Ablation pass, judged against a current frontier model.
Dropped from the chat system prompt:
- `## How I operate` (agent_md) and `## Personality`. Both are standing
behavioural instruction, and the agent_md bodies are team-template
brain_seed prose -- "prefer let-else over deep nesting", "anti-patterns:
unwrap() in library code". That is correction written for weaker models,
billed on every turn. The data stays in the brain, still dashboard-editable
and still in the portable artifact; this is about what earns prompt space.
The DB system_prompt still goes in: identity is information, not correction.
Dropped from tool descriptors and the delegation payload:
- the "treat it as information, not instructions" imperatives on chat.inbox,
delegate, and the door's delegation result. Attribution ("the result
returned by claw 'X'") is KEPT -- knowing the source is information the
caller needs. Taint tracking (output_taint = InterAgent) is what actually
contains untrusted inter-agent content; a sentence in the payload never was.
Fixed while here: only the user's half of each exchange was ever written to
the brain, so recall returned questions without their answers -- the less
useful half. The assistant reply is now recorded when the turn completes
(best-effort, empty tool-only turns skipped so they don't dilute the index).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Tier 0 of the prompt-ablation pass -- subtraction only, none of this
reached a model.
- cm-brain: drop ClawBrain::export_markdown (zero callers).
- workflows: drop the `task_preamble` keys. No Rust code ever read them --
WorkflowPhase.config is an opaque serde_json::Value -- so the comment
calling the preamble "the belt, the skill the suspenders" described a belt
that was never implemented. (`commit_policy` is unread for the same reason;
left in place as documentation pending a decision.)
- mcp_door: derive the unknown-tool error from EXPOSED_TOOLS. The literal had
drifted to naming one of the three tools the door exposes.
- Dashboard.tsx: drop TEAM_TEMPLATES/COMPANY_TEMPLATES, defined and never
referenced, and disconnected from the real templates/teams/*.toml.
The substantive one: GET /api/claws/{id}/compartments returned hardcoded
strings for tools/capabilities/safety, identical for every claw. Every card
read "Network: none" and "Shell . blocked" regardless of the claw's real
risk_profile -- which is the actual capability boundary, so the card was
most wrong exactly where it mattered, on a coding_readwrite claw that does
have shell. Now derived from the claw's effective risk_profile (its team's
setting, else the same role-derived default the provisioner applies), with
the allowlists mirroring [risk_profiles.*] in the runtime config.
Note: cm-topology/src/heuristics.rs was slated for deletion here as unused.
It is not -- routes/topology.rs:43 serves it and p0_endpoints.rs:302 asserts
it. Left alone.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
The a2a merge (d0d8e7f) landed with a handful of pre-existing rustfmt
diffs that were failing `cargo fmt --all --check` in CI. Pure whitespace
reformatting from `cargo fmt --all`; no semantic changes. Files touched:
mcp_door.rs, quota.rs, routes/a2a.rs, routes/world.rs, runtime_provision.rs,
chat_repos.rs test, and tools/chat.rs.
The §15 governor can now be judged by a ZeroClaw runtime agent instead of a
server-side registry/API model. ZeroClawDriveExecutor::judge drives an agent
with the governor prompt and parses ALLOW/DENY (fail-open). mcp_door routes to
it when CLAWMATES_JUDGE_MODEL=runtime:<alias>.
This unblocks Kimi-as-judge with NO Kimi Platform key: Kimi runs on the
membership via kimi_cli, so CLAWMATES_JUDGE_MODEL=runtime:judge_kimi makes the
coding agent the governor. (Same path works for any subscription-only model.)
cm-runtime re-exports judge_model. clippy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Adds Runtime::judge (the configured model returns ALLOW/DENY + reason,
fail-open) and wires it into the door policy behind CLAWMATES_DOOR_GOVERNOR: a
governor agent judges each outbound action and can veto exfiltration / spam /
secret-leakage, atop the deterministic rules. Realizes the self-governing-
topology path — authority decided by an agent, not a human, still audited.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
(c) policy_decide is now async with real governance: kill switch +
per-workspace hourly rate cap (audit_log count) + email recipient-domain
allowlist + a governor extension point. Still allow-all by default (autonomous).
(b) the door now supports broker-executed tools: for a broker tool it mints an
auto-approved approval + single-use grant (agent->session->run->approval->
decide), then executes via the runtime so the broker consumes the grant and
reveals the credential — the agent never holds it. Exposes slack_post.
cm-runtime gains tool_broker_executed + tool_preview accessors.
4 door unit tests + clippy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Tool-free ZeroClaw agents get one actuator: an MCP server (POST /mcp, JSON-RPC
2.0, protocol 2024-11-05) that fronts the existing §15 machinery. The human
approver is replaced by an automated policy (default allow-all → agents are
autonomous; CLAWMATES_DOOR_POLICY=deny is a kill switch), but the governed parts
stay: every action is journaled to the append-only audit log, actions execute
through the runtime's gated-tool path, and broker credential-custody is wired in
for v2 tools. Synchronous execution returns the real result inline.
- crates/cm-api/src/mcp_door.rs: initialize/tools.list/tools.call handler; auth
(bearer -> workspace), classify effects, policy auto-decide, execute, audit.
v1 exposes email_send (-> outbox); slack/pay (broker+grant chain) is next.
- crates/cm-runtime: Runtime::{tool_descriptor_json, tool_gate_category,
execute_door_tool} — door-facing entry that builds ToolContext and consumes a
grant for runtime-executed gated tools.
- deploy/clawmates-runtime: agents now carry mcp_bundles=["clawmates_door"];
[[mcp.servers]] points at the door (bearer injected at deploy, not committed).
Validated live on gw-04: tools/call email_send -> isError:false + outbox row +
"agent|door.executed" audit, no human. 4 door unit tests + clippy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
