Commit Graph
9 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 cbc8d35a2e Clerk authentication: hosted-identity session JWTs as a first-class mode
- tc-auth JwtVerifier: OIDC discovery -> JWKS, RS256 with the issuer
  pinned, 5s leeway (the crate's default 60s would double the life of
  Clerk's 60s session tokens), key cache with one refresh on unknown kid
  (Clerk rotates). Serves auth.mode = clerk AND generic oidc — a Clerk
  instance IS an OIDC issuer, so one verifier covers both
- AuthService.authenticate dispatches: JWT-shaped bearers take the
  hosted-identity path, everything else stays a local opaque session.
  External users JIT-provision keyed by the stable sub claim
  (users.auth_subject, unique partial index in migration 0007); an
  existing local account with the same email is LINKED, not duplicated;
  role tracks the issuer claim every request (org:admin -> Owner)
- Config auth.mode = "clerk" (requires issuer_url; validated), server
  pins the issuer at boot, Helm values/configmap accept mode=clerk
- Tests with REAL crypto, no mocks: fresh RSA keypairs, a live local
  issuer publishing real discovery + JWKS docs, Clerk-shaped tokens —
  JIT + role mapping, repeat-subject no-dup, expired refused (leeway
  regression), wrong-key forgery refused, foreign issuer refused, and
  the full router round trip with Authorization: Bearer <session JWT>
- docs/clerk.md: dashboard session-token customization (email + org
  role claims), config, @clerk/nextjs getToken() wiring, what CI proves

157 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 29 journeys. Air-gapped installs keep
local auth — Clerk is a cloud-only alternative, not a replacement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 10:29:27 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 a8efada690 P5 exit: usage metering, credit billing, promo codes, 3-step wizard
- LlmEvent::Usage across all three providers (Scripted deterministic
  word-count accounting; Anthropic message_start/delta usage; OpenAI-compat
  stream_options include_usage)
- tc-billing: ceil(tokens/1000) min 1 credit; lots drain oldest-first under
  FOR UPDATE; balance clamps at zero while the usage ledger records the
  full obligation; promo codes redeem exactly once via CAS (migration 0006)
- Runtime charges every completed run (billing failure never fails a run);
  proven: 1 token in + 3 out -> 1 credit deducted
- API: GET /api/team/usage, POST /api/credits/redeem (409 on reuse, audited)
- Credits page: balance, 7-day usage meter with runway estimate, PromoRedeem
- /claws/new is the full §9 wizard: ?step=identity|access|slack deep-linked
  progress, accent swatches + name randomizer, access toggles, optional
  Slack step, explicit review-and-confirm (creation = live agent), animated
  provisioning state -> straight into chat
- E2E: chat decrements the visible balance and fills the usage meter;
  WELCOME500 adds exactly 500 once then refuses; wizard round trip

140 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 23 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 07:19:34 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 91327e3618 P4 complete: OAuth authorization-code flow, MCP-OAuth, AddApps connects
- migration 0005 oauth_states: one-time states (10-min TTL), consumed by a
  CAS DELETE on callback — replays and forgeries both 404
- POST /api/apps/oauth/start: OIDC discovery on the configured issuer (or
  the custom MCP issuer for authType=mcp_oauth), state row, authorize URL
- GET /api/apps/oauth/callback: code exchanged at the REAL token endpoint
  (client id+secret form POST); the access token goes straight to the
  broker (test proves it never appears unencrypted in Postgres); connection
  row + audit; redirects to the claw's Add Apps panel
- [oauth] config (issuer/client/redirect_base) wired through AppState
- Tests against a real local IdP server (discovery + validating token
  endpoint): full round trip, broker-held token, replay/forged state
  refused, bad code fails exchange, mcp_oauth uses the custom issuer while
  plain oauth refuses without a configured IdP
- AddAppsApp: live connection badges + inline API-key connect per app
  (E2E: connect Notion by key from the directory)

136 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 21 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 06:50:41 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 6dbdd20ee0 P4: Slack inbound @mention — broker-verified signatures drive real runs
- Broker op VerifySlackSignature: v0 HMAC-SHA256 computed INSIDE the broker
  (constant-time compare); the signing secret never crosses the socket.
  Slack secrets are one JSON credential {bot_token, signing_secret}; the
  broker extracts the right field per operation
- Public POST /api/slack/events: signature verified against connected slack
  connections via the broker; forged signatures 401; url_verification
  handshake echoed only when signed; app_mention starts a real run in the
  agent's dedicated '💬 Slack' session — and the agent's reply is itself a
  gated outbound post
- SlackApp Connection tab captures bot token + signing secret
- Integration test: forged 401, signed challenge, signed mention -> run ->
  slack.post pending in the approval queue
- E2E: full loop — connect, gated outbound (sink empty -> exactly one post),
  then a node-crypto-signed mention -> approval card -> approve -> 'On it!'
  lands in the sink

134 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 21 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 06:40:04 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 000b9b3a4b P4 core: broker-held app connections + gated, broker-executed Slack posting
- app_connections repo; POST /api/apps/connect (keys/basic): the credential
  goes to the secret broker over its socket and only the encrypted ref lands
  in the row; disconnect endpoint; /api/apps directory merged with live
  connection status; audit rows for connect/disconnect
- Broker protocol: InvokeHttp carries a JSON body
- slack.post tool (SendsExternally -> gated): marked broker_executed — the
  runtime skips its own grant consumption and the BROKER independently
  verifies + consumes the single-use grant, then calls Slack with the bot
  token injected; the runtime never sees the credential
- Config: [broker] socket_path + [slack] base_url; e2e harness spawns the
  real teamclaw-broker daemon and the server hosts an e2e-only /__slack sink
- SlackApp: Connection tab stores the token via the broker; connected state
- Integration test: blocked while pending -> approved -> sink received
  exactly one post with 'Bearer xoxb-test-token' -> grant replay refused
- E2E journey: connect Slack in the panel -> gated post card with preview ->
  sink empty while pending -> approve -> exactly one post, queue clear

133 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 21 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 05:51:19 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 67f918439c P3 backend: files, skills, routines, claw chat with LIVE taint plumbing
- tc-files: BlobStore trait + LocalBlobStore (traversal-proof keys); wired
  through Runtime (config storage.data_dir in deployments)
- File tools: files.write/files.list (workspace-internal) + files.delete
  (gated FileDeletion — tested: file survives pending, gone after approve);
  GET /api/openclaw/files + /api/shared-drive/files (drive/agent scoped)
- Skills: catalog/library + idempotent install with counter, uninstall;
  GET /api/skills[?clawId=], POST install/uninstall
- tc-scheduler: croner cron math (clock-controlled tests), SKIP LOCKED
  claim-and-advance firing REAL runs into dedicated ' name' sessions
  (reused, exactly-once), paused routines skipped; routines API + agent
  tool routine.schedule; loop spawned in server
- Claw chat: 1:1 threads, chat.send enforcing the target's Other-Claws
  policy, chat.inbox whose output carries inter_agent taint; the run loop
  now ACCUMULATES taint from tool outputs into LoopState, classifies with
  it, and stamps steps + approvals — a poisoned inbox followed by
  email.send produces an approval whose taint_sources says inter_agent
- ScriptedProvider scenario selection now keys on the most recent marker
  (session history kept earlier markers alive)

132 Rust tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 05:28:50 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 de38449b41 P2 BLOCKING exit green: approval interception chain end-to-end
- tc-tools: Effect declarations -> §15 GatedCategory mapping, deny-by-default
  external reach, taint invariant property-tested (tainted external effects
  are NEVER auto-allowed)
- tc-safety: pending approvals with exact payload+preview, CAS decide with
  audit + single-use grant in one tx, checkpoint suspend/load, exclusive
  resume claim, expiry sweep, decided-unresumed work queue (migration 0004
  adds the outbox the gated email.send tool writes)
- tc-runtime: resumable LoopState checkpointed to agent_runs; gated tool ->
  approval row -> approval_required/run_suspended events -> suspend; resume
  consumes the grant BEFORE executing (spent grant = no execution), rejection
  feeds a structured refusal in-band; durable resume sweeper; continuous
  journal seq across suspension (tested). ContentPart::Text became a struct
  variant — internally-tagged newtype primitives don't serialize
- tc-api: GET/decide approvals endpoints (409 double-decide, tenant
  isolation), decision triggers in-process resume; full chain proven over
  HTTP incl. gateway resumeFrom continuation
- frontend: approval_required/run_suspended events, suspended reply state,
  inline ApprovalCard (§10: summary, category, exact payload preview,
  approve/reject -> decide + stream re-attach), /approvals queue page, nav
- E2E (14 journeys, workers:1 to serialize the shared backend): gated email
  blocks with disabled composer -> approve -> continuation + ✓ step + reload
  replay; reject -> ✗ step, nothing executed; queue page decides pending

106 Rust + 61 frontend tests + 14 Playwright journeys green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 04:58:47 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 32008c9ef0 P1 backend: chat persistence, tc-llm providers, runtime loop, gateway SSE
- tc-db: sessions/messages/steps/runs/run_events repos (atomic seq assignment,
  history with ordered step traces, journal replay-from-offset); migration 0003
- tc-llm: provider-neutral ChatRequest/LlmEvent; ScriptedProvider (scenario
  TOML, word-level deltas, multi-turn tool legs — ships in production for
  e2e/air-gap smoke), AnthropicProvider (Messages SSE), OpenAiCompatProvider
  (vLLM/Ollama/llama.cpp); opt-in live tests via TC_LIVE_LLM=1
- tc-runtime: run loop with persist-before-emit event journal, real built-in
  clock.now tool, step rows on the reply message, tool-error resilience,
  broadcast channels for live attach
- tc-api: agent CRUD + settings/full (tenant-isolated, RBAC'd, audited),
  sessions create/list/history?tools=true, POST /api/gateway SSE with
  monotonic ids and exact resumeFrom journal replay (tested equal to live)
- teamclaw-server: config-driven provider factory

83 Rust tests green, all against real Postgres / real TCP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 23:16:06 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 c4349bf292 P0: tc-auth local sessions, tc-api P0 endpoints, teamclaw-server binary
- tc-auth: argon2id passwords, hashed opaque bearer tokens in auth_sessions
  (migration 0002), anti-enumeration login errors, redacted token Debug
- tc-api: axum router with /healthz, /api/auth/login|logout, /api/user/me,
  /api/team/{claws,credits,permissions}; Authed bearer extractor + RBAC
  permission derivation; integration-tested over real TCP vs real Postgres
- teamclaw-server: config -> pool -> self-migrate -> serve

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 22:30:33 -05:00