2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5	000b9b3a4b	P4 core: broker-held app connections + gated, broker-executed Slack posting ... - app_connections repo; POST /api/apps/connect (keys/basic): the credential goes to the secret broker over its socket and only the encrypted ref lands in the row; disconnect endpoint; /api/apps directory merged with live connection status; audit rows for connect/disconnect - Broker protocol: InvokeHttp carries a JSON body - slack.post tool (SendsExternally -> gated): marked broker_executed — the runtime skips its own grant consumption and the BROKER independently verifies + consumes the single-use grant, then calls Slack with the bot token injected; the runtime never sees the credential - Config: [broker] socket_path + [slack] base_url; e2e harness spawns the real teamclaw-broker daemon and the server hosts an e2e-only /__slack sink - SlackApp: Connection tab stores the token via the broker; connected state - Integration test: blocked while pending -> approved -> sink received exactly one post with 'Bearer xoxb-test-token' -> grant replay refused - E2E journey: connect Slack in the panel -> gated post card with preview -> sink empty while pending -> approve -> exactly one post, queue clear 133 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 21 Playwright journeys. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-06-10 05:51:19 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5	ea5162ac65	P2 complete: Docker sandbox with kernel assertions + secret broker ... tc-sandbox: - SandboxSpec/SandboxDriver + DockerDriver (bollard): uid 10001, cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, embedded seccomp deny profile (unshare/ptrace/ bpf/keyctl/mount/...), read-only rootfs with tmpfs /tmp + /home/agent, network=none, mem/cpu/pids limits - agent-base image: non-root, all setuid binaries stripped - 6 kernel-level assertion tests probing from INSIDE real containers: uid + CapEff==0, rootfs read-only, seccomp EPERM on unshare, zero traffic-carrying interfaces + failed egress connect, no setuid + NoNewPrivs=1, lifecycle tc-secrets: - ChaCha20-Poly1305 envelope encryption under a FileKey (generated 0600, AEAD tamper detection tested); secrets table ciphertext-at-rest - teamclaw-broker daemon: length-prefixed JSON over a unix socket; no protocol operation ever returns plaintext; InvokeHttp independently consumes the single-use execution grant against Postgres BEFORE touching any credential, then performs the call itself with the secret injected - Tests over the real socket + real Postgres + a real local HTTP receiver: encrypted at rest, pending approval refused, approved call carries the bearer token exactly once, grant replay refused, non-http URLs rejected 116 Rust + 61 frontend tests + 14 E2E journeys green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-06-10 05:07:46 -05:00