feat(auth): the door that can delegate no longer needs a person's session

`/mcp` — `email_send`, `slack_post`, `delegate` — authenticated with
`authenticate`, which accepts only `full`. Nothing hands it a token today, so
this cost nothing yet; the moment something did, the only credential that
worked would have been an owner's session, held by an agent runtime.

`SCOPE_AGENT_DOOR` is that credential's narrow form. `full` still works, so
the UI and every human caller are unaffected, and the route now names what it
accepts rather than accepting everything by default.

The test that matters is not that each scope opens its own route: it is that
holding one grants nothing the other has. Both tokens live where an agent can
read them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Omar Sobh
2026-08-25 07:34:30 -05:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent f52cff3e04
commit 22eeaa6f15
4 changed files with 73 additions and 2 deletions
+10 -1
View File
@@ -237,12 +237,21 @@ async fn mint_grant(
}
/// Authenticate the bearer header → workspace/user. `None` if missing/invalid.
///
/// Accepts [`cm_auth::SCOPE_AGENT_DOOR`] as well as a person's session. This
/// route is the one that can `delegate`, and the thing that will eventually
/// hold a token for it is an agent runtime — so the narrow credential has to
/// exist before something reaches for the only one that does.
async fn authed(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<cm_auth::AuthedUser> {
let token = headers
.get(AUTHORIZATION)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.strip_prefix("Bearer "))?;
state.auth.authenticate(token).await.ok()
state
.auth
.authenticate_scoped(token, cm_auth::SCOPE_AGENT_DOOR)
.await
.ok()
}
/// Resolve the specific claw making the call. Our ZeroClaw fork stamps the