Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Omar SobhandClaude Opus 5 113de610ec fix(security): a signed Slack request could be replayed forever
Phase 5. The headline is not the coverage work — it is what looking for
coverage found.

A CAPTURED SLACK REQUEST AUTHENTICATED INDEFINITELY

`slack_signature_valid` verified the HMAC correctly, and nothing anywhere
checked how old the timestamp was. The timestamp is an input to the
basestring, so an old request's signature verifies exactly as well as a
fresh one — meaning anyone holding a single captured signed request (a
proxy log, a mirrored packet, a leaked webhook body) could replay it
forever, and every replay would authenticate.

Slack's documented 5-minute window is now enforced IN THE BROKER, not the
caller: the broker does not trust its caller (§15), and a check the caller
can forget to make is one that will eventually be forgotten. Symmetric, so
a far-future timestamp cannot mint a request valid for as long as the
attacker chooses.

Seven unit tests over the pure function with the clock injected, and the
HTTP-level test now asserts an hour-old but validly signed request is
refused. Negative control: removing the window fails the stale and
future cases specifically.

The existing slack_inbound test used the literal timestamp "12345" — a 1970
date — which passed only because nothing checked freshness. That is the
shape of the whole finding: the fixture could not have failed, so it never
told us anything.

COVERAGE, RE-EXAMINED

The review ranked crates by raw test count. That metric was misleading and
found the wrong crates: cm-safety's seven tests already cover the decide
CAS, grant double-consume, expiry and the approved/rejected split, and the
audit_log immutability trigger is tested over in cm-db.

Reading the API surface against the tests found the real gaps —
verify_slack_signature above, and `credits_for_tokens`, pure pricing
arithmetic that every existing billing test went through the database to
reach without ever checking directly. Now pinned: the round-up contract,
the deliberate one-credit floor, and that an absurd token count cannot wrap
into a negative charge (a refund granted by an overflow).

Still genuinely thin: cm-brain, where 6 of 9 tests need live
clawbrainhub.com. Stubbing it means reproducing an external registry
protocol we have no spec for — its own piece of work, not a coverage chore.
Recorded rather than faked.

GATEWAY PREFLIGHT

ZEROCLAW_GATEWAY_URL and ZEROCLAW_TOKEN have no defaults and are read at
FIRST USE, so a deployment missing them boots clean, serves every page, and
fails the first time someone presses run. Third sibling of runtime_preflight
and validator_preflight, same stance: a report, not a gate. The message
names the consequence — "container-tier missions cannot run" — rather than
only the unset variable.

One process note: `cargo test -p cm-secrets` passed while the LIBRARY build
was broken, because `time` is a dev-dependency there and my reference to it
only resolved under cfg(test). Switched to std. Checking `cargo build
--workspace` as well as the test profile is the guard.

Full workspace suite green: 106 binaries, zero build errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
2026-08-19 12:24:09 -07:00
Omar Sobh 977a1233af cm-secrets: chmod 0666 broker socket after bind
ci / gates (push) Successful in 6s
ci / frontend (push) Successful in 37s
ci / rust (push) Successful in 3m7s
ci / e2e (push) Has been skipped
ci / publish (push) Successful in 2m48s
Fixes 500 on any broker-touching route (POST /api/repos/connections,
POST /api/apps, the OAuth callback) when broker + server run under
different UIDs — which is exactly the prod topology on gw-04 (broker
uid 10001, clawmates-server distroless nonroot uid 65532). Linux Unix
socket connect(2) requires read+write on the socket file, and the
default bind mode 0755 gives 'others' r-x only.

Widen to 0666 after bind. The broker socket only lives inside the
shared broker_run volume — two containers mount it, nothing else on
the host can see it — so widening is safe. If set_permissions is a
no-op on the target filesystem (abstract sockets on some kernels),
we log and continue instead of failing serve().
2026-07-07 16:21:01 -07:00
Omar Sobh 6d087bf537 repos: backend — schema, /api/repos routes + GitHub sync provider
Migration 0034: two tables. repo_connections carries the workspace's
per-provider config (owner, base_url, label, last_synced_at,
last_sync_error) and points at an app_connections row for the PAT.
repos is the per-connection cache with (connection_id, external_id)
unique so upsert is idempotent across re-syncs. Cascading deletes clean
up cleanly on connection removal.

cm-secrets grows a FetchAuthorized op — GET with the stored PAT injected
as bearer, returns status + JSON body without ever exposing the
credential to cm-api. This is the least-privilege door for read-only
provider APIs (list repos), distinct from the InvokeHttp path that still
requires a single-use approval grant for outbound writes.

cm-api::routes::repos wires:
- POST /api/repos/connections (broker store_secret + insert both rows +
  initial sync + mark_synced)
- GET /api/repos/connections
- DELETE /api/repos/connections/:id
- POST /api/repos/connections/:id/sync
- GET /api/repos (500 cap, newest provider_updated first)
- GET /api/repos/:id (full detail incl. clone_url + html_url)

GitHub provider inline for v1 — paginated pull of /orgs/:owner/repos
(when owner set) or /user/repos (when absent), 100/page, capped at 20
pages (~2k repos) to keep first-sync latency bounded. Non-2xx surface
back to the caller as sync_error; parse failures are best-effort per
repo (skipped, logged, don't abort the batch).

Gitea + GitLab providers land in a follow-up — mostly URL swap +
response-shape adapter.
2026-07-07 14:52:47 -07:00
Omar SobhandClaude Fable 5 add4f79fed Rebrand: TeamClaw -> Clawmates (clawmates.work)
Full-depth rename per the approved plan; the 'claw' product vocabulary
(claws, /claws routes, clawId, Claw Chat) stays — it is now the brand.

- Display brand: Clawmates (manifest, titles, hero, login/rail logo
  'clawmates'); default host app.clawmates.work; registry
  ghcr.io/clawmates
- Crates tc-* -> cm-* (16 crates + all imports); binaries
  clawmates-server/broker/bundler; images clawmates/*; env prefix
  CLAWMATES_* (+ CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL / CM_LIVE_LLM); config
  clawmates.toml; helm chart deploy/helm/clawmates with clawmates-*
  resources; db names clawmates*; sockets /run/clawmates; cookie
  cm_session; kind cluster clawmates-test; seccomp node profile
  clawmates-agent-profile.json
- All 9 Playwright brand assertions updated in lockstep; historical
  spec document left untouched as the only remaining 'TeamClaw'
- Local env migrated: dev pg clawmates-dev-pg/clawmates_dev, shared
  test server clawmates-test-pg, kind cluster recreated with image +
  profile, compose images rebuilt under clawmates/*

Verified end to end: 161 Rust + 68 frontend tests, 29 Playwright
journeys, 4 live kind tests, helm/install/LOC/placeholder gates, and
the clean-room install rehearsal serving the clawmates login page from
a signed bundle of the rebuilt images.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 12:31:25 -05:00