2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5.5	4602e9b896	feat(secrets): redact server credentials from everything a mission records, and from the judge ... The live canary run (01a0cf3d) proved the push refusal — push refused, patch redacted, delivery.secret_blocked, no branch on the forge — and found the next leak: the judge QUOTED the canary verbatim in its verdict, which is stored, shown in the UI and written into the repo's project memory for later missions. - mission_events::record (the one insert path) scrubs every event's detail and target: tool output such as a printenv, prompts, verdict events - the verdict's reason, guidance, check outputs and plan are scrubbed before being stored or remembered - the evidence sent to the judge, and each check's output before the judge model reads it, are scrubbed — the judge is another company's model Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-09-23 12:12:25 -05:00
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5.5	a86bd7272d	feat(delivery): refuse to push a phase whose changes contain a server credential ... Container-tier missions carry model-provider keys in their environment (Claude Code needs its credential; the fallback chain needs GLM and Kimi), the agent has Bash, and no gate rule mentioned them. Delivery is the one exit all work passes through, so it now checks the outgoing diff and commit messages for the EXACT values of every watched secret (verbatim or base64): on a hit the push is refused with the key names recorded, the stored patch — served to the UI — is redacted, and a delivery.secret_blocked event is written. Values never logged. Exact matching, not shapes: text about keys is not flagged. A test pins the watched list to a superset of what containers are given in both auth modes. CLAWMATES_DELIVERY_CANARY (a random non-credential) lets the refusal be proven live without a real key. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <[email protected]>	2026-09-23 11:55:55 -05:00