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cbc8d35a2e60fe743a92fdb42c27e3e5e4a8f526
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3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 4f253bec93 P6: browser.goto — real Chromium browsing with live web taint 
- SandboxSpec gains an egress flag (default false — the kernel suite
  still proves zero-network for agent sandboxes). Egress-enabled
  containers exist ONLY for the browser: no credentials, no broker
  route, bridge network with host-gateway alias for local test pages
- images/agent-browser: Alpine Chromium, uid 10001, setuid bits
  stripped — same non-root hardening as agent-base
- browser.goto tool: headless chromium --dump-dom in the agent's
  browser container; HTML stripped to readable text (4k cap) and
  returned with output_taint=web; viewport screenshot captured,
  base64'd out of the container, stored in the blob store
- Taint semantics tightened: the step that PRODUCED untrusted output
  now carries its own taint (recorded before the step row), not just
  later steps — chat.inbox test updated to the stricter §15 reading
- GET /api/claws/{id}/browser/viewport.png serves the latest capture;
  BrowserApp polls it and renders the live viewport (spec §7.1),
  keeping the empty state until the agent has browsed
- Proven end to end with REAL Chromium against a REAL local page:
  content 'Revenue up 14 percent' returned tainted web; the gated
  email.send that follows carries 'web' in its approval taint_sources
  (untrusted content can never quietly reach outward); screenshot
  verified by PNG magic bytes

152 Rust tests + 63 frontend + 27 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
 2026-06-10 09:41:40 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 000b9b3a4b P4 core: broker-held app connections + gated, broker-executed Slack posting 
- app_connections repo; POST /api/apps/connect (keys/basic): the credential
  goes to the secret broker over its socket and only the encrypted ref lands
  in the row; disconnect endpoint; /api/apps directory merged with live
  connection status; audit rows for connect/disconnect
- Broker protocol: InvokeHttp carries a JSON body
- slack.post tool (SendsExternally -> gated): marked broker_executed — the
  runtime skips its own grant consumption and the BROKER independently
  verifies + consumes the single-use grant, then calls Slack with the bot
  token injected; the runtime never sees the credential
- Config: [broker] socket_path + [slack] base_url; e2e harness spawns the
  real teamclaw-broker daemon and the server hosts an e2e-only /__slack sink
- SlackApp: Connection tab stores the token via the broker; connected state
- Integration test: blocked while pending -> approved -> sink received
  exactly one post with 'Bearer xoxb-test-token' -> grant replay refused
- E2E journey: connect Slack in the panel -> gated post card with preview ->
  sink empty while pending -> approve -> exactly one post, queue clear

133 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 21 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
 2026-06-10 05:51:19 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 67f918439c P3 backend: files, skills, routines, claw chat with LIVE taint plumbing 
- tc-files: BlobStore trait + LocalBlobStore (traversal-proof keys); wired
  through Runtime (config storage.data_dir in deployments)
- File tools: files.write/files.list (workspace-internal) + files.delete
  (gated FileDeletion — tested: file survives pending, gone after approve);
  GET /api/openclaw/files + /api/shared-drive/files (drive/agent scoped)
- Skills: catalog/library + idempotent install with counter, uninstall;
  GET /api/skills[?clawId=], POST install/uninstall
- tc-scheduler: croner cron math (clock-controlled tests), SKIP LOCKED
  claim-and-advance firing REAL runs into dedicated '⏰ name' sessions
  (reused, exactly-once), paused routines skipped; routines API + agent
  tool routine.schedule; loop spawned in server
- Claw chat: 1:1 threads, chat.send enforcing the target's Other-Claws
  policy, chat.inbox whose output carries inter_agent taint; the run loop
  now ACCUMULATES taint from tool outputs into LoopState, classifies with
  it, and stamps steps + approvals — a poisoned inbox followed by
  email.send produces an approval whose taint_sources says inter_agent
- ScriptedProvider scenario selection now keys on the most recent marker
  (session history kept earlier markers alive)

132 Rust tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
 2026-06-10 05:28:50 -05:00