642b6ef44b7be2611a64898e7218b9c69e172668
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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5.5
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642b6ef44b |
feat(self-audit): continuous_improvement audits the project record it can actually reach
Its first run could not do its job. The template audited "every project
agent's .brain" through per-agent APIs — fetch a brain, submit to
/api/claws/{id}/level-up, pull claw metrics — none of which a mission can
reach; agent brains live in the server's /data/brains volume and nothing
delivered them in. It spent itself searching, found a ROSTER.md in a
scratch repo, and audited that.
A delivery channel alone would not have helped: per-mission crews carry
~2 KB seed brains with no history, because missions write memory to the
REPOSITORY brain, one judge verdict per phase. That is where a project's
history actually accumulates, so that is the subject now.
mission_memory::export renders the whole repo brain as markdown — the
.brain is HDF5 and a mission container has no library to read it — and
mission_orchestrator installs it at /mission/memory/PROJECT-MEMORY.md,
outside the checkout so it is input and never lands in the diff, the same
way install_skill_files delivers skills.
The three roles are rewritten for that record: an inspector that finds
patterns (several UNMET lines on the same kind of work) and quotes them;
a proposer that ties each proposal to at least two lines or drops it; and
an evaluator that checks the cited lines exist verbatim and marks each
proposal SUPPORTED, WEAK or UNSUPPORTED. Each says outright that "no
change is warranted" is a complete result — the property that kept the
first run from inventing improvements out of empty brains.
Local: 523 passed; the two DB-backed world tests panic PoolTimedOut
because Docker Desktop is down here. CI runs them against real Postgres.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WZb5A2kfVfjpdwSochkuHz
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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33560c7fe6 |
feat(decide): memory rerank and paper triage on the decision tier
mission_memory::recall is two stages when a key is set: BM25 proposes 8
candidates, one Noul per candidate ('this earlier verdict is relevant to
the task') reorders them and drops those under 0.3, three are kept. BM25
measures keyword overlap, and a verdict about MICROVM.md shares words
with every task that names a file. Without a key the BM25 order stands.
continuous_research: topic_tags was written as [] on every manifest line
since the manifest existed. triage_papers asks, per harvested paper, a
Choice over the mission's topics (readable names, the arXiv query as the
description, 'none' offered) and a four-level relevance Score; the tags
(every topic ≥ 0.3) and {score, confidence} land on the line the agents
already read. Probe on PORTICO's abstract: relevance 3.0 at 1.0; topic
'none' 0.59 / verification 0.41 — true, the topic list has no
authority/sandboxing entry. Untriaged papers write the old empty line.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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2069bdf322 |
sec(auth): a mission's door token is revoked when the mission ends
The skills-door token was minted with a 24 h TTL and nothing revoked it sooner, so a mission that finished in twenty minutes left a live credential in its container for the rest of the day. auth_sessions gains mission_id (ON DELETE CASCADE, so a purge revokes too); mint_scoped_for_mission records it; revoke_mission_sessions deletes it. Revocation runs on both terminal paths — the runner's close (RETURNING the closed ids) and the operator's stop — and says how many it cleared. Granularity is the mission, not the phase: the container and its door are installed once per mission and serve every phase. Lingering Authority (arXiv 2606.22504) is the reference. Tests: a minted token authenticates for its scope and not as a full session, is dead after revoke, and another mission's token is untouched; the harness gatepolicy scenario now runs on the index arm and asserts the server revoked ≥1, no row carries the mission, and the door answers 401 to the token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WZb5A2kfVfjpdwSochkuHz |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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248948cc84 |
fix: three things that were known and written nowhere
All three have the same shape — the system learns something and only stderr
hears it — and each was flagged in the handoff as a silent-discard defect.
The gate's install outcome. `container_tool_hooks::install` returned Some or
None and both call sites wrote `let _ =`. A mission whose gate never installed
left a record indistinguishable from one whose gate stood there and matched
nothing. `EnsuredContainer` now carries the outcome to the callers that have a
pool, and they record `gate.installed` (with the settings path) or
`gate.absent` on the mission, so "was this mission gated?" is answerable from
the mission.
The inert marker. `vm_tool_gate` writes an `inert` file when it cannot parse
its input and allows everything, precisely so an inert gate does not look like
a permissive one. The only reader was a unit test. `drain_inert` now reads and
clears it at every tap drain, and a `gate.inert` event with the occurrence count
lands beside the calls that ran unchecked.
The judge's spend. `LlmEvent::Usage` arrived on every judge call and was
matched by `Ok(_) => {}`. Two plan exhaustions (2026-08-29, 2026-09-09) with
no row anywhere saying a judge token had been spent; `usage_events` had no
provider or model column. The loop now accumulates requests and tokens onto the
Verdict — counting a request BEFORE the stream opens, so a 429 the provider
refused still counts, because the retry storm was made of those — and
`record` writes a `kind = 'judge'` row with provider, model, mission and
request count. Migration 0085 adds the columns, all nullable, so the two
existing writers are untouched.
Tests: a scripted-provider verdict records one request and nonzero tokens; a
provider that refuses still records the request and zero tokens.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WZb5A2kfVfjpdwSochkuHz
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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00160739de |
feat(skills): a files arm — progressive disclosure through Read, not a deferred tool
The `index` arm retrieves through `ReadMcpResourceTool`, which is DEFERRED:
absent from the agent's default tool list until `ToolSearch` loads it. Across
three matched production runs (same recipe, same task, same three offered
uris) it retrieved 1 skill in 9 chances:
01a07812 delegation forced no instruction 0/3
01a0842e no delegation no instruction 1/3
01a09877 no delegation told to load it 0/3
The third run is the decisive one. The preamble said in plain words to run
ToolSearch first; all three prompts carried it; zero ToolSearch calls, and the
three reasoning narratives never mention skills at all. The section was not
declined, it was never engaged with. Instruction is not the lever.
`Read` is a core tool. Never deferred, and every one of those agents used it.
So this arm keeps progressive disclosure exactly as `index` has it — a name, a
`when_to_use`, and a pointer the agent has to follow — and changes only what
the pointer is: a path under /mission/skills instead of an MCP uri. The bodies
are written into the container at launch (every visible skill, one tar upload;
bindings resolve per agent at turn time so a per-mission subset is not knowable
here) and a `Read` of that path is a tapped tool call, so Trigger is exactly as
observable as before.
A third arm and not a replacement, selected per mission like the others, so
the comparison runs against one binary. `resolve` falls back to `inline` when
the files were not written, for the reason `index` does: a pointer to nothing
reads as an agent ignoring its skills.
The writer and reader of a path are one pair of functions
(`skill_file_path` / `skill_from_file_path`), matched by the scorer through
the same seam `parse_uri` uses, and the end-to-end test fails when the matcher
is broken. `Mode::is_retrieval` exists so the next arm cannot silently inherit
`inline`'s "not observable" for what is a miss.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WZb5A2kfVfjpdwSochkuHz
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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f52cff3e04 |
feat(skill-use): progressive disclosure, as an arm and not a switch
Trigger — did the agent reach for the skill when it applied? — cannot be measured while every body is inlined into the prompt. Nothing was reached for. `skill_use` has been reporting `NotObservable` for that reason, and it was right to. The skills door made retrieval possible; this makes it a delivery arm. `index` sends each pinned skill's name, description, `when_to_use` and the uri that returns its body, and the agent fetches what it judges relevant. `inline` is unchanged and stays the default. An A/B rather than a switch, because `index` can only cost Compliance: under `inline` the procedure sits in front of the model whether or not it noticed it applied. Trading a measured axis for an unmeasured regression in another is not an improvement, so both arms stay runnable and the arm is recorded on the mission row. Three things the mechanism refuses to do: - `index` without a door falls back to `inline`. An index names bodies and says how to fetch them; with no `clawmates_skills` server reachable that is a list of dead ends, and it fails as an agent ignoring its skills rather than as a missing config. `install_skills_door` now returns whether it installed, because the caller needs the answer and not just the log line. - The scorer reads the arm off the recorded PROMPT, not off the mission row. The row says what the mission is configured to do now; the score is being computed against a turn that ran then. - Under `index`, a skill that was offered and never read is a Fail, not the inline arm's `NotObservable` — but only where the skill had a checkable consequence in that phase. Reusing the inline text would have said "this skill was inlined into the prompt" about a skill whose body was never sent, and scoring a real miss as a structural blind spot is the failure this measurement already made once. The arm is per mission (`config.skill_delivery`), not only per deployment. Both arms run against one server process; restarting between them would put a confound in the comparison that the numbers would not show. 829 tests, 108 binaries, green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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3aeee070b8 |
fix(missions): the door read a field that is not set yet
`install_skills_door` took the container name from `mission.runtime_container_name`, and `on_launch` loads the mission at the top — before `ensure_container` runs and binds that field. So it was always `None`, and the early return had no log, so the door simply never installed and said nothing about it. Verified against a live mission: no log line, no file in the container. That is the same shape as the three hook bugs before it, which is a poor excuse for repeating it. The name is derived from the mission id (`container_name`) instead, guarded on `mission_gateway` being Some — which is exactly the signal that `ensure_container` ran and that this mission has its own container rather than the shared runtime. Every remaining early return now logs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018i9Ten1LU4jUr5d7TAWda9 |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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73f5d71c55 |
feat(missions): install the skills door, with a credential it is safe to leave
The capability has been built and undeployed since `88eef99d4`: `claude_cli` accepts `mcp_config` and passes `--mcp-config --strict-mcp-config`, so Claude Code's own MCP client can reach our skills server. What was missing was the config document and, underneath it, a credential that could be left in a container an untrusted agent reads. Now both halves happen together — the document goes in, and the daemon is told to pass it — because doing one without the other leaves a door installed and unreachable, which looks exactly like a door nobody walked through. That is the same shape as the hooks that shipped installed and inert three bugs running. The API origin defaults to our own `HOSTNAME` rather than a container name. Mission containers share `clawmates_core` with the server, and the server's name differs between deployments (`clawmates-server-1` locally, `clawmates_server_1` on gw-04); docker's embedded DNS resolves a container id on a user-defined network, so this is self-configuring. Measured from a sibling container: both the id and the name return 200. `--allowedTools` is deliberately NOT touched. The provider passes it only when `tools` is set and the seed already sets it — without it `claude -p` stops mid-turn asking for write permission. Whether MCP tools also need naming there is undocumented in anything we control, and the daemon exposes no config read to merge into the list safely; overwriting it would take `Write` and `Bash` from every mission agent, and that failure would look like agents that stopped working rather than a config that was replaced. So the question gets answered by running a mission with the door installed. Guessing is how the last three defects in this file got in. Every failure degrades to "no door", never to a failed launch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018i9Ten1LU4jUr5d7TAWda9 |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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b89606fcf1 |
feat(missions): gate and observe tools on the container tier
The container tier is the one that actually runs missions in production, and it had neither a tool gate nor tool telemetry. The microVM tier has had both since yesterday; the tier that matters had neither. Both gaps have one cause. `claude_cli` runs claude as a subprocess, claude runs its tools inside that subprocess, and those calls never pass through ZeroClaw's executor — the only thing that emits TurnEvent::ToolCall and therefore the only thing the gateway turns into a frame ClawMates can see. Recovering the calls from the CLI's stream-json output did not help: a real mission produced zero tool.call events with the parser working perfectly. The transport was never the problem. Hooks are the way in, and they are proven. Claude Code reads hooks.PreToolUse / PostToolUse from the document given to `--settings` and honours them under `-p` — measured yesterday against the real binary, where the gate blocked a Bash call, recorded the payload, and got its refusal reason back to the model. So the same hook scripts the microVM tier uses are now written into the mission's container, and the provider is pointed at the settings document (`--settings` added to claude_cli in the fork, be9c34b1c). Composed in ONE script for one document: two writers of one settings.json is a silent clobber, and the microVM tier already learned that expensively. Installed on BOTH container paths — created and reused. A hook that exists only on first creation quietly disappears after a server redeploy, and the container outlives the server process. Everything degrades to "no hooks", never to a failed mission: a phase that runs unobserved still delivers; one that fails to start because telemetry could not be installed delivers nothing. Four tests, including two that exist because the halves are inert alone: the installer and the provider prop must both be wired (hooks nobody reads, or a document nobody wrote), and nothing may be written under /mission/repo, where it would arrive as part of the agent's delivered diff. Full workspace suite green: 107 binaries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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e4942ce985 |
fix(missions): skills can now reach a mission agent at all
Repairing the 55 broken skill bindings made the catalogue correct. This
makes it reachable, which it was not — for any skill, on any mission, since
the catalogue was built.
The skills had exactly ONE delivery channel: the `clawmates_skills` MCP
server. A mission claw could not reach it for three independent reasons:
1. `provision_claw` wrote the constant `["clawmates_door"]` and ignored
the template's mcp_bundles — which mission_orchestrator had already
resolved and stored on the team row.
2. The runtime config defines no `clawmates_skills` bundle. The live
local config defines no bundles at all, not even the door.
3. Mission claws run on `claude_cli`, which the runtime's own config
comments document as text-only: it cannot surface a tool call, so no
MCP server is reachable from a mission turn regardless of bundles.
And a mission turn's whole system context is two sentences synthesised from
the role slot in topology_exec::build_prompt. The template's role prose is
not used either — mission_orchestrator documents this, and it means the
role prompts describing which procedures to follow were never read.
Two doc comments in cm-runtime describe the mission path as already having
the summary-and-fetch contract. It never did. The belief was written down
twice and checked zero times, which is why nobody looked — and it is why
the Skill-Use measurement this review planned could only ever have returned
a trigger rate of zero. That would have read as a finding about the agents.
- provision_claw takes the bundles, with clawmates_door always added: a
template that forgets to list it must not get an ungated agent
- all 11 templates now request clawmates_skills; web_fetch removed, since
a list that is honoured must not name a bundle that does not exist
- the re-provision sweep re-asserts the team's own stored bundles rather
than a constant, which would have silently stripped a capability
mid-mission
- pinned skill BODIES are injected into the mission prompt, bounded and
with truncation stated. Bodies, not an index: there is no `skills.read`
tool on this path, so an index would advertise a capability that does
not exist — the exact failure this whole change is about
Three tests: the body reaches the prompt, an agent with no skills adds no
heading (an empty "Your skills" section announces skills the agent does not
have), and the composition is exercised separately from the lookup, because
`pinned_skills_text` working and `run_turn` calling it are different claims
and the second is the one that was false.
Also adds the three review documents: CAPABILITY-REVIEW (inventory, what
was repaired, what is deferred and why), PROVENANCE-ASSESSMENT (assess
only, per decision — what each store answers and the two candidate paths),
and RESEARCH-SWEEP (the fortnight's papers and what we did about each,
including the ones we deliberately did nothing about).
Full workspace suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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850f11838b |
fix(research): the manifest belongs to the mission, and a brittle phrase must not mean silence
Two defects from the first on-topic run.
**1. The manifest could never be updated twice in a day.** It was written into
the VAULT at a per-DATE path, but it is per-RUN data. A second mission the same
day rewrites a file that already exists, and `auto_merge` correctly refused the
whole branch:
diff is not additive (1 non-add change(s), first:
M ContinuousResearch/2026-08-18/harvest.jsonl); left for a human
So `main` kept the FIRST run's manifest, the next mission cloned it, and the
agents analysed yesterday's papers while every log line reported a successful
harvest. The merge policy was right; the placement was wrong. The manifest now
goes into the mission's own checkout after `ensure_checkout`, which keeps the
vault additive and gives each mission exactly its own papers. The agents commit
it alongside their analysis through the normal delivery path.
**2. A quoted phrase that matches nothing looked like a quiet day.** Phrase
search is precise and brittle: "hybrid retrieval BM25 dense" is a reasonable
topic and appears verbatim in no paper on arXiv — measured, 0 hits — while the
same four terms unquoted return exactly the hybrid-retrieval evaluations the
topic asked for. Harvesting zero because of adjacency is indistinguishable from
a genuinely quiet field, which is the distinction `Harvest::healthy()` vs
`added_anything()` exists to preserve. `search` now retries unquoted when the
phrase finds nothing, and says so in the log.
Proven in one run, all three behaviours at once:
"approximate nearest neighbor search" -> 5 candidates, 5 already held, 0 shelved
"hybrid retrieval BM25 dense" -> no exact phrase match, retrying broad
-> 5 candidates, 0 already held, 5 shelved
"LLM as a judge evaluation" -> 5 candidates, 5 already held, 0 shelved
wrote 5 paper(s) to .../ContinuousResearch/2026-08-18/harvest.jsonl
The seen-set suppressing 10 of 15 is the whole point of a recurring mission, and
the 5 that landed are on topic for the first time: RAG architecture evaluation,
agent-controlled search over chat logs, compute-aware retrieval and reranking,
hybrid retrieval in hyperbolic space, sparse-dense fusion limits.
353 tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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d524107b37 |
fix(missions): harvest before the checkout, and stop an unreachable judge failing done work
Two bugs from the first real Continuous Research run, both found by running it. **1. The harvest ran AFTER the checkout.** `on_launch` cloned the vault and then harvested, so the mission's working copy predated the manifest push. The reader agent found no `harvest.jsonl` and — being resourceful — queried arXiv itself and wrote its own. That is exactly what `skills/research/arxiv-daily.md` forbids: the papers it found are not checked off in `corpus_items`, so the next run re-offers them, while the 13 the real harvest DID shelve went unread. The harvest now runs first, so the clone contains the manifest. The analysis it produced was otherwise very good — it named `crates/clawhdf5-ann/src/hnsw.rs`, cited the ROADMAP's serial insert loop and proposed a concrete pre-build probe — which is the behaviour the whole design is for. It was reading the wrong papers. **2. An unreachable judge consumed a pass.** `Verdict.error` exists to distinguish "could not judge" from "judged incomplete" and nothing acted on it. glm-5.3 returned "transport error: error decoding response body", the phase counted it as a failed pass, and with two budgeted that single outage failed a phase whose work was done and committed. The evaluator was right to refuse a same-family fallback — that would trade independence for availability — so the fix belongs here: an unreachable judge no longer spends an iteration. Retrying forever would trade a wrong failure for an invisible hang, so the wait is bounded by `judge_blocked_since` (migration 0078), mirroring how `capacity_blocked_since` bounds a phase waiting on a VM slot. Thirty minutes is many sweep ticks, so a blip recovers inside it; past that the phase FAILS with the transport reason rather than requeueing, because re-running spends a container re-doing work that was never the problem. 346 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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a02e0cba69 |
feat(missions): Continuous Research harvests at launch, and cards launch by clicking
The card shipped in
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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d3a398716b |
fix(workforce): a crew should not read as an alphabetical run
Seeding the name pick with the role index (0..n) started every crew at the top of the pool and took the next free names, so the first mission after the switch to per-mission crews hired Aarav, Abebe, Adaora, Adrian, Agnieszka. Unique and correct, and transparently generated. Seed from the claw's own uuid instead. UUIDv7 puts its random bytes LAST — the leading bytes are a timestamp, which would cluster the same way — so the tail is what spreads five picks across the whole pool. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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98037f9b3e |
feat(workforce): every mission hires its own crew
Reverses the reuse added earlier, by operator decision. Reuse hired the existing claw for a (template, slot) so the roster stayed at one team — but it also meant every mission was staffed by the same five names, and the workforce view showed one crew repeated down the page with nothing to tell the missions apart. Distinct crews read better than a bounded roster. The cost is the one reuse existed to avoid: claws are lifecycle='permanent' and nothing reaps them until their MISSION is deleted, so the roster now grows by the team size per mission. `agent_names::pick` keeps names unique workspace-wide and degrades to a numeric suffix rather than colliding, and the pool grew from 70 to 200+ given names so a workspace runs ~35 missions before the first repeat. `reusable_claw` is kept in cm-db with its tests: this policy has now flipped twice and the query is the hard part. Also revives a test that had silently stopped running. An edit stranded `runtime_data_is_scoped_to_one_mission`'s `#[test]` above its neighbour, leaving two attributes there and none here — so the neighbour ran TWICE and this one never ran at all. The total test count was unchanged by the fix (291 before and after), which is exactly why a count is not evidence: rustc had said "duplicated attribute" and "function is never used" all along, and both read as ordinary warnings. The test guards per-mission `/zeroclaw-data` isolation, i.e. one mission reading another's door token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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0ad53da49c |
feat(workforce): missions group the roster, and agents get human names
Three things, all visible on the agents page.
**The roster looked like it was multiplying.** The sidebar flattened
orgs → companies → teams → agents, which renders a claw once per TEAM it
belongs to. Claws are reused across missions now, so a crew of five that had
run five missions appeared as twenty-five rows of the same five people. The
data was right and the view was lying. `GET /api/workforce` returns the roster
grouped by mission, and the tree renders each mission as a collapsible group,
so the repetition means something: the same colleague under each mission they
staffed. Claws on no mission come back under "Not on a mission" rather than
vanishing. The root now counts DISTINCT people, not rows.
**Agents were named after their jobs.** A team came back as planner, coder,
tester, reviewer, committer — the UI showed the same word twice (name on top,
role beneath) and the roster read as a stack of job tickets. New claws get a
given name from a deliberately wide pool (Amara, Vijay, Tomasz, Meredith…),
unique against the workspace roster AND within the team being minted. The role
is untouched in `job_title`, which is what the mission machinery binds on:
team_members.role_slot and the topology node carry the slot, so nothing
downstream keys off the display name. A reused claw keeps the name it had.
**Two latent reap bugs found while investigating a leak that was not one.**
Containers of completed missions are removed by `spawn_sweeper` after a
30-minute grace, and it works — an earlier report of leaking containers was me
reading that deliberate grace as a bug. But:
- the sweeper cleared the runtime binding even when teardown FAILED, and it
selects on `runtime_endpoint IS NOT NULL`. One transient docker error would
therefore hide a surviving container from the only thing that would retry
it, permanently. It now asks docker whether the container actually
survived: gone means clear, still there means keep the binding and retry —
which closes the orphan path without reintroducing the infinite retry the
original comment was guarding against.
- `set_runtime_binding` discarded rows_affected, so a mismatched workspace
updated nothing and returned Ok. The binding is how the sweeper finds a
container; a silent no-op there leaks one with no record of anything wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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fe2451fd60 |
feat(workforce): missions hire the agents you already have, and name them by role
Every zeroclaw mission minted a fresh team of claws. They are created
`lifecycle = 'permanent'` and nothing reaps them until the MISSION is deleted,
so the roster grew by a whole team per mission while each member worked exactly
once — "My Workforce" was a list of strangers, and upskilling had nothing
durable to act on.
A mission now hires the claw that already does the job, matched on
`agent_template_link (template_id, role_slot)`, minting only what is missing.
Oldest first, so reuse concentrates on the same few claws and their brains
actually accumulate rather than spreading thinly across a growing pool.
A claw on a RUNNING mission is not offered. Two missions driving the same
ZeroClaw agent and the same `.brain` at once is a data race with a model on the
other end of it, and minting a second claw is much cheaper than reasoning about
that.
A reused claw is NOT re-seeded from the template's brain_seed — that would
overwrite what it learned with its starting point, which is precisely the
accumulation this exists for.
Names are the role now (`planner`), not
`"{mission} · {purpose} · {template} · {slot}"`. That produced
"verify: a repo-less research mission keeps its output · mission · Rust SDLC ·
planner" — unreadable in the roster, the API and every log line at once. Which
mission a claw is on is context a caller can join to; it is not its name.
And the half that makes reuse safe rather than destructive: deleting a mission
now purges only claws no OTHER mission still employs. Without it, tidying up one
mission deletes staff another one holds — presenting as the roster quietly
shrinking rather than as an error. A test asserts the guard exists inside the
reaper AND runs before the purge, because a check after it is decoration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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Omar Sobh
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d84d17207f |
feat(placement): place per phase, and let a full fleet queue
Phase 1b: wires the capacity model from
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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f7f3dfe495 |
feat(fleet): GLM as a real microVM backend, and per-role models for claws
Three threads, all of which end at the same place: a mission whose verifier does
not share a model with the coder it reviews.
**GLM has a credential contract now.** `microvm_credential_for` returned one env
var name, which quietly assumed every provider reads its secret from the same
place Anthropic does. It returns a `Credential { source, target }` instead —
z.ai's key lives in the server's `ZAI_API_KEY` and Claude Code reads it as
`ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`, and collapsing those two names is what forces a guess at
the other end. A wrong guess here sends one provider's credential to another
provider's endpoint.
`images/agent-glm` is the same CLI at the same pinned version as `agent-claude`
with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` baked in. The split is deliberate: the ENDPOINT is a
property of the image, the CREDENTIAL is a property of the turn. That makes the
dangerous mix-up unrepresentable — a GLM VM cannot be handed an Anthropic
subscription token, and a claude VM cannot be pointed at z.ai. Asserted both
ways, because "the GLM VM must not carry CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN" is the
property that costs a credential if it ever stops holding.
Kimi stays refused. `KIMI_API_KEY` is set and Moonshot serves an
Anthropic-compatible API, but I have not verified its base URL against the
running service, and this function is precisely where guessing a URL is
expensive. It becomes an arm the day someone measures it.
`api.z.ai` joins the node's default egress allow-list. A default that cannot
run the images we ship is a trap rather than a policy — the alternative is an
operator discovering it as a hung agent with no model access.
**Per-role models for claws** (migration 0071). `template_roles` had no model
column, so `mint_team_from_template` bound every role of every mission team to
one literal — a template whose whole point is an independent reviewer minted a
reviewer sharing a model with the coder. A role may now name its own; roles that
say nothing still take the mint's default, so every template written before this
behaves exactly as it did. The literal is now that default rather than a
hardcode.
**A harness scenario for the roster flow.** `verify-mission-delivery.sh roster`
runs the whole Slice 5 loop — planner proposes, human approves, mission runs —
and asserts the roster LANDED on the mission row rather than trusting the API's
answer. That distinction is not theoretical: the first live approval returned an
error while leaving the proposal marked approved.
Built and proven on tank ahead of the deploy: `clawmates/agent-glm:dev` reports
`2.1.223` and `BASE=https://api.z.ai/api/anthropic`, and
`fc-build-rootfs.sh … glm 8G` boots a VM from it that has git, can write
/mission, and answers `claude --version`.
533 tests pass, clippy clean. Migration 0071.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
1797669296 |
feat(missions): Slice 5 — let a model size the mission's team
`routes/planner.rs` has had Opus proposing rosters since the Master Planner
shipped, and none of it ever reached a mission: the proposal lived in React state
and died with the tab. A mission's shape came from a team template instead —
fixed roles, and every claw minted `claude-sonnet-5` from a literal in
`mint_team_from_template`. That literal is why no mission has ever run more than
one provider.
A roster is `(topology_kind, [(role, backend)])`, which is exactly what the
composed executor already consumes: `Roster::graph` builds a `TopologyGraph` with
the backend in `attrs`, and `MicroVmTurnExecutor` reads `attrs["backend"]` per
node. So a verifier on another provider's rootfs stops being a bolt-on and
becomes a graph node — the correlated-failure break the independent judge exists
for, one layer down.
Three verbs, and the split is the point. **suggest** asks the model and persists
the answer, changing nothing. **decide** approves (writes `config.roster` and
switches the mission to the composed engine) or rejects. A proposal is never
applied on arrival: a model sizing a team is a suggestion about how many VMs to
boot, and this codebase treats model output that costs money as evidence for a
decision, not the decision.
Fail-closed at every seam, because each of these otherwise surfaces much later
and much more expensively:
- a backend no ONLINE node can boot is refused when PROPOSED, naming the ones
the fleet actually has. Placement would refuse it too — at launch, after the
roster was approved and someone believed the mission would run. The model is
handed that same list in its prompt, so the usual case never arises.
- an invented `topology_kind` is refused, not defaulted. `parse_topology_kind`
defaults to hub-spoke, which is right for a template we wrote and wrong for a
string a model just produced: running a `pipeline` proposal as a hub-and-spoke
changes what every node sees and nothing would say so.
- the roster is validated BEFORE it is stored, so a stored proposal is always
one that could be approved; and again at approval, against the fleet as it is
then — a node can go offline in between.
- `MAX_MEMBERS = 6`. Each member is a whole VM, not a subagent, and a model
asked to size a team proposes twelve happily.
Two properties live in SQL rather than in the handler: at most one approved
roster per mission (partial unique index — two approved rosters are two answers
to "what shape is this mission", and the executor reads one field), and
decide-once (`WHERE status = 'proposed'`, so a double-clicked approve claims
nothing the second time). Both tested against a real database, including that the
second approval is refused by Postgres rather than merely losing a race.
NEGATIVE CONTROL, run rather than assumed: with the roster preference removed
from `composed_graph`, `an_approved_roster_outranks_the_template` FAILS — 3 nodes
from the template instead of the roster's 2. A stored roster that is silently
ignored at launch is precisely the shape this project keeps paying for.
Not closed: per-role models for CLAWS. `template_roles` has no model column, so a
ZeroClaw team still mints one model for every role. The literal is now a named
constant that says so and points at the roster path, rather than sitting inline
where nobody reads it.
527 tests pass, clippy clean. Migration 0070. Not yet exercised against the
deployed stack — the route has never been called with a live model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
12147a1e01 |
feat(missions): Slice 4 — the two engines composed, with the file handoff proven
`team_engine='composed'` (the third name migration 0069 anticipated) runs a
mission as a durable ZeroClaw graph whose every node is a whole
Claude-Code-in-a-microVM session. Engine Z owns checkpoint/resume, cancellation
and per-node heterogeneity; Engine C owns shared context and cheap fan-out;
neither has the other's asset, which is why this is a composition and not a
compromise.
`MicroVmTurnExecutor` implements the existing `TurnExecutor`, so it inherits the
planners, the checkpoint, the stale-run recovery, `close_finished_phases`, the
evaluator, capture and delivery unchanged — the same trick `SubTopologyExecutor`
already plays with a heavy `run_turn`. Producer side emits ONE `queued` row
carrying the real graph and lets the worker claim it: the durability IS being
worker-driven, and the solo path's `tokio::spawn` has none of it. Still exactly
one `topology_runs` row per unit of work and one completion path — `finish()` is
now that one place, shared by every tier.
THE TRAP, solved and proven. A VM is inject → run → collect → destroy, so a
per-node VM with text-only handoff silently loses every file an earlier node
wrote: node 2 boots from the original checkout, sees nothing, and still reports
success. The mission's host checkout is the medium — every node injects from it
and collects back over it — and two properties make that safe rather than lucky:
`execute_resumable` is strictly sequential, so two VMs never write one directory;
and the vm id is deterministic per (phase, iteration, step), so a duplicate is
refused by the node ("vm already exists") instead of becoming a second writer.
NEGATIVE CONTROL, run rather than assumed: with `repo` swapped for a private
per-node workspace, `a_later_node_sees_an_earlier_nodes_files` FAILS with
`saw:[]`; restored, it passes. The `PhaseVm` seam exists for exactly this — it
models inject/collect through the real `mission_fs` tar path in milliseconds.
Two durability traps this tier walks into, both closed:
- `requeue_stale` fires at 180s on `updated_at`, and one node here can run for
an hour. `SubTopologyExecutor` keeps its parent alive from each leaf step;
there is nothing between the start and end of a VM turn, so the turn holds a
ticker that touches `updated_at` every 30s and aborts on drop. Without it a
healthy composed run is requeued mid-node and boots a second VM.
- the 15-minute stuck-run reaper asks "any step records since it was CREATED?",
which describes a healthy composed run as readily as a wedged one. Hence
`REAPABLE_TIERS` — worker-driven minus this tier. Reaping it would be #54 in
a different costume.
`on_launch` mints no team for a microVM mission, deliberately: claws in
containers are what a VM mission does not use. So `mission_orchestrator::
composed_graph` builds the shape from the team template directly — nodes, roles
and pattern, zero claws provisioned. Per-node `attrs["backend"]` and
`attrs["node_id"]` override the mission's, which is what makes a validator node
on another provider's image a first-class graph node; a malformed `node_id`
fails the node rather than quietly running it where the graph did not ask.
Refusals are recorded as a failed run, not returned as an error: `launch_phase`
is swept every ten seconds, so a returned error is a phase that retries forever
while the log repeats itself.
501 tests pass, clippy clean. NOT yet proven end to end: no composed mission has
run on the fleet, so the resume-after-a-killed-worker leg is argued from the DB
test and the step-numbering test, not from a real two-node run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar Sobh
|
7696009b25 |
fix(fleet): name the BACKEND in a placement refusal, not just "microvm capability"
Observed on the negative control: a mission with backend='kimi' was correctly refused, but the message read "no online node reports microvm capability" — and both nodes do report it. What one lacked was the image. That first clause would have sent an operator to reinstall firecracker on a node that already had it. The refusal now names the backend, and the remedy still names both halves. |
||
|
Omar Sobh
|
d9f53a3f96 |
fix(fleet): placement requires the backend's rootfs image, not just KVM
The first real microVM mission was placed on morpheus because it reports
{"microvm": true}, while only tank had rootfs-claude.ext4. It failed by name
rather than booting the wrong image — but whether a mission ran came down to
which capable node was listed first, which is a coin flip dressed as scheduling.
`missions.backend` was invisible to the scheduler.
The node now enumerates the images on its disk and reports them as a `rootfs`
ARRAY. `microvm::available_backends` lives beside `rootfs_for`, its inverse,
because the two must agree on what a backend name means; split apart, one drifts
and the scheduler starts promising images the booter cannot find. It only
advertises names `rootfs_for` would accept, and reports an empty array rather than
omitting the key — set_capabilities REPLACES, so a deleted image stops being
advertised instead of leaving a stale claim.
`nodes::online_for_backend` requires microvm AND that the node's list contains the
mission's backend. A node on an older daemon has no `rootfs` key and matches
nothing: unknown is not permission, the same treatment every other capability
gets. `backend_key` maps the three spellings of "the default image" to the one
name the node advertises, and is tested — a mismatch there would reject every node
for an ordinary mission with no backend set.
The launch error now names both halves of the fix, since "no capable node" was
true but unhelpful when the node was capable and merely lacked the image.
Mission gains `backend` on the domain struct; it was a column the executor read
from the phase query while the struct that placement uses could not see it.
464 tests pass, clippy clean.
|
||
|
Omar Sobh
|
1cd81a8b2a |
fix(missions): place a microvm mission before returning from on_launch
Self-inflicted, one commit old, and found by running a real mission: the early return I added for "a microvm mission materialises no team" sat ABOVE the microVM placement block in the same function, so on_launch returned before ever choosing a node. The mission then failed with the executor's own guard — "mission has no target_node_id ... a microvm mission cannot run on the gateway, which has no /dev/kvm" — which is the guard working exactly as designed, on a cause one layer further up. Placement now runs first. Worth noting the shape: adding an early return to a long function silently skipped everything below it that the same runtime_kind depends on. 461 tests pass, clippy clean. |
||
|
Omar Sobh
|
521b8dea10 |
fix(missions): the third team gate, and a container a microvm mission never uses
on_launch demanded a team template too — "pick teams in the wizard" — so a microvm mission still could not launch after the first two gates were exempted. Three separate places required a claw graph for a path that runs one `claude -p` inside a VM: routes::missions (draft→running), phase_runner::launch_phase (no matching teams → stay pending), and here. Returning before team materialisation rather than filtering its picks: claws that never run are not a cheaper version of the same thing, they are a runtime binding and a pairing code describing something nothing speaks to. Also stops provisioning the per-mission ZeroClaw container for a microvm mission. The first real run was observed starting one and leaving it holding a pairing code and ~3 GB of image for the life of a mission that never contacts it. 461 tests pass, clippy clean. |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
4f07430e92 |
feat(missions): B4.5 — phase_runner runs a microvm mission in a VM
`runtime_kind='microvm'` placed a mission on a KVM-capable node and then nothing
executed it: config accepted without a reader, one of the four seams this project
keeps closing. This is the reader.
`microvm_executor` — inject → run → collect → destroy, the shape copy mode
already proved for containers with a VM boundary instead of a namespace one. The
checkout goes in as a tar, the work comes back as a tar over the SAME host path,
so `mission_delivery::capture_phase_diff_at` needs no change at all.
The agent is told NOT to push, unlike the container path's session prompt. Two
reasons: delivery is already host-side and diffs the collected tree against the
recorded clone point (covering committed, staged and unstaged work in one pass),
so pushing would add a second untested way for work to arrive; and pushing would
mean forge credentials inside the VM, when the point of collecting is that the
guest never holds them.
Exactly ONE topology_runs row (tier='microvm'), mirroring launch_direct_session:
close_finished_phases, evaluation, capture and delivery all key off those rows,
and a second completion path would be a second way for a phase to finish with one
of them untested. The row and the phase flip happen BEFORE any fallible VM work,
so a missing token or a node that lost its capability shows up as a failed run an
operator can see — not a phase that stays pending and retries every ten seconds.
Fail-closed points, each the reader for a guarantee built earlier:
- credentials resolve BEFORE the VM boots, so a missing subscription token
fails the phase instead of booting a VM whose agent sits unauthenticated
- a VM reporting egress:false is REFUSED, which is what makes create's
egress/egress_host/egress_guest fields more than decoration — a turn without
egress does not fail, it hangs
- the injected checkout is PROVEN present in the guest before an agent turn is
spent on it; an inject that reports success while landing nothing would
otherwise become an agent reporting an empty repository
- work is collected even when the agent exits non-zero — a turn that failed
partway still wrote files, and a retry needs to see them
- a turn that ran but could not be collected is a FAILED phase, not a happy one
- destroy runs on every exit path, or an 8 GB sparse rootfs leaks
Two integration gaps found while wiring, both of which would have produced a
mission that completed having delivered nothing:
- `capture_finished_coding_phases` pulls work out of a CONTAINER before
capturing. A microvm mission has none, so the docker connect would fail, the
loop would `continue`, and capture would be skipped forever while the phase
sat marked completed. Its work is already collected by the executor.
- `launch_phase` provisioned a runtime container, copied the checkout into it
and wrote a runtime binding + pairing code describing a runtime nothing uses;
and the orchestrator's workspace pin — deliberately FATAL — would have failed
a microVM launch on a container it was never going to use.
461 tests pass, clippy clean.
NOT YET PROVEN END TO END: no mission has run through this path. The pieces under
it are each verified on tank (image, credentials, egress, a real agent turn), but
this executor has only been compiled and unit-tested. Deploy + one real microvm
mission is the remaining step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
0f7fa31f86 |
feat(fleet): B1 — microvm runtime kind and KVM placement predicate
Phase B step 1, on top of the B0 spike that proved microVMs boot here.
KVM is a HARD predicate, not a preference. gw-04 — where every mission
runs today — is itself a VM without nested virtualisation and has no
/dev/kvm, so a microvm mission landing there cannot start at all. The
scheduler therefore has to be able to tell nodes apart, which means the
node has to report what it can host.
Nodes gain a `capabilities` jsonb, populated from a probe on the node
rather than from configuration: /dev/kvm either exists there or it does
not, and nothing on the server can make it appear. The probe OPENS the
device rather than stat-ing it, because it can exist while being
unopenable (wrong group, or a container without the device passed
through) — which is precisely how firecracker will fail.
`microvm` requires BOTH kvm and a firecracker binary. A node with KVM
but no binary looks capable by the obvious test and fails at launch; a
node with the binary but no KVM is gw-04.
Placement fails the launch when no capable node exists, rather than
letting a mission sit in 'running' with nowhere to run. An explicit
target_node_id is treated as a request, not a guarantee — it is honoured
only if that node actually reports the capability.
`capabilities` defaults to '{}' NOT NULL so a node that has never
reported fails every predicate: an unqueried node and an incapable node
must be indistinguishable to the scheduler, because scheduling onto a
node whose abilities are unknown is how you get a mission that cannot
start and does not say why. The report replaces rather than merges, so a
capability the node has LOST disappears instead of leaving a stale true.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
1253595ba7 |
fix(missions): stop three launch failures from passing as success
A verification run against the deployed stack found a chain mission whose phase 0 reported `completed` with zero files, no commit error and no push error — indistinguishable from a phase that correctly had nothing to do. Three separate defects had to line up, each of them the same shape: a failure sharing its representation with a legitimate negative result. 1. `pin_agent_workspaces` embedded the whole config in one `sh -c` argv. That works until the file grows — config gains a block per provisioned claw — then fails with `argument list too long`. Now written through the tar upload API, which has no argv limit, so the failure mode is gone rather than merely further away. 2. A failed pin was logged "(continuing)". Without the pin, agents write to their sandboxes and the committer finds nothing in /mission/repo — the mission cannot deliver, so the launch now fails where someone is still looking. The restart that applies the pin is fatal for the same reason. 3. `capture_phase_diff_at` swallowed `git diff` failures with `unwrap_or_default`, so an unreadable base landed `empty: true, files_changed: 0` — byte-identical to an honest no-op. The error is now recorded as `diff_error`, and an empty patch that came from a failed diff is no longer trusted to mean an unchanged tree. Adds scripts/verify-mission-delivery.sh, which found #1 and #2 on its first real run. Its probes are fail-closed: no placeholder values, a self-test that proves the uid probe can detect the split it looks for, and FAIL-NORUN for a scenario that never executed. Its own first version had this bug too — a `die` inside `$(...)` exited the subshell, so a run that could not authenticate printed "all checks passed" and exited 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
2eb0880fc0 |
fix(skills): reconcile team-template skill names so role bindings actually bind
Every skill reference in every team template was failing to resolve. The TOMLs used snake_case slugs (`write_rust`, `index_selection`) while the authored skills under `skills/**/*.md` declare kebab-case names (`write-rust-current-edition`, `postgres-index-selection`), so `get_by_name` missed on all of them: 128 skipped bindings across 51 distinct names, and no mission agent received any of its template's skills. The mirror-image half was equally invisible: ten authored skills — including `int-xx-marker-protocol`, whose own `when_to_use` says "pin on every coding role" — were referenced by no role at all, so nothing could ever load them. - Rename the 14 references that have authored skills behind them, and dedupe the two that now collapse onto the commit-protocol skill. - Attach all ten orphaned skills to the roles their `when_to_use` names. All 23 authored skills now reach at least one role. - Aggregate the loader's per-name logging into one line per template. The old per-name spam is why this went unnoticed; a bound/unresolved count is noticeable. References with no authored skill are kept and listed — they record intent for skills not yet written. - Two regression tests: no authored skill may be orphaned, and every authored skill must be referenced by its exact name. Also clears the two standing clippy warnings: group `mint_team_from_template`'s eight positional args into `TeamMint`, and make `provider_alias_for` branch on `is_exact_provider_match` so the helper is live code and the two can't disagree about what counts as an exact family match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
95bd65540c |
docs(missions): record why template role prose is not deletable
Plan §12 proposed deleting the ~1,250 lines of `system_prompt` prose across the 23 team templates as instruction-shaped injection. Tracing the two prompt paths shows that would be strictly harmful: - Missions never see it. `topology_exec::build_prompt` synthesizes its own one-line system text from the role slot, so the prose costs zero mission tokens and deleting it saves zero. - Chat depends on it. `mission_orchestrator` copies it into `agents.system_prompt`, which is the base prompt `cm_runtime::brain::compose_system` augments for a claw's chat turns. Deleting it leaves every mission-minted claw with no identity in chat. The prose is also mostly information (domain standards, wire discipline) rather than instructions restating general competence, which is the kind ablation keeps. Comment left at the one injection site so this isn't re-derived. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 4.8
|
06ae608d0c |
fix(missions): provision claws into the mission's own daemon + reload the pin
Mission turns execute against the per-mission runtime container, but claws were provisioned via RuntimeProvisioner::from_env() — i.e. the GLOBAL gateway. That daemon loads config once at boot and never re-reads the file, so the per-mission daemon had no claw_* agents at all: querying it for a mission claw's risk_profile returned 404 while the global daemon returned 200. With the alias unresolvable, the daemon silently fell back to the default `scout` agent, which is jailed to the global workspace — agents reported "the scout agent workspace" and "/mission/repo isn't accessible", produced no files, and burned tokens. This is the deeper cause behind the empty-output runs; the tool-allowlist and workspace-pin fixes were necessary but not sufficient. - RuntimeProvisioner::for_gateway(url) — aim the provisioner at a specific gateway (mirrors ZeroClawDriveExecutor::from_env_for_gateway); from_env now delegates to it. - mission_orchestrator captures the per-mission endpoint from ensure_container and provisions every claw there, falling back to the global gateway only when there is no per-mission runtime (dev/no-docker). - workspace.path is file-only (the config prop API cannot set a PathBuf), and the daemon never re-reads the file, so pin_agent_workspaces is now followed by restart_container(): restart + wait for /health to answer. Agents created through the daemon's own config API are already persisted to that file, so they survive; the pairing code is re-minted on every launch. The readiness probe inspects the /health BODY — exec_capture only fails on docker errors, so a curl that cannot connect still "succeeds". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 4.8
|
34409bca0c |
fix(missions): grant coding tools + pin claw workspace to /mission/repo
Mission agents were burning ~275K tokens producing nothing: the coder had only file_read and its workspace was the empty ephemeral sandbox, so it dumped a full spec inline instead of writing files. Two root causes: 1. Risk-profile allowlists used pre-0.8 tool names. `coding_readwrite` allow-listed `file_write` (renamed to `file_edit` in ZeroClaw 0.8, and `file_write` now refuses on ephemeral workspaces) and omitted file_edit / content_search / glob_search / git_operations — the exact tools the phase prompt tells agents to use. Since allowed_tools is a strict allowlist, agents were effectively read-only. Documents the correct profiles in agent.config.example.toml (they only lived in host config; the live runtime profiles were corrected via its config API). 2. workspace.path never got set. `agents.<alias>.workspace.path` is an Option<PathBuf> the ZeroClaw Configurable macro skips from prop enumeration, so provision_claw's set_prop always 404'd and the whole call errored into a swallowed eprintln. Removes the dead set_prop and pins the workspace out-of-band: MissionRuntimeProvisioner:: pin_agent_workspaces patches the shared config file on the per-mission container (format-preserving via toml_edit, atomic temp+mv); the daemon applies it on the same reload that surfaces the freshly-provisioned claws. Covered by unit tests for the TOML stamp. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]> |
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|
Omar Sobh
|
6d5e7c87d7 |
fix(claws): point per-mission workspace at /mission/repo + tool-inventory preamble
Two stacked issues after risk_profile was fixed: 1. Claws had file_edit + 46 other tools available, but the templates trained the agents to expect file_read/file_write (older ZeroClaw tool names). Result: agent output kept saying "I only have file_read" and dumped implementations into the context window as text. 2. Even with file_edit, the sandbox pointed at /zeroclaw-data/.zeroclaw/agents/<alias>/workspace/ — NOT /mission/repo where the checked-out mission repo actually lives. unrestricted_filesystem=false blocked agents from reaching it. Fixes: - provision_claw now takes workspace_path. mission_orchestrator passes /mission/repo — pins the per-claw workspace via agents.<alias>.workspace.path to the bind-mount path so file_edit / content_search / glob_search operate on the mission's git checkout. - phase_task_text prepends an explicit tool inventory (file_edit, content_search, glob_search, git_operations, git_forge, ...) plus a WORKSPACE line pinned at /mission/repo. Each phase directive is rewritten to reference file_edit / git_operations explicitly and to call out "do NOT paste code in your reply expecting the platform to save it." |
||
|
Omar Sobh
|
84572186e9 |
fix(runtime_provision): use team-template risk_profile, not hardcoded toolfree
The provisioner was hardcoding risk_profile=toolfree for every claw, which the ZeroClaw config explicitly configures to EXCLUDE every usable tool (shell, file_read, file_write, http_request, browser). Result: coder/tester/committer claws had zero tools and produced text in the context window with no ability to actually write files or run tests — exactly what the last mission summary showed. Fixes: - provision_claw now takes risk_profile: &str, passed through from the team template (development teams already had coding_readwrite, which now actually gets applied). - Research team templates updated from toolfree → research_readonly (file_read) and papers_research → research_web_readonly (file_read + web_search + web_fetch). Applied to both the on-disk TOML files and the live DB rows. - Added RuntimeProvisioner::default_risk_profile_for_role for auto-provision code paths that lack a template context — picks coding_readwrite for coder-like roles, research_readonly otherwise. - Split rebind_model out of provision_claw so the model-change UI path doesnt inadvertently clobber the existing risk_profile. Templates DB fixup for missions launched pre-deploy is already applied via manual UPDATE. |
||
|
Omar Sobh
|
b569688e04 |
fix(mission_runtime): per-mission auto-pair via container log scrape (C3 auth)
The seed-mount approach didnt work: even with the shared runtimes data dir bind-mounted, a fresh gateway instance mints a new pairing key and requires re-pairing. The topology_worker connect returned 401 forever. New approach — per-mission gateways self-pair: - Provisioner tails container logs after start, extracts the X-Pairing-Code from the boot banner - Persists it on missions.runtime_pairing_code (migration 0059) - topology_worker constructs ZeroClawDriveExecutor with THAT code via from_env_for_gateway_with_code, which triggers the lazy /pair handshake on first turn and caches the returned bearer Drops the shared-runtime data-dir mount — each per-mission gateway now owns its own state, restoring the C3 isolation guarantee. |
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Omar Sobh
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7649b213ad |
missions: wire per-mission runtime container into launch + retry (C3 slice 2)
- mission_orchestrator::on_launch now calls ensure_container after the repo checkout, persists the container_name + endpoint on the missions row. Non-fatal — logs and continues on docker errors so dev-mode + tests keep working. - phase_runner::launch_phase does the same as a fallback for any mission whose runtime_endpoint is null (pre-C3 or torn down). Nothing reads the endpoint yet; slice 3 swaps topology_worker over. |
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Omar Sobh
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1e91a19707 |
missions: fix repo checkout for retries + tokenize git.redclaw.dev clones
- mission_orchestrator: run ensure_checkout BEFORE the team_id short-circuit. Previously, a re-launched or retried mission bailed out at the team_id=already-bound guard and skipped repo checkout entirely, so agents ran against an empty workspace. - mission_workspace: inject GITEA_TOKEN into git.redclaw.dev URLs so clone auth works from the server container. Redact any token echoed back on failure. - refresh buttons on MissionCanvas + MissionsList now spin the icon while loading so clicks are visibly acknowledged. - refresh-spinner keyframe added to motion.css. Requires operator on gw-04: sudo chown 65532:65532 /var/lib/clawmates-missions (applied 2026-07-21 pre-commit). |
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Omar Sobh
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b8b8cb452e |
missions: multi-team model — pick research + development teams
Directly addresses "we want to pick one or more teams to assign to a
mission, first screen research teams, next screen dev teams." A
mission now materializes N teams, each tagged with a phase purpose.
Backend:
- 0056_mission_teams.sql — new join table
mission_teams(mission_id, team_id, purpose). team_id PK because a
team belongs to one mission-purpose. missions.team_id kept as
legacy pointer to the first minted team for single-team surfaces.
- mission_orchestrator::on_launch — reads mission.config.phase_teams
(JSONB shape { research: [tid,...], coding: [tid,...] }), mints
one team per (purpose, template) pair, records each in
mission_teams, binds the first to mission.team_id. Legacy fallback:
if config.phase_teams is absent, uses missions.team_template_id.
Hard error if both are absent.
- GET /api/missions/{id}/teams — returns
[{ team_id, purpose, team_name }], sorted by created_at asc.
Frontend wizard (step 3 rewrite):
- researchTeamIds / devTeamIds — Set<string> multi-selects
- Reusable TeamMultiSelect component (checkbox-style cards)
- Panels rendered conditionally by preset:
hasResearchPhase → "Research teams" panel
hasCodingPhase → "Development teams" panel
neither → "Teams" panel (bench/security-only missions)
- canNext enforces at least one pick in every visible panel
- submit builds config.phase_teams and passes it via CreateMissionRequest
- Review step shows both selections by name
MissionTeamTab:
- Fetches /api/missions/{id}/teams and groups by purpose
- Each purpose renders a section with per-team cards
- Falls back to a single "mission" pseudo-row for legacy missions
that only have missions.team_id (no mission_teams rows)
CreateMissionRequest no longer sends team_template_id from the wizard
— the multi-team config.phase_teams path supersedes it. The backend
still accepts team_template_id for API callers.
Verified: cargo check --workspace + tsc + eslint --quiet all green.
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Omar Sobh
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0ee689f590 |
missions: hard-require team template — block empty-team launches
Root-cause fix for the "mission runs with zero agents" bug. Three
enforcement layers now guarantee a launched mission has a team:
1. mission_orchestrator::on_launch — the previous
\`return Ok(None)\` when both team_id and team_template_id are
None is now \`return Err(...)\`. That branch was never a real
"auto-provision later" path; it was a silent no-op that let
the mission flip to running with nothing to run.
2. routes::missions::set_status — the draft→running transition
now (a) rejects with 400 when team_id + team_template_id are
both null, and (b) runs on_launch BEFORE flipping status +
returns 500 on failure. No more orphan "running" missions
with no materialization.
3. MissionWizard step 3 — removed the misleading "LLM
auto-provision" tile (fake code path). First real template is
pre-selected on mount; canNext requires teamTemplateId set;
empty state surfaces a red warning if no templates loaded.
4. MissionCanvas Launch button — disabled with a "No team" label
and explanatory tooltip when the mission has neither team_id
nor team_template_id (defense-in-depth for legacy rows or
direct-API missions).
Also flipped the mission_orchestrator test that expected
Ok(None) → now expects a specific error message.
Prod cleanup: reset the stuck mission
019f814c-d36f-7d60-8915-1ce100683133 (running with team_id=NULL) back
to draft so the operator can delete or attach a template.
Verified: cargo check --workspace + tsc + eslint all green;
mission_orchestrator test updated to match new contract.
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Omar Sobh
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a2bc06d313 |
validation sweep: close residual TODO + strip 'future' stubs
- mission_orchestrator: replace hardcoded cli=\"claude\" with real precedence chain: mission.config.cli → template.config.default_cli → \"claude\". Missions can now A/B by CLI without a schema change. - fleet.rs: scope clippy::too_many_arguments allow on NodeHub::open_pty — 8 params (session address x4 + target address x3) is the actual dimensionality; a struct would be ceremony. - security_scan.rs: delete future_artifact_root — pure hint-stub, no callers, nothing depends on it. - routes/world.rs: delete the empty normalize() seam + its 30-line comment block. normalize_run_event higher up does the real work; the empty stub was pre-cleanup scaffolding. Post-sweep validation across the whole workspace: * cargo check --workspace → clean * cargo test --workspace --no-run → all bins build * cargo test -p cm-api --test mission_orchestrator → 3/3 pass * cargo clippy -p cm-api -p clawmates-node --tests → 0 warnings * tsc --noEmit → 0 errors Wiring audit: every recent route handler is registered in lib.rs. Every recent frontend component has at least one importer. Remaining #[allow(dead_code)] entries are deprovision_claw + unpublish_claw on RuntimeProvisioner — real rollback paths waiting on the team-delete route. Documented future hooks, not stubs. |
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Omar Sobh
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2b3ec27757 |
herdr phase 1c: wizard runtime picker + on_launch auto-dispatch
Closes the operator loop for the second-runtime path. Missions
created with runtime='local_herdr' now spawn a Herdr pane on their
target_node automatically on draft→running.
Frontend (MissionWizard):
- Step 4 grows a "Runtime" section above Schedule
- Radio: "Hosted (ZeroClaw)" default | "On a fleet node (Herdr)"
- Local-Herdr shows a dropdown of ONLINE nodes only (from
/api/nodes filtered by status='online')
- canNext blocks Next when local_herdr picked without a node
- Review step shows "Runtime: Herdr on <node-name>" or "Hosted"
- Empty-online-nodes state hints "Connect one from INFRA first"
Backend:
- mission_orchestrator::on_launch grows a NodeHub param; when
mission.runtime_kind='local_herdr' + target_node_id set +
hub present → calls fleet_herdr::dispatch(). Non-fatal:
logs and continues so a research_only mission with a Herdr
runtime chosen accidentally still boots the team.
- routes::missions::set_status passes state.node_hub through.
- Test call sites updated to pass None for the new param
(integration tests don't drive real fleet nodes).
CLI stub: on_launch currently hard-codes cli="claude" for the
Herdr pane. Phase 4 will read that from the team template so a
research team → kimi, gpu team → claude, etc.
Verified: cargo check --workspace + cargo test
-p cm-api --test mission_orchestrator + tsc --noEmit all green.
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Omar Sobh
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214d0c5e9f |
task #25: per-mission repo checkout on mission launch
Closes the follow-up gap flagged when task #23 landed. security_scan and benchmark_runner now exec against $CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT/ {mission_id}/repo — this commit is what actually puts a repo there. - crates/cm-api/src/mission_workspace.rs — new module. ensure_checkout(pool, workspace_id, mission_id): * mission with no repo_id → Ok(None), no-op * repo cloned into $ROOT/{id}/repo (--depth 1) * dir already a git repo → fetch + reset --hard origin/{branch} (idempotent — every launch brings the tree in sync with the remote default_branch) Auth uses the process's ambient git credential setup (SSH agent / .netrc / helper). Tokens deliberately not embedded in URLs. - crates/cm-api/src/mission_orchestrator.rs — on_launch calls ensure_checkout after team materialization + team_id bind. Non-fatal: clone failures log and continue so research_only missions (no repo needed) don't get blocked. - deploy/compose/docker-compose.yml — new named volume missions_workspaces mounted at /var/lib/clawmates-missions on both the server (writer) and where the clawmates-runtime container will mount it (reader for docker exec). CLAWMATES_ MISSIONS_ROOT + CLAWMATES_RUNTIME_CONTAINER env vars set on the server so mission_workspace + exec_target read the same canonical values. The scan/bench trigger buttons now actually produce findings once you (a) run a mission whose repo_id is set, (b) have the clawmates-runtime container bind-mounting missions_workspaces at /var/lib/clawmates-missions. Verified: SQLX_OFFLINE=true cargo check -p cm-api + cargo test -p cm-api --test mission_orchestrator both green. |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 4.7
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565f6cae65 |
slice 4: 5 workflow templates as TOML recipes + mission-launch orchestrator
Two things land together:
1. Ships the 5 workflow recipes as TOML files under
templates/workflows/*.toml:
- research_only (hub_spoke research → MD + PDF)
- research_and_code (research → coding loop until INT-XX drained)
- security_hardening (scan → research patches → coding with
reviewer approval + full MCP bundle)
- refactor (single-pass coding with dep audit
preamble + before/after benchmarks)
- benchmark (author + baseline benchmarks per stack)
Each declares phases[], per-phase config, default_team_template.
Loaded read-only into an in-memory registry (workflow_registry)
via OnceLock — no DB row per recipe.
2. Ships the mission-launch orchestrator that closes the loop from
Slice 3.5d's mechanics. When a mission transitions draft→running,
`mission_orchestrator::on_launch`:
- Reads mission.team_template_id (skips if unset)
- Loads the team template detail (roles + skills bindings)
- Builds a topology graph from role slots via cm_topology::build
- Inserts the teams row + stamps template_id/version/risk_profile/mcp_bundles
- For each role: agent insert, model binding, runtime provision
(opt-in via RuntimeProvisioner::from_env), brain_seed::ingest
(Slice 3.5d), agent_template_link::upsert (Slice 3.5d),
team_members bind, audit trail
- UPDATE missions SET team_id = ...
Wired into routes::missions::set_status when prior.status='draft'
and new='running'. Failures log + are non-fatal (mission still
flips to running so the user can inspect + retry).
With this, Slice 3.5d's brain-seed + link machinery actually gets
populated, and the MCP skills server's template-defaults-merge path
(Slice 3.5b/d) starts serving real bindings to real agents.
Follow-ups (Slice 5-8):
- Task-card parser watches run events for TASK/COMPLETED markers
→ mission_tasks rows
- PDF renderer worker turns MD artifacts into PDFs
- Before/after benchmark runner honors phases[].config.benchmark
- Security scan MCP bundle exposes cargo-audit/gitleaks/trivy/semgrep
- Level-up endpoints diff learned-vs-seeded via agent_template_link
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>
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