`/mcp` — `email_send`, `slack_post`, `delegate` — authenticated with
`authenticate`, which accepts only `full`. Nothing hands it a token today, so
this cost nothing yet; the moment something did, the only credential that
worked would have been an owner's session, held by an agent runtime.
`SCOPE_AGENT_DOOR` is that credential's narrow form. `full` still works, so
the UI and every human caller are unaffected, and the route now names what it
accepts rather than accepting everything by default.
The test that matters is not that each scope opens its own route: it is that
holding one grants nothing the other has. Both tokens live where an agent can
read them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
`docs/TOOL-CALL-ARCHITECTURE.md` §3 calls deploying the MCP door "config,
not code". It is not, and the reason is authentication.
`/mcp/skills` authenticates with `AuthService::authenticate`, which
returns a full `AuthedUser` carrying the user's role. There is no
narrower credential in the system. So pointing a mission container at the
door means writing a bearer token into a file inside that container — and
mission agents run arbitrary `Bash` with egress and no read gate, which
is this platform's own documented security posture. An owner-scoped token
there turns "the agent runs commands in a sandbox" into "the agent drives
the whole ClawMates API as the owner".
Checked before building this rather than assumed: no such credential is
in a mission container today. The runtime's config.toml has no
`[mcp.servers]` block and no bearer, so the door would have been a NEW
exposure, not an existing one.
So: `auth_sessions.scope`, defaulting to `full`. `authenticate` now
delegates to `authenticate_scoped(token, SCOPE_FULL)`, which means **every
existing caller rejects a narrow token** and a route must opt in by naming
the scope it accepts. `/mcp/skills` is the only opt-in.
Fail closed on purpose. The likely mistake here is adding a scope and
forgetting to wire its check; this way that mistake grants nothing rather
than granting everything.
`mint_scoped` refuses to mint a `full` token — a caller reaching for it
wants a narrow credential, and handing back a full one because an
argument was wrong is exactly the failure the column exists to prevent,
and it would be invisible because the token would work.
The test that matters is not that the door accepts the token, it is that
nothing else does. Negative-controlled: removing the scope comparison
fails `a_scoped_token_is_refused_by_every_unscoped_caller`.
`.sqlx` regenerated — `authenticate` is a compile-checked query and CI
builds with SQLX_OFFLINE=true.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018i9Ten1LU4jUr5d7TAWda9
The runtime template's static clawmates_door bearer is rejected by
cm_auth::authenticate() (needs an auth_sessions row). Every per-team
agent was getting `unauthorized: missing or invalid bearer token` and
`0 tool(s) registered from 0 server(s)`.
Add AuthService::mint_service_session + users::owner_of_workspace and
mint a 30d service session in try_team_gateway_url; inject it into the
freshly-spawned team container's config.toml [[mcp.servers]] clawmates
Authorization header via prewrite_daemon_config_with_risk (bearer arg).
Follow-up: apply the same pattern to research::spawn (per-topic) and
per-loop spawn paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <[email protected]>
Survey + fixes so the pipeline passes at the Docker level (no k8s).
- Remove k8s: drop the `sandbox-k8s` job (kind/Calico/--features k8s-tests) and the
"Helm chart lints" gate step. release.yml was already k8s-clean.
- Rust job:
- `cargo fmt --all` — fix pre-existing formatting drift (fmt --check was failing).
- clippy -D warnings: fix 3 lib warnings (cm-brain sort_by_key→Reverse, cm-api
fleet.rs doc list indentation, node_rules map_or→is_none_or).
- Regenerate the .sqlx offline cache (was missing the cm-runtime run_loop test
query → offline compile failed). DB-backed tests use testcontainers at runtime.
- Set SQLX_OFFLINE=true on the rust + e2e jobs so query! macros compile against
the committed cache deterministically (no DB needed at compile time).
- Frontend job:
- Fix the 1 ESLint error (useAgentTelemetry: no setState-synchronously-in-effect;
tag the slice with agentId + derive null on mismatch).
- Fix 2 stale panel-params tests (`terminal` is a valid app id now; assert the
current APP_IDS + use a genuinely-unknown id for the reject case).
Verified locally: fmt clean, clippy --all-targets -D warnings clean (offline),
frontend lint 0 errors, tsc clean, 86/86 frontend tests pass, build OK.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Decouples "many users" + "many server replicas" from "many machines" so the
platform is tenant-isolated and horizontally safe on the current single node.
- Per-signup workspaces (cm-auth): a new hosted-identity sign-in provisions and
owns its own workspace instead of joining the first. Config-gated by
auth.per_signup_workspace (default off); concurrent first-logins serialized by
a per-subject advisory lock so no duplicate workspaces.
- Terminal tickets in Postgres (migration 0016, hashed, single-use): any replica
can redeem a ticket minted by another. Drops the in-process ticket map.
- Container registry in Postgres (migration 0017, agent_containers): Terminal
and Sandbox managers resolve an agent's container through a shared registry,
so a 2nd replica reuses it instead of spawning a duplicate. node_id recorded
as 'local' (Phase 2 hook). Boot reconcile removes only true orphans, so
terminals now survive a redeploy (tmux sessions resume).
- Per-workspace quotas (cm-api/quota.rs): plan-tier caps on agents + live
containers, enforced at agent create + terminal spin-up (reconnects allowed),
returned as HTTP 402. New GET /api/quota surfaces usage vs limits.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
On a user's first login the authed shell fires several API calls at once;
each ran the JIT-provision path and raced to INSERT the same new user row,
tripping the partial unique index on auth_subject. The losing requests
500'd and the post-login SSR errored out. Use INSERT ... ON CONFLICT
(auth_subject) DO UPDATE ... RETURNING so concurrent callers converge on
the row the winner created. Regenerated the .sqlx offline query cache.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Made the Docker Compose route turn-key for a real self-host, then stood
the whole stack up and drove a live chat through it.
- First-owner bootstrap (cm-auth::bootstrap_owner): a fresh local-auth
install has no users and no signup route, so the initial Owner +
workspace are provisioned ONCE from CLAWMATES_BOOTSTRAP_* env on first
boot — idempotent, never clobbers an existing install (keys on 'any
workspace exists'). Two real-Postgres tests (creates + signs in;
second call is a no-op). Wired into server boot, guarded on a
non-empty password
- deploy/compose/README.md: full production bring-up — services, the
security topology, every config knob, Anthropic vs local-LLM, the
broker-key backup, ops, and TLS/SSE proxy notes
- .env.example fleshed out (bootstrap, LLM, auth mode, OTLP); compose
uses optional env_file so only the knobs you set are injected (unset
options never override clawmates.toml with empty strings)
- volume-init one-shot chowns the broker's named volumes so the non-root
scratch broker can write its socket + generated master key
Deployed locally and verified end to end: all 5 containers healthy,
broker generated its key, server bootstrapped owner@…, login + /api/user/me
work, and a real message streamed a live Anthropic response through the
gateway. Captured screenshots of login, workspace home, chat, and the
Computer panel.
166 Rust tests (+2 bootstrap).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Last open item from the roadmap + post-1.0 list. Run against the live
Clerk instance closing-seasnail-39.clerk.accounts.dev.
- Backend (crates/cm-auth/tests/live_clerk.rs, CM_LIVE_CLERK=1): pulls
REAL discovery + JWKS from the live instance, mints a REAL session JWT
via Clerk's Backend API (create user -> open session -> session token),
and runs it through AuthService::authenticate — verify + JIT provision
(keyed on the real sub), duplicate-subject suppression, tamper
rejection against the live JWKS. Decodes the instance domain from the
publishable key; cleans up the test user after. PASSING
- Frontend: built with AUTH_MODE=clerk + real keys, next start serves
Clerk's <SignIn /> at /login wired to the instance (instance domain +
data-clerk attributes present in the HTML). Both halves confirmed
end to end against production Clerk
- docs/clerk.md: documented the smoke procedure for both halves
166 Rust tests (+6 live, key-gated). Keys used via env only, never
stored — rotate them (they passed through chat).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Full-depth rename per the approved plan; the 'claw' product vocabulary
(claws, /claws routes, clawId, Claw Chat) stays — it is now the brand.
- Display brand: Clawmates (manifest, titles, hero, login/rail logo
'clawmates'); default host app.clawmates.work; registry
ghcr.io/clawmates
- Crates tc-* -> cm-* (16 crates + all imports); binaries
clawmates-server/broker/bundler; images clawmates/*; env prefix
CLAWMATES_* (+ CM_TEST_DATABASE_URL / CM_LIVE_LLM); config
clawmates.toml; helm chart deploy/helm/clawmates with clawmates-*
resources; db names clawmates*; sockets /run/clawmates; cookie
cm_session; kind cluster clawmates-test; seccomp node profile
clawmates-agent-profile.json
- All 9 Playwright brand assertions updated in lockstep; historical
spec document left untouched as the only remaining 'TeamClaw'
- Local env migrated: dev pg clawmates-dev-pg/clawmates_dev, shared
test server clawmates-test-pg, kind cluster recreated with image +
profile, compose images rebuilt under clawmates/*
Verified end to end: 161 Rust + 68 frontend tests, 29 Playwright
journeys, 4 live kind tests, helm/install/LOC/placeholder gates, and
the clean-room install rehearsal serving the clawmates login page from
a signed bundle of the rebuilt images.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
