44079eb8b4679aa4672ef446e4eb6dba53c0e95b
13
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
1d554396f4 |
fix(delivery): four failures from the #55 trace — auth, prompts, truncation, retry
All four were surfaced while tracing #55 and left open. Each one on its own is
small; together they are why a two-line git rejection took hours to read.
**1. `with_ambient_auth` failed open.** It matched one literal prefix,
`https://git.redclaw.dev/`, and returned the URL unchanged for everything else
with no log line. An `http://` remote, an explicit port, a different case in the
host, an ssh remote, a URL that already carried userinfo — all came back
unauthenticated and looked identical to success. It now returns `Authed`, which
carries the URL AND why no credential reached it, and recognises the forge in
every shape a remote can be written (host parsed with userinfo stripped BEFORE
the port, or `oauth2:token@host` reports its username as the host — the first
version of this function did exactly that and failed its own test).
**2. Nothing set `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`.** So a credential-less URL did not
fail — git opened `/dev/tty`, and in a server container that surfaces as
`No such device or address`, several layers from the missing token. Now set on
every git invocation that can reach the network. And `push_url_for` refuses
outright when the URL is on OUR forge and unauthenticated: that push cannot
succeed, and letting it proceed only buys a symptom that looks like something
else.
**3. The truncation fix went to the wrong path.**
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
4ff4e6f7ee |
fix(missions): a root-owned COMMIT_EDITMSG must not block delivery
Mission 019fcd0c produced correct work — a reviewed, tested function plus a REVIEW.md quoting a real cargo test summary — and delivered none of it: git commit → exit 128: could not open '.git/COMMIT_EDITMSG': Permission denied The agent ran `git commit` itself inside the mission container (as root), leaving that file owned by root at 0644. core.sharedRepository covers objects and refs — .git/index lands at 0666, which is why commits work at all — but not COMMIT_EDITMSG, which git writes with the default umask. Unlinking works where overwriting does not: removing a file needs write permission on the DIRECTORY, and .git/ is owned by the server. Silent on failure by design, so the commit reports the real error rather than this speculative cleanup. Third distinct instance of the same uid-split class (objects, then the capture base, now this). The pattern holds: the checkout is one directory written by two users, and each new file git touches is a new opportunity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
f7e336ff5f |
fix(missions): make an unrunnable test suite legible, and check the runtime at boot
Two changes against the same defect: the platform could not tell a missing capability from a legitimate negative result. verify_tests returned Option<bool>, collapsing four outcomes into None: no suite found, docker unreachable, exec failed, and no exit status. When clawmates-runtime shipped without cargo, every on_green_tests phase returned None and landed on -wip — identical to the reading for "this repo has no tests", which is the conclusion I drew and reported. The gate was correct throughout; it simply could not say why it was unproven. TestOutcome now names the four cases. Gating is unchanged (only Passed clears, unproven is never a pass), and tests_verified keeps its tri-state meaning for existing readers. tests_status and tests_detail are new, so an artifact distinguishes no_suite from could_not_run, and a CouldNotRun is logged as the infrastructure fault it is rather than passing quietly. runtime_preflight probes the runtime container at boot for every tool the platform invokes inside it and names what each absence disables. This is the check that was missing: the Dockerfile gained a toolchain, the image was never built, gw-04 ran the old one for days, and the only symptoms were an ungated suite and a security scan that scanned nothing. A report, not a gate — a missing scanner should stop us believing a scan, not stop the server. Its test guards the probes themselves, since a typo would produce a permanent false "missing" and train operators to ignore it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
9bdc3cd89b |
fix(missions): stop titling commits "phase phase work"
Mission 019fc4e0 pushed "clawmates: phase phase work" — the iteration
marker was interpolated into a slot whose default already said "phase".
A rerun read correctly ("pass 2 phase work"), so only the common case was
wrong. Cosmetic, but it lands in the operator's git history under their
own name now that delivery commits as them.
Subject is now "clawmates: phase work" and "clawmates: phase work
(pass 2)". The test covers both, since the bug lived only in the branch
the previous shape did not exercise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
ddab8e35f5 |
feat(missions): commit as the operator, overridable per deployment
Delivery commits now carry "Omar Sobh <[email protected]>" by default, so pushed branches associate with the operator's forge account the way their own commits do. CLAWMATES_COMMIT_NAME / CLAWMATES_COMMIT_EMAIL override it — a shared instance wants a bot identity, not a person's. This is attribution, not the fix. What made 019fc450's phase fail was the *absence* of any identity: the server container has none of its own, so git commit exits 128 regardless of which name would have been used. That was fixed in 25d9805; this only changes the value. The push credential is GITEA_TOKEN throughout and is untouched by any of it. Since the author line now names a person, the commit body says plainly that agents authored the work — otherwise autonomous commits would be indistinguishable from hand-written ones in git log. Also fixes 13 stray spaces that a string continuation had baked into every message body. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
25d9805806 |
fix(missions): commit under the pipeline's own git identity
Mission 019fc450 lost its first phase to: git commit → exit 128: Author identity unknown The server container has no git identity — `git config --global user.email` exits 1 — so any commit fails unless one is supplied. This is the third consecutive failure whose trigger was agent behaviour rather than our code. Earlier missions committed only because an agent had happened to run `git config user.email` in the checkout, leaving a local identity the server inherited. Alongside the object-permission split and the reset, the pattern is the same: delivery depended on incidental side effects of what an agent chose to do, so identical missions succeeded or failed for reasons invisible in our code. Supplied via GIT_AUTHOR_*/GIT_COMMITTER_* env on every git call, which overrides config without a leaked string per invocation and names the committer as the pipeline. Agents' own commits keep the identity they set. The test asserts the identity *overrides* an existing local config rather than trying to unset the developer's global — an override necessarily also applies when config is absent, and it does not race parallel tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
5b53705c97 |
fix(missions): let the server and the agent share one git checkout
Mission 019fc437 lost both phases' work to:
git add → exit 128: insufficient permission for adding an object
to repository database .git/objects
cm-api runs as uid 65532; the mission runtime container runs as root;
they share one bind-mounted checkout. Git's .git/objects/xx/ fan-out
directories inherit the ownership of whoever creates them, so an agent
that writes objects first locks the server out of those directories.
The failure is intermittent, which is why the previous run looked clean.
Mission 019fc42b's agents committed their own work, so the blobs already
existed and the server's `git add` never had to write one. Same template,
different agent behaviour, opposite outcome.
`core.sharedRepository` is git's own mechanism for this: objects and refs
are created group- and world-writable, and both parties read the setting
from the shared .git/config. It grants the agent nothing — it is already
root over the whole checkout — and unblocks the server, which was the
party being refused. Applied on clone and on checkout reuse.
Two supporting changes. The artifact now records `commit_error`: this
failure surfaced as `branch: null, push_error: null`, indistinguishable
from a phase that never had work to commit, with the reason only in host
stderr. And the test seeder now calls the production setup function
instead of reimplementing it — building the checkout by hand is what let
a clone-path defect stay invisible to fourteen tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
8bad869248 |
fix(missions): give each phase its own task and its own capture base
The first push run against a scratch repo (mission 019fc42b) delivered two branches correctly but exposed two bugs behind them. Per-phase instructions were inert. `phase_task_text` took only (kind, title, description), so `mission_phases.config.task` was accepted by the API, stored, and read by nothing. Every phase of a mission received byte-identical text differing only by the kind directive — so both coding phases did the whole mission instead of their slice, producing the same two files. The task now reaches the agent as a trailing THIS PHASE'S TASK block, scoped against the shared brief. The capture base never advanced. `.git/clawmates-base` is written once at clone time, so phase two diffed against the original clone point and reported the union of both phases' files as its own. It now moves to each phase's committed head after the patch is on disk; the pushed branch stays cumulative because it is built from HEAD. Both regression tests were confirmed to fail with their fix disabled. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
e2871c4361 |
feat(missions): publish the mission branch, gated by commit_policy
Completes delivery. A phase's work is now captured, committed, gated and pushed — in that order, so every failure costs strictly less than the one before it. Publishing is last for a reason. By the time it runs the patch is on disk, the artifact is registered and the work is on a local branch, so a rejected ref, a rotated token or an unreachable forge costs a push and nothing else. A test pushes at a path that does not exist and asserts the commit is still there afterwards. The gate decides the branch name, never whether the work survives: - green, or policy `always` → `clawmates/mission-<m8>-<p8>` - red / unrunnable / no suite → `…-wip` - `on_reviewer_approval` → `…-review` Both land on the forge. A human can inspect, fix and re-push a branch; nobody can recover work discarded for failing a test. Deleting a red branch reproduces the old behaviour on purpose rather than by accident. `verify_tests` runs the project's own suite through the runtime container and returns `Option<bool>` — `None` for "could not establish", which the gate treats as unproven. An unreadable exit status is not a pass. That is the same fail-closed stance as the phase evaluator, and it is here because this tranche has now found four separate things reporting success while doing nothing. Never force-push. A rejected update is reported and left alone: the remote ref belongs to whoever set it, and overwriting it to make delivery look tidy is how a mission eats someone else's commit. The push URL is built fresh from the repo row and the ambient token, not read from `.git/config` — which no longer carries credentials, since agents run as root in a container that mounts the checkout. Tests push to a real `git init --bare` remote and assert the ref and its content actually arrived. A mock would have accepted anything. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
3ea288dbb5 |
fix(missions): every phase of a mission shared one branch
`branch_name` took `[..8]` of both the mission and the phase id. Both are
UUIDv7, which leads with a 48-bit timestamp, so ids minted in the same
millisecond — which is exactly what happens when a mission inserts its phases
in one transaction — share their leading hex. Production produced:
clawmates/mission-019fc40e-019fc40e
for both the research and the coding phase. Each phase's commit moved the ref
the previous one had just set, so a two-phase mission ended with one branch
and the earlier phase's work reachable only by sha.
The segments now come from opposite ends: the mission keeps its time-ordered
prefix so branches group and sort usefully, and the phase contributes its
random tail so siblings cannot collide.
The existing test missed this because it compared iteration 0 against
iteration 1 of the *same* phase, where the `-i2` suffix guaranteed a
difference. The new test asserts the precondition explicitly — two v7 ids
minted together do share leading hex — and then that their branches differ
anyway.
Also adds the `commit_policy` gate, which three workflow recipes have declared
since they were written with nothing reading it. Two properties it must have:
a failed gate redirects work to `<branch>-wip` rather than discarding it, and
an unrunnable or undiscoverable test suite counts as unproven, never as green.
`discover_test_command` returns None for a `package.json` with no test script,
because `npm test` exits non-zero for a missing script and would read as a red
suite rather than an absent one. Not yet wired to publishing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
|
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
ca1fd46e08 |
feat(missions): commit captured work to a branch of its own
Second half of delivery, minus the push. After the patch is on disk and the artifact registered, the phase's work is committed onto `clawmates/mission-<mission8>-<phase8>`, with `-i<N>` for re-runs so a second pass cannot collide with the first. Three rules hold throughout: - Never the default branch. The name is derived from the mission and phase, so a mission can only ever add a ref nobody else owns. - Never force. A rejected update gets reported, not overwritten. - The same exclusions as capture. What was too noisy for a patch is too noisy for someone's history — build output, vendored trees, and the workaround files agents write when infrastructure fights them. A test drops a 50 KB binary in `target/` and a `.gitconfig_temp` beside the real change and asserts neither is committed. Ordering is deliberate: commit runs *after* capture, and a commit failure is logged without failing the capture. The patch is the guarantee; the branch is the convenience on top. The branch is created even when there is nothing to stage, because agents often commit their own work — `rust_sdlc` has a committer role — and that commit is unreachable once the checkout is reaped unless a ref points at it. One test changed meaning rather than breaking: it asserted capture left the working tree untouched, which was correct while capture stood alone. Capture now commits, so it asserts the new invariant — work on a namespaced branch, a clean tree, and the created file present in the commit. Push is still deliberately absent. Everything here is local, so a bug costs a retry rather than reaching a remote. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
409ca65ee7 |
fix(missions): capture from the clone point, and let agents create files
Two defects found by running a real coding mission (019fc372) rather than a test. Both made a coding phase look like it produced nothing. **Capture measured the wrong baseline.** It diffed the working tree against HEAD, which is correct only while work stays uncommitted. `rust_sdlc` has a *committer* role, so committing is the intended path — meaning a mission that did its job properly leaves a clean tree and captured nothing. That is exactly what happened: the agent created `DELIVERY_PROBE.md`, committed it as `aa3be95`, and the artifact recorded `empty: true` beside a commit that plainly contained the work. `mission_workspace` now records the clone point in `.git/clawmates-base` (in `.git/`, so it travels with the checkout, stays invisible to the repository, and cannot be reached by an agent through its pinned workspace), refreshed whenever `fetch_and_reset` moves HEAD. Capture diffs from there, covering committed, staged and unstaged changes in one pass. Checkouts predating the marker fall back to HEAD and say so via `base_recorded: false`. **Agents could not create files.** `coding_readwrite` granted `file_edit` but not `file_write`. `file_edit` replaces an exact existing string and rejects an empty `old_string`, so creating a new file was impossible. The mission transcript is unambiguous: "the tool rejected empty old_string... the shell is restricted", after which the agent worked around it through `shell`. The comment above that profile has claimed it grants file_write since the day it was written; the list never contained it. Also broadens capture from coding/benchmark/security_scan to every phase kind of a repo-bearing mission: `phase_task_text` tells research phases to "save findings under /mission/repo/research/", so filtering by kind would have discarded every research brief such a mission produced. Regression tests cover committed-only and committed-plus-uncommitted work against a real git repo. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |
||
|
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5
|
716ee9a304 |
feat(missions): capture a coding phase's diff to durable storage
First half of mission delivery: the work is captured before anything is published. A coding mission has until now produced nothing durable — the checkout is deleted thirty minutes after completion and `register_artifact` had no callers at all, so the only surviving output was an LLM narrative of what the agents said they did. `capture_phase_diff` writes `diff.patch`, `diffstat.txt` and `delivery.json` under `<missions_root>/_outputs/<mission>/<phase>/` and registers a `code_diff` artifact. That directory is a *sibling* of the per-mission directories the sweeper removes, and outside every bind mount handed to a container — so teardown cannot take the record with it and agents cannot edit their own evidence. Three details that decide whether this works at all: - `git add --intent-to-add` before diffing. Untracked files are invisible to `git diff`, and a phase that only *creates* files is the likeliest shape for generated code — silently capturing an empty patch would be the worst possible failure. The index is reset afterwards so capture leaves the tree exactly as the agents left it, which the test asserts. - Build output is excluded by pathspec (`target`, `node_modules`, `.venv`, …). A phase that ran `cargo build` leaves a directory larger than the repo. - An empty diff is still an artifact, flagged `empty: true`. "This coding phase wrote no code" is currently invisible to an operator and is worth saying out loud. `RegisterArtifact` gains `metadata`, which the column has had since 0047 and nothing ever wrote; the diffstat and base sha go there. No migration needed — `kind` is unconstrained TEXT and the column already exists. Tests run against a real `git init` repo rather than a mock: every bug in this area so far came from git behaving differently than assumed, and a fake git would have agreed with the assumption. `capture_phase_diff_at` takes explicit paths so parallel tests cannot race through the process-global CLAWMATES_MISSIONS_ROOT — the first version of these tests did exactly that and two of four failed non-deterministically. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]> |