P6: shell.exec — agents execute code in their real hardened sandbox
- SandboxManager (tc-runtime): one container per agent, provisioned
lazily on first use, reused for the manager's lifetime, replaced
transparently if dead, destroyed on shutdown
- shell.exec tool: sh -lc inside the agent's sandbox; stdout/stderr/
exit_code return to the model as the step output. No external effects
declared — the sandbox boundary (uid 10001, no caps, seccomp
allowlist, read-only rootfs, zero egress) is the §15 control here,
not an approval gate
- RuntimeConfig.sandboxes (+ with_sandboxes builder); [sandbox] config
{image, enabled}; the server connects the Docker driver at boot and
tolerates an absent engine (shell.exec reports it per-call)
- Tests with the REAL DockerDriver: a scripted run executes two
commands — output proves uid 10001 from inside, and /home/agent state
written by the first call is read by the second (same sandbox); a
deployment without a sandbox runtime records honest error steps and
the run still completes
151 Rust tests + 27 Playwright journeys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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co-authored by
Claude Fable 5
parent
84c51168be
commit
7392ce1d08
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ async fn slack_post_blocks_then_the_broker_executes_exactly_once() {
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RuntimeConfig {
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model: "scripted".into(),
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max_tokens: 1024,
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sandboxes: None,
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broker_socket: Some(socket),
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slack_base_url: sink_url,
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},
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