Two defects found by running a real coding mission (019fc372) rather than a
test. Both made a coding phase look like it produced nothing.
**Capture measured the wrong baseline.** It diffed the working tree against
HEAD, which is correct only while work stays uncommitted. `rust_sdlc` has a
*committer* role, so committing is the intended path — meaning a mission that
did its job properly leaves a clean tree and captured nothing. That is exactly
what happened: the agent created `DELIVERY_PROBE.md`, committed it as
`aa3be95`, and the artifact recorded `empty: true` beside a commit that
plainly contained the work.
`mission_workspace` now records the clone point in `.git/clawmates-base` (in
`.git/`, so it travels with the checkout, stays invisible to the repository,
and cannot be reached by an agent through its pinned workspace), refreshed
whenever `fetch_and_reset` moves HEAD. Capture diffs from there, covering
committed, staged and unstaged changes in one pass. Checkouts predating the
marker fall back to HEAD and say so via `base_recorded: false`.
**Agents could not create files.** `coding_readwrite` granted `file_edit` but
not `file_write`. `file_edit` replaces an exact existing string and rejects an
empty `old_string`, so creating a new file was impossible. The mission
transcript is unambiguous: "the tool rejected empty old_string... the shell is
restricted", after which the agent worked around it through `shell`. The
comment above that profile has claimed it grants file_write since the day it
was written; the list never contained it.
Also broadens capture from coding/benchmark/security_scan to every phase kind
of a repo-bearing mission: `phase_task_text` tells research phases to "save
findings under /mission/repo/research/", so filtering by kind would have
discarded every research brief such a mission produced.
Regression tests cover committed-only and committed-plus-uncommitted work
against a real git repo.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <[email protected]>
Mission agents were burning ~275K tokens producing nothing: the coder had
only file_read and its workspace was the empty ephemeral sandbox, so it
dumped a full spec inline instead of writing files. Two root causes:
1. Risk-profile allowlists used pre-0.8 tool names. `coding_readwrite`
allow-listed `file_write` (renamed to `file_edit` in ZeroClaw 0.8, and
`file_write` now refuses on ephemeral workspaces) and omitted file_edit
/ content_search / glob_search / git_operations — the exact tools the
phase prompt tells agents to use. Since allowed_tools is a strict
allowlist, agents were effectively read-only. Documents the correct
profiles in agent.config.example.toml (they only lived in host config;
the live runtime profiles were corrected via its config API).
2. workspace.path never got set. `agents.<alias>.workspace.path` is an
Option<PathBuf> the ZeroClaw Configurable macro skips from prop
enumeration, so provision_claw's set_prop always 404'd and the whole
call errored into a swallowed eprintln. Removes the dead set_prop and
pins the workspace out-of-band: MissionRuntimeProvisioner::
pin_agent_workspaces patches the shared config file on the per-mission
container (format-preserving via toml_edit, atomic temp+mv); the daemon
applies it on the same reload that surfaces the freshly-provisioned
claws. Covered by unit tests for the TOML stamp.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Single-role drafter on a fixed concision-weighted brief, one turn per backend,
judge-ranked: GLM-4.7 > Claude > Kimi > GLM-5.2. Notable inversion — the
flagship GLM-5.2 ranked last by over-writing the 25-word brief, underscoring
that the best model is role/task/rubric-dependent. Adds the worker_glm5
(glm-5.2 Opus-class) tier to the example config. Gemini excluded this run
(Google June-19 API-key-restriction 403; infra, not model).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Gemini via the built-in `gemini` API family (gemini-2.5-flash default,
gemini-3-pro-preview flagship) and Groq via `groq` — both wired as topology
worker aliases (worker_gemini, worker_groq), no image rebuild. Documents the
Phase C recipe: map semantic roles to per-model aliases via the server
ZEROCLAW_AGENT_MAP, then POST /api/topologies/run.
Five subscription/API backends now selectable per role: Claude, Kimi, GLM,
Gemini, Groq. Proven live on gw-04 — a 3-stage pipeline ran researcher=GLM-4.7
-> analyst=Kimi-K2 -> writer=Gemini-2.5-flash end-to-end (RunRecord persisted).
Quota-care notes added (5h/weekly caps, low concurrency -> prefer sequential
pipelines, short prompts).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
GLM Coding Plan has no CLI of its own and ToS-throttles raw SDK/API access
("1113 Insufficient Balance"); it is served only inside officially supported
tools, and Claude Code is the primary one. So GLM rides the existing
claude_cli provider with a z.ai env override (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=
api.z.ai/api/anthropic + ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN) — no new provider, no image
rebuild. Fresh HOME + CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN="" so the container's cached
Claude subscription doesn't override the routing; key via $NAME indirection.
Deployed & verified on gw-04: worker_glm answers "I am GLM-4.7, built by
Zhipu AI" over /ws/chat. Three subscription models now co-reside on one
runtime — Claude (coordinator), Kimi (worker_kimi), GLM (worker_glm).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Runtime image now installs Node 22 (nodesource) + both agent CLIs —
@anthropic-ai/claude-code and @moonshot-ai/kimi-code — so the zeroclaw
daemon can spawn `kimi -p` for the new kimi_cli provider on a Kimi
membership, parallel to `claude -p` (claude_cli). Kimi needs Node >=22.19;
the image was on Node 18.
Documents the kimi_cli worker recipe in agent.config.example.toml (the
coding endpoint is User-Agent gated → drive Kimi through its own CLI, not a
raw OpenAI-compat client) and keeps GLM via the registry family.
Deployed & verified on gw-04: coordinator (claude_cli) answers "Anthropic
built me", worker_kimi (kimi_cli) answers "I am Kimi, built by Moonshot AI"
— heterogeneous Claude + Kimi on one runtime, over /ws/chat.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Phase A wiring (config-only): server registry kimi provider now targets the
Kimi Code coding endpoint (api.kimi.com/coding/v1, model kimi-for-coding,
subscription-billed via a Kimi Code Console key). Runtime example documents a
custom.kimi worker provider (OpenAI-compatible coding endpoint) + GLM, selectable
per topology role via ZEROCLAW_AGENT_MAP. Activates on KIMI_API_KEY; no rebuild.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
ZeroClaw already supports glm + moonshot (Kimi) as model providers; document the
pattern to run a topology worker on them (env model+key, agent on the alias,
role->alias via ZEROCLAW_AGENT_MAP).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Adds the claude_cli.door provider pattern (mcp_config + allowed/disallowed
tools) so a subscription claude_cli agent reaches the Clawmates door via Claude
Code's own MCP client, with native tools locked out (door = only actuator).
Validated live on gw-04: subdoor agent (claude_cli, subscription) → door →
outbox + agent|door.executed audit, cost 0.0; shell command denied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Set the tool-free risk profile to level="full" so ZeroClaw raises no in-channel
approval (the human is removed; the Clawmates door auto-governs). Document that
claude_cli is text-only (claude -p doesn't surface tool calls), so agents that
ACT through the door need a tool-capable provider (groq/anthropic) — with a
commented actor-agent example.
Validated live: a groq-brained actor agent at full autonomy emitted
clawmates__email_send with no approval prompt; the door executed it (outbox +
agent|door.executed audit). No human in the loop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Tool-free ZeroClaw agents get one actuator: an MCP server (POST /mcp, JSON-RPC
2.0, protocol 2024-11-05) that fronts the existing §15 machinery. The human
approver is replaced by an automated policy (default allow-all → agents are
autonomous; CLAWMATES_DOOR_POLICY=deny is a kill switch), but the governed parts
stay: every action is journaled to the append-only audit log, actions execute
through the runtime's gated-tool path, and broker credential-custody is wired in
for v2 tools. Synchronous execution returns the real result inline.
- crates/cm-api/src/mcp_door.rs: initialize/tools.list/tools.call handler; auth
(bearer -> workspace), classify effects, policy auto-decide, execute, audit.
v1 exposes email_send (-> outbox); slack/pay (broker+grant chain) is next.
- crates/cm-runtime: Runtime::{tool_descriptor_json, tool_gate_category,
execute_door_tool} — door-facing entry that builds ToolContext and consumes a
grant for runtime-executed gated tools.
- deploy/clawmates-runtime: agents now carry mcp_bundles=["clawmates_door"];
[[mcp.servers]] points at the door (bearer injected at deploy, not committed).
Validated live on gw-04: tools/call email_send -> isError:false + outbox row +
"agent|door.executed" audit, no human. 4 door unit tests + clippy clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
Switch the per-tenant runtime to ZeroClaw's new native `claude_cli` model
provider (added in the zeroclaw repo): every agent turn spawns `claude -p`
headless, authed by CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN — i.e. the Claude subscription, no
per-minute API TPM ceiling (the groq free tier 429'd multi-turn pipelines).
- Dockerfile: install the Claude Code CLI (@anthropic-ai/claude-code) into the
runtime image.
- agent.config.example.toml: role-cast on model_provider = "claude_cli.default".
NOTE: set the model via env (ZEROCLAW_providers__models__claude_cli__default__model)
not the TOML sub-table, else resolve_default_model() reads empty -> NEEDS_ONBOARDING.
- .gitignore: token.key (local Claude OAuth token, never committed).
Validated live on gw-04: a 2-node researcher->writer pipeline ran via the
deployed POST /api/topologies/run -> claude_cli -> real claude turns; 2-step
RunRecord, cost_usd 0.0 (subscription), no rate limiting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
cm-orchestrator owns the topology graph; each turn now drives a real ZeroClaw
role-agent in a container via the proven gateway drive recipe, instead of a
tool-free cm-llm call.
- crates/cm-api/src/topology_exec.rs: ZeroClawDriveExecutor impl TurnExecutor —
pair (POST /pair + X-Pairing-Code, token cached) -> ws /ws/chat?agent=<alias>
-> send {type:message,content} -> drain chunk/done/approval_request/error.
approval_request is recorded as a BLOCKED GatedAction, never auto-approved (§15).
Role->alias via ZEROCLAW_AGENT_MAP, fallback ZEROCLAW_DEFAULT_AGENT (scout).
- POST /api/topologies/run {task,graph} -> execute() -> RunRecord, persisted
best-effort to the existing topology_runs table (no migration). compare stays
tool-free. from_env() is read in-handler so cm-api still boots unset.
- deploy/clawmates-runtime: example config now declares a tool-free multi-agent
role-cast; README documents the ZEROCLAW_* knobs + run endpoint.
tokio-tungstenite 0.26 (already in lock) + dev axum `ws` for the hermetic test.
3 lib tests green, clippy clean, SQLX_OFFLINE build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
