Post-1.0: Localhost seccomp on K8s, warm sandbox pool, server HPA

- K8sDriver.with_localhost_seccomp(profile): sandbox pods run under the
  STRICT allowlist instead of the runtime default. Proven live on kind:
  the harness installs the profile onto the node, a pod runs ordinary
  work as uid 10001, and unshare is kernel-denied inside the pod — the
  same probe the Docker suite uses, now passing on both targets
- Helm: sandbox.seccomp=localhost renders a DaemonSet that installs the
  chart-shipped profile into /var/lib/kubelet/seccomp on every node
  (ConfigMap + hostPath); ci/check-helm.sh enforces the chart copy stays
  byte-identical to images/seccomp/agent-profile.json and asserts the
  hardened render (DaemonSet + profile + HPA)
- server HPA (autoscaling/v2, CPU target) behind
  server.autoscaling.enabled
- SandboxManager.warm(n): a background warmer keeps n pre-provisioned
  sandboxes ready so an agent's first exec skips container startup;
  unhealthy pool entries are discarded, reuse never drains the pool,
  shutdown destroys assigned AND pooled. [sandbox] warm_pool config
  (default 0). Real-Docker test: prefill -> assign -> refill -> reuse ->
  clean shutdown

160 Rust tests + 4 live kind tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>

ci/check-helm.sh

@@ -35,4 +35,27 @@ require 'readOnlyRootFilesystem: true'
 # Config wired through the ConfigMap.
 require 'socket_path = "/run/teamclaw/broker.sock"'
 
+# The chart-shipped seccomp profile must BE the Docker driver's profile.
+if ! diff -q "$ROOT/images/seccomp/agent-profile.json" \
+     "$CHART/files/agent-profile.json" >/dev/null; then
+  echo "FAIL: chart seccomp profile diverged from images/seccomp"
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+HARDENED=$(helm template teamclaw "$CHART" \
+  --set auth.issuerUrl=https://idp.example.com \
+  --set oauth.redirectBase=https://teamclaw.example.com \
+  --set sandbox.seccomp=localhost \
+  --set server.autoscaling.enabled=true)
+for needle in \
+  'kind: DaemonSet' \
+  'teamclaw-agent-profile.json' \
+  'kind: HorizontalPodAutoscaler' \
+  'averageUtilization: 70'; do
+  if ! grep -qF -- "$needle" <<<"$HARDENED"; then
+    echo "FAIL: hardened render is missing: $needle"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+done
+
 echo "helm chart OK"

crates/bins/teamclaw-server/src/main.rs

@@ -90,11 +90,17 @@ async fn run() -> Result<(), String> {
             Ok(driver) => {
                 let driver: std::sync::Arc<dyn tc_sandbox::SandboxDriver> =
                     std::sync::Arc::new(driver);
-                (
+                let agents = std::sync::Arc::new(tc_runtime::SandboxManager::new(
-                    Some(std::sync::Arc::new(tc_runtime::SandboxManager::new(
                     driver.clone(),
                     &config.sandbox.image,
-                    ))),
+                ));
+                let agents = if config.sandbox.warm_pool > 0 {
+                    agents.warm(config.sandbox.warm_pool)
+                } else {
+                    agents
+                };
+                (
+                    Some(agents),
                     Some(std::sync::Arc::new(
                         tc_runtime::SandboxManager::new(driver, &config.sandbox.browser_image)
                             .with_egress(),

crates/tc-config/src/lib.rs

@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ pub struct SandboxConfig {
     pub browser_image: String,
     /// Disable to run without environment tools (shell.exec errors).
     pub enabled: bool,
+    /// Pre-provisioned sandboxes kept ready (0 = provision on demand).
+    pub warm_pool: usize,
 }
 
 impl Default for SandboxConfig {
@@ -152,6 +154,7 @@ impl Default for SandboxConfig {
             image: "teamclaw/agent-base:dev".into(),
             browser_image: "teamclaw/agent-browser:dev".into(),
             enabled: true,
+            warm_pool: 0,
         }
     }
 }

crates/tc-runtime/src/sandboxes.rs

@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@ pub struct SandboxManager {
     image: String,
     egress: bool,
     handles: Mutex<HashMap<AgentId, SandboxHandle>>,
+    /// Pre-provisioned, unassigned sandboxes (the warm pool).
+    pool: Mutex<Vec<SandboxHandle>>,
+    /// Warm-pool target; the background warmer keeps `pool` at this size.
+    warm_target: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize,
 }
 
 impl SandboxManager {
@@ -31,9 +35,59 @@ impl SandboxManager {
             image: image.to_owned(),
             egress: false,
             handles: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
+            pool: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+            warm_target: std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0),
         }
     }
 
+    /// Starts the background warmer: keeps `target` sandboxes
+    /// pre-provisioned so an agent's first exec skips container startup.
+    pub fn warm(self: Arc<Self>, target: usize) -> Arc<Self> {
+        self.warm_target
+            .store(target, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+        let manager = self.clone();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            loop {
+                let target = manager
+                    .warm_target
+                    .load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
+                if target == 0 {
+                    break;
+                }
+                let deficit = target.saturating_sub(manager.pool.lock().await.len());
+                for _ in 0..deficit {
+                    match manager.provision_one().await {
+                        Ok(handle) => manager.pool.lock().await.push(handle),
+                        Err(_) => break,
+                    }
+                }
+                tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
+            }
+        });
+        self
+    }
+
+    /// Unassigned warm sandboxes currently ready.
+    pub async fn pool_size(&self) -> usize {
+        self.pool.lock().await.len()
+    }
+
+    async fn provision_one(&self) -> Result<SandboxHandle, String> {
+        let short = uuid::Uuid::now_v7().simple().to_string();
+        let spec = SandboxSpec {
+            name: format!("tc-agent-{}", &short[short.len() - 12..]),
+            image: self.image.clone(),
+            memory_bytes: 512 * 1024 * 1024,
+            nano_cpus: 1_000_000_000,
+            pids_limit: 256,
+            egress: self.egress,
+        };
+        self.driver
+            .provision(&spec)
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| format!("sandbox provision failed: {e}"))
+    }
+
     /// The browser-container variant: egress on, no credentials inside,
     /// all output tainted `web` by the calling tool.
     pub fn with_egress(mut self) -> SandboxManager {
@@ -51,20 +105,20 @@ impl SandboxManager {
             None => false,
         };
         if !alive {
-            let short = uuid::Uuid::now_v7().simple().to_string();
+            // A warm sandbox if one is ready (and still healthy);
-            let spec = SandboxSpec {
+            // otherwise provision inline.
-                name: format!("tc-agent-{}", &short[short.len() - 12..]),
+            let mut assigned = None;
-                image: self.image.clone(),
+            while let Some(candidate) = self.pool.lock().await.pop() {
-                memory_bytes: 512 * 1024 * 1024,
+                if self.driver.health(&candidate).await.unwrap_or(false) {
-                nano_cpus: 1_000_000_000,
+                    assigned = Some(candidate);
-                pids_limit: 256,
+                    break;
-                egress: self.egress,
+                }
+                let _ = self.driver.destroy(&candidate).await;
+            }
+            let handle = match assigned {
+                Some(handle) => handle,
+                None => self.provision_one().await?,
             };
-            let handle = self
-                .driver
-                .provision(&spec)
-                .await
-                .map_err(|e| format!("sandbox provision failed: {e}"))?;
             handles.insert(agent_id, handle);
         }
         let handle = handles.get(&agent_id).expect("just ensured");
@@ -74,11 +128,19 @@ impl SandboxManager {
             .map_err(|e| format!("sandbox exec failed: {e}"))
     }
 
-    /// Destroys every sandbox this manager provisioned.
+    /// Destroys every sandbox this manager provisioned — assigned and
+    /// pooled — and stops the warmer.
     pub async fn shutdown(&self) {
+        self.warm_target
+            .store(0, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
         let mut handles = self.handles.lock().await;
         for (_, handle) in handles.drain() {
             let _ = self.driver.destroy(&handle).await;
         }
+        drop(handles);
+        let mut pool = self.pool.lock().await;
+        for handle in pool.drain(..) {
+            let _ = self.driver.destroy(&handle).await;
+        }
     }
 }

crates/tc-runtime/tests/warm_pool.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+//! Warm sandbox pool: pre-provisioned containers absorb the first-exec
+//! latency. Real Docker — the pool fills in the background, an exec
+//! takes a sandbox from it, and the warmer restores the target.
+
+use std::process::Command;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use tc_domain::AgentId;
+use tc_runtime::SandboxManager;
+use tc_sandbox::DockerDriver;
+
+const IMAGE: &str = "teamclaw/agent-base:dev";
+
+fn ensure_image() {
+    let exists = Command::new("docker")
+        .args(["image", "inspect", IMAGE])
+        .output()
+        .expect("docker available")
+        .status
+        .success();
+    if !exists {
+        let root = env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR");
+        let status = Command::new("docker")
+            .args([
+                "build",
+                "-t",
+                IMAGE,
+                "-f",
+                &format!("{root}/../../images/agent-base/Dockerfile"),
+                &format!("{root}/../../images/agent-base"),
+            ])
+            .status()
+            .expect("docker build runs");
+        assert!(status.success());
+    }
+}
+
+async fn pool_reaches(manager: &SandboxManager, target: usize) {
+    for _ in 0..120 {
+        if manager.pool_size().await == target {
+            return;
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
+    }
+    panic!(
+        "pool never reached {target} (now {})",
+        manager.pool_size().await
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn the_pool_prefills_assigns_and_refills() {
+    ensure_image();
+    let driver: Arc<dyn tc_sandbox::SandboxDriver> =
+        Arc::new(DockerDriver::connect().expect("docker reachable"));
+    let manager = Arc::new(SandboxManager::new(driver, IMAGE)).warm(2);
+
+    // The warmer fills the pool without any exec happening.
+    pool_reaches(&manager, 2).await;
+
+    // An exec is served from the pool — and works.
+    let agent = AgentId::new();
+    let result = manager.exec(agent, "id -u").await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(result.stdout.trim(), "10001");
+
+    // The warmer restores the target while the agent keeps its sandbox.
+    pool_reaches(&manager, 2).await;
+    let again = manager.exec(agent, "echo still-mine").await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(again.stdout.trim(), "still-mine");
+    assert_eq!(
+        manager.pool_size().await,
+        2,
+        "reuse must not drain the pool"
+    );
+
+    // Shutdown destroys assigned AND pooled sandboxes.
+    manager.shutdown().await;
+    assert_eq!(manager.pool_size().await, 0);
+}

crates/tc-sandbox/src/k8s.rs

@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ fn engine_err(e: impl std::fmt::Display) -> SandboxError {
 pub struct K8sDriver {
     client: kube::Client,
     namespace: String,
+    /// Kubelet-relative path of the strict allowlist profile when the
+    /// nodes carry it (installed by the Helm DaemonSet); RuntimeDefault
+    /// otherwise.
+    localhost_seccomp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 impl K8sDriver {
@@ -41,6 +45,7 @@ impl K8sDriver {
         let driver = K8sDriver {
             client,
             namespace: namespace.to_owned(),
+            localhost_seccomp: None,
         };
         driver.ensure_namespace().await?;
         Ok(driver)
@@ -100,7 +105,18 @@ impl K8sDriver {
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// Uses the node-installed strict allowlist profile instead of the
+    /// runtime default (see deploy/helm templates/seccomp-installer).
+    pub fn with_localhost_seccomp(mut self, profile: &str) -> K8sDriver {
+        self.localhost_seccomp = Some(profile.to_owned());
+        self
+    }
+
     fn pod_spec(&self, spec: &SandboxSpec) -> Pod {
+        let seccomp = match &self.localhost_seccomp {
+            Some(profile) => json!({ "type": "Localhost", "localhostProfile": profile }),
+            None => json!({ "type": "RuntimeDefault" }),
+        };
         serde_json::from_value(json!({
             "apiVersion": "v1",
             "kind": "Pod",
@@ -116,7 +132,7 @@ impl K8sDriver {
                     "runAsNonRoot": true,
                     "runAsUser": 10001,
                     "runAsGroup": 10001,
-                    "seccompProfile": { "type": "RuntimeDefault" }
+                    "seccompProfile": seccomp
                 },
                 "containers": [{
                     "name": "sandbox",

crates/tc-sandbox/tests/k8s_security.rs

@@ -145,3 +145,60 @@ async fn destroy_removes_the_pod_and_health_reflects_it() {
     }
     panic!("pod never disappeared");
 }
+
+/// With the strict allowlist installed on the node (the Helm DaemonSet's
+/// job; the harness drops it into the kind node), pods run under
+/// `Localhost` seccomp and the kernel refuses what the profile removed.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn localhost_seccomp_profile_denies_unshare_inside_pods() {
+    ensure_image_in_kind();
+    let status = Command::new("docker")
+        .args([
+            "exec",
+            "teamclaw-test-control-plane",
+            "mkdir",
+            "-p",
+            "/var/lib/kubelet/seccomp",
+        ])
+        .status()
+        .expect("kind node reachable");
+    assert!(status.success());
+    let root = env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR");
+    let status = Command::new("docker")
+        .args([
+            "cp",
+            &format!("{root}/../../images/seccomp/agent-profile.json"),
+            "teamclaw-test-control-plane:/var/lib/kubelet/seccomp/teamclaw-agent-profile.json",
+        ])
+        .status()
+        .expect("docker cp");
+    assert!(status.success());
+
+    let driver = K8sDriver::connect(NAMESPACE)
+        .await
+        .expect("cluster reachable")
+        .with_localhost_seccomp("teamclaw-agent-profile.json");
+    let spec = SandboxSpec {
+        name: format!("tc-k8s-seccomp-{}", std::process::id()),
+        image: IMAGE.into(),
+        memory_bytes: 256 * 1024 * 1024,
+        nano_cpus: 1_000_000_000,
+        pids_limit: 128,
+        egress: false,
+    };
+    let handle = driver.provision(&spec).await.expect("pod provisions");
+
+    // Ordinary work runs...
+    let ok = driver.exec(&handle, &["id", "-u"]).await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(ok.stdout.trim(), "10001");
+
+    // ...but the syscalls stripped from the allowlist are gone — the
+    // same kernel probe the Docker suite uses.
+    let unshare = driver
+        .exec(&handle, &["unshare", "--user", "true"])
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_ne!(unshare.exit_code, 0, "unshare must be denied: {unshare:?}");
+
+    driver.destroy(&handle).await.unwrap();
+}

deploy/helm/teamclaw/files/agent-profile.json

@@ -0,0 +1,705 @@
+{
+ "_comment": "TeamClaw agent-sandbox seccomp profile: Docker's default ALLOWLIST (vendored from moby v27.5.1) minus syscalls an agent workload never needs \u2014 namespace/mount/trace/key/module/perf surface removed even where capabilities would otherwise permit them. defaultAction ERRNO.",
+ "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
+ "defaultErrnoRet": 1,
+ "archMap": [
+  {
+   "architecture": "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64",
+   "subArchitectures": [
+    "SCMP_ARCH_X86",
+    "SCMP_ARCH_X32"
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "architecture": "SCMP_ARCH_AARCH64",
+   "subArchitectures": [
+    "SCMP_ARCH_ARM"
+   ]
+  }
+ ],
+ "syscalls": [
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "accept",
+    "accept4",
+    "access",
+    "adjtimex",
+    "alarm",
+    "bind",
+    "brk",
+    "cachestat",
+    "capget",
+    "capset",
+    "chdir",
+    "chmod",
+    "chown",
+    "chown32",
+    "clock_adjtime",
+    "clock_adjtime64",
+    "clock_getres",
+    "clock_getres_time64",
+    "clock_gettime",
+    "clock_gettime64",
+    "clock_nanosleep",
+    "clock_nanosleep_time64",
+    "close",
+    "close_range",
+    "connect",
+    "copy_file_range",
+    "creat",
+    "dup",
+    "dup2",
+    "dup3",
+    "epoll_create",
+    "epoll_create1",
+    "epoll_ctl",
+    "epoll_ctl_old",
+    "epoll_pwait",
+    "epoll_pwait2",
+    "epoll_wait",
+    "epoll_wait_old",
+    "eventfd",
+    "eventfd2",
+    "execve",
+    "execveat",
+    "exit",
+    "exit_group",
+    "faccessat",
+    "faccessat2",
+    "fadvise64",
+    "fadvise64_64",
+    "fallocate",
+    "fanotify_mark",
+    "fchdir",
+    "fchmod",
+    "fchmodat",
+    "fchmodat2",
+    "fchown",
+    "fchown32",
+    "fchownat",
+    "fcntl",
+    "fcntl64",
+    "fdatasync",
+    "fgetxattr",
+    "flistxattr",
+    "flock",
+    "fork",
+    "fremovexattr",
+    "fsetxattr",
+    "fstat",
+    "fstat64",
+    "fstatat64",
+    "fstatfs",
+    "fstatfs64",
+    "fsync",
+    "ftruncate",
+    "ftruncate64",
+    "futex",
+    "futex_requeue",
+    "futex_time64",
+    "futex_wait",
+    "futex_waitv",
+    "futex_wake",
+    "futimesat",
+    "getcpu",
+    "getcwd",
+    "getdents",
+    "getdents64",
+    "getegid",
+    "getegid32",
+    "geteuid",
+    "geteuid32",
+    "getgid",
+    "getgid32",
+    "getgroups",
+    "getgroups32",
+    "getitimer",
+    "getpeername",
+    "getpgid",
+    "getpgrp",
+    "getpid",
+    "getppid",
+    "getpriority",
+    "getrandom",
+    "getresgid",
+    "getresgid32",
+    "getresuid",
+    "getresuid32",
+    "getrlimit",
+    "get_robust_list",
+    "getrusage",
+    "getsid",
+    "getsockname",
+    "getsockopt",
+    "get_thread_area",
+    "gettid",
+    "gettimeofday",
+    "getuid",
+    "getuid32",
+    "getxattr",
+    "inotify_add_watch",
+    "inotify_init",
+    "inotify_init1",
+    "inotify_rm_watch",
+    "io_cancel",
+    "ioctl",
+    "io_destroy",
+    "io_getevents",
+    "io_pgetevents",
+    "io_pgetevents_time64",
+    "ioprio_get",
+    "ioprio_set",
+    "io_setup",
+    "io_submit",
+    "ipc",
+    "kill",
+    "landlock_add_rule",
+    "landlock_create_ruleset",
+    "landlock_restrict_self",
+    "lchown",
+    "lchown32",
+    "lgetxattr",
+    "link",
+    "linkat",
+    "listen",
+    "listxattr",
+    "llistxattr",
+    "_llseek",
+    "lremovexattr",
+    "lseek",
+    "lsetxattr",
+    "lstat",
+    "lstat64",
+    "madvise",
+    "map_shadow_stack",
+    "membarrier",
+    "memfd_create",
+    "memfd_secret",
+    "mincore",
+    "mkdir",
+    "mkdirat",
+    "mknod",
+    "mknodat",
+    "mlock",
+    "mlock2",
+    "mlockall",
+    "mmap",
+    "mmap2",
+    "mprotect",
+    "mq_getsetattr",
+    "mq_notify",
+    "mq_open",
+    "mq_timedreceive",
+    "mq_timedreceive_time64",
+    "mq_timedsend",
+    "mq_timedsend_time64",
+    "mq_unlink",
+    "mremap",
+    "msgctl",
+    "msgget",
+    "msgrcv",
+    "msgsnd",
+    "msync",
+    "munlock",
+    "munlockall",
+    "munmap",
+    "name_to_handle_at",
+    "nanosleep",
+    "newfstatat",
+    "_newselect",
+    "open",
+    "openat",
+    "openat2",
+    "pause",
+    "pidfd_open",
+    "pidfd_send_signal",
+    "pipe",
+    "pipe2",
+    "pkey_alloc",
+    "pkey_free",
+    "pkey_mprotect",
+    "poll",
+    "ppoll",
+    "ppoll_time64",
+    "prctl",
+    "pread64",
+    "preadv",
+    "preadv2",
+    "prlimit64",
+    "process_mrelease",
+    "pselect6",
+    "pselect6_time64",
+    "pwrite64",
+    "pwritev",
+    "pwritev2",
+    "read",
+    "readahead",
+    "readlink",
+    "readlinkat",
+    "readv",
+    "recv",
+    "recvfrom",
+    "recvmmsg",
+    "recvmmsg_time64",
+    "recvmsg",
+    "remap_file_pages",
+    "removexattr",
+    "rename",
+    "renameat",
+    "renameat2",
+    "restart_syscall",
+    "rmdir",
+    "rseq",
+    "rt_sigaction",
+    "rt_sigpending",
+    "rt_sigprocmask",
+    "rt_sigqueueinfo",
+    "rt_sigreturn",
+    "rt_sigsuspend",
+    "rt_sigtimedwait",
+    "rt_sigtimedwait_time64",
+    "rt_tgsigqueueinfo",
+    "sched_getaffinity",
+    "sched_getattr",
+    "sched_getparam",
+    "sched_get_priority_max",
+    "sched_get_priority_min",
+    "sched_getscheduler",
+    "sched_rr_get_interval",
+    "sched_rr_get_interval_time64",
+    "sched_setaffinity",
+    "sched_setattr",
+    "sched_setparam",
+    "sched_setscheduler",
+    "sched_yield",
+    "seccomp",
+    "select",
+    "semctl",
+    "semget",
+    "semop",
+    "semtimedop",
+    "semtimedop_time64",
+    "send",
+    "sendfile",
+    "sendfile64",
+    "sendmmsg",
+    "sendmsg",
+    "sendto",
+    "setfsgid",
+    "setfsgid32",
+    "setfsuid",
+    "setfsuid32",
+    "setgid",
+    "setgid32",
+    "setgroups",
+    "setgroups32",
+    "setitimer",
+    "setpgid",
+    "setpriority",
+    "setregid",
+    "setregid32",
+    "setresgid",
+    "setresgid32",
+    "setresuid",
+    "setresuid32",
+    "setreuid",
+    "setreuid32",
+    "setrlimit",
+    "set_robust_list",
+    "setsid",
+    "setsockopt",
+    "set_thread_area",
+    "set_tid_address",
+    "setuid",
+    "setuid32",
+    "setxattr",
+    "shmat",
+    "shmctl",
+    "shmdt",
+    "shmget",
+    "shutdown",
+    "sigaltstack",
+    "signalfd",
+    "signalfd4",
+    "sigprocmask",
+    "sigreturn",
+    "socketcall",
+    "socketpair",
+    "splice",
+    "stat",
+    "stat64",
+    "statfs",
+    "statfs64",
+    "statx",
+    "symlink",
+    "symlinkat",
+    "sync",
+    "sync_file_range",
+    "syncfs",
+    "sysinfo",
+    "tee",
+    "tgkill",
+    "time",
+    "timer_create",
+    "timer_delete",
+    "timer_getoverrun",
+    "timer_gettime",
+    "timer_gettime64",
+    "timer_settime",
+    "timer_settime64",
+    "timerfd_create",
+    "timerfd_gettime",
+    "timerfd_gettime64",
+    "timerfd_settime",
+    "timerfd_settime64",
+    "times",
+    "tkill",
+    "truncate",
+    "truncate64",
+    "ugetrlimit",
+    "umask",
+    "uname",
+    "unlink",
+    "unlinkat",
+    "utime",
+    "utimensat",
+    "utimensat_time64",
+    "utimes",
+    "vfork",
+    "vmsplice",
+    "wait4",
+    "waitid",
+    "waitpid",
+    "write",
+    "writev"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "socket"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 40,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_NE"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "personality"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 0,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_EQ"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "personality"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 8,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_EQ"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "personality"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 131072,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_EQ"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "personality"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 131080,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_EQ"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "personality"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 4294967295,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_EQ"
+    }
+   ]
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "sync_file_range2",
+    "swapcontext"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "ppc64le"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "arm_fadvise64_64",
+    "arm_sync_file_range",
+    "sync_file_range2",
+    "breakpoint",
+    "cacheflush",
+    "set_tls"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "arm",
+     "arm64"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "arch_prctl"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "amd64",
+     "x32"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "modify_ldt"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "amd64",
+     "x32",
+     "x86"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "s390_pci_mmio_read",
+    "s390_pci_mmio_write",
+    "s390_runtime_instr"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "s390",
+     "s390x"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "riscv_flush_icache"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "riscv64"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "clone",
+    "fanotify_init",
+    "fsconfig",
+    "fsmount",
+    "fsopen",
+    "fspick",
+    "lookup_dcookie",
+    "mount_setattr",
+    "open_tree",
+    "quotactl_fd",
+    "setdomainname",
+    "sethostname",
+    "syslog",
+    "umount"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "clone"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 0,
+     "value": 2114060288,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ"
+    }
+   ],
+   "excludes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
+    ],
+    "arches": [
+     "s390",
+     "s390x"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "clone"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "args": [
+    {
+     "index": 1,
+     "value": 2114060288,
+     "op": "SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ"
+    }
+   ],
+   "comment": "s390 parameter ordering for clone is different",
+   "includes": {
+    "arches": [
+     "s390",
+     "s390x"
+    ]
+   },
+   "excludes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "clone3"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
+   "errnoRet": 38,
+   "excludes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_ADMIN"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "chroot"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_CHROOT"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "kcmp",
+    "pidfd_getfd",
+    "process_madvise"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_PTRACE"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "iopl",
+    "ioperm"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_RAWIO"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "settimeofday",
+    "stime",
+    "clock_settime",
+    "clock_settime64"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_TIME"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "vhangup"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "get_mempolicy",
+    "mbind",
+    "set_mempolicy",
+    "set_mempolicy_home_node"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYS_NICE"
+    ]
+   }
+  },
+  {
+   "names": [
+    "syslog"
+   ],
+   "action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
+   "includes": {
+    "caps": [
+     "CAP_SYSLOG"
+    ]
+   }
+  }
+ ]
+}

deploy/helm/teamclaw/templates/hpa.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+{{- if .Values.server.autoscaling.enabled }}
+apiVersion: autoscaling/v2
+kind: HorizontalPodAutoscaler
+metadata:
+  name: teamclaw-server
+  labels: {{- include "teamclaw.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
+spec:
+  scaleTargetRef:
+    apiVersion: apps/v1
+    kind: Deployment
+    name: teamclaw-server
+  minReplicas: {{ .Values.server.autoscaling.min }}
+  maxReplicas: {{ .Values.server.autoscaling.max }}
+  metrics:
+    - type: Resource
+      resource:
+        name: cpu
+        target:
+          type: Utilization
+          averageUtilization: {{ .Values.server.autoscaling.targetCPU }}
+{{- end }}

deploy/helm/teamclaw/templates/seccomp-installer.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+{{- if eq .Values.sandbox.seccomp "localhost" }}
+# Installs the strict allowlist seccomp profile onto every node so
+# sandbox pods can run with seccompProfile type Localhost. The profile is
+# the SAME file the Docker driver embeds (ci/check-helm.sh enforces the
+# copies stay identical).
+apiVersion: v1
+kind: ConfigMap
+metadata:
+  name: teamclaw-seccomp-profile
+  labels: {{- include "teamclaw.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
+data:
+  teamclaw-agent-profile.json: |-
+{{ .Files.Get "files/agent-profile.json" | indent 4 }}
+---
+apiVersion: apps/v1
+kind: DaemonSet
+metadata:
+  name: teamclaw-seccomp-installer
+  labels: {{- include "teamclaw.labels" . | nindent 4 }}
+spec:
+  selector:
+    matchLabels:
+      app.kubernetes.io/name: teamclaw-seccomp-installer
+  template:
+    metadata:
+      labels:
+        app.kubernetes.io/name: teamclaw-seccomp-installer
+    spec:
+      initContainers:
+        - name: install
+          image: busybox:1.36
+          command:
+            - sh
+            - -c
+            - cp /profile/teamclaw-agent-profile.json /host-seccomp/
+          volumeMounts:
+            - { name: profile, mountPath: /profile, readOnly: true }
+            - { name: host-seccomp, mountPath: /host-seccomp }
+      containers:
+        - name: hold
+          image: busybox:1.36
+          command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
+          resources:
+            requests: { cpu: 5m, memory: 8Mi }
+            limits: { cpu: 10m, memory: 16Mi }
+      volumes:
+        - name: profile
+          configMap: { name: teamclaw-seccomp-profile }
+        - name: host-seccomp
+          hostPath:
+            path: /var/lib/kubelet/seccomp
+            type: DirectoryOrCreate
+{{- end }}

deploy/helm/teamclaw/values.yaml

@@ -7,6 +7,11 @@ image:
 
 server:
   replicas: 1
+  autoscaling:
+    enabled: false
+    min: 1
+    max: 5
+    targetCPU: 70
   resources:
     requests: { cpu: 250m, memory: 256Mi }
     limits: { cpu: "1", memory: 512Mi }
@@ -62,6 +67,11 @@ oauth:
   clientSecretName: teamclaw-oauth
   redirectBase: ""
 
+sandbox:
+  # runtimeDefault | localhost (localhost installs the strict allowlist
+  # profile onto every node via a DaemonSet and runs sandbox pods under it)
+  seccomp: runtimeDefault
+
 ingress:
   enabled: true
   className: nginx