster must actually be on the mission");
}
/// Claim and apply are one decision, so they must commit or fail together. A
/// proposal marked `approved` against a mission that never received the roster
/// is permanent: the partial unique index blocks every later approval, and the
/// mission runs solo while its proposal says otherwise.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_failed_apply_leaves_the_proposal_undecided() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = mission(&pool, ws).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
proposals::insert(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &roster(), "claude-opus-4-8")
.await
.expect("insert");
// A mission id that does not exist in this workspace: the apply half matches
// no row, which is the failure the transaction has to undo.
let err = proposals::approve_and_apply(
&pool,
id,
Uuid::now_v7(),
ws.as_uuid().to_owned(),
&json!({}),
None,
None,
)
.await;
assert!(err.is_err(), "applying to a missing mission must fail: {err:?}");
let rows = proposals::list(&pool, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned()).await.expect("list");
assert_eq!(
rows[0].status, "proposed",
"the claim must have been rolled back, or this proposal is stuck approved forever"
);
// And it can still be approved properly afterwards.
let graph = json!({"kind":"pipeline","nodes":[{"id":"n0","role":"implementer","attrs":{}}],"edges":[]});
assert!(
proposals::approve_and_apply(&pool, id, m, ws.as_uuid().to_owned(), &graph, None, None)
.await
.expect("apply")
);
}
+1
View File
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ async fn a_template_with_live_agents_still_accepts_edits() {
system_prompt: prompt,
skills: extra,
brain_seed: None,
model: None,
}],
};
team_templates::upsert_builtin(&pool, build("first", vec![]))
+218
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
//! The sweepers must leave SELF-DRIVEN runs alone.
//!
//! A `tier='microvm'` or `tier='session'` run is inserted directly as `running` by
//! `phase_runner` and owned start-to-finish by its own `tokio::spawn`. Nothing
//! touches its `updated_at` or `checkpoint` while it is in flight, because there
//! is no per-step loop to hook.
//!
//! Both sweepers were written when every `running` row was a `cm_orchestrator` job
//! that checkpointed after each step, and neither filtered on tier. The result,
//! measured in production on 2026-08-06: `requeue_stale` declared a healthy microVM
//! run stale at 180 seconds, the worker claimed it, failed to deserialize its graph
//! placeholder, and killed the phase with "missing or invalid graph" — while the
//! agent went on working and its VM was orphaned for over an hour.
//!
//! **Every microVM mission that appeared to work did so by finishing inside three
//! minutes.** The end-to-end harness runs a 90-second mission, so it cannot see
//! this class at all — which is why the guard lives here, against the real SQL, and
//! costs milliseconds instead of eight minutes.
use cm_db::repo::topology_runs;
use cm_domain::WorkspaceId;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Insert a run that is `running` and has looked idle for a long time — exactly
/// the shape a long agent turn presents.
async fn stale_running_run(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, ws: WorkspaceId, tier: &str) -> Uuid {
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO topology_runs
(id, workspace_id, task, kind, status, graph, tier,
created_at, updated_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'long turn', 'run', 'running', $3, $4,
now() - interval '30 minutes', now() - interval '30 minutes')",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(ws.as_uuid())
// The placeholder a self-driven run carries: no `kind`, so `TopologyGraph`
// cannot parse it. That is what turned a requeue into a hard failure.
.bind(serde_json::json!({ "nodes": [], "edges": [], "executor": tier }))
.bind(tier)
// `mission_id` is left NULL: it has an FK to `missions`, and `requeue_stale`
// does not look at it. The reaper DOES filter on `mission_id IS NOT NULL` —
// which is precisely what used to be mistaken for "orchestrator-driven" — and
// it now shares the same tier allowlist, asserted below.
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("insert run");
id
}
async fn status_of(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, id: Uuid) -> String {
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, String>("SELECT status FROM topology_runs WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id)
.fetch_one(pool)
.await
.expect("read status")
}
async fn workspace(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> WorkspaceId {
let ws = cm_domain::Workspace {
id: WorkspaceId::new(),
name: "Sweeper".into(),
plan: "team".into(),
};
cm_db::repo::workspaces::insert(pool, &ws)
.await
.expect("workspace");
ws.id
}
/// The bug, in one assertion: 30 minutes idle and it must still be `running`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn requeue_stale_leaves_self_driven_runs_alone() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let microvm = stale_running_run(&pool, ws, "microvm").await;
let session = stale_running_run(&pool, ws, "session").await;
let moved = topology_runs::requeue_stale(&pool, 180.0)
.await
.expect("requeue");
assert_eq!(
status_of(&pool, microvm).await,
"running",
"a microvm run was requeued out from under a live VM ({moved} rows moved)"
);
assert_eq!(
status_of(&pool, session).await,
"running",
"a session run was requeued out from under a live agent"
);
}
/// And a worker-driven run in the same state MUST still be requeued, or the fix
/// would have been "stop sweeping" rather than "sweep the right rows".
#[tokio::test]
async fn requeue_stale_still_rescues_worker_driven_runs() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let team = stale_running_run(&pool, ws, "team").await;
topology_runs::requeue_stale(&pool, 180.0).await.expect("requeue");
assert_eq!(
status_of(&pool, team).await,
"queued",
"a genuinely stalled team run must still be recovered"
);
}
/// Defence in depth: even handed a queued self-driven row, the worker must not
/// adopt a job it cannot execute. Claiming one is what produced the
/// "missing or invalid graph" failure on a run that was perfectly healthy.
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_worker_will_not_claim_a_self_driven_run() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
topology_runs::enqueue_run_tier(
&pool,
id,
ws,
"should never be claimed",
&serde_json::json!({ "nodes": [], "edges": [], "executor": "microvm" }),
"microvm",
)
.await
.expect("enqueue");
let claimed = topology_runs::claim_next_queued(&pool).await.expect("claim");
assert!(
claimed.is_none(),
"the worker claimed a microvm run: {:?}",
claimed.map(|c| c.tier)
);
assert_eq!(status_of(&pool, id).await, "queued", "and it must be left as it was");
}
/// The composed tier is the mirror image of the two above and must not be
/// mistaken for them: it runs VMs, but the WORKER drives its graph, so being
/// claimed and requeued is exactly what gives it checkpointing and resume.
#[tokio::test]
async fn the_worker_claims_and_rescues_a_composed_run() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
topology_runs::enqueue_run_tier(
&pool,
id,
ws,
"compose the engines",
// A real graph, unlike the self-driven placeholder: the worker plans it.
&serde_json::json!({
"kind": "pipeline",
"nodes": [{ "id": "a", "role": "worker", "attrs": {} }],
"edges": []
}),
"microvm_graph",
)
.await
.expect("enqueue");
let claimed = topology_runs::claim_next_queued(&pool)
.await
.expect("claim")
.expect("a composed run must be claimable, or it never runs at all");
assert_eq!(claimed.tier, "microvm_graph");
assert_eq!(claimed.id, id);
// And a composed run whose worker died must come back: its checkpoint is
// what makes resume possible, and requeue is what triggers it.
sqlx::query("UPDATE topology_runs SET updated_at = now() - interval '30 minutes' WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.expect("age the run");
topology_runs::requeue_stale(&pool, 180.0).await.expect("requeue");
assert_eq!(
status_of(&pool, id).await,
"queued",
"a composed run orphaned by a dead worker must be recovered"
);
}
/// The allowlist is the single place this policy lives, so assert its membership
/// directly — a new self-driven tier added without touching it would otherwise be
/// exposed exactly as microvm was.
#[test]
fn the_allowlist_names_only_worker_driven_tiers() {
for driven in ["team", "swarm", "company", "org"] {
assert!(
topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&driven),
"{driven} is driven by the worker and must be sweepable"
);
}
for self_driven in ["microvm", "session"] {
assert!(
!topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&self_driven),
"{self_driven} owns its own lifecycle; sweeping it kills live work"
);
}
// `microvm_graph` is worker-driven but NOT reapable: one of its steps is a
// whole agent session in a VM, so "no step records in 15 minutes" is what a
// healthy composed run looks like, and reaping it would orphan a live VM —
// #54 in a different tier.
assert!(topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(&"microvm_graph"));
assert!(!topology_runs::REAPABLE_TIERS.contains(&"microvm_graph"));
for reapable in topology_runs::REAPABLE_TIERS {
assert!(
topology_runs::WORKER_DRIVEN_TIERS.contains(reapable),
"{reapable} is reaped but never driven"
);
}
}
+156
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
//! A failed phase must not strand its mission at `running` forever.
//!
//! `start_pending_phases` launches a phase only when every lower-order phase is
//! `completed`, so once one fails the rest can never run. They sat `pending`,
//! and `close_finished_missions` requires no phase to be non-terminal — so the
//! mission never finished, and `mission_runtime`'s sweeper (which fires after a
//! terminal state) never reaped its container.
//!
//! Found by counting containers on gw-04, not by a test: one leaked runtime
//! container per failed multi-phase mission, accumulating for days. This is the
//! SQL that ends it, tested against a real database because the bug lived
//! entirely in the interaction between two queries' predicates.
use cm_domain::WorkspaceId;
use uuid::Uuid;
async fn workspace(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> WorkspaceId {
let ws = cm_domain::Workspace {
id: WorkspaceId::new(),
name: "Unreachable".into(),
plan: "team".into(),
};
cm_db::repo::workspaces::insert(pool, &ws).await.expect("workspace");
ws.id
}
/// A running mission whose phase 0 failed and whose phases 1..n never started.
async fn stuck_mission(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, ws: WorkspaceId) -> Uuid {
let id = Uuid::now_v7();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO missions (id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, status, schedule, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'stuck', 'research_and_code', 'running', '{}'::jsonb, '{}'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(ws.as_uuid())
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("mission");
for (idx, status) in [(0, "failed"), (1, "pending"), (2, "pending")] {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_phases (id, mission_id, kind, order_idx, status, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'coding', $3, $4, '{}'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(Uuid::now_v7())
.bind(id)
.bind(idx)
.bind(status)
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("phase");
}
id
}
/// The sweep, as `phase_runner::skip_unreachable_phases` runs it.
async fn skip_unreachable(pool: &sqlx::PgPool) -> u64 {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE mission_phases mp
SET status = 'skipped', completed_at = now()
WHERE mp.status = 'pending'
AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM missions m WHERE m.id = mp.mission_id AND m.status = 'running')
AND EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM mission_phases prior
WHERE prior.mission_id = mp.mission_id
AND prior.order_idx < mp.order_idx
AND prior.status = 'failed'
)",
)
.execute(pool)
.await
.expect("skip")
.rows_affected()
}
async fn statuses(pool: &sqlx::PgPool, mission: Uuid) -> Vec<String> {
sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT status FROM mission_phases WHERE mission_id = $1 ORDER BY order_idx")
.bind(mission)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await
.expect("statuses")
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_failed_phase_makes_the_later_ones_unreachable_not_pending_forever() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = stuck_mission(&pool, ws).await;
assert_eq!(skip_unreachable(&pool).await, 2, "both later phases are unreachable");
assert_eq!(
statuses(&pool, m).await,
vec!["failed", "skipped", "skipped"],
"a phase that can never run must say so, or the mission never closes"
);
// Every phase is now terminal, which is what `close_finished_missions`
// waits for — the container sweeper keys off the mission reaching that.
let non_terminal: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT count(*) FROM mission_phases
WHERE mission_id = $1 AND status NOT IN ('completed','failed','skipped')",
)
.bind(m)
.fetch_one(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(non_terminal, 0);
}
/// A phase waiting AHEAD of the failure is untouched: order is what makes a
/// phase unreachable, and a failure later in the list says nothing about one
/// still queued before it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_phase_before_the_failure_is_left_alone() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = Uuid::now_v7();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO missions (id, workspace_id, title, template_kind, status, schedule, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'ordered', 'research_and_code', 'running', '{}'::jsonb, '{}'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(m)
.bind(ws.as_uuid())
.execute(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
for (idx, status) in [(0, "pending"), (1, "failed"), (2, "pending")] {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO mission_phases (id, mission_id, kind, order_idx, status, config)
VALUES ($1, $2, 'coding', $3, $4, '{}'::jsonb)",
)
.bind(Uuid::now_v7())
.bind(m)
.bind(idx)
.bind(status)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
}
skip_unreachable(&pool).await;
assert_eq!(statuses(&pool, m).await, vec!["pending", "failed", "skipped"]);
}
/// A mission that is not running is not swept: a draft's phases are pending by
/// definition and must not be skipped out from under it.
#[tokio::test]
async fn only_a_running_missions_phases_are_skipped() {
let pool = cm_testkit::test_pool().await;
let ws = workspace(&pool).await;
let m = stuck_mission(&pool, ws).await;
sqlx::query("UPDATE missions SET status = 'draft' WHERE id = $1")
.bind(m)
.execute(&pool)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(skip_unreachable(&pool).await, 0);
assert_eq!(statuses(&pool, m).await, vec!["failed", "pending", "pending"]);
}

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