Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 7392ce1d08 P6: shell.exec — agents execute code in their real hardened sandbox
- SandboxManager (tc-runtime): one container per agent, provisioned
  lazily on first use, reused for the manager's lifetime, replaced
  transparently if dead, destroyed on shutdown
- shell.exec tool: sh -lc inside the agent's sandbox; stdout/stderr/
  exit_code return to the model as the step output. No external effects
  declared — the sandbox boundary (uid 10001, no caps, seccomp
  allowlist, read-only rootfs, zero egress) is the §15 control here,
  not an approval gate
- RuntimeConfig.sandboxes (+ with_sandboxes builder); [sandbox] config
  {image, enabled}; the server connects the Docker driver at boot and
  tolerates an absent engine (shell.exec reports it per-call)
- Tests with the REAL DockerDriver: a scripted run executes two
  commands — output proves uid 10001 from inside, and /home/agent state
  written by the first call is read by the second (same sandbox); a
  deployment without a sandbox runtime records honest error steps and
  the run still completes

151 Rust tests + 27 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 09:25:38 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 000b9b3a4b P4 core: broker-held app connections + gated, broker-executed Slack posting
- app_connections repo; POST /api/apps/connect (keys/basic): the credential
  goes to the secret broker over its socket and only the encrypted ref lands
  in the row; disconnect endpoint; /api/apps directory merged with live
  connection status; audit rows for connect/disconnect
- Broker protocol: InvokeHttp carries a JSON body
- slack.post tool (SendsExternally -> gated): marked broker_executed — the
  runtime skips its own grant consumption and the BROKER independently
  verifies + consumes the single-use grant, then calls Slack with the bot
  token injected; the runtime never sees the credential
- Config: [broker] socket_path + [slack] base_url; e2e harness spawns the
  real teamclaw-broker daemon and the server hosts an e2e-only /__slack sink
- SlackApp: Connection tab stores the token via the broker; connected state
- Integration test: blocked while pending -> approved -> sink received
  exactly one post with 'Bearer xoxb-test-token' -> grant replay refused
- E2E journey: connect Slack in the panel -> gated post card with preview ->
  sink empty while pending -> approve -> exactly one post, queue clear

133 Rust + 63 frontend tests + 21 Playwright journeys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 05:51:19 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 67f918439c P3 backend: files, skills, routines, claw chat with LIVE taint plumbing
- tc-files: BlobStore trait + LocalBlobStore (traversal-proof keys); wired
  through Runtime (config storage.data_dir in deployments)
- File tools: files.write/files.list (workspace-internal) + files.delete
  (gated FileDeletion — tested: file survives pending, gone after approve);
  GET /api/openclaw/files + /api/shared-drive/files (drive/agent scoped)
- Skills: catalog/library + idempotent install with counter, uninstall;
  GET /api/skills[?clawId=], POST install/uninstall
- tc-scheduler: croner cron math (clock-controlled tests), SKIP LOCKED
  claim-and-advance firing REAL runs into dedicated ' name' sessions
  (reused, exactly-once), paused routines skipped; routines API + agent
  tool routine.schedule; loop spawned in server
- Claw chat: 1:1 threads, chat.send enforcing the target's Other-Claws
  policy, chat.inbox whose output carries inter_agent taint; the run loop
  now ACCUMULATES taint from tool outputs into LoopState, classifies with
  it, and stamps steps + approvals — a poisoned inbox followed by
  email.send produces an approval whose taint_sources says inter_agent
- ScriptedProvider scenario selection now keys on the most recent marker
  (session history kept earlier markers alive)

132 Rust tests green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 05:28:50 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 32008c9ef0 P1 backend: chat persistence, tc-llm providers, runtime loop, gateway SSE
- tc-db: sessions/messages/steps/runs/run_events repos (atomic seq assignment,
  history with ordered step traces, journal replay-from-offset); migration 0003
- tc-llm: provider-neutral ChatRequest/LlmEvent; ScriptedProvider (scenario
  TOML, word-level deltas, multi-turn tool legs — ships in production for
  e2e/air-gap smoke), AnthropicProvider (Messages SSE), OpenAiCompatProvider
  (vLLM/Ollama/llama.cpp); opt-in live tests via TC_LIVE_LLM=1
- tc-runtime: run loop with persist-before-emit event journal, real built-in
  clock.now tool, step rows on the reply message, tool-error resilience,
  broadcast channels for live attach
- tc-api: agent CRUD + settings/full (tenant-isolated, RBAC'd, audited),
  sessions create/list/history?tools=true, POST /api/gateway SSE with
  monotonic ids and exact resumeFrom journal replay (tested equal to live)
- teamclaw-server: config-driven provider factory

83 Rust tests green, all against real Postgres / real TCP.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 23:16:06 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 fc173f170d P0 exit: e2e harness, Playwright shell journeys green, deploy skeleton
- teamclaw-server e2e mode (TEAMCLAW_MODE=e2e): idempotent deterministic
  seed through the real registration paths
- Playwright suite (6 journeys) against the real backend + prod Next build:
  login redirect, bad-password error, shell/roster/online-dot, team members,
  seeded credits, sign-out revocation — P0 exit criterion met
- Dockerfiles: musl-static server -> distroless, Next standalone -> distroless
  node (multi-arch via TARGETARCH)
- Air-gapped compose topology with edge/core/sandbox_net/secrets_net
  segmentation (engine-validated in CI), config-file + env-overlay pattern
- CI: compose validation + e2e job with trace upload

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 22:48:28 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 c4349bf292 P0: tc-auth local sessions, tc-api P0 endpoints, teamclaw-server binary
- tc-auth: argon2id passwords, hashed opaque bearer tokens in auth_sessions
  (migration 0002), anti-enumeration login errors, redacted token Debug
- tc-api: axum router with /healthz, /api/auth/login|logout, /api/user/me,
  /api/team/{claws,credits,permissions}; Authed bearer extractor + RBAC
  permission derivation; integration-tested over real TCP vs real Postgres
- teamclaw-server: config -> pool -> self-migrate -> serve

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-09 22:30:33 -05:00