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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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794f2124bc |
feat(microvm): Claude Code 2.1.276 rootfs pins, and a VM run that says what it ran
Every rootfs on the fleet had sat on Claude Code 2.1.223–2.1.226 since August while the container tier moved to 2.1.276, and nothing recorded either. GLM and Kimi exist only as microVM backends, so "have we upgraded GLM and Kimi" is this change and the rebuild it drives. Pins. All four agent-* images pin 2.1.276 — as separate ARGs, since Docker has no include and each file has to stay reproducible alone — and scripts/fc-build-rootfs.sh refuses to build if they disagree, naming the odd one out. They had already drifted (claude 226, the rest 223) under comments saying "same version on purpose". Between 2.1.226 and 2.1.276, 2.1.265 and 2.1.275 each broke every turn on ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL endpoints, which is how glm and kimi reach `claude` inside a VM; the container-tier verification never exercised that path, so the VM runs on those backends are the real test. Provenance. `VmOutcome` carries the rootfs the node reported booting and the guest's own `claude --version`; `launch_microvm_phase` persists both as `checkpoint.vm` beside `records` (the two readers parse only `records`) and names them in its log line. "Which image and CLI did this mission run on" is a query now. Independence. `evaluator` derived the implementer family from a constant `"anthropic"`, true while every backend was Claude on Anthropic. With glm and kimi rootfs it made a glm mission judged by glm:glm-5.3 read as `independent = true` — the one claim that path exists to make honestly. `implementer_family(missions.backend)` mirrors `microvm_credential_for`; the subscription judge is now independent exactly when the agent did NOT run on Anthropic. Harness. `verify-mission-delivery.sh glm|kimi` run the microvm scenario on each backend and add the proof the mission itself cannot give: the placed node's journal must show the VM dialling that provider's host, never being denied it, and dialling nothing else but the forge — a model's self-report is measured worthless here. `assert_cli_version` reads checkpoint.vm. The stale scratch-repo default (dead since the 09-14 wipe) is the re-synced id. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WZb5A2kfVfjpdwSochkuHz |
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Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
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f7f3dfe495 |
feat(fleet): GLM as a real microVM backend, and per-role models for claws
Three threads, all of which end at the same place: a mission whose verifier does
not share a model with the coder it reviews.
**GLM has a credential contract now.** `microvm_credential_for` returned one env
var name, which quietly assumed every provider reads its secret from the same
place Anthropic does. It returns a `Credential { source, target }` instead —
z.ai's key lives in the server's `ZAI_API_KEY` and Claude Code reads it as
`ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN`, and collapsing those two names is what forces a guess at
the other end. A wrong guess here sends one provider's credential to another
provider's endpoint.
`images/agent-glm` is the same CLI at the same pinned version as `agent-claude`
with `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` baked in. The split is deliberate: the ENDPOINT is a
property of the image, the CREDENTIAL is a property of the turn. That makes the
dangerous mix-up unrepresentable — a GLM VM cannot be handed an Anthropic
subscription token, and a claude VM cannot be pointed at z.ai. Asserted both
ways, because "the GLM VM must not carry CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN" is the
property that costs a credential if it ever stops holding.
Kimi stays refused. `KIMI_API_KEY` is set and Moonshot serves an
Anthropic-compatible API, but I have not verified its base URL against the
running service, and this function is precisely where guessing a URL is
expensive. It becomes an arm the day someone measures it.
`api.z.ai` joins the node's default egress allow-list. A default that cannot
run the images we ship is a trap rather than a policy — the alternative is an
operator discovering it as a hung agent with no model access.
**Per-role models for claws** (migration 0071). `template_roles` had no model
column, so `mint_team_from_template` bound every role of every mission team to
one literal — a template whose whole point is an independent reviewer minted a
reviewer sharing a model with the coder. A role may now name its own; roles that
say nothing still take the mint's default, so every template written before this
behaves exactly as it did. The literal is now that default rather than a
hardcode.
**A harness scenario for the roster flow.** `verify-mission-delivery.sh roster`
runs the whole Slice 5 loop — planner proposes, human approves, mission runs —
and asserts the roster LANDED on the mission row rather than trusting the API's
answer. That distinction is not theoretical: the first live approval returned an
error while leaving the proposal marked approved.
Built and proven on tank ahead of the deploy: `clawmates/agent-glm:dev` reports
`2.1.223` and `BASE=https://api.z.ai/api/anthropic`, and
`fc-build-rootfs.sh … glm 8G` boots a VM from it that has git, can write
/mission, and answers `claude --version`.
533 tests pass, clippy clean. Migration 0071.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
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