clawmates

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3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5	add4f79fed	Rebrand: TeamClaw -> Clawmates (clawmates.work) Full-depth rename per the approved plan; the 'claw' product vocabulary (claws, /claws routes, clawId, Claw Chat) stays — it is now the brand. - Display brand: Clawmates (manifest, titles, hero, login/rail logo 'clawmates'); default host app.clawmates.work; registry ghcr.io/clawmates - Crates tc-* -> cm-* (16 crates + all imports); binaries clawmates-server/broker/bundler; images clawmates/; env prefix CLAWMATES_ (+ CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL / CM_LIVE_LLM); config clawmates.toml; helm chart deploy/helm/clawmates with clawmates-* resources; db names clawmates; sockets /run/clawmates; cookie cm_session; kind cluster clawmates-test; seccomp node profile clawmates-agent-profile.json - All 9 Playwright brand assertions updated in lockstep; historical spec document left untouched as the only remaining 'TeamClaw' - Local env migrated: dev pg clawmates-dev-pg/clawmates_dev, shared test server clawmates-test-pg, kind cluster recreated with image + profile, compose images rebuilt under clawmates/ Verified end to end: 161 Rust + 68 frontend tests, 29 Playwright journeys, 4 live kind tests, helm/install/LOC/placeholder gates, and the clean-room install rehearsal serving the clawmates login page from a signed bundle of the rebuilt images. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-06-10 12:31:25 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5	84c51168be	P6: strict seccomp allowlist + K8s sandbox driver proven on kind - images/seccomp/agent-profile.json is now a TRUE ALLOWLIST: Docker's default profile (vendored from moby v27.5.1, defaultAction ERRNO) with 18 syscalls an agent never needs stripped from the allow groups (unshare, ptrace, bpf, mount family, setns, module loading, perf_event_open, process_vm_*, reboot, quotactl, ...); arch map trimmed to x86_64 + aarch64. All 6 Docker kernel assertions still green. - K8sDriver (tc-sandbox feature 'k8s', kube-rs): one hardened pod per sandbox — runAsUser 10001, cap-drop ALL, no-new-privs via allowPrivilegeEscalation=false, RuntimeDefault seccomp, read-only rootfs with emptyDir /tmp + /home/agent, resource limits, no service account token — in a PSS-restricted namespace carrying a default-deny NetworkPolicy (applied server-side apply, idempotent). Exec via the API server attach channel with exit codes parsed from v1.Status. - Live suite (feature 'k8s-tests') against a REAL kind cluster: uid / CapEff==0 / NoNewPrivs / rootfs probes from inside pods, PSS label + deny-all policy asserted via the API, lifecycle. Honest limits in the rustdoc: Localhost seccomp profile and CNI-enforced egress are per-cluster provisioning (kindnet does not enforce NetworkPolicy). - rustls 0.23 process provider pinned to ring at driver connect. - CI: dedicated sandbox-k8s job (helm/kind-action) running the suite. 149 Rust tests + 3 live kind tests; clippy clean including the k8s feature. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-06-10 09:00:56 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5	ea5162ac65	P2 complete: Docker sandbox with kernel assertions + secret broker tc-sandbox: - SandboxSpec/SandboxDriver + DockerDriver (bollard): uid 10001, cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, embedded seccomp deny profile (unshare/ptrace/ bpf/keyctl/mount/...), read-only rootfs with tmpfs /tmp + /home/agent, network=none, mem/cpu/pids limits - agent-base image: non-root, all setuid binaries stripped - 6 kernel-level assertion tests probing from INSIDE real containers: uid + CapEff==0, rootfs read-only, seccomp EPERM on unshare, zero traffic-carrying interfaces + failed egress connect, no setuid + NoNewPrivs=1, lifecycle tc-secrets: - ChaCha20-Poly1305 envelope encryption under a FileKey (generated 0600, AEAD tamper detection tested); secrets table ciphertext-at-rest - teamclaw-broker daemon: length-prefixed JSON over a unix socket; no protocol operation ever returns plaintext; InvokeHttp independently consumes the single-use execution grant against Postgres BEFORE touching any credential, then performs the call itself with the secret injected - Tests over the real socket + real Postgres + a real local HTTP receiver: encrypted at rest, pending approval refused, approved call carries the bearer token exactly once, grant replay refused, non-http URLs rejected 116 Rust + 61 frontend tests + 14 E2E journeys green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>	2026-06-10 05:07:46 -05:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5

add4f79fed

Rebrand: TeamClaw -> Clawmates (clawmates.work)

Full-depth rename per the approved plan; the 'claw' product vocabulary
(claws, /claws routes, clawId, Claw Chat) stays — it is now the brand.

- Display brand: Clawmates (manifest, titles, hero, login/rail logo
  'clawmates'); default host app.clawmates.work; registry
  ghcr.io/clawmates
- Crates tc-* -> cm-* (16 crates + all imports); binaries
  clawmates-server/broker/bundler; images clawmates/*; env prefix
  CLAWMATES_* (+ CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL / CM_LIVE_LLM); config
  clawmates.toml; helm chart deploy/helm/clawmates with clawmates-*
  resources; db names clawmates*; sockets /run/clawmates; cookie
  cm_session; kind cluster clawmates-test; seccomp node profile
  clawmates-agent-profile.json
- All 9 Playwright brand assertions updated in lockstep; historical
  spec document left untouched as the only remaining 'TeamClaw'
- Local env migrated: dev pg clawmates-dev-pg/clawmates_dev, shared
  test server clawmates-test-pg, kind cluster recreated with image +
  profile, compose images rebuilt under clawmates/*

Verified end to end: 161 Rust + 68 frontend tests, 29 Playwright
journeys, 4 live kind tests, helm/install/LOC/placeholder gates, and
the clean-room install rehearsal serving the clawmates login page from
a signed bundle of the rebuilt images.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

2026-06-10 12:31:25 -05:00

Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5

84c51168be

P6: strict seccomp allowlist + K8s sandbox driver proven on kind

- images/seccomp/agent-profile.json is now a TRUE ALLOWLIST: Docker's
  default profile (vendored from moby v27.5.1, defaultAction ERRNO) with
  18 syscalls an agent never needs stripped from the allow groups
  (unshare, ptrace, bpf, mount family, setns, module loading,
  perf_event_open, process_vm_*, reboot, quotactl, ...); arch map trimmed
  to x86_64 + aarch64. All 6 Docker kernel assertions still green.
- K8sDriver (tc-sandbox feature 'k8s', kube-rs): one hardened pod per
  sandbox — runAsUser 10001, cap-drop ALL, no-new-privs via
  allowPrivilegeEscalation=false, RuntimeDefault seccomp, read-only
  rootfs with emptyDir /tmp + /home/agent, resource limits, no service
  account token — in a PSS-restricted namespace carrying a default-deny
  NetworkPolicy (applied server-side apply, idempotent). Exec via the API
  server attach channel with exit codes parsed from v1.Status.
- Live suite (feature 'k8s-tests') against a REAL kind cluster: uid /
  CapEff==0 / NoNewPrivs / rootfs probes from inside pods, PSS label +
  deny-all policy asserted via the API, lifecycle. Honest limits in the
  rustdoc: Localhost seccomp profile and CNI-enforced egress are
  per-cluster provisioning (kindnet does not enforce NetworkPolicy).
- rustls 0.23 process provider pinned to ring at driver connect.
- CI: dedicated sandbox-k8s job (helm/kind-action) running the suite.

149 Rust tests + 3 live kind tests; clippy clean including the k8s feature.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

2026-06-10 09:00:56 -05:00

Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5

ea5162ac65

P2 complete: Docker sandbox with kernel assertions + secret broker

tc-sandbox:
- SandboxSpec/SandboxDriver + DockerDriver (bollard): uid 10001, cap-drop
  ALL, no-new-privileges, embedded seccomp deny profile (unshare/ptrace/
  bpf/keyctl/mount/...), read-only rootfs with tmpfs /tmp + /home/agent,
  network=none, mem/cpu/pids limits
- agent-base image: non-root, all setuid binaries stripped
- 6 kernel-level assertion tests probing from INSIDE real containers:
  uid + CapEff==0, rootfs read-only, seccomp EPERM on unshare, zero
  traffic-carrying interfaces + failed egress connect, no setuid +
  NoNewPrivs=1, lifecycle

tc-secrets:
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 envelope encryption under a FileKey (generated 0600,
  AEAD tamper detection tested); secrets table ciphertext-at-rest
- teamclaw-broker daemon: length-prefixed JSON over a unix socket; no
  protocol operation ever returns plaintext; InvokeHttp independently
  consumes the single-use execution grant against Postgres BEFORE touching
  any credential, then performs the call itself with the secret injected
- Tests over the real socket + real Postgres + a real local HTTP receiver:
  encrypted at rest, pending approval refused, approved call carries the
  bearer token exactly once, grant replay refused, non-http URLs rejected

116 Rust + 61 frontend tests + 14 E2E journeys green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

2026-06-10 05:07:46 -05:00