Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 794f2124bc feat(microvm): Claude Code 2.1.276 rootfs pins, and a VM run that says what it ran
deploy / test (push) Successful in 5m18s
deploy / build (push) Successful in 5m54s
Every rootfs on the fleet had sat on Claude Code 2.1.223–2.1.226 since August
while the container tier moved to 2.1.276, and nothing recorded either. GLM
and Kimi exist only as microVM backends, so "have we upgraded GLM and Kimi"
is this change and the rebuild it drives.

Pins. All four agent-* images pin 2.1.276 — as separate ARGs, since Docker has
no include and each file has to stay reproducible alone — and
scripts/fc-build-rootfs.sh refuses to build if they disagree, naming the odd
one out. They had already drifted (claude 226, the rest 223) under comments
saying "same version on purpose". Between 2.1.226 and 2.1.276, 2.1.265 and
2.1.275 each broke every turn on ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL endpoints, which is how
glm and kimi reach `claude` inside a VM; the container-tier verification never
exercised that path, so the VM runs on those backends are the real test.

Provenance. `VmOutcome` carries the rootfs the node reported booting and the
guest's own `claude --version`; `launch_microvm_phase` persists both as
`checkpoint.vm` beside `records` (the two readers parse only `records`) and
names them in its log line. "Which image and CLI did this mission run on" is
a query now.

Independence. `evaluator` derived the implementer family from a constant
`"anthropic"`, true while every backend was Claude on Anthropic. With glm and
kimi rootfs it made a glm mission judged by glm:glm-5.3 read as
`independent = true` — the one claim that path exists to make honestly.
`implementer_family(missions.backend)` mirrors `microvm_credential_for`; the
subscription judge is now independent exactly when the agent did NOT run on
Anthropic.

Harness. `verify-mission-delivery.sh glm|kimi` run the microvm scenario on
each backend and add the proof the mission itself cannot give: the placed
node's journal must show the VM dialling that provider's host, never being
denied it, and dialling nothing else but the forge — a model's self-report is
measured worthless here. `assert_cli_version` reads checkpoint.vm. The stale
scratch-repo default (dead since the 09-14 wipe) is the re-synced id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WZb5A2kfVfjpdwSochkuHz
2026-09-18 20:16:06 -05:00
Omar Sobh 8b12245e79 chore(image): promote Claude Code 2.1.226 after the canary passed
Canary first, production second — the point of pinning is that the upgrade is a
decision, and the point of `canary-claude` is that the decision has evidence.

Taken for 2.1.225's fix to a transient 401 that replaced a long-lived
CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN with a short-lived one and broke HEADLESS sessions until
restart. Our sessions are headless and our VMs are per-mission, so "until
restart" reads as a failed phase.

The 2.1.225 workspace-trust prompt does NOT apply: `--help` states the dialog is
skipped in non-interactive mode (`-p`, or stdout not a TTY) and we satisfy both.
Read from the CLI in a booted 2.1.226 VM rather than inferred from the changelog.

Verified on the production path after the rebuild: guest kernel 6.1.128,
delegation to a subagent, `--settings` stop gate installed, judge independent
(glm-4.7), single writer. 6/6.

`rootfs-canary-claude.ext4` is left on tank as the mechanism for the next
candidate, not as a leftover.
2026-08-08 05:47:25 -07:00
Omar Sobh 11b274edc6 chore(images): Claude Code 2.1.223, and make the verifier foreground
Reviewed the changelog rather than bumping on principle. 2.1.220 → 2.1.223 for one
reason that bears on how we use subagents:

  2.1.222 — "Fixed PreToolUse auto-allow hooks bypassing tool restrictions in
  background agent tasks."

Subagents run in the background by default since 2.1.198, and the `verifier`
role's entire guarantee is a TOOL restriction — no Edit, no Write. So on 2.1.220
the one property we rely on was the one that bug could undo. 2.1.221 also fixes
`--mcp-config` servers not connecting before the first turn in print mode, which
is the mode we run and will matter when the MCP door reaches a VM.

Two findings from the changelog that we already had at 2.1.220, both worth knowing:
  - 2.1.219: subagents can nest to depth 3 (was 1), so our roles can delegate
    further than assumed.
  - 2.1.212: a subagent inherits the parent's permission mode, which confirms the
    verifier's read-only property must come from `tools` and not from permissions.
    That is how it was written; now the reasoning is recorded next to it.

And a correctness fix that follows from the background default: the verifier is now
`background: false`. A background verifier lets the lead carry on and write its
report before the check has finished — the finding would arrive after the
conclusion it was supposed to inform.

Verified on tank: image reports 2.1.223, rootfs rebuilt, `--vm-selftest` all green
including a real agent turn on subscription auth, egress allow and deny both firing.
2026-08-05 21:37:49 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 0c291ed1bb feat(fleet): B4.4a — a real agent-claude microVM image, and a check that it has an agent in it
The only rootfs on this track came from clawmates/agent-terminal:dev. Mounted,
it held git and nothing else: no claude, no node, no cargo. A VM booted from it
looks perfect and cannot run a mission, so B4.5 could have been written and
never verified.

images/agent-toolchain — the shared mission toolchain (node 22, git, rust +
cargo-audit, gitleaks/trivy/semgrep, tea/gitea-mcp), lifted from the proven
deploy/clawmates-runtime image minus the zeroclaw daemon: a microVM mission runs
the direct-session model, so there is no daemon to host. A base image rather
than three self-contained Dockerfiles because this layer is ~3 GB and the real
risk is scanner and toolchain versions drifting between per-CLI images — the
evaluator runs the project's own suite to check a claim, so `cargo` present in
one image and absent in another makes the same mission pass or fail by backend
with nothing saying why.

images/agent-claude — plan A6, first of three: the pinned CLI and its env
contract only, so bumping Claude Code does not rebuild the toolchain and cannot
disturb agent-kimi / agent-glm. HOME=/root with an empty .claude for B4.4 to
inject into; no ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, since it silently overrides the subscription
OAuth we already pay for.

Both the builder and the node selftest now ASK the guest for the CLI the image
is named for, instead of trusting the name. `required_cli` maps claude/kimi/glm
to a probe; an unrecognised backend reports unchecked and prints SKIP rather
than passing quietly.

Verified on tank:
  - rootfs-claude.ext4 boots; git, node, cargo, a real git commit all work
  - `claude --version` → 2.1.220 over vsock, in both the builder and
    `--vm-selftest` (11/11, create 1498 ms)
  - negative control: the same builder run against agent-terminal with
    FC_CLI forced reports `cli rc=127 claude: not found` and exits 1, so the
    green result above is a measurement and not a default
  - `claude -p hello` fails with "Not logged in · Please run /login" — the CLI
    runs headless in the VM, and B4.4 only has to supply the credential
  - no leaked firecracker processes or vm dirs afterwards

437 tests pass, clippy clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-05 11:33:07 -07:00